ROAD CONSTRUCTION AND WET WEATHER LOGISTICS IN THE LAOTIAN PANHANDLE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010024-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 1, 2009
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: June 1, 1968
• Content Type: IM

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I/ Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Road Construction and Wet Weather Logistics
in the Laotian Panhandle
Secret
ER IM 68-74
June 1968
copy N2 65
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the weaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
downgrading and
d.clanifcation
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
June 1968
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Road Construction and Wet Weather Logistics
in the Laotian Panhandle
Summary
The North Vietnamese have made substantial
improvements to the wet-season capacity of the
road network in Laos used for truck transport of
supplies from North Vietnam to South Vietnam in
1967-68. The estimated wet-season capacity for
continuous truck movement as far south as the A
Shau Valley has been increased from 50 to 100
short tons a day. An additional 50 tons of capac-
ity is available for movements along routes lead-
ing into Quang Tin and Kontum Provinces.
The increased wet-season capacity of this road
network, if fully used, could sustain traffic
volumes amounting to 85 percent of the daily
average -- 175 tons -- moved during the 1967-68
dry season (September 1.967 - April 1968) ~ The
current requirement of Viet Cong and North Viet-
namese forces in South Vietnam for logistic support
from the north via Laos is only slightly more than
30 tons a day.
The improved capacity of the road network
strengthens North Vietnam's capability to p..-avide
sustained logistic support to Communist forces in
the South. It will also reduce the dependence of
these troops on storage areas and porterage for
logistic resupply.
Note: This memorandum was produced s,, 1,t ~y, by "IA
It was prepared by the Office of Economic Poe-ezrch
and was coordinated with the I); rect..cr's S ia7
Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs.
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Effects of the Road Improvement Pr,.gram
1. The North 'Vietnamese have been improving
the original Laotian road net and building new
military roads since early 1965.. Their con-
struction methods and the general condition of
these roads have steadily improved over time.
By March 1967 the Communists had developed within
the Laotian Panhandle a road network capable of
moving supplies by truck all the way to the borders
of South Vietnam. This network had an estimated
capacity to move by truck either within the Pan-
handle or to the borders of South Vietnam about
550 short tons of supplies a day during the dry
season. The 1967 wet-season capacity of this
network was significantly less. Although the
system had a wet-season capacity of moving an
estimated 100 tons a day within southern Laos,
only 50 tons a. day could be moved all the way by
truck to South Vietnam.
2. Beginning in the last quarter of 1967, at
the end of the monsoon season, the Communist road
construction and repair effort was noticeably
intensified. This effort is still under way and
seems to be concentrated on measures that will
improve the wet-season capacity of the network.
The new roads started in late 1967 have a limited
all-weather capability. Many of the earlier
routes have been upgraded during successive dry
seasons by the construction of bypasses around
chokepoints and trouble spots and, in a few cases,
by the construction of alternate routes. The
number of bypasses and alternate routes constructed
is much greater than that observed during past dry
seasons. Upgrading and improvement have also been
achieved by the addition of gravel, where available,
and the extensive use of corduroy.
3. The road net in the Laotian Panhand__e is
not all-weather in the sense that the roads are
well drained and surfaced with gravel, asphalt,
or concrete. By a variety of construction tech-
niques, however, the North Vietnamese have im-
proved the roads to such an extent that much of
the system will be passable during most of the
current rainy season. This "limited all-weather"
capability is possible primarily because of
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extensive bypass construction during the recent dry
season (October-April). Bypasses were built in
high terrain around low areas that flood and around
areas with unsuitable soil conditions. Other road
segments were strengthened or were surfaced with
locally available gravel and corduroy. Some road
sections were realigned and widened, while others
were reconstructed with better grades and adequate
drainage.
4. The maintenance of this limited all-weather
capability is highly dependent on the use of large
numbers of laborers and engineering battalions to
keep the roads passable. Although the network is
not elaborate and maintenance techniques are simple,
the system works. During June, July, and August of
the 1967 rainy season, truck traffic primarily moving
northward was observed by roadwatch teams on Route 15
in the Mu Gia area and on Route 12. They also ob-
served traffic on the other routes in Laos on which
observers were located. Trucks were also seen on all
of the routes covered by aerial observers in Laos
during the period. Most of the trucks noted by aerial
observers at this time were on Routes 922, 912, and
110. Very little traffic was reported by pilots on
the other routes.
5. The repairs and improvements carried out
during this dry season will increase the wet-season
capabilities for the network in the Laotian Panhandle.
The wet-season capacity for distribution of goods
within the Panhandle as far south as the junction
of Routes 911 and 912 has been increased from 100
to J150 short tons a day. Similarly, the wet-season
capacity to move goods by truck into South Vietnam
increased iron; 50 to 150 tons a day. I f this increased
capacity can be fully utilized during the present
wet season, the North Vietnamese will be able to
truck supplies into South Vietnam at a rate equal
to 85 percent of the average daily tonnage -- 175
tons -- moved from North Vietnam to Laos during the
past dry season. Of the 175 tons per day delivered into
Laos, an estimated 47 tons per day were required in the
Panhandle to support military operations and the in-
filtration network. In addition, as much as 20 percent
of the deliveries (about 35 tons per day) were proba-
bly lost due to air attack, breakage, and spoilage.
Thus, about 93 tons per day were available for immedi-
ate use in South Vietnam or for stockpiling in Laos or
in South Vietnam for later use during the rainy season.
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Significance of Road Improvements During 1967-68
6. The road improvements carried out during
the past dry season should provide the North Viet-
namese with an increased capability for sustained
logistical support of their forces in South Vietnam
and reduce the reliance of these troops on caches
and porterage.
7. In past years, the number of trucks moving
into southern Laos during the wet season has averaged
less than one-third the daily average of the dry
season, and there has been little truck traffic
within the Laotian Panhandle. The logistical needs
of enemy troops in South Vietnam were supplied
principally from caches built up during the dry
season. The limited resupply efforts carried on
during previous rainy seasons consisted of some in-
land water movement in Laos and a considerable amount
of short-haul portering within Laos and from Laos
to South Vietnam.
8. As a result of the buildup of their forces
and the increased intensity of fighting in South
Vietnam, the Communists will probably be unable to
be so dependent on caches and porterage as they
have been previously. The destruction of supplies
by air attacks in both Laos and South Vietnam as
well as the increasing amounts of enemy supplies
being captured by ground action in South Vietnam
creates additional stress on the resupply system.
9. North Vietnamese logistics planning for the
implementation of its present "fight-talk" strategy
undoubtedly took into account the need for signifi-
cantly improving the wet-season capability of the
road network, and most of the construction effort
in the past eight months was probably done with
this in mind. It is estimated, therefore, that
truck traffic during the 1968 monsoon season will
be considerably higher than in previous years,
even though the heavy resupply movements of the
past dry season indicate that substantial stock-
piles were built up in Laos and in South Vietnam.
Information available thus far in the rainy season
indicates that traffic is indeed being maintained
and at levels considerably higher than that observed
during previous rainy seasons. During 15 days of
observation in June 1967, for example, an average
of three trucks a day reportedly moved south through
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Mu Gia Pass from North Vietnam toward Laos. During
19 days of observation in June 1968, the average
number of trucks southbound over this same stretch
of road was 20 per day, nearly seven times the daily
average for the previous year. Moreover, there are
other reports that indicate a high level of truck
traffic is continuing in the early rainy season on
Route 911 between Routes 912 and 9 and on Route 92,
north of Route 9. This early trend tends to con-
firm the enemy's intentions (as stated in documents
captured in the A Shau Valley in April 1968) to
operate "at a level many times higher than that of
the last year."
10. Although total enemy requirements for logistic
support from North Vietnam via Laos have doubled
since the summer of 1967, they remain relatively
small --- slightly more than 30 short tons a day
of weapons, equipment, and ammunition. The pro-
vision of this amount of supplies would involve
utilization of one-fifth of the impending wet-
season capacity of the road connections between
Laos and South Vietnam.
Status of Individual Road Segments (See the Map)
Route 12
11. Route 12 is the Laotian extension of Route
15 which leads from North Vietnam to Mu Gia Pass.
It has an estimated capacity of 350 short tons a
day during the dry season and 100 tons a day during
the wet season. Southbound trucks move over Route
12 and its bypasses, Routes 1201 and 1202, to the
junction with the northern portion of Route 23.
They then move over Route 23 to Route 911.* Route
911 can move an estimated 50 tons per day during
the rainy season as far south as its junction with
Route 912, the other truck access route to southern
Laos. Thus with the 100-ton wet-season capacity
The remaining portions of Route 3 sunning south
from its junction with Route 911 are excZuded from
this analysis because they play no significant role
in logistical resupply efforts during the rainy
season. They do, however, serve as an alternate
approach to Route 9 during the dry season.
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on Route 912, a total of 150 tons a day can arrive
at the junction of Routes 912 and 911. This ton-
nage can move to South Vietnam as described below.
Route 912
12. Since 1966, when the North Vietnamese built
Route 137/912, which runs from Route 101 in North
Vietnam to Route 911 in Laos, they have not had to
rely exclusively on the roads directly south of Mu
Gia Pass for truck movements to South Vietnam.
Route 912 remained open throughout the 1967 rainy
season and is expected to remain open during the
current rainy season. It is well constructed and
located in high terrain, and some sections near the
North Vietnamese border are graveled. The esti-
mated capacity of Route 912 is at least 1.00 short
tons per day during the wet season.
Route 911 South of Its Junction with Route 912
13. The portion of Route 911 between the inter-
sections with Routes 912 and 9 is narrow with sharp
curves. It traverses high terrain which provides a
good, sometimes stony, road surface. Many short
bypasses permit riovement around frequently interdicted
sections. One major bypass, 29 miles long, was con-
structed during the past dry season and traverses
high ground to reduce the threat of flooding. The
completion of this bypass is the principal reason
for increasing the estimated wet-season capacity of
this portion of Route 911 from 50 short tons per day
in 1967 to 150 tons in 19 6 8 .
Route 9
14. Route 9 leading to the Khe Sanh area from
Laos is generally in good condition but is not
covered by jungle and is thus subject to air inter-
diction. The surface is largely crushed and com-
pacted stone and will therefore remain passable
during the wet season. During the past dry season,
moreover, the North Vietnamese built a new earth-
surfaced road, as yet unnumbered, over high ground
which parallels Route 9 to its junction with Route
92. Route 914 also acts as a bypass to Route 9 and
shortens the distance for traffic moving south. The
estimated capacity of Route 9 from the Tchepone area
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to the South Vietnamese border during the wet
season is 100 short tons per day. Route 914 and the
unnumbered bypass combined could also carry 50 tons
per day.
Route 92 North of Route 922
15. Route 92 remained open during the 1967 rainy
season and probably will remain open during the
current rainy season. It passes through stony
hills which are covered with dense jungle. The
route is graveled in sections and was heavily used
in May of this year. The estimated capacity of
Route 92 during rainy weather is 100 short tons
per day.
Route 922 Leading to the A Shau Valley
16. The North Vietnamese have used Route 922
since March 1967 to mov3 supplies into South Vietnam
and have improved it considerably since the beginning
of the dry season in the fall of 1967. They have
built several short bypasses, realigned some sections,
and laid out extensive truck parks and logistical
complexes. Long stretches of the road near the South
Vietnamese border have been corduroyed, some with
pierced-steel planking from the abandoned Special Forces
airfields in the A Shau Valley. In the border areas the
road traverses higher terrain, providing better drainage
and load-bearing soils. This route probably has a
wet-season capacity of 100 short tons per day, about
one-third of its dry-season capacity, and will be
passable during the current wet season.
Route 92 South of Route 922 to Ban Bac
17. This section of the north-south truck route
usually remains open for limited through traffic,
although the cumulative effects of weather may
occasionally halt through traffic for short periods
during the last few weeks of the monsoon season.
In this area the road passes through rugged terrain,
dense jungle, and good load-bearing soils. More-
over, the southern portion of this road enters an
area of large streams which become flooded by the
rains and provide water routes. Nevertheless, the
wet-season capacity of Route 92 to the Ban Bac area
could be as high as an average 100 short tons per
day.
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Route 96 South of Ban Bac
18. Much of Route 96 will probably be flooded
for short periods, but shuttling operations will
continue during the entire rainy season. Long
sections of this route are paralleled by riv'rs
that offer the North Vietnamese use of waterborne
craft during most of the year. Several new water-
to-highway transshipment points are connected to
Route 96 by short feeder roads that are usually
kept open. As Route 96 approaches Route 110, the
road generally avoids low-lying areas and should
remain passable for all except short periods during
the entire rainy season, although in the past the
enemy has not maintained this section. It is esti-
mated that a daily average of only 50 short tons
could be moved from Ban Bac southward to Route 110
over Route 96 during the wet weather.
19. From the Chavane area, Route 165 was ex-
tended across the South Vietnamese border earlier
this year and recently connected with South Viet-
namese Route 14 just north of Kontum Province. Some
of the supplies being moved south on Route 96 could
be introduced into South Vietnam over this road,
segments of which show evidence of good construction.
The route as a whole could carry at least 50 short
tons per day during the rainy season.
Route 110
20. The North Vietnamese have stockpiled con-
siderable material and made extensive preparations
to keep Route 110 in the tri-border area open through-
out the rainy season. In the recent dry season, the
road was constructed with good grades and drainage
through an area with good load-bearing soils.
Several bypasses hava already been built, and po-
tential trouble spots have been strengthened in
anticipation of the rains. 25X1
~ This segment of
Route 110 should remain passable during the entire
rainy season and should be able to transmit all
tonnages fed to it by Route 96. Moreover, sections
of Route 110 near and through the Cambodian salient
could carry as much as 100 short tons per day.
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Prospects
21. The North Vietnamese will be able to keep
open the road net in the northern part of the
Laotian Panhandle throughout the entire monsoon
season as far south as Route 922 leading into the
A Shau Valley. This will permit continual truck
supply movements in support of the sizable forces
committed in the I Corps area of South Vietnam, in
particular those around Khe Sanh. Furthermore, the
enemy could maintain some truck traffic as far south
as Route 165 near Chavane in support of the forces
recently introduced into this area of the central
highlands. Late in the rainy season, however,
the sections of the road between Chavane and the
tri-border area may be closed to through truck
traffic for short periods, although the possibility
of moving supplies short distances over water routes
would probably lessen the effects of the loss of
truck traffic.
IQPC:R FT
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*Thakhek
Savannakhet
NORTH ~i
Tchopone
.Attopeu
0 25 50 Miles
0 25 50 75 Kilometers
Chavane
SOUTH
Kham Duc
V VIETNAM
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