SOLARZ/INTERVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000606280005-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 20, 2010
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: November 6, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/20: CIA-RDP90-00552R000606280005-6
6 November 1983
SOLARZ/
INTERVIEW BRINKLEY: John, thank you. Coming next, Rep. Stephen Solar
i
from New York, from the House Foreign Affairs Committee, who has
been a critic of the whole Grenada operation.
BRINKLEY: Mr. Solarz in New York, thanks very much for coming
in and talking with us. Delighted to have you. SOLARZ: Good
to be here, David.
BRINKLEY: Here with me are George Will of ABC News, and Sam
Donaldson, ABC News White House correspondent. Mr. Solarz, you
have been critical of the Grenada operation. What, if you were
making the decisions, what would you have done? SOLARZ: Well,
my position David., has been that, if in fact it can be
demonstrated that the Americans on Grenada were in jeopardy, or
if it becomes clear that Cuba was transforming Grenada into a
base for aggression and subversion in the Caribbean, then what
we did was justified. But at least, as of a few days ago, it
was by no means clear that the lives of the students were in
jeopardy. My understanding is, for example, that the
authorities on Grenada had offered on several occasions to
permit the Americans who were there to leave, and we apparently
made no serious effort whatsoever, to contact the authorities in
an effort to make an arrangement for the students on the island
to leave. In so far as the extent to which Cuba was attempting
to utilize Grenada as a base for aggression and subversion in
the Caribbean is concerned, I want to hear what the
Congressional delegation which has just visited Grenada has to
say. If the arms we've discovered there were clearly far in
excess of any legitimate requirements on the part of the
Grenadian militia, then I think a good case can be made that we
had a responsibility to protect the other Democratic countries
of the Caribbean from Cuban aggression. But so far, it seems to
me, that case has not yet been definitively established.
BRINKLEY: So if the Reagan administration's description of this
operation turns out to your satisfaction, you will support it?
SOLZARZ: If the arguments which have been advanced by the
administration turn out to be, once the press and the Congress
has had an opportunity to examine them, to be accurate, then I
think what they did made sense, but I think we have to keep a
couple of things in mind. For one thing, the administration, as
you know, in fact prohibited the press from going-onto the
island until after the invasion was already well underway, and
then, the reporters who were there, were clearly restricted in
terms of their access. Secondly, I think we do have to
recognize that while we have clearly succeeded in making
possible the restoration of democracy on Grenada, which is
unquestionably a plus, that we've also paid a very heavy price
for what we've done. We've generated very serious concerns on
the part of our allies in Europe at a time when we're about to
proceed with the deployment of the Euro-missiles. That has
created great problems with friendly governments in that part of
the world. We've clearly produced an intensification of
anti-Americanism in Central America. We have acted in ways
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/20: CIA-RDP90-00552R000606280005-6