THERE IS NO LIGHT AT THE END OF THE PRESIDENT'S TUNNEL VISION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000606280001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 19, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
We Can Quarantine Nicaragua With Talk, Not Bloodshed
By srLPHEN J. SOLARZ
Far more than President Reagan's
reputation as the "Great Communicator"
will be at stake in Thursday's congres-
sional vote on additional aid to the Nicara-
guan contras.
In fact, a handful of swing votes could
determine whether the United States
throws its clout behind the forces of
regional peace or weighs in on the side of
a further militarization of the current
conflict in Central America.
The President's request for $100 million
in assistance for the contras is simply the
latest wrinkle in a four-year effort to
topple the Nicaraguan government. The
Administration has already provided the
contras with $100 million worth of supplies.
It has imposed economic sanctions against
the Sandinista regime. It has conducted
massive military maneuvers in neighbor-
ing countries and adjacent waters. It has
mined Nicaragua's harbors. It has thumbed
its nose at international law and turned its
back on the World Court. It has even
Written an assassination manual for the
contras.
None of this has worked. More to the
point, nothing of this sort holds any
promise of working. Our own intelligence
agencies agree that We;-contras have no
Nicaragua allow its neighbors the same
freedom from outside interference that it
claims for itself.
But funding a "secret army" in Central
America to oppose the Sandinistas will not
return political freedom to Nicaragua or
protect Nicaragua's neighbors or wean
Managua from Cuban influence.
It will, however, inflame historic Latin
fears about "U.S. meddling." It will tie the
United States to a force that has shown the
same disdain for basic human decency that
we rightly condemn in the Sandinistas.
And if it fails, as it surely will, it may lead to
the subsequent introduction of American
combat forces.
The President disclaims-sincerely, I
believe-any desire to send American
troops to Nicaragua. But his policies are
inexorably carrying us toward the point
where we will have to choose between
dispatching the Marines and putting up
with the Sandinistas, humiliating as that
might be.
Nicaragua presents the United States
with two sets of problems. We have
legitimate security concerns there, in the
presence of Cuban advisers, the possibility
of Soviet bases and Nicaragua's continuing
interference in the affairs of its neighbors.
We also have political concerns, in the
denial of democracy and the abuse of
human rights in Nicaragua.
The Sandinistas have indicated that,
in exchange for U.S. promises not to
destabilize their regime or invade their
nation, they would declare Nicaragua,
off-limits to foreign bases and troops and
accept verifiable arrangements guarantee-
ing Nicaragua's non-interference in the
affairs of its neighbors.
Perhaps no agreement along these lines
would work, but we should at least test
Managua's sincerity. If a regional agree-
ment subsequently broke down, we would
then have a sounder basis for mobilizing
our Latin American allies against the
Sandinista regime
genuine democracy, which could lead to
their removal from power, the Administra-
tion is attempting to achieve the impossi
ble. Whatever else the Sandinistas may be
willing to do, they clearly are not prepared
to commit political suicide.
Consequently, by imposing unrealistic
demands as a condition for a negotiates
settlement, we will be not only unavalJil'
in our efforts to promote political denvcra-
cy in Nicaragua but also unsuccessful in
containing Sandinista adventurism. ,
By obtaining an agreement on the secu-
rity issues and reducing regional tensions,.
we have a far better chance of promoting;
our democratic values.
Our Latin American allies, many 9r;
whom have even more at stake in. the
region than we do, have begged us riot'
to militarize the conflict further. TtW
Contadora countries of Mexico, Columbia,
Panama and Venezuela have publicly'
asked us to give their diplomatic efforts
more time to bear fruit before we heat up
the region with additional military aid.,
So, too, have almost all the other democra-
cies in Latin America, ranging from mighty
Argentina, at the far end of the beans
sphere, to tiny Costa Rica, just across the
Nicaraguan border. '
Beneath all the inflated rhetoric about
Sandinista armies rampaging as far north`
as Texas lie two choices. We can work
with our friends in the region to promote.
an end to the fighting and a situation im
which neighbors can live together in peace
and without fear of outside intervention,-
Or we can follow a go-it-alone policy that.
to be successful, will ultimately require
the U.S. Marines.
The American people do not want any
more Cuban in Central America, but ffisir
ther do they want another Vietnam. It
remains essential that we give diplomacy--I
chance. Our friends in the region ask this of
us. Our own interests require it. Most of all,
our ideals demand it.
chance of overturning the government in
the have yet to hold even a
single town in KI-go-
This is not to say that U.S. policy has had
no effect. Unfortunately, it has had the
wrong effects. Instead of facilitating real
democracy, It has led to greater repression.
Rather than inducing the Sandinistas to
adopt a policy of genuine nonalignment, it
has driven Nicaragua more firmly into the
Soviet-Cuban embrace.
Most Americans deplore the fact that
the Sandinistas have betrayed the demo-
cratic promises of their revolution. Most
Americans agree that the present San-
dinista regime daily tramples on the liber-
ties of the Nicaraguan people. All Ameri-
cans hope for a restoration of political
pluralism and human rights in Nicaragua.
And all Americans rightly insist that
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LOS ANGELES TIMES
19 March 1986
There Is No Light at the End of the
By insisting, however, that the Sandin- Stephen J. Solari (D-N.Y.) is a member
istas also agree to the establishment of a of the House Foreign Affairs Committee..
President's Tunnel Vision
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