AFRICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00289R000100370001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 27, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 12, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
MASTER FILE P.
LJu NOT UIb!L CUT
OR MARK UN
Africa Review
Seerct
2,7
ALA AR 85-016
12 July 1985
Copy 3 5 4
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Articles South Africa: Are Blacks Catching Up With Whites?
Analysis of South African data indicates that black economic gains
have been mixed at best and that prospects are virtually nonexistent
in the 1980s for any significant improvement in some key measures
of black welfare, such as unemployment and closing the wide gap in
wages between blacks and whites.
Western Europe-South Africa: Reactions to 7
Several West European allies that have often condemned apartheid
are now sorting out whether they will be willing to emulate the
United States if Washington invokes economic sanctions against
South Africa.
As its pivotal general synod approaches next year, the Dutch
Reformed Church faces a possible split over racial reform. The most
divisive issue will be the revision of the church's social policy, which,
as drafted in 1974, provided a theological justification of apartheid.
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A number of whites have expressed concern that former Rhodesian
Prime Minister Smith's surprisingly strong victory in the white
elections last month might trigger a government backlash.
Secret
ALA AR 85-016
12 July 1985
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Production Staff, Office of African and Latin American Analysis
Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief,
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South Africa:
Are Blacks Catching Up
With Whites?
equal political rights to the black majority.
Government and private sector leaders in South
Africa contend generally that blacks have made
significant economic gains in recent years under
apartheid and can look forward to further
improvement under the continuation of white rule;
they say that these gains would be jeopardized by a
switch to black government. According to this
argument, these economic benefits should in part
offset the white government's unwillingness to grant
housing, electricity, and transportation.
Analysis of South African data on employment and
wages, however, indicates that black economic gains
have been mixed at best and that prospects are
virtually nonexistent in the 1980s for any significant
improvement in some key measures of black welfare,
such as unemployment and closing the wide gap in
wages between blacks and whites. This article sorts
out some of the basic facts about employment and
wages for the roughly 2.8 million blacks who hold jobs
in South African mining, manufacturing, and services
(excluding domestic servants in the homes of whites).
Future articles will look at other key determinants of
black economic progress, such as the availability of
Black employment in these sectors constitutes slightly
more than one-fourth of the black labor force,
according to our estimates, and makes up the largest
category of black wage and salary employment in
South Africa. Jobs in mining, manufacturing, and
services offer the principal opportunities for blacks to
rise out of poverty, and blacks employed in these jobs
make up the largest segment of the black population
that has attained some of the characteristics of lower
middle-class living standards. Although self-
employment in business is an alternative avenue for
Black Employment in Mining,
Manufacturing, and Services
black advancement, a relatively small number of
blacks have established a foothold in business, in our
judgment. Similarly, few of the roughly 2 million
blacks who earn low wages as farm laborers and as
domestic servants earn enough to accumulate
substantial savings or develop skills that would enable
them to increase their earning potential. The rest of
the black work force is unemployed or earns its living
through a combination of subsistence farming and
part-time work at odd jobs.
Black Gains and Shortfalls
Black employment in mining, manufacturing, and
services increased by more than 640,000 workers
during 1971-83' (see table 1). Although this exceeded
the increase in white employment by almost 300,000
jobs over the same period, we estimate that it fell
short of the increase in the black labor force by more
than 2 million people and, therefore, that black
unemployment increased.
Average black wages in mining, manufacturing, and
services-after adjusting for inflation-increased
from R1,935 2 per year in 1970 to R3,740 in 1983.
This represented a significant real increase in the
purchasing power of blacks and exceeded by one-
fourth the growth in average inflation-adjusted white
wages. Even so, the purchasing power of black wages
in 1983 in constant terms was only about one-fourth
that of whites.
' The latest year for which detailed data are available is 1983. We
doubt that black employment and wages have increased much
during 1984-85 because of the economic downturn in South Africa.
' We have denominated wage and salary data in South African
rand instead of US dollars in order to avoid distortions in
measurements of domestic South African purchasing power that
would result from taking account of the large devaluations of the
rand against the dollar over the past several years.
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Secret
ALA AR 85-016
12 July 1985
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Table 1
South Africa: Employment by Industry
Black
2,181,000
2,677,000
2,776,000
2,824,000
White
1,103,000
1,294,000
1,360,000
1,451,000
Mining
Black
585,000
635,000
627,000
617,000
White
62,000
68,000
75,000
79,000
Manufacturing
Black
588,000
726,000
768,000
747,000
White
264,000
304,000
313,000
361,000
Construction
Black
213,000
297,000
295,000
295,000
White
50,000
57,000
56,000
56,000
Electricity
Black
14,000
23,000
26,000
33,000
White
8,000
14,000
16,000
23,000
Trade and
Black
283,000
329,000
340,000
351,000
accommodations
White
238,000
268,000
280,000
270,000
Transport and
Black
109,000
143,000
200,000
205,000
communications
White
147,000
158,000
170,000
170,000
Finance and
Black
10,000
13,000
20,000
19,000
White
72,000
83,000
90,000
109,000
Government and
Black
379,000
510,000
500,000
557,000
services
White
262,000
341,000
360,000
383,000
Average current black wages-not adjusted for
inflation-increased at a rate of about 17 percent
annually during 1971-83, compared with only 12
percent for whites. As a result, the relative gap
between average white and black wages narrowed
from almost 7 to 1 in 1970 to less than 4 to 1 in 1983
(see table 2). The gap in terms of current rand,
nonetheless, widened during the same period from
about R2,790 to R10,400 (see figure 1). At these
rates, the current gap would not even begin to close
until 2008, and average black wages would not
surpass those of whites until 2015. F__1
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If one excludes the growth of mine wages during
1971-83, the gap between white and black wages
would not close for almost 50 years. Black miners
received a series of extraordinary wage increases in
the mid-1970s that pulled black mine wages, long the
lowest in the economy next to agriculture, roughly
into equality with those of blacks in other industries of
the modern urban economy (see figure 2). These one-
time wage increases for miners tend to impart an
overly optimistic slant, however, to statistical
oroiections for the future growth of black wages.
The rates of increase in black employment and wages
have declined sharply since 1980, reflecting a falloff
in the pace of South African economic growth:
? At the low rate of increase in employment since
1980, the number of additional blacks who cannot
find employment in mining, manufacturing, or
services currently exceeds 200,000 annually,
according to our estimates.
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Figure 2
South Africa: Wages and Salaries 1970
(Average Annual Growth Rates)
1983
Legend
? BLACK
? WHITE
CONSTR UTILITIES TRADE & TRANSP & BANKING & GOVERN
ACCOM COMMUN FlNANCE
? Almost 91,000 new jobs were filled by whites during
1981-83 compared with only 44,000 by blacks,
reflecting employers' preferences based probably on
racial bias and on the generally higher educational
and training qualifications of whites.
? Average increases in inflation-adjusted black wages
and salaries dropped from 5.7 percent annually
during 1971-80 to 3.5 percent during 1981-83, while
increases for whites rose from 0.4 percent to 2.3
percent (see table 3).
Prospects
We see virtually no chance of a decrease in black
unemployment or a narrowing of the current
black/white wage gap during the remainder of this
decade. Black gains during the 1970s were associated
with record 7- to 7.5-percent economic growth in 1974
and 1980 that, in turn, was made possible by
extraordinarily high gold prices in those two years. In
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Figure 1
South Africa: Average Wages and Salaries
*........ ~. a...................................
? ? A
Slack
1 9 1 x q I \ 9 1 2 N o 4 1b 1815 \916 \91 \cle \ 1 \ O $ \g%
10:1
7:1
4:1
E.
0
2:1
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Table 2
South Africa: Selected
Indicators of Black Progress
Ratios of average 6.9:1 4.0:1 3.8:1
white to black wages
and salaries
Current gap between 2,790 7,020 10,400
white and black
wages and salaries
(current rand)
Table 3
South Africa: Wages, Salaries,
and Employment, by Race
Average annual
growth in percent
contrast, economic growth averaged only 1.3 percent
annually during 1981-84 as a result of drought and
austerity measures imposed by the government to
cope with foreign exchange shortages resulting from
low gold prices: Economic growth in 1985 is likely to
be no more than about 1 percent, according to our
estimates. Barring further fortuitous gold price
surges, we expect that South African economic
growth will average less than 3 percent annually
during 1986-89 and that this relatively low growth
rate will continue to put a damper on gains in black
employment and wages.
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Western Europe-South Africa:
Reactions to US
Sanctions LegislationF--]
Several West European allies that have often
condemned apartheid are now sorting out whether
they will be willing to emulate the United States if
Washington invokes economic sanctions against
France appears more interested in rhetoric-perhaps
designed to curry favor with nonaligned countries-
than in action. The Dutch support sanctions in
principle, but so far stop short of imposing them. West
Germany so far has not had any role in the debate.
Norway, on the other hand, has already implemented
But Reluctance To Apply Sanctions
While West European governments are willing to
censure South Africa, the threat by the US Congress
to pass sanctions legislation has forced Allied
governments to reexamine their willingness to take
stronger action against Pretoria. The allies almost
certainly are concerned that their governments will
face increased domestic public pressure for sanctions
if Washington adopts a tougher policy. Some officials
already have expressed their opposition to sanctions
during private discussions on the problem with US
officials
action against Pretoria.
Annoyance With South African Actions
Allied leaders, through public statements and private
demarches, have expressed irritation with the abortive
South African raid against oilfields in Cabinda on 21
May and the attack against African National
Congress personnel in Gaborone on 14 June. The
British, in particular, believed that this adventurous
behavior hurt their efforts at diplomatic dialogue with
Mozambique and Angola. In addition, one Canadian
official drew the attention of US Embassy officers to
the fact that Foreign Minister Clark condemned
South African actions twice in an 18 June statement.
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West European members of the UN Security Council
participated in a 15-0 approval of a resolution
condemning the raid on Cabinda, although the British
diplomats stated that their government believed
calling it an "act of aggression" was too harsh. The
British-but not the French joined Washington in
abstaining on another resolution, which passed the
previous day 13-0-2, calling for a list of "appropriate
voluntary measures," including "stopping of new
investments" and prohibitions of Krugerrand sales.
During the debate the Canadian Ambassador
criticized South Africa more strongly than his
colleagues, causing the British-according to US
diplomats at the United Nations-to consider a
demarche in Ottawa.
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ALA AR 85-016
12 July 1985
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British officials are attempting to reinforce US
awareness of the disadvantages of sanctions. For
example, London reportedly agreed with Ambassador
Walters that disinvestment would hurt South African
blacks, damage neighboring states, and enable South
African hardliners to block progress toward
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and an office in Paris.
has mixed public affirmation of Paris's willingness to
consider sanctions with private hope that the issue will
go away. Prime Minister Fabius told a Paris human
rights rally on 31 May-after Cabinda but before
Gaborone-that France stands ready to curtail
investment in South Africa if the latter does not
ameliorate the apartheid system within 18 months.
Fabius also declared-in principle-his willingness to
upgrade relations with the South-West Africa
People's Organization (SWAPO). France had
previously agreed to give SWAPO an official status
French Diplomacy. French policy so far
In addition, the French adopted an anti-South
African diplomatic posture for the benefit of
nonaligned delegations at the United Nations. During
the maneuvering that preceded the recent Security
Council resolutions, French diplomats told US
officials that Paris could accept stronger language on
sanctions than Washington or London wanted. US
diplomats reported that the French distanced
themselves from other Western delegations and gave
every indication of trying to "cut their own deal" with
nonaligned delegations. The French reportedly did not
coordinate their policies or tactics with other Western
delegations until the last moment.
Privately, however, the French take a more cautious
line. Foreign Ministry officials told Ambassador
Walters on 4 June that they considered sanctions
unlikely and hoped the issue could be avoided.
The Dutch Are Cautious. The Hague has been put in
an awkward position because at least one Dutch
national reportedly was killed during the South
African raid on Gaborone, and the editor of the Dutch
newspaper Trouw was arrested briefly by South
African police on 25 June after spending a morning in
a black township. The attack on Gaborone coincided
with the completion of a Dutch Government report
supporting in principle multilateral investment
sanctions, but rejecting them in practice because they
have insufficient international backing. The
government, which presented the report to parliament
on 18 June, promised to maximize the "stimulating
effect" of international investment on the
emancipation of black workers. In addition, it called
for legislation making it mandatory for Dutch firms to
comply with the EC Code of Conduct regarding their
investments in South Africa.
The report denied the possibility of immediate
unilateral sanctions. Parliament had asked the
government to consider restrictions on petroleum
exports to, and coal imports from, South Africa, but
the report stated that the latter is prevented by legal
obligations under the GATT, EC regulations, and a
bilateral agreement with Pretoria. The government
claimed that it had lobbied hard in the United
Nations for a mandatory oil embargo, but complained
that Security Council action appeared unlikely. The
Dutch implied that they might stiffen their position if
the US Congress approved economic sanctions.
So Are the Canadians. Canada announced on 6 July a
series of relatively moderate measures, including
abrogation of the Canada-South Africa double
taxation agreements. According to the US Embassy
in Ottawa, these steps are meant to signal Canada's
moral position while avoiding stronger economic
sanctions. Predictably, at least one opposition
spokesman has called Ottawa's action "a joke." Press
commentary also has portrayed it as weak
Norwegians Preparing To Act. Norway has sanctions
in place and, in contrast to its Allies, was preparing
for further action even before the Gaborone raid. On
7 June the parliament approved a government white
paper toughening the following restrictions:
? An embargo on export of Norwegian oil.
? No nuclear cooperation.
? No bilateral sports contacts.
? No Norwegian Government approval of capital
exports for investment in South Africa.
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? Visa requirements for South African nationals
seeking to visit Norway.
? Humanitarian aid for some liberation movements
and refugees.
? Direct Norwegian funding of projects designed to
reduce other countries' dependence on South Africa.
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In addition, parliament condemned the "politically
illegitimate" South African Government and directed
the Cabinet to evaluate a wide spectrum of additional
sanctions. These include banning exports of South
African military equipment into Norway and
forbidding the export of materials to South Africa
that could be used militarily. While supporting UN
trade sanctions against South Africa, parliament
recognized that such restrictions lack adequate
international support.
On 26 June Norway, Sweden, and Denmark
announced cancellation of their air traffic agreement
with South Africa. Scandinavian Airlines System's
flights to South Africa will halt within six months,
according to press sources. The Danish parliament-
according to the US Embassy in Copenhagen-had
already passed legislation banning new investment in
South Africa in late May.
Outlook
Pretoria's military policies and the resulting debate in
the US Congress are forcing West European
governments to face the contradictions in their policy
toward South Africa. Allied governments-and
particularly the British-are concerned that they may
no longer be able to deflect antiapartheid activists and
Third World governments with pleas that West
Europeans can do little by themselves to constrain
The French probably will continue to support
sanctions verbally-largely for the benefit of
nonaligned countries-but are unlikely to take any
direct action until after the debate in Washington
clarifies the US stance. The Dutch also will wait for
US action, almost certainly pointing to Washington as
the necessary element in any future international
sanctions regime. No other ally currently appears
ready to follow the Norwegian and Danish lead, and
all will probably protect their particular economic ties
with South Africa unless and until international trade
restrictions come into force.
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South Africa:
The Dutch Reformed Church
and Racial Reform
Traditionally a strong supporter of South Africa's
ruling National Party, the Dutch Reformed Church,
commonly known by its Afrikaans acronym, NGK,' is
often referred to as the "National Party at prayer."
The NGK has long been an integral part of Afrikaner
culture and is by far the most influential church in the
country today; 65 percent of all Afrikaners and 42
percent of all South African whites are members.
Most National Party members, government officials,
and bureaucrats are members. As its pivotal general
synod approaches next year, the NGK faces a possible
split over racial reform, reflecting other fissures in
Afrikanerdom. The National Party and the
Broederbond-the secretive Afrikaner cultural
group-have both split in recent years as a result of
the divisive debates over racial policies and reform.
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Mounting Pressure
Opposition to the NGK's support of apartheid has
grown in recent years. A collection of essays written
in 1981 by 24 Afrikaner theologians and laypersons
strongly criticized apartheid and made a plea for the
multiracial unification of the NGK family of
churches. In addition, an open letter by 123 NGK
ministers and theologians in 1982 called for greater
church efforts to reduce tensions between racial
groups in South Africa. The letter stated that
apartheid not only promotes alienation and distrust
but also is not justified by the scriptures. It
emphasized the primacy of the principle of unity
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These internal calls for church reform have been
echoed by international Reformed Church groups. In
August 1982, the World Alliance of Reformed
Churches suspended the NGK, demanding that it end
segregated communion and worship, reject apartheid,
and assist those suffering from the effects of racial
segregation in South Africa. The World Alliance then
elected as its president Dr. Alan Boesak, a leading
colored minister in the Dutch Reformed Mission
Church-the NGSK-who favors merging the
Dutch Reformed Church (NGK):
? Colored Mission Church (NGSK)
? Reformed Church in Africa (Indian)
? Dutch Reformed Church in Africa (African)
reformed churches into a multiracial Dutch Reformed
Church. Boesak led the NGSK in unconditionally
rejecting all apartheid laws, and called for a new,
nonracial political system in South Africa.
The synod of the colored NGSK first signaled its
displeasure with the NGK "mother church" in 1982
when it declared the NGK guilty of heresy and
idolatry for supporting apartheid. The NGSK joined
the South African Council of Churches-a liberal,
predominantly English-speaking, interdenominational
group long opposed to the NGK.
Despite this growing criticism, the NGK general
synod in 1982 did not result in any major shifts in
policy. The church body rejected the open letter by
123 ministers and declared the charges of the NGSK
unreasonable. The synod decided to stay in the World
Alliance of Reformed Churches, largely to retain a
communications link with the international body, and
to avoid playing into the hands of antiapartheid forces
trying to isolate the church, according to press
reports. The synod rejected the integration of regular
services, but agreed to permit individual churches to
decide whether to allow blacks to attend special
services. It also continued to condemn mixed
marriages and sexual relations between whites and
nonwhites.
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More pressure was put on the NGK by the NGSK's draft a more enlightened version. The synod will also
decision in March 1983 to put into practice its be reconsidering its membership in the World
principle that apartheid is a heresy. The NGSK Alliance of Reformed Churches and the Reformed
announced it would perform and recognize interracial Ecumenical Synod.
marriages and advised its members to resolve church-
state dilemmas on the basis of conscience.
The most significant break in NGK ranks occurred in
late 1983 when the liberal Western Cape synod
decided unconditionally to open church services and
membership to all races. It also declared that the bans
on interracial marriages and relations contradicted
the scriptures and ethical principles of marriage.
Although it did not join the NGSK in declaring
apartheid a heresy, the Western Cape synod said the
NGK should disassociate itself from any theological
justification of apartheid.
The last international channel of communication open
to the NGK was closed earlier this year. The
Reformed Ecumenical Synod, a conservative body of
orthodox Calvinist churches, last year called for the
repeal of South Africa's ban on interracial marriages
and relations and asked the NGK to inform it by 1987
of its position on apartheid in light of the Bible. The
NGK's executive leadership objected to this demand
and preempted next year's general synod by
suspending, provisionally, its membership in the
organization.
Outlook
Most observers believe that the 1986 general synod of
the NGK is likely to divide the church even further.
The US Embassy reports that a number of NGK
ministers and theologians believe a formal split in the
church is possible. One leading South African
theological professor told Embassy officials there
already are two separate movements within the NGK
that differ over biblical interpretations of apartheid,
adding that some rural parishes are ignoring rulings
of the 1982 general synod.
The most divisive issue before the 1986 synod will be
the revision of the church's social policy, which as
drafted in 1974 provided a theological justification of
apartheid. A committee of NGK ministers and
theologians has met since 1982 and probably will
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Zimbabwe:
White Elections
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Former Rhodesian Prime Minister Smith's
Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe captured a
majority of parliamentary seats in a surprisingly
strong showing in the elections on 27 June for whites.
Smith's party won 15 of the 20 seats reserved for
whites under the Lancaster House Constitution,'
easily defeating a loose coalition of independents who
had broken with the Conservative Alliance over the
past two years.F__1 25X1
vowed to scrap the seats reserved for whites
The triumph by Smith's party followed a campaign
that drew little interest among the white electorate,
which was widely expected to vote for the
independents, according to the US Embassy. Smith's
strong personal appeal among the white community,
the party's superior organization, and intense
campaigning by Smith, in our judgment, contributed
Reaction
Prime Minister Mugabe reacted strongly to Smith's
victory, describing it as a betrayal by the white
electorate and a rejection of his government's
conciliatory policies toward whites
immediately, according to press reports.
A number of whites have expressed concern to US
Embassy officials that Smith's victory might trigger a
government backlash. We suspect, along with the US
Embassy, that renewed white emi ration is likely,
r v rsin a r)r electi n trend.
Other whites, including members of the Commercial
Farmers Union, have tried to distance themselves
from the Conservative Alliance. Smith has taken a
nonconfrontational stance, and he pledged to renew
his efforts to communicate with the government.
Prospects
The victory by the Conservative Alliance will be
difficult for Mugabe and his ruling Zimbabwe
African National Union to swallow, despite Smith's
reassuring statements. Relations between whites-
who comprise less than 2 percent of the population but
dominate the economy-and blacks undoubtedly will
deteriorate, especially if Mugabe uses his landslide
victory in early July to move more rapidly toward a
more socialist-oriented, single-party state. At a
minimum, we expect Mugabe to brush aside
constitutional legalities and abolish the reserved seats
for whites and move to install a one-party state within
the next few years. F-7
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Smith and the white electorate, calling them "the
racists of the past" and claiming blacks were deceived
by trusting whites. Mugabe said his party would
purge the country's white minority and only those
whites who were willing to work with his government
would remain in Zimbabwe. He called the Lancaster
House Constitution a "dirty piece of paper" and
Mugabe publicly attacked
' Under the British-mediated Constitution which brought
Zimbabwe to independence in 1980, 20 of 100 parliamentary seats
are reserved for whites until at least 1987. After 1987 a 70-member
vote of parliament is sufficient to abolish the reserved seats. F_
Secret
ALA AR 85-016
12 July 1985
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00289R000100370001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00289R000100370001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00289R000100370001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00289R000100370001-8
Africa
Brief
Angola-Zaire Worsening Relations
Relations between Zaire and Angola have deteriorated in the past several months
as Luanda has become convinced that Kinshasa is providing significant logistic
support to UNITA insurgents. Luanda
believes that UNITA's sustained operations in northern Angola-which range
from the capital in the northwest to the economically important diamond mining
region in the northeast-would not be possible without Zairian support. Angola
last May expelled the first secretary of the Zairian Embassy in Luanda on charges
The roots of the often antagonistic relationship stem from President Mobutu's
support for Holden Roberto's National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA)
and Jonas Savimbi's UNITA against Agostino Neto's MPLA during Angola's
struggle for independence in the early 1970s. The MPLA retaliated by backing
two rebel invasions of Zaire's Shaba Province in the late 1970s by the anti-Mobutu
Front for the Liberation of Congo (FLNC), and by allowing some 6,000 FLNC
members to reside in Angola. The two, however, did agree during President dos
Santos' visit to Zaire last February not to allow their territory to be used to
undermine the security of the other.
In our view, bilateral relations are likely to deteriorate further in the coming
months as UNITA increases its activities in northeastern Angola and Cabinda
Province, while consolidating its position farther south along the border with
Zaire. Luanda would view UNITA's gains as confirmation of Zaire's support for
the insurgents and this would lead the MPLA to step up public criticism or
perhaps make further expulsions of Zairian diplomats. Moreover, the increased
flow of refugees into Zaire in recent months-which has included soldiers fleeing
with their weapons and equipment-raises the likelihood of a border incident.
Mobutu is likely to continue to conceal his limited support to UNITA because
Luanda could retaliate by arming the FLNC. Discovery of Zairian involvement
with UNITA also could undermine Kinshasa's efforts to persuade other
neighboring countries to crack down on cross-border activity by Libyan-supported
dissidents.
19 Secret
ALA AR 85-016
12 July 1985
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00289R000100370001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00289R000100370001-8
Secret
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/06: CIA-RDP87T00289R000100370001-8