ANGOLA-ZAIRE: AN UNEASY PEACE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000707300001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 21, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 8, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/01 :CIA-RDP86T01017R000707300001-3
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/01 :CIA-RDP86T01017R000707300001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/01 :CIA-RDP86T01017R000707300001-3 25X1
Central Intelligence Agency
Washinglcxi. D. C. 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
8 July 1986
Angola-Zaire: An Uneasy Peace
Summary
The traditionally uneasy relationship between Angola and
Zaire has worsened noticeably in recent months as suspicions on
both sides have mounted about each other's willingness to
increase aid to dissident groups. The summit scheduled for 10
July in Luanda between Angolan President dos Santos and Zairian
President Mobutu is unlikely to relax growing tensions, even
though we expect both leaders to give lip service to improving
diolamatic relations,
Although we doubt that Kinshasa will reduce
its involvement with UNITA, President Mobutu is working hard to
reduce Zaire's regional isolation, project a more nonaligned
foreign policy, and improve relations with Moscow in the
unrealistic hope that such cosmetic moves will paper over
growing difficulties with Angola.
Should tensions continue to mount in the wake of the
summit, we believe Angola will take limited military moves
against Kinshasa, probably including increased hot pursuit
operations against UNITA forces using Zaire as a sanctuary or
limited cross-border raids by regular Angolan Army troops. We
This memorandum was requested by Raymond Smith, Deputy Director, Office of
Southern African Affairs and Edward Killham, Director, Office of Cep
American Analysis. The paper was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations. Questions and comments are welcome and may be directed to the
Chief, Africa Division, ALA
ALA M 86-20033C
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/01 :CIA-RDP86T01017R000707300001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/01 :CIA-RDP86T01017R000707300001-3 25X1
already under way.
expect, however, Luanda would weigh carefully the pros and cons
of renewing substantial assistance to Zairian dissidents in
recognition of the likelihood of a strong Western response to a
major incursion as happened in the 1977 and 1978 invasions of
Zaire's mineral-rich Shaba region. Nevertheless, we judge that
Angola might be tempted to renew major support for Zairian
dissidents in the event of additional evidence that Zaire had
su rted a dramatic UNITA attack on oil facilities in Cabinda
Under such
circumstances, Soviet reservations about resurrecting
anti-Mobutu dissidents in Angola might diminish. At this
juncture, however, we have no evidence to confirm frequent
Zairian allegations that reparations for a Shaba III is
relations
between Angola and Zaire have cooled noticea yin recen nths largely
because of both 'sides' heightened concerns about each other's willingness
to increase aid to dissident groups. In our view, bilateral relations are
more strained than at any time since Angola supported Zairian rebel
invasions into Zaire's Shaba region in 1977 and 1978 in retaliation for
Kinshasa's support for the MPLA's opponents in the 1975-76 civil war that
followed Angola's independence from Portugal. Moreover, we do not expect
Background
Tensions between Angola and Zaire are nothing new. Zaire since the
1960s supported the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), a
pro-Western nationalist movement, and subsequently extended assistance to
Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
(UNITA) after Angola's independence in November 1975. UNITA and the FNLA
had joined forces in an unsuccessful effort to block the Soviet- and
Cuban-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) from
seizing control in Luanda. In turn, the MPLA, probably with Soviet
acquiescence, in the late 1970s provided enough training, equipment, and
bases to enable anti-Mobutu dissidents called the Front for the National
Libera i n of Congo (FLNC) to invade Zaire's Shaba region in both 1977 and
1978.
Following the defeat of these invasions, Angola and Zaire managed to
achieve a modus vivendi of sorts by maintaining abroad range of contacts
airian President Mobutu's visit to Luanda--now scheduled for 10 July
--will defuse growing tensions.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/01 :CIA-RDP86T01017R000707300001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/01 :CIA-RDP86T01017R000707300001-3 25X1
and cooperation on certain issues, such as refugees. Nevertheless,
fundamental differences between Kinshasa and Luanda rooted in personality
difference between their leaders, opposing ideologies, and differing
foreign policies account for many of the longstanding bilateral
frictions. (See Appendix for~er background discussion of
Angolan-Zairian relations). 25X1
Mobutu's security fears are compounded by his growing sense of
isolation in the region and by reports of Libyan efforts to unite
disparate Zairian dissident groups in a militaril viable o osition
movement.
to gain intelligence and--if necessary--to harass FLNC.
Sources of Current Tensions
As revealed in conversations with US officials, Mobutu's fears of
Angolan intentions intensified late last year after Luanda succeeded for
the first time in several years in putting UNITA on the defensive and
recapturing some territory near Angola's border with Zaire. US Embassy
reporting suggests that Mobutu has long supported UNITA, in part because
of its potential usefulness as a buffer against the continued presence of
FLNC dissidents in Angola. In our view, UNITA's presence along much of
Angola's border with Zaire's Shaba region denies the dissidents bases near
this vital mineral producing area and puts Savimbi's grou~i~ position
From the Angolan perspective, Luanda's suspicions of Zairian good
faith clearly have increased in recent years, a reflection of Angola's
growing conviction that Zaire has allowed UNITA use of Zairian territory
as a safehaven, especially those areas near the diamond and coffee rich
northern provinces as well as near the Angolan exclave of Cabinda--the
edomina
pr
earnings.
te source of Luanda's crude oil exports and foreign exchange
We believe specific incidents and persistent rumors during the past
year have only compounded Angolan fears:
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/01 :CIA-RDP86T01017R000707300001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/01 :CIA-RDP86T01017R000707300001-3 25X1
i
-- Earlier seeds of doubt were sowed in May 1985, when the Angolans
discovered a map of Zaire on a South African soldier captured
while on tae mission a ainst oil installations in
Cabinda.
The smooth transfer by UNITA to Zaire in March 1986 of over 150
hostages--expatriate employees captured at a diamond mine in the
northern town o'f Andrada--and the subsequent refusal by Zaire to
return to Angola those UNITA forces that accompanied the captives
also heightened Angolan suspicions
Reactions to Date
Embassy reporting suggest that leaders in both Kinshasa an uan a are
leaning toward believing the worst of each other. Paranoia over the
threat posed by Zairian exiles in nearby countries is running even higher
than usual in Kinshasa, while Luanda is inclined to believe that massive
US aid is flowing through Zaire to UNITA. Although their perceptions are
in part skewed, they are no less troubling or real to Presidents' Mobutu
and dos Santos as they prepare for their summit, now scheduled for 10
July. In our iudgment, should their security concerns intensif the
prospects for a rash reaction or miscue will increase.
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/01 :CIA-RDP86T01017R000707300001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/01 :CIA-RDP86T01017R000707300001-3
Meanwhile, diplomatic reporting shows that the Angolans have
privately complained to a wide range of diplomats in Luanda as well as to
leaders of the Frontline States and the Organization of African Unity
about t that Zaire is collaborating with Washington to aid
IINTTA.
Weighing Their Options
Both Angola and Zaire appear to be trying to anticipate each other's
next steps and are actively weighing the costs and opportunities of their
respective options. However, a review of US
Embassy reporting suggests to us that at this point Heil er s ~de~ias made
any firm plans for further actions against each other.
The An olan Perspective. We believe that any options Angola
consi ers vis-a-vis acre must be weighed against its own demanding
internal security situation and the need to focus its main energies
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/01 :CIA-RDP86T01017R000707300001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/01 :CIA-RDP86T01017R000707300001-3 25X1
against UNITA activities inside Angola. While we have received mixed
signals on the issue of timing,
Angola still appears preoccupied with taking a vantage o ry
season--from May to November--to mount another annual offensive against
UNITA, probably in several weeks as an extension of fighting now under way
in the area of Munhango.
25X1
25X1
e e eve
Angola will continue to look for concrete evidence o ins asa's collusion
with UNITA and for opportunities to present its case against Zaire in the
OAU and the other international meetings, perhaps including the UN
Security Council. In our view, such moves--while certain to enhance
Kinshasa's discomforture--are likely to lead to louder protestations of
good neighborliness from Zaire but probably little else.
Another option Angola seems to be exploring is encouraging other
Frontline states* to either turn a blind eye to or to grant covert support
to the activities of anti-Mobutu dissidents in their countries. Several
diplomatic reports indicate that Frontline leaders at a meeting in April
in Luanda discussed Mobutu's su ort for UNITA, particularly his alleged
role in facilitating US aid.
~ome Frontline states
consi eration to enhancing anti- o u u issi capao as a means
of showing solidarity with the beleaguered Angolans.
Ultimately
we judge that Luanda wou d pro a y
take some limited mi itary moves against Kinsnasa, out weigh carefully
further efforts to resurrect FLNC for another major attack on Zaire.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
* The Frontline States include Angola, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique,
Botswana, and Tanzania.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/01 :CIA-RDP86T01017R000707300001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/01 :CIA-RDP86T01017R000707300001-3 25X1
Kinshasa of its vulnerability, the Angolans could easily increase
their cross-border ~oerations into Zaire--with overflights, troop
crossings or both.
-- A limited cross-border attack. As a more pointed reminder to
Zaire, a small number of forces--either Angolans disguised as
Zairian dissidents or perhaps even a reconstituted FLNC
unit--could enter Zaire on an attention-getting, small-scale
raid. The brief occupation of a small town in Shaba or the
heavyhanded treatment of some civilians would almost certainly
cause severe concern to Mobutu, who probab would rush elite
troops from Kinshasa to the border area.
We believe any major Angolan resuscitation of FLNC would be a
long-term option, given the time that would probably be required to get
the nearly moribund organization on its feet, the stiff manpower and
logistics demands of current anti-UNITA operations, and the need for
Soviet and Cuban acquiescence and probable support. FLNC, according to
sketchy US Embassy reporting, has been in disarray for several years.
Embassy reporting from Kinshasa suggests that while perhaps between 2,000
and 3,500 combat=age FLNC males reside in Angola, only a small proportion
of them would be readily available for combat operations. Moreover, we
suspect much of their spirit and commitment has been sapped since their
failure to take Shaba in 1977 and 1978 and by probable fighting with
UNITA, which operates in FLNC areas in northern Angola. In addition, the
defection of key Zairian dissident leaders--such as former Prime Minister
Nguza Karl-I-Bond--and the failure of new leaders to emerge suggest yet
other weaknesses.
Nonetheless, we judge that Luanda would be tempted to renew support
to FLNC under certain circumstances. This would include a dramatic UNITA
attack on oil facilities in Cabinda, serious Angolan military setbacks
riurina this year's counterinsurgency effort
Under such circumstances, i is our
view that Moscow might overcome some of its reservations about FLNC and
the consequences of supporting it, resulting in more active Soviet
interest in the group.
The historical record suggests that Moscow probably has ambivalent
attitudes toward FLNC. We believe that the Soviets almost certainly would
discourage Angola from aiding them until the conclusion of adry-season
offensive and might even oppose such aid at any point given their
that Mobutu's current flirta ions wi a ovie s wou ough to woo
Moscow into blocking renewed Angolan aid to the Zairian dissidents.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/01 :CIA-RDP86T01017R000707300001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/01 :CIA-RDP86T01017R000707300001-3 25X1
Havana, which provided military training to FLNC in the late 1970s, would
probably be willing to suppor~ rebels even at the risk of losing its
diplomatic ties to Zaire.
The Zairian Perspective
In our judgment, Zaire will continue recent efforts to deal with what
it sees as a worsening security situation, growing regional isolatio
On the political front, Mobutu
is likely to continue to emp asize regiona diplomacy in an effort to
counteract Frontline censure over Zaire's support to UNITA. Recent US
Embassy reporting suggests that Mobutu's vehement public denials of
support for UNITA and his recent decision to reactivate its membershi in
the OAU are primarily calculated to reduce his regional isolation.
In addition, we believe that Mobutu is trying to improve currently
poor relations with the USSR in the hope--unrealistic in our view--that
Moscow might forestall possible Angolan retaliation. Moreover, Mobutu may
believe that expanded ties with Moscow--such as permitting Aeroflot
landing rights or Soviet involvement in a limited number of economic
projects--will give him greater leverage in Washington. He might even
entertain the idea of g Moscow to make more visible any warming of
bilateral relations.
Despite his growing security concerns, we believe Mobutu will
continue to discreetly help UNITA infiltrate Angola and to provide use of
airfields, personnel, and intelli ence su ort to facilitate the transfer
of materiel to UNITA.
Should UNITA suffer
serious setbacks during the next six months, we judge that Mobutu would
probably come under pressure from Savimbi and South Africa to provide
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/01 :CIA-RDP86T01017R000707300001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/01 :CIA-RDP86T01017R000707300001-3 25X1
UNITA with staging areas inside Zaire. Without specific security
guarantees from his Western backers, however we doubt that Mobutu would
risk such visibly increased support. 25X1
Despite Mobutu's unusual interest in recent Soviet proposals to
improve relations, we expect any Zaire-Soviet rapprochement will be
limited because of Mobutu's longstanding distrust of Soviet motives and
desire to retain a security relationship with the US and other Western
backers--especially the French and the Belgians, who intervened on Zaire's
behalf during the Shaba incursions of 1977 and 1978. Mobutu, however, may
allow tensions in relations with the US to remain high for the near term
and could join other regional states in their criticism of Washington's
southern African policies. In our view, Mobutu probably judges that his
rPrPnt contrariness has given him leverage in Washington for increased aid
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/01 :CIA-RDP86T01017R000707300001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/01 :CIA-RDP86T01017R000707300001-3 25X1
Appendix
Angola-Zaire: A Troubled Relationship
Fundamental Difference: Zaire and Angola have for years been part of
the larger East-West struggle in sub-Saharan Africa as the historical
record shows that each country's relationship with and dependence on rival
big powers has been a key element in the undercurrent of mutual distrust
between the two countries. Open source reporting indicates that Angolan
and Zairian views are diametrically opposed on most African problems and
international issues. Angola, by all accounts, is one of Africa's leading
"radical" states, while Zaire is considered one of the continent's most
conservative. In addition, Angola has close diplomatic links with most
black nations in southern Africa and participates actively in regional
organizations like the Frontline States, the Southern Africa Development
and Coordination Conference, and the Organization of African Unity.
Zaire, by contrast, has traditionally been viewed as the odd country out
in the Southern African political landscape.
ine countries that surround Zaire, Kins,
regarded Angola as potentially the most dangerous.
Despite occasiarral f l i rtatio~- w.iith Myascow,
Zairian President Mobutu has often displayed an almost pararroid fear of
Communism, frequently citing the "red belt" around Zaire fueled by the
pervasive Soviet and Cuban presence in Angola and Luanda's own avowed
commitment to Marxism-Leninism. Luanda's frequent verbal attacks on
Zaire's mayor Western backers, combined with Mobutu's rowin sense of
isolation, underscore the Zairian leader's worries.
Supportin Each Other's Dissidents: Zaire from the early 1960s
serve as a ase o support for the National Front for the Liberation of
Angola (FNLA), apro-Western nationalist movement led by Holden Roberto
that vied with the Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of
Angola (MPLA) in opposing Portuguese rule in Angola. Joseph Kasavubu,
Zaire's President from 1961 to 1964, provided support for the FNLA, while
Moise Tshombe, Zaire's President in 1964-65, curtailed FNLA activities
because his own supu~r~ a from the Portuguese in Angola and white
settlers in Zaire. u
With Mobutu's assumption of power in 1965, however, the Zairian Army
began organizing, training, and equipping FNLA soldiers. In the
mid-1970s, Zaire served as a conduit for US and Chinese military aid to
the FNLA. B 1974, approximately 10,000 to 12,000 FNLA guerrillas resided
in Zaire.
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/01 :CIA-RDP86T01017R000707300001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/01 :CIA-RDP86T01017R000707300001-3 25X1
After the failure in early 1975 of the Alvor agreement under which
the three Angolan factions--the FNLA, MPLA, and UNITA--had agreed to
participate with Portugal in a transitional government leading to
independence, the FNLA and Jonas Savimbi's UNITA formed a loose coalition
to combat the Soviet-supported MPLA.
As the MPLA--with substantial Soviet and
Cuban military support--strengthened its military position beyond Luanda
Zaire provided sanctuary to large numbers of defeated FNLA
in 1976
,
soldiers and occasional saf ehaven to UNITA guerrillas under pressure from
Angolan and Cuban troops.
Angola retaliated for Zaire's earlier support to FNLA and UNITA by
providing support for the abortive invasions of Zaire's mineral-rich Shaba
region in 1977 and 1978 by the anti-Mobutu Front for the National
Liberation of Congo (FLNC), also known as the "Katangan gendarmes".
Angola provided training bases, military instructors, and equipment to the
FLNC.
Following the defeat of the two Shaba invasions, each time with
intervention by French and Belgian forces
Zaire and Angola reached an understanding in 1979 that
neither country would allow opposition movements aimed at the other to
operate actively from their respective territories. Both governmeets also
began to work through diplomatic channels to trydefuse security
problems and to find areas for cooperation.
Areas of Cooperation: Despite longstanding bilateral frictions,
Angola and Zaire pursue abroad range of official contacts at several
levels. Both governments over the years have generally adhered to a
two-track policy: discussing mutual hostilities in private while publicly
putting the best face on their relationship. Even in recent months,
Kinshasa and Luanda have stressed publicly their commitment to a good
neighbor olic and to nonintervention in the internal affairs of the
other.
In the diplomatic sphere, Kinshasa and Luanda have embassies in each
other's capitals as well as consulates--Zaire in Luena and Angola in
Lubumbashi. Open press reporting indicates that cabinet-level officials
occasionally exchange visits, and for all their differences, Mobutu and
dos Santos have met several times over the years, most recently in
Kinshasa in February 1985 in what our Embassy in Kinshasa described as an
outwardly cordial atmosphere.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/01 :CIA-RDP86T01017R000707300001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/01 :CIA-RDP86T01017R000707300001-3 25X1
Zairian ruling party official attended an MPLA party congress in Luan a
last December at the MPLA's invitation, according to open press sources.
Potentially, the most significant agreement signed between the two
countries at the summit early last year was an accord covering defense and
security issues, including a renewed pledge not to let their respective
territorv be used to undermine each other's stability.
The two countries have generally cooperated on-refugee issues, a
chronic problem given the unsettled security situation and uncertain
economic climate in much of Angola and Zaire. While the numbers
fluctuate, the UNHCR estimates that some 30,000 to 40,000 Angolans reside
in the Shaba region of Zaire. We lack similarly reliable figures for the
number of Zairian refugees in Angola, but estimate that there are several
thousand Zairians there. Luanda was distinctly irritated earlier this
year, however, when Kinshasa received from UNITA forces over 150 foreign
nationals captured when the insurgents overran the diamond mines at
Andrada. In the past, Zaire had not allowed UNITA to release prisoners
into Zairian territory.
Trade between Angola and Zaire is practically nil, aside from
smuggling operations. The two countries have established a maritime.
freight agreement to deal with transit problems on the Zaire Rive a
medical aid agreement, and an information exchange commission.
Limits to Cooperation: While the historical record shows that
diplomatic and security links have aided both countries in dealing with
some potentially sticky situations--such as the unscheduled landing in
Zaire last year of an Angolan aircraft carrying Cuban military
personnel--there are limits to the effectiveness of such ties.
-- The defense and security accord has not prevented Zaire from
continuing to grant safehaven and logistic assistance to UNITA
nor Angola from continuing to harbor anti-Mobutu elements.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/01 :CIA-RDP86T01017R000707300001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/01 :CIA-RDP86T01017R000707300001-3 25X1
SUBJECT: Angola-Zaire: An Uneasy Peace
Original--Raymond F. Smith, Deputy Director, Office of Southern
African Affairs, and Edward L. Killham, Director, Office of
Central African Affairs, Department of State
1--Phillip Ringdahl, Director of African Affairs, NSC
1--Charles Freeman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State,
Bureau of African Affairs
1--Robert Cabelly, Special Assistant to the Assistant
Secretary of State, Bureau of African Affairs
1--Edward G. Lanpher, Director, Office of Southern
African Affairs, Department of State
1--Allen Harris, Deputy Director, Office of Southern
African Affairs, Department of State
1--Douglas Holladay, Working Group on South Africa
and Southern Africa, Department of~State.
1--Anthony S. Dalsimer, Director, Office of Analysis
for Africa, INR, Department of State
1--Jerry Galluci, Desk Officer for Angola, Department of State
1--Ralph Bressler, Desk Officer for Zaire, Department of State
1--James Wood, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Africa, International Security Affairs, Office of the
ALA/AF/W/
1--PDB Staff
1--ILS
1--C/DDI/PES
1--D/ALA
1--ALA Research Director
2--ALA/PS (one sourced copy; one clean)
4--OCPAS/IMD/CB
4--ALA/AF
4--ALA/C (Analyst)
4--ALA/C (File)
4--ALA/W (Analyst)
1--DDO/AF
1--NIC
1--DDO/Africa
1--Walter Barrows, Assistant to the Director, International
Security Agency.
1--DDI
1--NIO for Africa
4--ALA/W (File)
(9 July 1986)
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/01 :CIA-RDP86T01017R000707300001-3