BOTSWANA: PRESIDENT MASIRE'S VISIT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000901170002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 19, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 25, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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r T
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
25 April 1984
BOTSWANA: President Masire's Visit
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Summary
Botswana President Quett Masire'probably hopes that his
visit to Washington 7-10 May will cement his status as a worthy
successor to Botswana's revered first president, Seretse Khama,
prior to the parliamentary elections set for this fall. Masire
almost certainly will want to discuss the status of the South
African-Angolan disengagement and prospects for Namibian
Independence. Like the leaders of other Frontline States,
Masire is skeptical about South Africa's sincerity in the
Namibia negotiations, and is likely to urge the US to keep
pressing on Pretoria to abide by its public commitment to
implement the plan for Namibian i dependene bodied in UN
Security Council Resolution 435. n 7
Masire can also be expected to discuss the pressure
Pretoria has been applying to Botswana for a formal security
accord to control anti-South African groups, and he may appeal
to the US to intercede and urge South African restraint.
Masire might also mention the border problems Botswana is
having with Zimbabwe stemming from anti-Mugabe dissidents' use
of Botswana as a staging area and refuge. Masire probably
This typescript was prepared by South Africa
Branch, Office of African and Latin American ysis. It has been
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations. Comments and queries may
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fears that Harare would demand a similar securit accord if
Botswana signed one with Pretoria.
Haire could also use the occasion of his visit to appeal
for continued US support for the Southern African Development
Coordination Conference, a nine nation regional,arouo formed to
alleviate economic dependence on South Africa.
The Setting
Quett Masire, Vice-President for over 14 years under Botswana's first
president, Seretse Khama, has firmly established his control since
assuming the presidency after Khama's death in 1980 and has continued his
predecessor's moderate, pragmatic policies. Botswana, one of Africa's few
stable democracies, has favored free enterprise, respect for human rights,
and multiparty democracy in a parliamentary system. External relations
have been characterized by a delicate balance that reflects Botswana's
willingness to join fellow African states in criticizing South Africa's
racial policy while maintaining extensive unofficial contacts with
Pretoria.
The Domestic Political Scene: Masire's Reelection Prospects
Parliamentary elections set for this fall will be the first electoral
test of Masire's presidency.
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neither Masire nor his ruling Botswana Democratic Party 25X1
(BDP) is likely to face a serious challenge. The BDP has dominated all 25X1
four of Botswana's general elections since 1966 and currently holds 29 of
the 32 seats in parliament. 25X1
signs have appeared of
internal factionalism in the BDP--primarily centering around tribal and
personal loyalties--but in our view these will have little effect on the
election. Masire, a member of the minority Bangwaketse tribe, has been
alert to the sensitivities of the majority Bamangwato tribe that has
historically played a major role in the BDP. Seretse Khama was a
Bamangwato, and, some Bamangwato
leaders have been dissatisfied with a they view as their minor role in
the Masire government. Masire has so far been able to balance these
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competing loyalties, however, and to keep the internal rifts in the BDP
from becoming serious.
All 'but one of Botswana's half dozen or so opposition parties have
extremely narrow constituencies and ill-defined programs, and present no
real alternative to Masire's BDP. Only the Botswana National Front (BNF)
appears to have a definite base of support--primarily among young, urban
Batswana*--but its Marxist, pro-Soviet rhetoric has made it unattractive
to most dissatisfied BDP supporters. The BNF currently holds only two
seats in Parliament, and in our judgment it will do poorly in the coming
Masire seems to be coping effectively with occasional public
criticism of the government's handling of Zimbabwean refugees, most of
whom are Ndebele tribesmen ethnically related to the northern Batswana.
The northern Batswana resent even the limited efforts that Botswana
security forces have mounted against their brethren--some of whom probably
are dissidents--in response to pressure from Harare. Opposition parties
have been unable to exploit this resentment, however, and Masire has been
careful to limit his cooperation with Harare even at the risk of
antagonizing Zimbabwean officials.
A nagging concern for Masire is the political future of Ian Khama,
son of the late President and Deputy Commander of the Botswana Defense
Force. Khama's political plans are the subject of intense speculation
within Botswana. Khama, in addition to having the family name, also is
Paramount Chief of the Bamangwato. Since 1981, Khama has made no secret
of his desire to enter politics and most observers are convinced that his
ultimate goal is the presidency.
A major impediment to Khama's political aspirations, however, is a
constitutional amendment that makes a tribal chief ineligible for
political office until five years after relinquishing his tribal
position.
Deing, Khama appears to be weighing his options: whether to renounce his
chieftanship, work within the BDP n opposition group, or even form
his own opposition party.
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* Citizens of Botswana refer to themselves as Batswana rather than
Botswanans.
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J V V IN L. 1
Foreign Policy Issues
A Regional Focus
Masire has generally supported US initiatives seeking peaceful
solutions to southern African disputes. He probably hopes that the
agreement between South Africa and Angola for a disengagement of forces
can serve as the basis for a broader regional settlement. Along with
other Frontline State leaders, however, Masire is skeptical about South
Africa's sincerity in the Namibian negotiations and is likely to urge the
United States to keep pressure on Pretoria to abide by its public
commitment to implement the plan for Namibian independence embodied in UN
Security Council Resolution 435.
Masire's major foreign policy concerns stem largely from Botswana's
extremely vulnerable position in the region. Caught between its two more
powerful neighbors, South Africa and Zimbabwe, Botswana has recently come
under growing economic and military pressure to make politically
unpalatable concessions to both. Pretoria and Harare are demanding that
Gaborone more actively restrain opposition elements residing in
Botswana--Ndebele dissidents in the case of Zimbabwe and ANC insurgents in
the case of South Africa--and have implied that failure to do so could
invite military intervention.
Relations with South Africa. Masire probably is concerned that South
Africa's recent success in reaching a formal security accord with
Mozambique will encourage Pretoria to step up pressure on Botswana for a
similar agreement to control anti-South African groups. He may appeal to
the United States to intercede and urge South African restraint. Pretoria
has already used a recent attempt by the South West Africa People's
Organization (SWAPO) to infiltrate Namibia from Botswana as an opportunity
to urge Gaborone to enter into a formal nonaggression agreement.
In our judgment, Masire is especially fearful that South African
pressure will take the form of military retaliation should the ANC--in the
wake of the South Africa-Mozambique agreement--make greater use of
Botswana territory as a staging area for attacks into South Africa.
Although Botswana is resisting South African pressure to sign a formal
pact, Botswana will, in our judqment, continue to crack down on ANC and
SWAPO activity as best it can. Because of Botswana's small defense force
and vast, desolate border areas, however, it is unlikely the government
could control either of these grn,ps should they make a determined effort
to use Botswana's territory.
Masire is undoubtedly well aware that Botswana's vulnerabilities also
extend to its heavy economic dependence on South Africa. Most of
Botswana's exports and imports are transported on South African roads and
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railways. Some 40,000 Batswana work in South Africa as migrant
laborers--half of them in South Africa's mines. These workers help
relieve Botswana's growing unemployment, and the wages they remit a
source of valuable foreign exchange for the Gaborone government.
Botswana also is dependent on South African corporate investment and
other forms of economic cooperation vital for continued growth. One
promising project requiring Pretoria's cooperation is development of soda
ash deposits. British Petroleum has begun the initial phases of an
investment of over $300 million in this project, but Pretoria has
attempted to link its cooperation in the venture--as a market and possibly
as a partner in costly transport development--to Botswana's willingness to
sign a security accord, according to Embassy sources. Gaborone's
eagerness to proceed with the project, however, and Pretoria's interest in
obtaining a low cost source of soda ash for its glass, aluminum. and paper
industries, probably will open the way for compromise.
Botswana's membership, along with Lesotho and Swaziland, in the South
African-dominated Southern African Customs Union (SACU) has provided
Pretoria with another source of leverage that it appears to be willing to
use. South Africa collects duties on the imports of these landlocked
countries and distributes shares based roughly on the members' percentage
of total SACU imports. Pretoria also provides a hidden form of foreign
aid by allowing the other SACU members to overstate their imports.
Recently, however, Pretoria hinted that it will reduce members' shares in
September unless they accept South Africa's four so-called independent
tribal homelands as new and equal members of SACU, something we believe
Botswana will strongly resist. SACU receipts provide over 30 percent of
Botswana government revenues, and Gaborone would feel the pinch if they
were reduced.
Relations with Zimbabwe. Masire has wrestled for over two years with
the problem of Zimbabwean dissidents whose use of eastern Botswana as a
staging area and refuge has bedeviled relations with Harare. Botswana's
strong commitment to protecting the rights of legitimate Zimbabwean
refugees has been particularly irritating to Harare. Despite Masire's
assurances that Botswana is doing all it can with its limited security
resources to control Zimbabwean dissidents, Harare is dissatisfi d and has
continued to blame Botswana publicly for its dissident problem. 7
Masire is especially concerned that if Botswana were to sign a
security pact with South Africa, Harare would demand a similar pact. The
Zimbabwean Army already has cond!icted repeated, albeit small, cross-border
operations against suspected dissidents in Botswana, and we believe there
will be more such incursions despite Gaborone's protests.
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Other- Regional Concerns. We believe Masire may well use the occasion
of his visit to appeal for continued US support for the Southern African
Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), a nine nation regional group
formed to alleviate economic dependence on South Africa. Despite
extensive commitments of financial support from Western donors, SADCC has
made little progress toward its goal. Its members, battered by recession
and drought, have so far met with little success in their efforts to
escape from Pretoria's economic stranglehold.
Relations with Communist States
Masire has had few dealings with the Soviets since their unsuccessful
attempt to make major inroads into Botswana in 1980, when Gaborone signed
a $4-7 million arms deal with Moscow. The equipment, consisting primarily
of 32 armored personnel carriers and 64 SA-7 antiaircraft missiles, and a
few Soviet advisers arrived in August 1981. According to US Embassy
reporting, however, maintenance and performance problems with the Soviet
equipment soon soured relations, and Gaborone declined to renew the
initial one year contracts for the Soviet advisers.
Masire probably has suspected, and in our view rightly so, that
Moscow has provided direct financial support to opposition elements in
Botswana has modest economic and technical assistance agreements with
other Communist states. China has funded an agricultural development
project, provided small arms and ammunition and is now providing a team
of medical doctors.
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China also
agreed recently to carry out a $14 million refurbishment of Botswana's
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main rail line.
The Econamy*
As he begins his reelection campaign, Masire probably is relieved by
Botswana's strong economic rebound since early last year from a brief but
sharp recession. Production and sales of diamonds, the country's
principal export, spurted sharply upward, resulted in record earnings, and
made Botswana the largest diamond producer in the world. Foreign exchange
reserves have risen dramatically, and the balance of payments is a record
surplus. Botswana's external debt is low, with debt servicing absorbing
less than 6 percent of export earnings. Despite these improvements,
however, Masire recognizes that the recent recession underscored the ways
in which Botswana's narrowly-based, export-led economy, which is dependent
on diamonds, cattle, and metals, is vulnerable to events that are beyond
its control.
While in Washington, Masire probably will express his appreciation
for the economic development and food assistance Botswana has received in
the past from the US, about $160 million since 1970 and an appeal for an 25X1
increase in annual commitments of such aid. He has already requested
additional emergency food relief to cope with the effects of drought this
year, and probably hopes for a favorable response that will coincide with
his visit. The drought has devastated southern Africa since 1981,
aggravating Botswana's already chronic food deficiencies (even under
normal weather conditions Botswana cannot feed itself because of limited 25X1
arable land and water) and raising its dependence on imports of food from
South Africa and international food relief. More than half of the nearly
one million Botswana are now dependent to some degree on government
distribution of food, according to Embassy reports. Masire is a rancher
and is keenly interested in Botswana's important cattle industry, which
also has been seriously damaged by drought. Nonetheless, recent high
levels of beef production and x ort robably can be sustained for one
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* See Annex for a detailed discussion of Botswana's economic prospects.
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Masire may also hope that his visit to the United States will enhance
Botswana's tourist potential, a relatively untapped area for foreign
investment and economic development. The country has some of the last
great unspoiled areas in Africa, centered around the Okavango Delta in the
northwest, but there has been little development of tourist facilities,
nor has an effective international marketing effort been mounted.
Botswana plans to send a trade/investment mission to the US in 1985
spur interest in this and other areas of potential investment.
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ANNEX
Economic Performance and Prospects
Past Successes
Botswana has had one of the most impressive development records in
Africa. At the time of independence in 1966, Botswana was heavily 25X1
dependent on foreign assistance and per capita national income was about
$50, one of the lowest levels in Africa. Today Botswana finances all of
its operating budget and much of its development spending from its own
resources. Per capita national income now tops $900, according to the US
Embassy, and prospects are good for moderate gains in real growth for the
The 1970s were a decade of rapid, export-led economic growth, and of
stability for the budget and the balance of payments. The mining of
diamonds and of nickel and copper, begun in the early 1970s, boosted real
national income by an average of about 10 percent annually during the
decade. Increased customs receipts and mineral royalties led a 33-percent
annual rise in government revenues, while Gaborone maintained its
traditionally conservative approach to fiscal management and enjoyed
regular budget surpluses. Mining investments accounted for the bulk of
large inflows of private capital that, together with rapidly rising
exports, generated balance of payments surpluses.
Fundamental Weaknesses
The economy's good performance last year may have marked the
beginning of its recovery from the 1981-82 recession. Nonetheless,
Botswana's economy is fragile and extremely vulnerable to changes in the
diamond market, drought, and recurring outbreaks of cattle diseases.
Diamonds, for example, are Botswana's best friend but also its
greatest potential vulnerability. Diamond sales account for up to
two-thirds of all exports. Slumoing world demand for diamonds in
1981--especially for the gemstones that account for over one-third of
Botswanan production--combined with a weak metals market to trigger
Botswana's first decline in real national income. The diamond collapse
has compelled Gaborone to carry i massive stockpile of unsold output now
valued at more than $500 million, according to press reports. Moreover,
output from a massive new Australian mine, scheduled to begin production
next year, probably will have a depressing effect on the diamond market.
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The cattle industry, the country's second largest foreign exchange
earner, has been a major factor in economic growth and is still the main
activity of about 80 percent of all Batswana. With nearly 3 million head
of cattle the country has the highest cattle to people ratio (about 3:1)
in the world. Beef exports--primarily to South Africa and the European
Community--were just recovering from two devastating bouts of hoof and
mouth disease in 1979-80 when the drought hit. Some losses have been
prevented by maintaining a high slaughter rate, but average animal weights
are down. According to Embassy and press reporting, the combination of
slaughter and drought has reduced the national herd by some 800,000 head
since 1981. The US Embassy reports an additional 500,000 to 1 million
head may die from drought before the next rains in October.
The creation of new, nonagricultural jobs is likely to remain an
intractable economic problem, exacerbated by Botswana's rapid rate of
urbanization. The unemployment rate probably exceeded 12 percent last
year, hitting young people hardest and creating potentially fertile ground
for recruitment by opposition political parties. Botswana's high rate of
population growth is outpacing both the economy's ability to provide jobs
and Gaborone's ability to expand education and training. Only about 30
percent of the labor force is employed in the modern sector: mining
provides less than 10 percent of all such jobs.
The largest single private employer is the troubled nickel and copper
mine at Selebi-Pikwe, owned jointly by the government, Anglo-American of
South Africa, and a US firm that is the only significant US investor in
Botswana. The mine is considered by experts to be one of the most
technically efficient in the world, but because of weak world demand has
experienced a prolonged financial crisis since opening in 1974. Because
of the mine's political importance as a source of employment, however, the
government has persuaded its partners to keep the mine open through a
series of financial bail-outs.
Limits to Growth
Although Gaborone has demonstrated sound economic management and,
with the recent firming of diamond prices, has been cautiously optimistic
about the near term, there are serious and persistent obstacles to
economic diversification and growth over the longer term. The limited
availability of arable land and recurring drought will continue to be
major barriers to improved crop production. Moreover, impediments to a
significant expansion of manufacturing are unlikely to be overcome any
time soon. They include the small domestic market, severe shortages of
skilled manpower, limited raw materials, underdeveloped infrastructure--
especially water, power and transport--and formidable competition in the
regional market from well-established producers in Zimbabwe and South
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As a result of these obstacles, Botswana's wide range of financial
incentives for domestic and foreign private investment, and the inducement
of duty-free access to the South African market, have been largely
ineffective in attracting new investment. The few promising investment
prospects between now and the end of the decade are limited to
capital-intensive development of steam coal and soda ash deposits in
eastern Botswana. Plans call for coal exports to begin by the end of the
decade under an agreement with Royal Dutch Shell for a substantial
expansion of output. South Africa will be the major market for a soda ash
project just getting underway.
A less practical project that Botswana has nonetheless proposed is a
rail line to transport coal across the Kalahari Desert to the port at
Walvis Bay in Namibia. Such a line would for the first time open up
western Botswana to commercial development. The government has already
contracted for feasibility studies, but in our judgment and that of most
observers the project is fraught with technical and financial difficulties
as well as political uncertainty associated with negotiations for the
independence of Namibia.
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SUBJECT: BOTSWANA: President Masire's Visit
Original -- Frederick L. Wettering, Director African Affairs, NSC
1 -- Donald Gregg, Office of the Vice President
1 -- Chester Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of
African Affairs
1 -- James Bishop, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State,
Bureau of African Affairs
1 -- Robert Cabelly, Special Assistant to the Assistant
Secretary of State, Bureau of African Affairs
1 -- Hugh Montgomery, Director, State/INR
1 -- Herman Cohen, Deputy Director, State/INR
1 -- Leonardo Neher, Director INR/AA, Department of State
1 -- Peter Spicer, DIO/AF, Defense Intelligence Agency
1 -- Noel Koch, Deputy Assistant Secretary, International
Security Affairs, Department of Defense
1 -- Daniel Simpson, AF/S, Department of State
1 -- Douglas Mulholland, Special Assistant to the Secretary
(National Security), Department of the Treasury
1 -- David Peterson, Director, Office of Intelligence Liaison,
Department of Commerce
1 -- DCI
1 -- DOCI
1 -- SA/DCI/IA
1 -- Executive Director
1 -- NIO/Africa
1 -- NIC Action Group
1 -- DDO/Africa
1 -- DDI
1 -- ADDI
1 -- PDB Staff
1 -- ILS
1 -- C/DDI/PES
1 -- D/ALA
1 -- ALA Research Director
2 -- ALA/PS (one sourced copy; one clean copy)
4 -- OCPAS/IMD/CB
4 -- ALA/AF.
2 -- ALA/AF/S
4 -- ALA/AF/S
ALA/AF/S~ I(23 April 1984)
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