TERRORISM REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00893R000100130001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 5, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 31, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Idh
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Terrorism
Review
GI TR 83-007
31 March 1983
Copy 438
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Terrorism
Review F_
1 London Letter-Bomb Campaign
(OGI)
3 Peru: Government Successes Against Terrorists
(ALA)
5 Terrorist Exploitation of the Political Offense Exception
(OGI)
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Research
Director, Instability and Insurgency Center, Office of Global Issues, telephone
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London Letter-Bomb
Campaign)
Three groups appear to be responsible for much of the
continuing rash of letter bombs in London.
Since May 1982 the United Kingdom has been the
scene of at least 36 incidents of terrorism by mail.
Three letter bombs were sent to the US Embassy and
the US Navy Building in London, and others were
sent to British Government offices, foreign embassies,
political party offices, and private businesses.
The diversity of targets and multiple claims of respon-
sibility have complicated police investigations. Al-
though at least seven groups have claimed credit for
the incendiary attacks, police have dismissed as prob-
ably spurious claims from the Jewish Defense League,
the 2nd of April Group, and the Wat Tyler Peoples
Liberation Army. The arrest of a 14-year-old boy on
23 March in connection with the 1 December 1982
attack further confuses the picture. According to the
police, the following three terrorist groups appear to
be responsible for the majority of the letter bombs:
? The Scottish National Liberation Army (SNLA), a
Scottish separatist group opposed to British rule.
? The Animal Rights Militia (ARM), an extremist
group protesting animal vivisection and seal
hunting.
? The Makhnos Anarchist Army, a Ukrainian group
named for an anarchist in the era of the Russian
Revolution.
In addition to the three groups that have concentrated
their activity in London, two groups-the Angry
Brigade (an anarchist group) and the Army of the
Gael (a Scottish nationalist group)-have limited their
letter-bomb operations to targets outside the capital.
The confusion surrounding the responsible groups and
their motivations makes it difficult to identify the
threat level to US installations. We suspect, however,
that the publicity resulting from attacks on such
facilities as the US Embassy and the British Prime
Minister's Office may encourage more such attacks.
In the attacks to date, the letter bombs have contained
only small amounts of explosives, probably to avoid
personal injury and to preclude discovery by security
measures. (See table on page 2.)
Secret
GI TR 83-007
31 March 1983
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Letter-Bomb Attacks by Terrorist Groups
Scottish National Liberation Army
16 March 1983
15 March 1983a
17 February 1983
22 November 1982
19 June 1982
May 1982
17 March 1982
15 March 1983a
22 February 1983a
2 February 1983a
1 February 1983a
25 January 1983a
25 January 19838
Animal Rights Militia
28 February 1983
16 February 1983
15 February 1983
Prime Minister's Office, London
Prime Minister's Office, London
City Hall, Glasgow
British Industry Secretary, London
Political party headquarters, Edinburgh
Assembly rooms, Edinburgh
Government offices, Edinburgh
Government offices, Glasgow
Edinburgh
US Navy Building, London
US Embassy, London
Soviet Weekly Office, London
Soviet Embassy
Intourist office
Aeroflot office
London Furrier
Hull
Manchester
Canadian Embassy, London
Cambridge University Kidney Transplant Surgeon
Bristol University Veterinary School
Manchester Furrier
Agricultural Ministry, London
Prime Minister's Office, London
Office of Liberal Party leader, London
Office of Labor Party leader, London
Office of Social Democratic Party leader, London
Office of junior minister responsible for animals,
London
23 December 1982 Labor Party offices, London
a Considered to be related by Scotland Yard.
Jewish Defense League
Jewish Defense League
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Peru: Government Successes
Against Terrorists
forces have inflicted heavy casualties on the Sendero
Luminoso (SL) terrorist group since President
Belaunde authorized military involvement in counter-
terrorism last December. The US Embassy reports
that government forces and progovernment peasants
operating in the emergency zone-which comprises
sections of the central highland departments of Aya-
cucho, Apurimac, and Huancavelica-killed 62 ter-
rorists in the period 22-24 February alone. Since early
Peruvian security
25X1 January substantial numbers have been captured as
well. Additionally, police report
that they have now killed or captured nine of the 11
principal SL leaders in Lima. In late 1982 the group
was estimated to have more than 1,000 militants,
most of whom operate in the Ayacucho area.
the past two months against the terrorists.
have reacted by carrying out a number of attacks in
Police and military forces appear to be cooperating
well and to be maintaining good relations with civil-
ians in the area. According to the US defense attache,
military units in Ayacucho are used primarily for
static defense, civic action, and logistic support of the
police. This has enabled the police to patrol more
aggressively and reoccupy isolated rural posts. The
increased presence and reported restraint of the secu-
rity forces have enabled Lima to gather extensive
intelligence on Sendero members. Local inhabitants
who have been encouraged by successful government
operations to inform on the terrorists have been
victims of increasingly brutal attacks. Many peasants
Although the counterterrorist campaign has met with
considerable success, some military leaders privately
concede that eliminating Sendero Luminoso could
take two to three years. Many officers fear that the
terrorists will withdraw from the emergency zone and
establish new bases in adjoining areas. The govern-
ment's long-term success will hinge on the continued
maintenance of adequate security forces in the area,
the effectiveness of local civic action programs, and
the capture or killing of major terrorist leaders in the
field. The apparent progress in Ayacucho, however,
has probably strengthened the political position of the
Belaunde administration by improving its ties with
the the military and boosting public confidence.
Secret
GI TR 83-007
31 March 1983
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Secret
Terrorist Exploitation
of the Political Offense
Exception
Terrorist groups have sought to exploit the interna-
tional legal system both for propaganda purposes and
to secure release or obtain better treatment for their
imprisoned members-tactics we expect to see refined
and increasingly employed.
Although democratic states rely heavily on extradi-
tion to counter international terrorism, such efforts
often run afoul of traditions of political asylum and
considerations of national sovereignty, which terror-
ists are able to exploit. The most successful legal
defense used by terrorists to avoid extradition is the
"political offense exception," a standard provision in
extradition agreements that prohibits extradition for
an offense deemed to be essentially political. It has
been used to best effect when the requesting country
has a reputation as repressive and when political
considerations have been brought to bear. The lack of
a consensus definition as to what constitutes a politi-
cal offense ultimately leaves the determination to the
state receiving the extradition request; often political
and economic considerations, rather than legal merit,
prove to be the prime determinants in an extradition
decision.
Terrorist groups that regularly employ sophisticated
legal defenses and heavily rely on the political offense
exception argument include the Provisional Irish Re-
publican Army (PIRA), both wings of the Basque
Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), the West German Red
Army Faction (RAF), and the Italian Red Brigades
(see table).
Of all European terrorist groups, the Spanish ETA
has been the most successful in avoiding extradition.
Both wings use France as a safehaven and exploit the
French tradition of political asylum, liberal interpre-
tation of the political offense exception, and the
government's desire to placate the French Basque
minority. Since 1975, the French Government has not
honored any of the more than 20 S anish requests for
extradition of ETA fugitives. 25X1
Although the West German KAr nas been mvoivea
in several highly publicized extradition cases, its legal
efforts have been unsuccessful. RAF sympathizer
groups, however, in some instances have generated
considerable favorable publicity. The Italian Red
Brigades, in contrast to other European terrorist
groups, make less use of the political offense exception
not only because they are involved in fewer extradi-
tion cases but, we believe, because the Italian political
system is widely perceived by West Europeans as
accommodating a diversity of views, thus reducing the
credibility of such a defense.F___~ 25X1
In our view, the political offense exception has been
used to best effect by ethnic separatists. Such groups
can often persuasively document a history of serious
grievances, government repression, organized resist-
ance to the central authority, and a base of popular
support, thereby demonstrating a political rationale
for their violent acts. Thus, we believe, Basque and
Irish nationalists can present a more compelling case
than an anarchic group such as the German Red
Army Faction. 25X1
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G! TR 83-007
31 March 1983
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Political Offense Exception: Key Terrorist Extradition Cases
Requested by/ Incident Group Outcome
Requested of
West Germany/Greece Pohle case (1976). Freed from a German RAF Extradition affirmed. An Athens court
jail in return for a kidnaped Berlin mayoral denied extradition on grounds that act
candidate, Pohle fled to Greece where he constituted a political offense; after the
was arrested. German Government exerted extremely
heavy pressure on the Greek Government,
the Greek Supreme Court reversed the
decision.
West Germany/France Croissant case (1977). Charged with pro- RAF Extradition affirmed. A French court re-
viding operational support to the RAF,' jected initial German warrant on grounds
Croissant fled to France and requested that charges cited were political and non-
political asylum. ored only one of 15 charges in second
warrant. Croissant became a cause celebre
among French Leftists and an embarrassment
to President Giscard.
West Germany, Abu Daoud case (1977). Organizer of the Black Extradition denied. The French Govern-
Israel/France 1972 attack against the Israeli Olympic September ment under heavy Arab pressure denied
team, Daoud was arrested by French au- (PLO) extradition on grounds that the German
thorities in 1977. warrant was technically defective and had
not been followed by an official request
through diplomatic channels. The Israeli
request was denied on grounds that the
offense had not taken place on French soil
and therefore the Franco-Israeli extradi-
tion agreement did not apply.
West Germany/ Folkerts case (1978). Germany requested RAF Extradition affirmed. The Dutch Supreme
Netherlands extradition for crimes including the murder Court denied extradition for Schleyer mur-
of German industrialist, Hanns-Martin der on political offense grounds. Folkerts
Schleyer. was ultimately. extradited on other charges,
but court finding alarmed both German
and Dutch officials as it placed the Dutch
Government in the position of appearing to
sanction political murder.
Italy/France Piperno case (1979). Extradition requested Red Brigades Extradition affirmed. The French court
for complicity in the kidnaping and murder rejected the initial Italian warrant on
of former Italian Prime Minister Aldo grounds that the cited offenses were politi-
Moro. cal but ultimately honored two of the 46
charges listed in a second warrant. Piperno
was returned to Italy where the Italian
court released him for lack of evidence.
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Political Offense Exception: Key Terrorist Extradition Cases (continued)
Requested by/ Incident
Requested of
Spain/France Linaza case (1981). Spain requested extra- ETA-M
dition for the murder of six Civil Guard
members, assassination of a municipal
councilor, and the bombing of Spain's
nuclear facility near Milano.
for the
Extradition denied. A French court,
first time since the death of Franco 1975),
ruled to extradite an ETA member, but
return
the
Linaza family and the French Basque
Israel/United States Abu Eain case (1981). Israel requested PLO
extradition for a bombing that killed two
and wounded 36 in a Tiberius market
square.
ild be
y the
,cted
the
Piperno case (1982). Extradition requested
for supporting Red Brigade activities and
complicity in the Moro and other murders.
jected three separate Italian extradition
tion
Terrorist success in using the political offense excep-
tion depends primarily on the interests of the request-'
ed government, the capabilities of sympathizer groups
to manipulate public opinion, and the nature of the
crime itself. We believe that terrorist exploitation of
the international legal system will increase as groups
refine their tactics and that the political offense
exception will continue to represent a prime legal
weapon until democratic governments feel sufficiently
threatened to effectively narrow its application.
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Statistical Overview
International Terrorist Incidents, 1982-838
Total, 490
Of which: US targets, 236
10
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
\I - 1 1
0
J
A
S
0
N
D
J
F
M A M J
1982
1983
Total
Category of
T
t
l
73
90
50
57
45
46
55
52
1 I
22
490
International
o
a
Terrorist Incidents,
1982-83,by
i
Kid
3
3
3
1
2
2
2
16
Month
nap
ng
Barricade,
1
1
7
1
6
2
1
1
20
hostage
Bombing
42
31
13
17
18
23
20
23
6
193
Armed attack
2
1
3
1
7
Hijacking
3
4
1
3
3
1
4
5
2
26
Assassination
3
4
5
1
4
2
19
Threats, hoax
19
45
16
22
11
14
19
14
7
167
Sniping
1
2
3
2
1
1
2
12
a Figures for the most recent months are subject
to change as additional data are received.
bBreak-ins, conspiracy, shoot-out, etc. 25X1
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and had 10 additional criminal cases pending against him when he escaped.
Chronology
This chronology includes significant events, incidents, and trends in
international terrorism. It provides commentary on their back-
ground, importance, and wider implications.
France: Bombings in Toulouse
Since October the Toulouse area has experienced several anarchist bombings.
Socialist Party headquarters was bombed on 14 October and the offices of a
nuclear power equipment producer were bombed on 17 December. The bombing
on 23 December of Regional Television Studios has been claimed by Groupe
D'Action Anarchiste. The long radical tradition and large university population of
Toulouse, combined with the transitory nature of groups that organize, conduct an
attack, and disband, have hampered police investigations. F 25X1
11 January 1983 Portugal: Escape of Portuguese Terrorist
In Lisbon, three armed men freed Popular Forces of 25 April (FP-25) member
Daniel Horacio Martins Tavares while he was being escorted from prison to a
hospital for medical examination. Martins Tavares was serving'a 10-year sentence
24 January 1983 Greece: Greek Bombing Suspect Arrest
In Kavala, Greek police arrested a suspect in the bombing on 12 February of
Khrysoupolis Airport, which caused severe damage. The suspect admitted planting
five bombs in Xanthi, Kavala, and Drama and is a possible suspect in the 1980-81
Athens department store arson attacks, which we believe were set by the Greek
leftist terrorist group Revolutionary Group October 1980.F I 25X1
claimed credit for previous attacks on two other computer-related firms.
28 January 1983 France: Anarchists Attack Computer Center
In Toulouse, the Committee for Liquidating or Diverting Computers (CLODO)
claimed responsibility for the bombing of the French Government Computer 25X1
Center, causing $5 million damage. A confessor letter left at the scene also
7 February 1983 Belgium: Bombings of French Interests
In Brussels, a bomb exploded at the French Ambassador's residence, followed by a
second bomb at the Air France office. Initial forensic reports indicate the bombs.
were skillfully assembled, but police have no clues to the identities of the _ __,
Secret
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10. February 1983 Netherlands: Bombing of French Consulate
In Amsterdam, a bomb exploded at the French Consulate, causing minor damage.
No one was injured in the daylight attack. A claim of responsibility by the
Militante Autonome Front is not being taken seriously by police, despite the
group's previous claims concerning the July 1982 attack on the Netherlands
Socialist Party Secretariat and the January 1983 fire in the Amsterdam under-
ground railway.
as foreign interests.
14 February 1983 France: Bombing of Aviation Parts Firm
In Paris, an obscure group calling itself "Bakunin-Gdansk-Paris-Guatemala-
Salvador" claimed responsibility for the bombing of an aviation parts firm. The
group surfaced in December 1981 and says it is anti-US, anti-Soviet, and antiwar
"production." It has claimed credit for 16 bombing attacks against French as well
Turkey: Labor Official Slain-Correction
Subsequent investigation of the assassination of the President of a Turkish labor
union official in Istanbul (Terrorism Review, 3 March 1983) has revealed Dev Sol
terrorists were not involved in the attack, which appears to have been a criminal
assault.
for the attacks, which appear related.
15 February 1983 West Germany: Car Bombs
In Kassel, an incendiary device exploded under a US privately owned vehicle. A
second crude incendiary device was discovered under a vehicle belonging to a US
firm as the result of an anonymous telephone call. No group has yet claimed credit
Guatemala: Guerrilla Cooperation Poses Increased Threat
Increased combat cooperation among the three major Guatemalan guerrilla
groups is a growing threat to the armed forces,
Coordination is being carried out under t e
aegis of the Guatemalan Nations Revolutionary Union, which,
was organized in 1981 at the direction of Fidel Castro
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authorities are pursuing this investigation for information on specific targets.
Liquidating or Diverting Computers and Groupe D'Action Anarchiste. French
that terrorists in the Toulouse area intend to switch the focus of attacks from
civilian nuclear targets to the "military/industrial complex." Several US compa-
nies located in the area are involved in defense-related production and may become
targets. Two anarchist groups currently active in Toulouse are the Committee for
French authorities have learned
room suitable for use as a prison cell, lending credence to the kidnaping theory.
planned PL kidnaping in Sicily. four PL members had 25X1
been monitoring the movements of an unidentified local "US military representa-
tive." A search of Umana's summer home in a secluded area revealed a hidden
the arrest on "
In Sigonella,
24 February of Prima Linea (PL) terrorist Salvatore Umana may have thwarted a
the attack was in reprisal for recent executions in Guatemala
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN). Honduran officials believe
Honduras: Guatemalan Consulate Bombed
A small homemade bomb thrown from a taxi slightly damaged the Guatemalan
Consulate in Tegucigalpa. Credit was claimed by the Lorenzo Zelaya group, 25X1
which has often engaged in joint operations in Honduras with the Salvadoran
10 March 1983 France: Terrorist Threat to French Industry
12 March 1983 India: Another Explosion Despite NAM Security
An explosion in the lavatory of the New Delhi post office resulted in one injury. As
in the bomb explosions on 8 March at the bus terminal and bazaar in New Delhi,
police have speculated that Sikh extremists are responsible. F___1 25X1
West Germany: Bombing of Turkish Bank
In Nuremberg, a bomb exploded in front of the Turkish Bank, causing slight
damage and no injuries 25X1
13 March 1983 Netherlands: Onkruit Demonstration
In Rotterdam, 100 members of the antimilitarist group Onkruit occupied the US
military Traffic Management Command Headquarters and painted peace slogans
on the walls. Local police arrested approximately 45 individuals. Despite the
minimal damage, we view Onkruit as a threat to US military installations. Its
ideology and past activities are anti-US, and it is capable of conducting damaging
terrorist attacks 25X1
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14 March 1983 Switzerland: Pipe Bomb Explosion
In Bern, a pipe bomb exploded in front of the Cantonal Parliament building,
causing little damage. No group has claimed credit for the attack, which is the lat-
est in a series of minor attacks since January. We have no indication if the attacks
are related or if one group is responsible for all of them.
15 March 1983 Canada: Reward Offered for Terrorist Capture
The Canadian Government has offered a $100,000 reward for information leading
to the capture of the assassin of the Turkish Military Attache in Ottawa in August
1982. The Turkish Government has actively sought visible forms of cooperation
from West European and North American governments in countering Armenian
15-18 March 1983 Lebanon: Attacks on Multinational Force
Troops assigned to the MNF have become the targets of grenade and sniper
attacks. An unidentified assailant threw a grenade from a passing car at a French
sentry in the Ash Shiyyah area of South Beirut. One French marine was injured.
On 16 March, an 11-man USMC foot patrol accompanied by a US Navy
corpsman were attacked by a single male who threw a handgrenade. Hours earlier,
nine Italian soldiers were wounded by a rocket-propelled grenade and gunfire from
unidentified gunmen on the road to Beirut airport. We believe that Iran may be
encouraging extremist Shiite groups to undertake terrorist acts against US and
nothing.
16 March 1983 Japan: Incendiary Device Found at.US Naval Base
Japanese newspapers received calls on 15 March claiming a firebombing of
"Hario" ordnance facility. The next day an incendiary device, which had failed to
ignite, was discovered in a magazine at the US naval base, Hario-Shima Ordnance
Depot. Shortly thereafter the Japanese police received an anonymous call that two
more devices had been placed in the area, but further inspections turned up
Libyan denials concerning his whereabouts.
17 March 1983 Spain: Bombing of Libyan Embassy
In Madrid, a bomb exploded outside the Libyan Embassy, causing little damage
and no injuries. The Imam Musa Sadr Command of the Black Brigade subse-
quently claimed responsibility for the bombing. The Imam Musa Sadr is a Shiite
Muslim leader who disappeared in the 1970s on a trip to Libya. Followers of the
Imam have conducted attacks to attempt to force the Imam's release, despite
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20 March 1983 Greece: Greek Publisher Slain
In Athens, the Greek leftist group Anti-Military Struggle has claimed responsibil-
ity for the assassination of a rightist Greek publisher. Police sources said wording
of the confessor letter indicated the group might be the same as the one that
took responsibility for the killing of CIA officer Richard Welch in 1975. The
17 November Revolutionary Organization claimed credit for two other assassina-
tions in addition to the Welch killing. 25X1
21 March 1983 France: Attempted Bombing Attack on ASALA Leader
In Paris, police defused a bomb attached to a car driven by the leader of the Na-
tional Armenian Movement, a group with links to the terrorist Armenian Secret
Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA). ASALA has claimed responsibil-
ity for numerous attacks on Turkish targets in an attempt to obtain independence
for Armenia and Turkish admission of the 1915 "genocide" of 1.5 million
Armenians. No one has claimed credit for the abortive bombing attempt, although
ASALA representatives have publicly accused Turkey of sending "hit squads" to-
assassinate Armenian leaders. 25X1
Spain: Basque Kidnaping
In San Sebastian, the Anti-Capitalist Autonomous Commandos (CAA) has
claimed responsibility for the kidnaping of a Basque industrialist. The CAA is an
anarchist offshoot of the Basque separatist group Fatherland and Liberty/ Military
Wing. 25X1
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Secret
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