LAW AND NATIONAL SECURITY INTELLIGENCE REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00806R000100080005-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 13, 2010
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: June 1, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/13: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100080005-7
A I~ AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
A
~
STANDING COMMITTEE Law and National Security
INTELLIGENCE REPORT
Volume 7, Number 6 John Norton Moore, Chairman
Secretary Shultz Addresses Conference
On Bipartisanship in Foreign Affairs
word-" nonpartisanship"-to describe the American
tradition of cooperation on foreign policy. But on re-
flection, I decided it wasn't quite right. I prefer the term
that most of us do use: "bipartisanship." Parties make
our system work. Our political leaders and legislators
are strong-minded individuals, but our democratic pro-
cess works by the contention of ideas, organized around
two parties, tempering policy by the heat of debate. Bi-
partisanship means that our parties care about an issue,
work it through by the process of compromise, and then
unite behind the policy that has been formulated.
A bipartisan foreign policy achieved great things in
the years after World War II, such as the Marshall Plan,
NATO, and the foundation of the world economic sys-
tem. At other times, partisanship and domestic division
have seriously harmed our interests, notably in the de-
feat of the Versailles Treaty in 1919, and during the
periods of McCarthyism and then Vietnam.
Modernization of our defenses is essential. [But] de-
spite our profound differences with the Soviet Union,
the American people recognize we have a common inter-
est in averting nuclear holocaust. Every president in the
nuclear age has sought negotiations to control nuclear
weapons and reduce the danger of war. We must con-
tinue to resist Soviet encroachments firmly while hold-
ing open the door to more constructive relations. In the
past, we have tended to alternate between building up
our strength and negotiations. But both must go to-
gether. That is the consistency and coherence that
should discipline our strategy.
Pleads for Support of Central America Policy
Secretary of State George P. Shultz was the lead-off
speaker at a one-day conference on "Restoring Biparti-
sanship in Foreign Affairs" conducted at the May-
flower Hotel, Washington, D.C., on May 23, under
the sponsorship of the Standing Committee on Law and
National Security and the Committee on Executive-
Congressional Relations of the Section of International
Law and Practice of the American Bar Association.
Other speakers included Senators Daniel Patrick
Moynihan and Jeremiah Denton; Congressmen Henry
J. Hyde, Dante B. Fascell and Richard B. Cheney; and
from the public sector, Lloyd N. Cutler, former White
House counsel to President Carter and William G.
Hyland, editor of Foreign Affairs.
The secretary said that the United States had achieved
great things when it pursued a bipartisan foreign policy.
A very large part of his speech, however, was devoted to
the situation in Central America where, he said, no such
bipartisan support existed.
All of the speakers agreed with the principle that bi-
partisan support was essential for foreign policy initia-
tives to be successful. Some were frankly pessimistic,
some were optimistic on the possibility of stimulating
bipartisanship by appeals or remonstrations. Although
a number of the participants made outstanding contri-
butions, constraints of space compel us to limit our-
selves here to printing excerpts from the remarks of
Secretary Shultz. The conference proceedings will be
printed in brochure form and should be available in a
few months.
I have given these remarks the title: "Restoring Bi-
partisanship in Foreign Affairs."
When I began work on this speech, I used a different
The Situation in Central America
Today, over 90 percent of the population of Latin
America and the Caribbean lives under democratic gov-
ernments-in contrast to only one-third in 1979. This
heartening development should inspire us as we re-
awaken to our historic interest and moral responsibility
to promote and support democracy around the world.
Continued on page 2
Editor: Wllll un C. Mott. Associate Editor: David Martin. Standing Committee on Law and National Security,
ABA, 750 North Lake Shore Drive, Chicago, M. 60611
Copyright O 1985 American Bar Association, ISSN 0736.2773
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/13: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100080005-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/13: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100080005-7
Bipartisanship in Foreign Affairs
Continued from page 1
We have broad bipartisan agreement that U.S. policy
in Central America should foster democracy, economic
progress, social reform, and regional security. We also
agree on the underlying economic and social causes of
instability in Central America. In the past four years, 77
percent of our aid to the region has been economic, not
military. At the suggestion of a giant of bipartisanship,
the late Senator Henry Jackson, President Reagan in
1983 appointed a distinguished commission to find a
basis for a bipartisan policy for the region. Headed by
Henry Kissinger, the commission included three leading
Democrats, Robert Strauss, a former party chairman,
Lane Kirkland, president of the AFL-CIO, and Mayor
Henry Cisneros of San Antonio. As recommended by
the commission, we have requested enactment of an $8
billion aid program over five years. Congress has ap-
proved $1.8 billion, and the authorization of the bal-
ance is in the foreign aid bills now pending. The Carib-
bean Basin Initiative to give countries of that area open
access to the U.S. market is another example of biparti-
san cooperation.
Thanks to the support of Congress, we are starting to
achieve our goals in El Salvador, which has held four
fair elections in three years. Under President Duarte,
the army's performance is improving, human rights
violations are down sharply, and the roots of democracy
are growing. The guerrillas are weaker, and President
Duarte is seeking a dialogue with them.
In all but one of the other countries in Central Amer-
ica, democracy is taking hold. Nicaragua is the one ex-
ception. Our policy toward that country has been
hindered, to some extent, by misconceptions and con-
fusion about our policies. Political partisanship, I am
compelled to say, also has burdened our task.
We seem to have general, and growing, agreement
that the Nicaraguan communist regime poses a threat
to the security of the region. We have general, and
growing, agreement that, rather than fulfill the demo-
cratic promises of the 1979 revolution, the Nicaraguan
leaders are increasing repression. We also seem to have
general, and growing, acceptance that their huge mili-
tary build-up and the large presence of foreign com-
munist military advisers in the country are obstacles to a
peaceful settlement. The dispute in this country is about
some of the tactics of addressing the problem.
This country has made a major effort to cooperate
with Nicaragua from the outset. When the Sandinistas
took power in July 1979, until 1981, we gave Nicaragua
$118 million in aid, more than they received from any
other country. The Carter administration initially halted
our aid because of the Sandinistas' attempts to subvert
El Salvador.Thereafter, we made major attempts to re-
solve our differences in August 1981 and April 1982,
Continued on page 7
London ABA Conference:
National Security Leaks-
Is There A Legal Solution?
The Standing Committee on Law and National
Security of the American Bar Association will pre-
sent a panel discussion on the important and time-
ly subject of national security leaks at the ABA
annual meeting in London. The program will take
place at the Royal Garden Hotel, Kensington, on
Wednesday, July 17, from 2 to 5 p.m.
Controversy over leaks of national security in-
formation has made headlines in both the U.S.
and Britain in recent months. The U.S. admin-
istration is reported to be seeking new legislation
to reinforce its powers against government em-
ployees who disclose classified information, while
at the same time senior U.S. government officials
have accused members of the U.S. media of irre-
sponsibility in publishing certain information dis-
closed to them and have taken steps to try to re-
duce media access to classified information. In
Britain, the trial of Clive Ponting under the Of-
ficial Secrets Act for disclosing information to a
member of Parliament has provoked intense con-
troversy over the validity of the Official Secrets
Act.
The discussion, entitled "National Security
Leaks-Is There A Legal Solution?", will bring
together a distinguished panel of U.S., British and
Canadian experts in matters of national security,
the media, and legal controls on the dissemination
of information. The panel will focus on whether
new legislation is needed in the U.S. and, if so,
what form that legislation should take. The dis-
cussion will include an assessment of the magni-
tude of the problem and of the feasibility of con-
trolling leaks, and debate on the public policy and
legal ramifications of the problem. Comparisons
will be made to the British and Canadian experi-
ence under their respective Official Secrets Acts.
The panel will include such experts as Brian
Raymond, who was Clive Ponting's solicitor;
Douglas Rutherford, Q.C., assistant deputy at-
torney general (criminal law) of Canada; Kathleen
Buck, Office of General Counsel, Department of
Defense; Richard Willard, acting assistant at-
torney general, Civil Division, Department of
Justice; Carl Stern, NBC-TV News; Daniel
Schorr, journalist; Mark Lynch, staff counsel
with the ACLU National Security Project; and
Thomas Martin, formerly acting assistant at-
torney general, Civil Division, Department of
Justice. The panel will be moderated by Daniel B.
Silver, former general counsel, Central In-
telligence Agency.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/13: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100080005-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/13: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100080005-7
Reflections on Anniversaries, Detente,
And Disinformation
By Frank R. Barnett
Editor's Note: There is a strong historical bond be-
tween the National Strategy Information Center, of
which Mr. Barnett is president, and the ABA Standing
Committee on Law and National Security. Frank
Barnett, whose speech on April 30 to the committee's
final breakfast session of the 1985 spring series is repro-
duced below, has been educational consultant to the
committee since its inception. The two groups have con-
ducted educational efforts in close cooperation, and as
John Norton Moore, chairman of the committee, has
indicated, they will continue to do so.
Mr. Barnett was introduced by William J. Casey,
director of central intelligence, whose remarks are also
reproduced below.
Mr. Casey. Frank Barnett is an educator, a founda-
tion executive, a specialist in Soviet strategy, in European
theater politics, and in defense innovation, an author
and lecturer, and consultant on national security affairs.
Frank and I go back a long way. He was discovered
on the' banks of the Wabash, teaching literature at
Wabash College. He had worked with the army in Ber-
lin, and had come to know the Russians as have few
Americans, either now or then. He wanted more action,
and turned up in New York. At that time, some of us
were trying to set up an organization called the Ameri-
can Friends of Russian Freedom. We wanted to help
those Russians whom the Soviet regime sought to re-
patriate. There was good reason to believe that their
fate, if repatriated, would be execution or the concen-
tration camps of the gulag archipelago. We persuaded
Frank to become the executive director of that organiza-
tion, and he carried on that work nobly for several years.
Since that time, he has done a great many things. I
think the most notable is the creation and the develop-
ment of the National Strategy Information Center. I
credit him with being an extremely effective director of
that organization. I have always taken particular pride
in watching the organization take shape under his direc-
tion, and in watching the many things that Frank Barnett
has done to contribute to our national security. Let me
cite just one example. It was Frank Barnett and his team
who were responsible for the fact that there are now na-
tional security courses offered on 500 college campuses
in the United States. I recall that when this program
started, the ROTC was being driven off the campuses.
Frank and his colleagues had the concept of enriching
the curricula of the ROTC, and they developed this into
formal programs of national security studies. At that
time, there were probably not half a dozen professors of
national security in the United States. I recall asking at a
NATO meeting in 1970 how many such programs there
were in Europe. Not surprisingly, the answer was that
there were only a handful. Since that time, thanks in
large measure to Frank's considerable influence in
Europe, a number of similar programs have been estab-
lished.
Frank and I have had a few escapades together. There
was a time when we were supporting Robert A. Taft for
the Republican nomination in Chicago, and our oppon-
ents campaigned on the slogan that Taft couldn't win.
This was, I think, the first covert action of a foundation
called the Liberty Fund. We had Pierre Goodrich and a
few others-I think Frank was the key person among
them-who produced a full-page news memorandum
which said, "Ike can't win." It was very persuasively
done and we almost convinced him!
The work that Frank has done for some 20 years has
made an important contribution to the development of
our military defenses and to the ongoing modernization
of our defense establishment. But, the enemy has learned
how to get inside our defenses, how to manipulate our
public opinion, how to manipulate our political process,
and how to conduct a propaganda campaign using the
techniques of semantics and various kinds of psycho-
logical skills. This is something we have to learn to cope
with. Out at Langley we are holding a two-day seminar
on this question: the manipulation of public opinion by
our adversaries. This is a subject that I think Frank
could well add to his repertoire.
And with that, I'll introduce Frank. It's a real pleasure
to be here today.
Mr. Barnett. Ladies and gentlemen, I'm very grateful
to Bill Casey, not only for that generous introduction,
but for serving as a founding director of NSIC, and
even more for being a friend and tutor for over three
decades.
While I have the chance, I want to add something:
Bill, I have the absolute conviction that if General
"Wild Bill" Donovan were with us today, he would be
just as happy as the rest of your friends that his shoes
fit you so comfortably. And I also would take this
opportunity to refute the rumor that General Donovan
used to call you "The Mumbling Pimpernel."
I owe other debts of gratitude to a number of men in
this room. The ABA Committee on Law and National
Security has been my regiment for nearly 25 years. In
fact, NSIC owes its genesis to the prompting and sup-
port of former and present members of this committee
-like Lewis Powell, Morry Leibman, Bill Mott, Jack
Marsh, and John Norton Moore-to all of whom I pay
deep tribute and thanks.
If NSIC has had some small success in implanting
courses on national security policy in universities both
here and in Europe, it's partly because we've tried to
emulate the modus operandi of this committee. That
"m.o.," as I see it, is to build consensus on unimpeach-
able research; avoid "hardening of the categories" in
Continued on page 4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/13: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100080005-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/13: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100080005-7
Anniversaries, Detente, and Disinformation
Continued from page 3
the body politic; and enlist liberals and conservatives
on the same team, animating people who agree to dis-
agree on secondary issues but are willing to stand to-
gether against all forms of totalitarian aggression.
One of the few compensations of becoming a senior
citizen is that people seem slightly more tolerant of your
banalities; or perhaps it's rather that your antennae
have atrophied, and you don't really notice the im-
patience with which your modest gifts of wisdom are
really received. In either case, counting on your forbear-
ance, I ask leave to reminisce about World War II anni-
versaries, detente, and disinformation.
Soviets and U.S. Meet on the Elbe
Let me begin with anniversaries: 40 years ago last
Thursday, the American 69th Infantry met the First
Ukranian Army at the Elbe River, cutting Nazi Ger-
many in two. By random luck, I was there, and by an
even more improbable chance, I became the interpreter
for the U.S. military government unit that worked with
the Red Army to repatriate Soviet displaced persons
and POWs. At first, the Russian and American GIs got
along famously. The Russians were boisterous and
friendly; we sang together, we applauded while they
danced, we traded souvenirs, drank too much vodka,
and relished those glorious weeks in May following the
end of the war in Europe. As the troops from both sides
of the Elbe got to know each other better, GIs would
pull out sweat-stained wallets, to show a Russian pal
photos of home back in Denver or Des Moines. Quite
often the pictures would show a small house, a Ford in
the driveway, and handsome shoes on the feet of wives
and children.
Soviet soldiers were astonished. It was not that great
affluence was on display; rather it was that ordinary
GIs, the American proletariat, carried visible proof that
workers under capitalism were not so oppressed as
Stalinist mythology contended. Fraternization began to
spread a dangerous virus to the East. And then the pic-
nic ended.
In the first days of June 1945, the Iron Curtain came
down on the Elbe. Regular units of the Red Army were
withdrawn, and replaced by an MVD detachment, with
Mongolian cadres who in effect created a "cordon san-
itaire" between Russians and Americans. The Mongol-
ians spoke no German, and didn't even appear to speak
Russian. They carried Al Capone-type tommyguns,
with which they unpredictably blasted birds and shot up
the river. So we stayed prudently on our side. The era of
friendship on the Elbe was short-lived. And despite
propaganda charades it has never been renewed. The
Mongolian machine-gunners have been replaced with
barbed wire, minefields and the Berlin wall; but whether
we refer to "cold war," or the cosmetics of detente, the
reality of protracted conflict remains. In fact, the cere-
mony on the Elbe last week was overshadowed by the
recent murder of Major Nicholson, for which the Krem-
lin offers neither remorse nor apology.
Nazi Genocide and the Soviet Record
No one can doubt the need to honor the victims of
Hitler's war and reaffirm the righteousness of the
crusade against fascism. We must never forget Dachau.
But not every holocaust has been perpetrated by the SS,
nor have European Jews been the only objects of state
terror. Yet, if "never again" is to have operational
meaning today, the world must direct effective outrage
against the gauleiters of Lenin and Mao as well. We
shall master the fearful lesson that Hitler taught the
democracies only when we comprehend that the "killing
fields" of Cambodia are the moral equivalent of Ausch-
witz. Thus, in light of communist genocide in Southeast
Asia, and the ongoing butchery of Afghan civilians by
the Red Army, the relevant lessons of World War II
must include anniversaries the Kremlin prefers to forget.
Most historians cite September 1, 1939, the date of
Germany's invasion of Poland, as the start of World
War II. But on August 23, with the signing of a non-
aggression treaty in Moscow between Nazi Germany
and Stalin's Russia, the red dictator freed the hands of
his Nazi counterpart for the prelude to the Holocaust.
The Molotov-Ribbentrop pact had a secret blueprint for
the partition of Eastern Europe into Nazi and Soviet
spheres of influence. As early as 1935, according to his-
torian Paul Johnson, Stalin privately put out periodic
feelers to persuade the Nazis to relinquish their anti-
Soviet crusade, and settle for a totalitarian brotherhood
of mutual respect and divided spoils.
Not only did the Hitler-Stalin accord loose the dogs
of war in Europe; the Soviet Union provided crucial
material support to fuel the Luftwaffe in the skies above
Britain and drive the Panzers in the invasion of the Low
Countries and France. Soviet oil, rubber, zinc, copper,
manganese and grain were all supplied to Nazi Germany
during the first 22 months of the war. Moscow, to this
day, accuses the U.S. and West Germany of "pro-fas-
cism." We should never forget that the first wave of the
Nazi "blitzkrieg" was fed with Soviet supplies.
Stalin's designs "metastasized" during the period of
Nazi-Soviet collaboration. Soviet armies invaded Galicia
on the 17th day of the German-Polish war, attacking
Polish troops from the rear. More than a million and a
half Poles were deported in 1939 and 1940 by the Red
Army. The eastern half of Poland was submerged in the
gulag, in the context of fraternal collaboration be-
tween the NKVD and the Gestapo. And then thousands
of Polish officers were massacred in the Katyn Forest
to further Stalin's goal of decapitating Polish national-
ism, which would otherwise prove an obstacle to the
Kremlin's post-war expansion.
Next came Russia's winter war with Finland-an un-
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/13: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100080005-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/13: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100080005-7
provoked power grab against a peaceful neighbor, frus-
trated in part by the tenacity of Finnish arms. And then
the three Baltic nations, independent since 1918, were
smuggled into Soviet dungeons in 1940. The horror of
Hitler's "final solution" for the Jews was foreshad-
owed when Stalin's boxcars transported-by the tens of
thousands-the future of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania
to extinction in the Siberian permafrost.
And finally, another neutrality pact-this one be-
tween the Soviet Union and Japan in April 1941-stabil-
ized Japan's rear, while the Tojo cabinet completed its
plans for Pearl Harbor.
Thus Stalin was either a bumbling broker of World
War II, or at least a co-sponsor of many state crimes
that led to its outbreak. That he was ultimately betrayed
by Hitler, his partner in genocide, scarcely entitles him
to our sympathy.
Our sincerest sorrow and gratitude, however, can
rightly be reserved for the millions of Soviet citizens
who shed their blood fighting Hitler's armies. Human-
ity also owes compassion to other millions: Russians,
Ukrainians, Crimean Tartars and the like, all victims of
the Kremlin's internal war against its own people, which
continued despite the war against Hitler.
Some may ask if this is "ancient history," with no
meaning for today. Well, the Polish nation knows bet-
ter. The workers who built "Solidarity," only to see it
crushed on orders from Moscow, had fathers who were
even more brutally betrayed by Russians. To decimate
the potential leadership of post-war Poland, Stalin de-
liberately halted the Red Army offensive outside of
Warsaw for two months in 1944, to give the Germans
ample time to wipe out the resistance forces in Warsaw.
Cordell Hull's memoirs tell us that Stalin refused to
grant landing rights to American bombers so they could
drop arms and supplies to the Poles. With 200,000 anti-
Soviet Poles in their graves, it was easy for Stalin to im-
prison the handful of pro-Western leaders who returned
from exile in London after the war, and install Mos-
cow's puppets in their stead.
The Soviet People and the Leninist Oligarchy
Stalin's crimes do not diminish the bravery and suf-
fering of the Soviet people during the war against Hitler.
The Russians are not our enemies. Rather, it is the Len-
inist oligarchy, which uses Russia as a base for project-
ing power, which is the enemy of all of us. Thus it would
be folly to ignore the legacy of Lenin and Stalin as we
celebrate the victory over the Nazis. For while Adolph
Hitler's regime was obliterated forever in 1945, Joseph
Stalin's political and ideological heirs occupy offices in
the Kremlin today.
Some will object to that assertion and will postulate
yet again another "thaw," another Prague spring, an-
other helping of goulash communism with a human
face. But so far, every detente has resulted in more
Soviet throwweight, fresh communist insurrection,
more refugees and new bases for the export of subver-
sion.
Some American entrepreneurs, anxious to sell tech-
nology to Moscow, still profess to believe that the Rus-
sian leaders are simply Slavic-speaking graduates of the
Harvard Business School. They are not. They are an
ideological "mafia," who control an empire and
possess the guts and guile to carry out their ambitions.
Our political heritage, as we all know, derives from
Magna Carta, Locke and Jefferson. The Soviet legacy
is from Genghis Khan, Ivan the Terrible and Lenin,
which means that the "culture gap" is wider than the
missile gap, and has a bleak impact on policy.
Gorbachev's "Camelot"
Today, two years after the disinformation about An-
dropov's penchant for Johnny Walker Black and
Jacqueline Susanne, we are now digesting stories des-
cribing the off-Kremlin tryout of Camelot. We should
remember that the Soviet Union has regularly initiated
peace offensives, without abandoning ideological war-
fare, since Trotsky returned from Brest-Litovsk. Gor-
bachev's political biography suggests little will change in
the years ahead, nor does the appointment of an Andro-
pov protege as his patronage chief offer much com-
fort.
Mikhail Gorbachev was born in 1931 in a village near
Stavropol in the Caucasus. After the war he began work
at a Machine Tractor Station, the agricultural machin-
ery depots which insure party control of the peasants.
Later, at Moscow State University, he was appointed
head of the Komsomol apparatus at the University.
Gorbachev is said to have participated in the mid-50s
"cleansing" of the university of Soviet student ele-
ments who were supportive of the Hungarian uprising.
Returning to Stavropol, Gorbachev rose in the party
ranks due to his patient nurturing of personal ties with
vacationing Soviet politicians in the resort areas of the
Black Sea coast. In short, he enhanced his career by
playing "good old boy" to Moscow's visiting bosses in
a holiday mood.
One of the officials with whom Gorbachev devel-
oped close links was Suslov, ideological czar and the
most inveterate Stalinist of his generation. Suslov be-
came patron and teacher of the younger apparatchik.
His fellow countryman in the nomenklatura, Yuri An-
dropov, also a native of the Stavropol region, became
another mentor.
Gorbachev was moved to Moscow in the mid-1970s
to take over the agricultural portfolio after the death of
Kulakov, an old Brezhnev crony. In spite of repeated
Soviet crop disasters, Gorbachev attained full rank in
the Politburo, a singular success at age 48. After the
death of Andropov, Gorbachev moved to secure con-
trol of Party ideology-Suslov's former fiefdom.
Soon after Gorbachev became ideological secretary,
Continued on page 6
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/13: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100080005-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/13: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100080005-7
Anniversaries, Detente, and Disinformation
Continued from page 5
Pravda and other official organs began to mention the
name of Josef Stalin in favorable terms. It was, as the
Soviets say, "no accident." The rehabilitation of Stalin
is proceeding as the Soviets prepare for the 40th anni-
versary of Victory Day over Hitler.
Moreover, Gorbachev's first public announcement as
General Secretary was a bald threat to Pakistan about
the consequences of continued aid to the Afghan rebels.
Recently, this well-pressed dictator has tried to black-
mail the West into abandoning research on SDI, for
fear that otherwise the Kremlin will again abrogate the
arms talks. This is scarcely a Russian Dubcek or a re-
born Kerensky. In fact, given his vitality and the tutor-
ing from Suslov and Andropov, Gorbachev may prove
to be a more formidable adversary than Stalin, who
after all, had neither ICBMs nor a four-ocean navy at
his disposal.
The Twilight War
May I offer one recommendation. Certainly, the Pen-
tagon is justified in expending large resources to avert
worst-case scenarios. Yet the most terrible danger may
be the least likely to materialize. Hence, while we con-
stantly strive to ward off Armaggedon, we cannot
ignore lesser threats that recur with disturbing fre-
quency: terrorism, subversion, insurgency, and the
other black arts of the "twilight war," so difficult to
counter by a society based on pluralism and the rule of
law.
But if we cannot cope with the export of guerrilla war
into the resource-rich areas of the world, upon which
the economies of Japan, Europe and the United States
depend, then eventually even NATO, and an effective
SDI may prove to be maginot lines. The Kremlin has
crafted a Special Operations cadre that includes East
Germans, Cubans, Bulgarians and the PLO, as well as
the Soviet Spetsnaz. This conflict consortium is en-
gaged in low-cost, low-visibility warfare. The targets
are: the oil of the Middle East; the strategic minerals of
Africa; the vital sea lanes of the Caribbean; and within
a decade, perhaps even sooner, Mexico. If and when
U.S. divisions earmarked for the reinforcement of
NATO are pinned to the defense of the Texas and Ari-
zona borders, the current game of dominoes in Central
America will not, in retrospect, seem so trivial to many
observers.
One reason why the West is muddled in its ability to
counter the "twilight war" is that Soviet covert opera-
tions in the Third World are coordinated with a cloud of
propaganda and other active measures in Europe and
the U.S. In effect, Moscow seeks to interdict the Third
World battlefield not with airstrikes, but with political
warfare that discredits anti-communist resistance and
dries up its logistical support from natural allies. This
tactic is effective against the West precisely because it is
so difficult to distinguish Soviet active measures from
the quite legitimate dissent and honest doubts that in-
variably arise among free men.
Disinformation, Disagreement, Disloyalty
Certainly, we do not wish to confuse disagreement
with disloyalty. How then do we protect ourselves from
Soviet disinformation? I know of no conclusive answer.
Perhaps we begin by persuading more leaders in the
private sector to emulate the work of this ABA com-
mittee-to simply do their homework in geopolitics,
comparative ideology, world strategy and national
security. Hopefully, from a more professional analysis
may emerge a more workable consensus on how to deal
with Leninism, without curtailing our own liberties.
I again salute this ABA committee for its elan and
finesse in the battle of public opinion. In an open so-
ciety, that struggle is crucial and never-ending-espec-
ially now that totalitarian elites have learned how to ex-
ploit the customs of fair play and democratic discourse.
May I conclude by repeating some lines I wrote 25
years ago to socialize my own frustrations over the
propaganda war. I wish these lines were totally obsolete.
I'm afraid they're still partly relevant.
If our nation should ever be pushed into a nar-
row corner by a combination of Soviet nuclear
blackmail and political warfare, then all our
affluence, all our stockpile of weapons, might be
as impotent as were the walls of Troy, against
the cunning of the Greeks. Either we create for
ourselves a sophisticated public opinion based on
a passion for the facts and responsible Aissent-
or we may find some parts of our intellectual
climate polluted by alien forces, who have bor-
rowed a little bit from Goebbels, Pavlov, Lenin
and Mao, and use this witches' brew to sow dis-
information and despondency in the national
psyche. Should we permit that to happen, the
epitaph on America's tombstone might read as
follows: "Here lies the only civilization that
perished at the peak of its power, with its power
unused. Here lies a decent people who wanted
love, not empire, and got neither; who tried to
trade power for popularity, and lost both; here
lies a nation of advertisers who knew how to
change consumer tastes in cigarettes, but were
themselves manipulated on the issues that really
mattered to their salvation. Here died a sort of
Lancelot in the court of nations, who, granting
all his grievous flaws, was still perhaps the
noblest knight of all: except this Lancelot, crip-
pled with an undeserved guilt complex, let his
weapons and ideals fall unused, and so con-
demned all mankind to the thousand year winter
of the Russian bear."
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/13: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100080005-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/13: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100080005-7
Personally, I don't believe that epitaph will ever be
written, but whether it's written or not, will depend not
exclusively on decisions in the White House or the Pen-
tagon or the Department of State, but on the courage,
wisdom and civic commitment of such leadership
groups as this ABA Committee on Law and National
Security. Thank you.
Messages were received by the Standing Com-
mittee from Morry Leibman, a former chairman,
and from Supreme Court Justice Lewis Powell,
regretting their inability to be present at the break-
fast meeting.
Morry Leibman, in a message that evoked much
laughter, said: "Long live Frank Barnett and the
League to Save Carthage."
Justice Powell said: "I have known and ad-
mired Frank for more than 20 years. Frank's Na-
tional Strategy Information Center has been a
uniquely constructive organization in helping to
educate policy makers and the public as to mat-
ters vital to the security of our country and the
western democracies."
Bipartisanship in Foreign Affairs
Continued from page 2
offering to restore aid if they would reverse their poli-
cies. The regime refused both times. More recently, we
held nine rounds of direct negotiations, conducted on
our side by Ambassador Shlaudeman.
A second argument occasionally heard is that we are
driving the Nicaraguans into the arms of the Soviets.
The fact that some were surprised by Daniel Ortega's
journey to Moscow-his third in the past year-and to
Eastern Europe, the day after Congress voted against
any kind of aid to the democratic resistance, shows that
we have a wide information gap, which needs to be
closed. The record demonstrates that the Nicaraguan
leaders are already dedicated communists aligned with
the Soviet Union:
? From the beginning, Nicaragua aligned itself with the
Soviet bloc in the United Nations. Only five months
after taking power, when our aid was still flowing in,
the Nicaraguan government refused to condemn the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Nicaragua has voted
against us-and Israel-on every issue.
? In March 1980, when our aid was still flowing in, Mr.
Ortega made his first visit to Moscow, where he
signed a political cooperation agreement with the
Soviet Communist Party. That was like the party-to-
party agreements the Soviets sign with foreign com-
munist parties.
? The regime's internal policies of censorship, oppres-
sion of the Roman Catholic Church, hostility to the
private sector, its massive military buildup and
widening control of the population, add up to an ef-
fort to consolidate totalitarian control. The regime is
also connected with drug trafficking and terrorism.
? The large influx of communist military personnel
began in January 1980, only months after the revolu-
tion. Today there are 50 to 75 Soviet military and 150
civilian advisers in the country. There are 2,500 to
3,500 Cuban military and security personnel, and
3,500 to 4,000 civilian advisers, as well as personnel
from other communist countries, Libya, and the
PLO.
? As documented in the House Intelligence Committee
Report of May 1983, the Salvadoran communist
guerrillas have their command-and-control center
outside Managua and receive vital logistics support
from Nicaragua. Documents captured with a guer-
rilla leader in April provide extensive new evidence of
Nicaraguan support for the Salvadoran communists.
? Commandante Bayardo Arce, the regime's chief
ideologist, in May 1984 gave a secret speech, revealed
last July, in which he said, "[t]he Nicaraguan people
are for Marxism-Leninism." Arce explained the
Nicaraguan strategy of neutralizing American opin-
ion by hiding behind a facade of progressive rhetoric.
This is similar to the policy of the late Maurice
Bishop's regime, as revealed in documents we cap-
tured in Grenada in 1983. These documents are
highly illuminating in what they reveal of communist
tactics to manipulate our media and our democratic
ideals.
I understand the desire of our critics to find a peace-
ful accommodation. I share their desire. But the critics
err in failing to see the Nicaraguan communists for what
they are. Mr. Ortega is a man who, in Warsaw on May
9, described our policies as "fascist" and said he
suspected that during World War II President Reagan
"had Hitler's portrait hanging in his room." Two days
later, at a press conference in Madrid, Mr. Ortega again
compared our president to Hitler. Prime Minister Gon-
zalez had to remind his guest that the United States had
liberated Europe from the Nazis.
Some say they would favor the military option if all
else fails and a real threat comes. But by refusing to help
the freedom fighters, even with humanitarian aid, they
are hastening the day when the threat will grow and
when we will be faced with an agonizing choice about
the use of American combat troops. That is not our
policy, and I am sure it is not their intention. We want a
negotiated settlement, but like all adherents of the post-
war bipartisan consensus, we understand that negotia-
tions, especially with communists, cannot succeed
unless backed by strength.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/13: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100080005-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/13: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100080005-7
Bipartisanship in Foreign Affairs
Continued from page 7
Further, a failure to aid the freedom fighters en-
dangers the progress that has been made in El Salvador.
President Duarte said he is "very concerned" by Con-
gress' action last month. How paradoxical that those
who purport to back President Duarte are, at the same
time, giving the Nicaraguan communists a free hand to
undermine him.
A third argument is that in helping the freedom fight-
ers we are supporting the Somocistas. In truth, the
opposition is led by former opponents of Somoza, many
of whom fought or worked with the Sandinistas to over-
throw Somoza. Arturo Cruz, who served on the revolu-
tionary junta and in 1981 as ambassador to the United
States, was the presidential candidate of the unified
opposition last November; Alfonso Robelo, head of the
Democratic Revolutionary Alliance, was one of the
original five members of the junta in 1979; Adolfo
Calero, commander-in-chief of the Nicaraguan Demo-
cratic Force (FDN), the largest resistance group, was
once imprisoned by Somoza for directing a general
strike. Five of the six leaders of the FDN were long-time
civilian opponents of Somoza. I could go on.
The so-called contras, along with others, are in fact
the democratic resistance of Nicaragua. They comprise
about 15,000 men and women, many peasants, in a
country of only 2.9 million. This would be equivalent
to over one million Americans under arms; clearly it is
a popular revolt.
When communist countries back communist guer-
rillas against democratically elected governments, as in
El Salvador, should not the United States back demo-
cratic forces fighting for their freedom against a com-
munist regime? How is it that we can all agree on our
obligation to aid the freedom fighters in Afghanistan,
or the anti-communist guerrillas in Cambodia, but are
so divided over aiding freedom fighters near our very
borders? There is no logical distinction.
Obstacles to a Bipartisan Foreign Policy
Bipartisanship must include the recognition that we
have only one president at a time. Under the Constitu-
tion, the president alone conducts foreign negotiations.
In addition, at times he has to make critical decisions
quickly and decisively. Bipartisanship should mean an
acknowledgement of the burden that rests on the presi-
dent's shoulders. In October 1983, after news of the
Grenada rescue mission was announced, several mem-
bers of Congress took the floor to denounce our action
even before I went up to Capitol Hill that day to brief
them. A few even proposed impeaching the president
for the mission. But when they learned the facts that the
president had, and saw the overwhelming support of
the American-and Grenadian-people for the opera-
tion, many came to regret their criticism.
The American people are in broad agreement on the
ideas, ideals, and interests that define America's role in
the world. Naturally, there will be legitimate disagree-
ments on specific issues. But we have made a good start
on renewing a bipartisan consensus. We have more
work ahead of us, as we endeavor to restore fully, in
principle and practice, the bipartisan conduct of for-
eign policy that so successfully safeguarded peace and
freedom in the postwar era. The president and I are
ready to play our part. We ask all Americans to join us.
Standing Committee on Law and National Security
Chairman: John Norton Moore. Members: Richard E. Friedman, Rita E. Hauser, Ronald A. Jacks,
Max M. Kampelman, Monroe Leigh, John B. Rhinelander, John H. Shenefield,
Daniel B. Silver, Raymond J. Waldmann, R. James Woolsey.
Advisory Committee Chairman: Morris I. Leibman.
The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the American Bar Association or the Standing
Committee on Law and National Security. Questions or comments should be directed to W. C. Mott, Editor, 217 9th
Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003, Tel. [phone].
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/13: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100080005-7