INTELLIGENCE STUDY OF THE INTERNATIONALS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89B00423R000100030046-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 30, 2010
• Sequence Number: 46
• Publication Date: March 6, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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6 March 1984
Memorandum for: Bob
The attached memorandum is for your signature.
It transmits the typescript memorandum we have
produced for State/ARA at the request of
Hugh Montgomery of INR. Although both EURA and ALA
were originally given action on this, we agreed
that EURA should produce the paper with ALA
coordination.
Mary-Ann
Director,
EURA
Office of European Analysis
Directorate of Intelligence
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Central Intelligence Agency
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Hugh Montgomery
Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State
SUBJECT Intelligence Study of the Internationals
1. -In response to your memorandum of 3 February 1984,
forwarding a request by Assistant Secretary Motley, we attach
herewitha typescript memorandum updating our previous studies on
the party internationals. In this paper we have concentrated on
the specific questions posed by Ambassador Motley.
2. As I noted in my previous memorandum to you, information
on the Socialist International is much more plentiful than
information on the Christian Democrats, the Liberals, and the
International Democratic Union. We have done our best to answer
Ambassador Motley's questions about the latter three while
specifically noting gaps in information.
robert M. pa)tes
Deputy Director fo Intelligence
Attachments:
As stated
EUR M 84-10031
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Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
6 March 1984
The Party Internationals and Latin America
Summary
The four party internationals -- the
Socialist, Christian Democratic, and Liberal
Internationals and the International Democratic
Union -- are West European dominated organizations
that serve primarily as channels of communication
among member parties. Because many of their
leaders have a knack for public relations, the
activities of the Internationals sometimes seem
more significant than they are. In fact, the
Internationals -- each of which combines disparate
elements -- have difficulty arriving at common
positions that go beyond platitudes. More
important, they generally have little influence
over positions governments or individual member
parties take on any given issue. In essence,
Internationals are useful to party leaders as
platforms for burnishing their images as
statesmen, as means of demonstrating the vigor of
their shared political philosophies, and as
sources of patronage for selected party
This memorandum w pared by
the Office of European Analysis.
was requested by Hug Montgomery, Director of the Bureau of
Intelligence and Research, Department of State. It was
coordinated with the Office of African and Latin American
Analysis. Research was completed on 27 February 1984. Questions
and comments may be addressed to Chief, European Issues Division,
EUR M 84-10031
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Governments and political movements in Latin
America sometimes woo the Internationals in the
belief that these organizations can swing funds
their way or influence governments to support them
politically. They have usually discovered that
the Internationals do not have the money or
political clout that they expected. But Latin
Americans still value the support of the
Internationals because the organizations can
direct media attention to the causes of their
Latin American proteges, particularly when the
latter are threatened by internal or external
The four Internationals differ sharply in
their views and levels of activity. The Socialist
International (SI) has traditionally been the most
active and the most outspoken in criticizing US
policies, particularly in Nicaragua and El
Salvador. The Christian Democratic International
(CDI), which is attempting to become more active
in the region, generally supports US ob'ectives.
The International Democratic Union (IDU}1 strongly
supports US policies in Central America, and the
Liberal International is only mildly critical; but
neither grouping has much influence in the region.
The Socialist, Christian Democratic, and
Liberal Internationals are attempting to overcome
their differences and work out a common statement
on Central America. An early draft identifies
social and economic problems as the cause of
conflict in the region and condemns in general
terms external intervention. We believe, however,
that the Internationals are unlikely to reach
agreement on specifics of the US role in the
region or attitudes toward the regimes in El
Salvador and Nicaragua.
The Socialist International
The Socialist International continues to take an interest in
Central American developments despite some waning of enthusiasm
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for active involvement over the past year. SI leaders have
adopted a more cautious approach because of the negative reaction
of many Latin American governments to the Franco-Mexican
initiative of 1981 (which the SI supported) and to SI offers to
mediate, and because of the divisive effect of Central American
issues within the SI itself. Moreover, partly due to
argumentation provided by the United States, the SI as a whole
has developed a more realistic understanding of the barriers to a
settlement in Central America. During the past year, the
organization has even reduced the number of "fact-finding" groups
sent to the region. Nevertheless, the SI's declarations still
show strong disapproval of US policy and a resistance to the idea
of breaking completely with leftist forces. This is the case
despite a growing concern among West European members about the
radical tendencies of some of their Latin American colleagues
within the SI, and a more critical attitude among some of the
Latin American members toward the Sandinistas, the Salvadoran
insurgents, and Grenada's New Jewel Movement.
Key Players on Latin American Issues
Since their admission to the SI during the late 1970s, Latin
American parties such as the Venezuelan Democratic Action, the
Dominican Revolutionary Party, and the Jamaican People's National
Party have played a key role in shaping SI positions on regional
issues. In addition to those parties holding membership,
moreover, other parties (including the Sandinistas from
Nicaragua) attend SI gatherings as observers. In practice there
is little difference between the rights of observers and of
members, since both are allowed to participate in meetings.*
The typical SI declaration on Latin America is a collage of
contributions supplied by the regional parties, each of which
concentrates on its own narrow interests. There are some
leaders, however, whose interests and influence transcend their
own countries. These include Jose Francisco Pena Gomez of the
Dominican Republic (chairman of the SI's Committee on Latin
America and the Caribbean), Carlos Andres Perez of Venezuela,
Daniel Oduber of Costa Rica, Michael Manley of Jamaica, and
Anselmo Sule of Chile. In addition, the Sandinistas and
Guillermo Ungo's National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) continue
to influence directly the SI's views of US policy.
Among West European leaders, the most active on Latin
American issues has been Spain's Felipe Gonzalez, who has often
*For lists of SI member parties and of observers frequently
present at meetings, see Appendix A.
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attended socialist gatherings in the Western Hemisphere and is on
a first name basis with most regional representatives. Gonzalez
also chairs the Committee for the Defense of the Nicaraguan
Revolution, a body formed in the afterglow of the Sandinista
victory that has fallen progressively into disuse. After the
Spaniards, the French Socialists and the West German Social
Democrats are the most active. SI President Willy Brandt's
personal interest in Central America has been sporadic and aimed
mostly at papering over divisions within the SI.
Formulation of Positions
West European socialist leaders, in our view, are painfully
aware of the fact that although they are the mainstays of the SI,
they have been so preoccupied with other matters that they have
been unable to control declarations on Latin America. Despite
the disclaimers of Latin American parties, it is these parties
that continue to shape resolutions pertaining to the region,
largely by writing them in advance at meetings of the SI's
Committee on Latin America and the Caribbean, chaired by Pena
Gomez. Subsequent meetings of all the SI parties -- which have
never been known for their thoroughness or procedural correctness
-- allow little time for a West European contribution. Debate
about Central America often begins (and sometimes ends) with
statements by Sandinista representatives and Salvadoran leftist
Guillermo Ungo who recently became one of the many vice
The West Europeans have tried to correct these problems by
creating a new position at SI headquarters in London to
coordinate Latin American matters. Luis Ayala of the Chilean
Radical Party has already been appointed to this post, although
his duties are still unclear. Since Ayala's party has on
occasion displayed sympathy for the revolutionary left in Central
America, he seems a doubtful candidate to play a moderating
role. West European members have also told US officials
frequently in private that they want the SI to stop admitting new
members from the Third World -- yet at last year's Congress four
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part
es from Latin American and the Caribbean were admitted.
including the Puerto Rican Independence Party.
Relations Among Leaders
SI member parties still have differences about Central
America, but they probably are cl-oser to a consensus now than at
any time since 1979. On Nicaragua, for example, none of the West
European parties and few of the Latin American parties now take
an avidly pro-Sandinista position. Reports from US diplomats in
West European capitals indicate that most leaders have abandoned
the earlier image of the Sandinistas as "new wave" socialist
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heroes and now see them as exasperating individuals who
nevertheless must be dealt with to prevent their further
radicalization. A cross-section of SI leaders from Western
Europe and Latin America -- including Willy Brandt, Felipe
Gonzalez, Carlos Andres Perez, and Daniel Oduber -- now seem to
sharea!
Although the recent announcement by Managua scheduling elections
for November has created a positive impression, the honeymoon
period of 1979 is unlikely to be recreated completely.
Among the West European SI parties, the Scandinavians
(particularly the Swedes) and the Dutch probably still retain
vestiges of the old romantic view of the FSLN. At the other end
of the spectrum, the vigor of attacks by the Italian Social
Democrats and the Portuguese Socialists against the Sandinistas
has diminished somewhat in recent months. Mario Soares'
preoccupation with his duties as Prime Minister may help explain
this trend. On the other hand, both the Portuguese and the
Italian PSDI may believe that they have already made their
point. Gonzalez and Willy Brandt currently represent the middle-
of-the-road position in the SI on Nicaragua.
Last summer, Brandt, Gonzalez, Perez, and Oduber labored
mightily over a letter
advising the Sandinistas to implement their promises
regar ing aemocracy, political pluralism, and non-alignment. The
letter was sent to Managua, but it was phrased as advice rather
than as an ultimatum. The contents of the letter leaked despite
efforts to keep it a secret, and it provoked considerable
criticism from other SI parties, which had not been consulted..
Later, during the fall, SI leaders became convinced that the
United States was about to invade Nicaragua. They called media
attention to the "danger" and even warned US officials against
military action. The fact that the invasion did not occur
prompted some leaders to declare later that they had prevented
it.
These two episodes during a period when many socialists were
becoming more critical of the Sandinistas suggest the probable
limits of SI action regarding Nicaragua. They indicate that
despite concerns about Managua's policies, the SI is still
unlikely to criticize the Sandinistas publicly; indeed, the
acrimony surrounding the "ultimatum that never was" -- and the
inability of the leaders to agree on a tough message -- may
discourage further attempts in the SI context to jawbone the
Sandinistas. Private bilateral talks between the FSLN and
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individual parties rather than the SI seem more likely to produce
the kind of tough warnings that proponents of Nicaraguan
democracy desire.
The invasion scare, on the other hand, shows that the SI's
growing disenchantment with the Sandinistas is not incompatible
with a strong aversion to the perceived military pressure applied
by the United States against Managua.
On El Salvador, the SI recently has avoided statements
supporting a military victory by the insurgents, but almost all
members continue to back a "negotiated settlement" that
presumably would give some power to the extreme left. There have
even been signs recently that the West German SPD has become
impatient with Ungo and the MNR for their lack of influence on
the FMLN and unwillingness to participate in elections. Italian
diplomats have noted that, privately at least, the SPD may now
look with some favor on Christian Democrat Jose Napoleon
Duarte. The attraction of Duarte for the socialists, however, is
that in their view he might be willing to engineer a peace
settlement with the extreme left. The SI as a whole would find
it difficult if not impossible -- particularly with Ungo still a
major figure in the organization -- to abandon him and adopt its
earlier villain, Duarte. Moreover, few SI parties seem likely to
oppose resolutions calling on the US to cease military aid to the
Salvadoran government. Even Mario Soares, the Sandinistas'
nemesis within the SI, has told US officials that he opposes the
military aspects of US policy in El Salvador.
Relations with Communists
During the "Brandt era" (post-1976), meetings between SI
officials and Communists to discuss world problems have become
routine. SI leaders stress that they are opposed to Communism as
a system, but they insist on the pragmatic necessity of dialogue
to promote peace. In our judgment, many SI leaders have trouble
taking Communism seriously in a Third World context. They
especially tend to place Latin American Marxist-Leninists in a
different category from the Soviet variety, seeing the former
primarily as anti-colonialist nationalists who in the long run
will be open to persuasion from more "sophistic.ated" social
Many of the socialists' recent efforts toward a Central
American settlement have been focused on Fidel Castro. The
discussions Castro has had over the past year with Pena Gomez,
Oduber, French government representatives, and delegations of
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West German Social Democrats -- as well as with Felipe Gonzalez
in Madrid last month -- support the judgment that most SI members
envision Cuba playing a role in a regional settlement.
The willingness to carry on a dialogue with Communists and
other extreme left forces, however, does not extend to allowing
them membership in the SI. The SI's major faux pas in that
direction -- admittance of Grenada's New Jewel Movement -- is a
move that is unlikely to be replicated because of the negative
fallout that it brought on the organization. In our judgment, it
is unlikely that the SI will admit the Sandinistas as members,
for example, unless Managua unequivocally changes course toward
non-alignment and democracy.
Positions on Elections
As avowed supporters of social democracy, SI members favor
free and fair elections, but the simultaneous emergence of the
issue in El Salvador and Nicaragua places these parties in a
delicate position. We believe that most SI leaders will welcome
enthusiastically Managua's recent announcement that it is
scheduling elections for November. They will undoubtedly claim
that the decision vindicates their attitude toward the
Sandinistas of public friendliness and private urgings toward
liberalization. Recent statements by a French Socialist Party
functionary (to US officials) and by an aide to a prominent West
German Social Democrat (in the press) suggest that some parties
may be leaning toward providing observers for the Nicaraguan
balloting. US diplomats also report that the SI has encouraged a
Nicaraguan opposition group to participate in the election. We
suspect, however, that the socialists are seeking primarily to
bolster the legitimacy of the election rather than to promote the
cause of the opposition.
The elections in El Salvador pose a different kind of
problem for the SI. The organization criticized the 1982
election, arguing that the influence of a rightwing government
and the hostilities in the country -prevented a fair result.
Under the circumstances, no one in .the SI really expected Ungo's
party to participate, and the absence of the left reinforced the
socialists' impression that the election was meaningless.
Although the heavy turnout in El Sallvador probably caused a few
doubts in SI circles about the organization's position, the
argument that the election would not end the war predominated.
Most party leaders still maintain that only direct negotiations
between the Salvadoran government and the FDR/FMLN can do that.
We suspect that many SI leaders would prefer to present a
uniform position supporting elections in both countries, but
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believe they are unable to do so unless Ungo and his associates
participate in the Salvadoran balloting. A recent conversation
between an Austrian Socialist and a US official indicates that
some SI members have urged Ungo and his party to take part.
view, however, this behind-the-scenes pressure -- though
significant in itself -- probably does not foreshadow a new
public stance supporting the Salvadoran electoral process. The
FDR/FMLN apparently has no intention of letting the SI off the
hook, and we doubt that in the final analysis SI leaders will
challenge Ungo's old argument that MNR candidates would be
murdered if they campaigned.
Although the SI almost certainly will refuse to reverse its
well-publicized attitudes toward Salvadoran elections, the
organization's relatively low profile so far does suggest that
its pre-election rhetoric could remain relatively muted this
time. Once the election is over, chances are slim that the SI
will take a positive position on the process unless Ungo sees a
possibility of compromise with the government that ensues.
Still, some of the more influential SI leaders might make an
effort to abstain from negative comment if the Christian
Democrats win and the SI's bete noir, the ARENA party, is
excluded from the government.
In sum, SI attitudes on the electoral processes in these
countries are by no means uniform or free of bias. It seems
likely at this point that at least some of the major SI parties
will send observers to the Nicaraguan election, while most if not
all will refuse to do the same for El Salvador. It is even
conceivable, if SI leaders continue to perceive political
"progress" in Managua, that they will send observers there under
the SI's aegis. We believe that parties contemplating such a
dual policy realize their vulnerability to charges of
inconsistency. In order to avoid the many possible awkward
questions about Salvadoran versus Nicaraguan democracy, civil
liberties, pluralism, wartime conditions, etc. they probably will
try to let the question of the Salvadoran elections die down
before taking positions on Nicaragua. Rather than link the two
cases themselves, weebelieve they will try to treat them as
separately and unobtrusively as possible.
Funding
The SI's annual budget of around $600,000 is made up of
contributions from member parties. The biggest contributors
traditionally have been the West Germans the Swedes, and the
Austrians. this was still true 25X1
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as of late 1982, and we have no reason to believe the situation
has changed. As a result, the,SI in many ways still displays a
Central European orientation.
The organization has never had the resources to dole out
significant financial aid to "fraternal" artier or movements
and it is even less able to do so now.
Publications
The SI publishes two periodicals, Socialist Affairs and the
Socialist International Women Bulletin. The former, which is the
SI's main media outlet, appears quarterly. The publication
schedule for Socialist International Women Bulletin seems to
vary. Both publications devote substantial attention to Latin
American affairs through feature articles and news of regional
parties. Articles in these publications are not restricted
exclusively to the "orthodox" socialist view and some have
presented the views of socialists who are critical of groups like
Assistance to Latin American Members
The SI as such does little or nothing in the way of training
or subsidizing travel for Latin American member parties. We
believe that current budget allocations are used almost
exclusively for necessities such as running SI headquarters,
paying the small staff, organizing meetings, and publishing SI
periodicals.
SCI leaders are quick to point out that organizations
affiliated with individual West European parties that do fund
travel and training-- such as the West German SPD's Friedrich
Ebert Foundation -- have no direct connection with the SI. We
suspect, however, that in some cases advice from party leaders
who participate in the SI would have some influence with the
foundations if those leaders decided to weigh in for or against
specific projects.
The Christian Democratic International
The Christian Democratic International has traditionally
been less active than the SI.* The CDI has long stressed the
*Before November 1982, the CDI was known as the World Union
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similar religious and political traditions of its European and
Latin American member parties as well as their commitment to
democracy and development. In general, however, the organization
has avoided taking controversial stands on issues. Instead, it
usually has been content to issue broad statements of principle
in order to offset SI propaganda.
The Italian and West German Christian Democratic parties are
the most important West European members. The CDI is based in
Rome and was headed by Italian Christian Democrats until 1982.
The member parties finance the CDI, according to an academic
study, with the West Germans providing the largest share of
funding. The US Embassy in Brussels reports that CDU/CSU
financial aid to Latin American member parties gives the West
Germans substantial influence in the CDI, particularly in
personnel.decisions. and Chancellor Kohl has taken an interest in
The most active Latin American members are the Venezuelan,
Salvadoran, and Chilean parties. The Latin American subsidiary
of the CDI, the Christian Democratic Organization of America, is
based in Caracas, and its Secretary General is Aristides Calvani
of Venezuela.* Napolean Duarte, the Salvadoran Christian
Democratic chairman, maintains close contacts with his West
European and South American counterparts, according to various US
diplomatic reports. For the Chilean party, the International is
a source of moral support in its opposition to the Pinochet
regime.
In November 1982, the organization elected exiled Chilean
Christian Democrat Andres Zaldivar as president. Zaldivar has
been attempting to reinvigorate the CDI and to focus its
attention on Latin America, particularly on Chile, El Salvador,
and Nicaragua. According to various US Embassy reports, Zaldivar
has also promoted contacts with the Socialist and Liberal
Internationals, and has consulted closely with the United
Functions
Like the Socialist International, the CDI acts primarily as
a channel of communication among its member parties. At annual
or biannual congresses, party leaders exchange views on various
East-West and Third World issues. The CDI occasionally organizes
special conferences on specific topics, often in cooper-ation with
other Christian Democratic or right-of-center groupings. The
*For a list of Latin American member parties, see Appendix B.
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small permanent staffs of the CDI secretariat in Rome and of
regional affiliates in Brussels and Caracas act as points of
contact for the national party bureaucracies. They also publish
the Christian Democratic International Bulletin and the quarterly
Panorama DC.
The CDI also encourages consultations among West European
Christian Democratic parties outside the CDI. Members of the
Christian Democratic faction of the European Parliament cooperate
routinely on a wide range of issues, including EC foreign
policy. Its members undertake occasional fact-finding missions
to Third World trouble spots, such as a tour last September to
Costa Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Cuba.
Equally important are bilateral contacts among the Christian
Democratic parties. The Dutch, Belgian, and West German
Christian Democrats, for example, routinely discuss foreign
policy issues on a party-to-party basis. Contacts between the
West German and Italian Christian Democrats have traditionall
been weak
Policies
During 1983, the CDI sponsored or co-sponsored several
international conferences on Latin America to call attention to
its views. CDI statements supported basic US objectives, but
Latin American parties were generally more reluctant than their
West European counterparts specifically to condemn Soviet and
Last April, the CDI and the European People's Party
sponsored a conference on Central America in Brussels. The West
European and Latin American participants resolved to intensify
cooperation by:
-- establishing a permanent contact group on Latin America
headed by Mario Pedini of Italy;
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-- setting up a foundation in Western Europe to support
Latin American Christian Democratic parties;
-- proposing a common peace plan for Central America to all
democratic parties in Western Europe; and
-- consulting closely with the United States.
The conference also adopted a resolution supporting
democracy and non-interference in Central America. According to
the US Embassy in Brussels and press accounts, the resolution
-- urged the Salvadoran government to promote social reforms
and political participation by all non-violent groups;
-- demanded free elections and the restoration of religious
and civil liberties in Nicaragua;
-- condemned the imposition of a Soviet-Cuban supported
military dictatorship in Suriname and suggested ending EC
Last August, CDI member parties organized a conference on
Central America in San Jose. The meeting's final document,
entitled "The Manifesto of San Jose," condemned dictatorial
repression and external military interference. The loosely-
worded statement called for free elections in El Salvador,
Guatemala, Panama, and Nicaragua. To promote discussion of these
goals, it established a "Democratic Encounter of Central.America
and Panama" with a secretariat based in Costa Rica and national
affiliates.
The CDI's congress in Santiago last December emphasized
support for democracy in Latin America. The final declaration
criticized the Chilean dictatorship and welcomed the return to
democratic rule in Argentina and Bolivia. At a press conference
sponsored by the International, West German CDU Secretary General
Geissler called upon the Chilean authorities to hold free
elections. release political prisoners, and end the use of
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The International Democratic Union
The IDU, which is the youngest of. the four internationals,
unites conservative parties from 19 countries in Western Europe,
North America, and the Pacific region. It contains right-of-
center Christian Democratic parties such as the West German
CDU/CSU, but the Italian, Dutch, and Belgian Christian Democrats
have not joined the IDU because they consider it too
conservative. According to press reports, both Spanish member
parties -- the Popular Alliance and the Popular Democratic Party
-- are urging the IDU to expand to Latin America, where it now
has no affiliates. The organization has already been striving to
establish ties to the region and to publicize its views on Latin
American issues, especially in Western Europe.
The IDU strongly supports basic US goals in Central
America. A statement issued shortly after its founding in June
1983
-- criticized Soviet and Cuban activities in Central
America;
-- endorsed the Contadora process;
-- welcomed the democratic and social progress in El
Salvador; and
-- called for ending economic aid to Nicaragua pending the
introduction of democracy.
In conversations with US officials, IDU Chairman Alois Mock of
Austria has suggested greater efforts by the United States to
present its views on Central America to the West European
public. Mock and IDU Executive Secretary Scott Hamilton of the
British Conservative Party toured Central America in early
February and endorsed the conclusions of the Kissin ear
Commission, according to the US Embassy in Bogota.
The IDU is attempting to increase its profile in Latin
America. In February, the organization helped the West German
Christian Democratic Konrad Adenauer Foundation organize a
conference in Bogota on trade and finance. The conference dealt
informally with Central America and heard addresses on the
subject by Ambassador Stone and Colombian Foreign Minister
Lloreda. According to the US Embassy in Bogota, the IDU is
hoping to establish a Latin American affiliate that would compete
directly with the CDI for the allegiance of the region's
Christian Democratic parties.
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The IDU Executive Committee issued a resolution on Central
America at a mid-February meeting in Madrid. The conservative
leaders endorsed US policy in the region and offered to send
observers to monitor elections in El Salvador and Nicaragua,
according to the US Embassy. The IDU also proposed a public
debate on Central America with representatives of the Socialist
International. At present, we have no information on IDU
financing and publications.
The Liberal International
The Liberal International -- probably the least influential
of the transnational groupings -- is primarily a debating forum
for such issues as European integration, human rights, and North-
South economic matters. Although the LI is essentially a
European organization, it has acquired members from other parts
of the world. In Latin America, the Panamanian and Nicaraguan
liberal parties enjoy full membership status. However, some
European liberal leaders -- especially the International
Secretary of the Dutch Liberal Party -- have doubts about the
Nicaraguan Liberal Party's commitment to democratic principles
and its independence from the Sandinistas. Political parties and
individuals from Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay
attend the LI's annual congresses and special conferences as
observers. While they do not vote on the organization's
resolutions. they undoubtedly help shape the LI's policy
positions.
The organization has stressed the need for strengthening
democratic systems and protecting human rights in Latin
America. The LI has supported elections in El Salvador, but it
remains skeptical about the Salvadoran government's ability to
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bring leftist insurgents into the electoral process.
While the LI generally is favorably disposed toward the US,
it has criticized recent US policy in Central America. The
organization believes that social and economic imbalances are the
principal causes of the Central American turmoil and that US
military initiatives aggravate the conflict by furthering East-
West tensions in the region. The LI maintains that Western
development aid is the most appropriate means for encouraging
stable democracies and countering the expansion of Soviet
influence.
The LI is funded by member parties and organizations. We
have no information about the size of members' financial
contributions, but we believe that the West German Free
Democratic Party (FDP) is the largest contributor and exerts the
greatest influence over the organization's policies. The
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Friedrich Naumann Foundation, which is closely connected to the
FDP, also has given financial aid to political parties,
newspapers, and trade unions in Latin America committed to
liberal democratic ideals.
The LI's major publications are Liberal International
News/Bulletin Spires of Liberty, and Experiment in
Internationa ism. Discussions of Third World issues generally
are thoughtful and reflect sincere concern for the problems of
developing countries.
Cooperation Among the Internationals
Since early 1983, CDI President Zaldivar has been pushing
for cooperation among the Socialist, Christian Democratic, and
Liberal Internationals. Zaldivar has apparently not approached
the IDU, which is directly competing with the CDI for influence
in both Latin America and Western Europe.
On 9 January, working-level representatives of the three
Internationals met in Brussels to draft a joint communique on El
Salvador and Chile which was to have been issued in the names of
the organizations' presidents at a follow-up conference in Rome
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We believe that the three Internationals will be unable to
agree on more than a broad outline of an approach to Latin
America. Socialist international President Brandt, fearing
further conflict in his already divided organization, is not
likely to agree to a stronger statement on Communist activities
in the Central American region, and Chancellor Kohl does not
appear to be willing to alter his priorities. If the SI and LI
do not join the CDI in issuing a stronger declaration on Central
America, the CDI may make one on its own.
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APPENDIX A
SI Member Parties from the Western Hemisphere
Costa Rica
Curacao
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador
Grenada
Guatemala
Guyana
Jamaica
Paraguay
Peru
Puerto Rico
St. Lucia
Venezuela
Labor Party
New Democratic Party
Radical Party
National Liberation Party
New Antilles Movement*
Dominican Revolutionary Party
Democratic Left Party
National Revolutionary Movement
New Jewel Movement
Democratic Socialist Party
Working People's Alliance*
People's National Party
Febrerista Revolutionary Party
APRA Party*
Independence Party*
Progressive Labor Party*
Democratic Action
*Parties with "consultative status."
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I I "
Observers from the Western Hemisphere
at the SI's Congress in April 1983
Bolivia Revolutionary Movement of the Left
National Revolutionary Movement of
the Left
Brazil Brazilian Democratic Movement
Party
Democratic Workers' Party
Dominica United Dominica Labor Party
El Salvador Democratic Revolutionary Front
Guatemala National Revolutionary Unity
Haiti Democratic Movement for the
Liberation of Haiti
Democratic Rally of Haitian
National Progressives (RDNP)
Uruguay
Union of Patriotic and Democratic
Haitian Forces (FOPADA)
Institutional Revolutionary Party
(PRI)
Sandinista National Liberation
Front
Revolutionary Socialist Party
Democratic Convergence
Socialist Party
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Christian Democratic Or anization of America
Argentina
Bolivia
Chile (illegal)
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cuba (illegal)
Dominican Republic
El Salvador
Ecuador
Guatemala
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Peru
Paraguay
Puerto Rico
Uruguay
Venezuela
Christian
Christian
Christian
Christian
Christian
Christian
of Cuba
Democratic Federation
Democratic Party
Democratic Party
Social Democratic Party
Democratic Party
Democratic Movement
Social Christian Revolutionary
Party
Christian Democratic Party
Popular Democracy
Christian Democracy of Guatemala
Democratic Community Party
Social Christian Party
Christian Democratic Civic
Movement
Christian Democratic Party
Christian Democratic Party
Christian Democratic Front
Christian Democratic Party
Social Christian Party (COPEI)
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