BRIEFING BOOK FOR 16 MARCH SIG MEETING ON CENTRAL AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00140R000100090023-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 2, 2011
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: March 16, 1981
• Content Type: MEMO

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BRIEFING BOOK FOR 16 MARCH SIG MEETING ON CENTRAL AMERICA
CONTENTS
Tab 1 - NIO/LA Briefing Paper, 16 March 1981
Tab 2 - CIA Talking Points
Tab 3 - State Department's NSC Paper on Nicaragua, 13 March 1981
Tab 4 - NIO/LA Memorandum on 11 March IG Meeting on Nicaragua, dated
13 March
Tab 5 - Draft IIM on Nicaraguan Support of Salvadoran Insurgents,
15 March 1981
Tab 6 - Definition of "conclusive", from Webster's Unabridged.
Tab 7 - OPA/LA's Paper on Current Arms Flow to Salvadoran Insurgents,
16 March 1981
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NI0/LA Briefing Paper for 16 March SIG Meeting on Central America
1. This briefing package is directed toward the Nicaragua issue.
We will check to see if other Central American issues will be raised, and
inform you subsequently.
2. You will probably be asked to present an intelligence briefing.
One is presented in Tab 2, based on draft IIM (Tab 5).
3. The way Acting Assistant Secretary Bushnell (ARA) states the issue
on Nicaragua (Tab 3):
a. There are good reasons to avoid a public clash with Nicaragua
now. CIA analysis would support his judgments on the likely negative
effects of a clash.
b. The range of US options depends on whether there is "conclusive"
proof that the Government of Nicaragua is currently aiding the insurgents
materially.
The usual meaning of "conclusive" (Tab 6) is "irrefutable
and certain". In other words, "very persuasive" does not mean
"conclusive".
CIA analysts are convinced that the Nicaraguans continue to
aid the insurgents. This is based on history, logic, and past-proved
practices. But we do not have conclusive proof for current activities,
in the form of irrefutable evidence.
Our usual published judgment then is "very persuasive" or
"almost certain".
Arguments have been made in past meetings that "conclusive
proof", the standard chosen by President Carter, is the wrong standard
for President Reagan. I would recommend neutrality on the issue. But
I would remind the meeting that our publications and briefings (including
Congress) would lead many, if not most, to conclude that material support
activities do or almost certainly do continue. (see Tab 4)
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4. From CIA's point of view, Option 4 (Nuanced Determination) is
probably the least bad choice.
a. It preserves the integrity of the intelligence calling.
b. It keeps intelligence components out of Presidential-
Congressional crossfire.
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c. It affords the US some time to implement its Salvadoran
strategy and to base its Nicaraguan tactics on more deliberate
development of a Nicaraguan policy.
5. State may be split, with some in ARA wanting a softer option. S/P
and perhaps the Deputy Secretary would prefer a tougher one. Bushnell will
straddle.
tougher option.
6. DOD reps could support Option 4, though they too might prefer a
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Participants of SIC/Central America-.::
Paul Dremsr, III, Zxscutive socre
SIC M4etingt Central rica, Monday,
March 1.5, 1931
The attached paper on Nicaragua is for diacussio4
at the March 16 BIG to be chaired by Judge C1ar'c with
s
vi.. to preparing the issue for NSC consideration on .
Thursday, march 19, 191..
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CL. -
POD gran Car ucc , Deputy Secretary of Ds3 sea
Pranci8 J. Nest, Assistant S cratary of Defines
(ISA) (Attontiont Captain p'rsderic)) - .
JCS - Lt. General John Pustay (Attention: Brig.?Cenral
IBC - Richard V. Allen
VP'* O?k+2CL - Admiral Xurphy
Alt ?tint s
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N516; X?APL'X ON NICARAGUA
Sow do w+ proceed with Nicaraguan assistanc.7 :._.
DA=0100"
The intelligence agencies at* preparing an assessment
81torts..:to? activate the airlift from costs Ric& and
overland., shipments from Honduran stocks arm cited.
countries, ..stockpiling, and planning future suppozt..:,-f
includes training Salvadorans, operations is tbird .>
the Salvadoran ineurgenti probably continues. Support
31 Salvador from Nicaragua since ?ebruary 1. However,
There is no hard evidenco of arms arriving in
which will be distributed separately.
Kass COWaxr -TIONS
Our actions must accord with the law. If
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less tba:t''conclusive there is diacration" to decide
a. determination must be ;wade. If the evidence is
there is Conclusive prop' that the Government-of Nieatat-
qua is currents 'abetting violence in other. countr ies.,
Whether Or not to oaks a determination -depending on
We would also 1iha to continue the operation
of our E*bassy in Nicaragua ao that our intelligence
asseto can be strengthen d. No must be concerned
aibly fatally.
and other nn--Coj n--Communist forces within Nicaragua, pos-
of a cut-off and could load to accelerated infiltration
into El Salvador, even infiltration of combat per4onnel.
A U.$. acid cut-off would weaken private sector
would eliminate the leverage provided by the threat
forces in xi Salvador; a formal cut-off of U.S. aid
counterproductive. We need time to develop government
thin ataaord - of evidence ,applied.
-- A confrontation Jith Nicaragua now could be
with the safzty of our p$ople.
GD:3 3/13/37
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confrontation with Pica aua arul
, - and West Geraeanv all strnnaiv uraa us to -r~cinf i ntv m -
'UE osaaague and aasaatance to Nicaragua. They eithsr
believe there is still hope fora non-comacunist %icara-
and leftist groups. Vft would prefer that it be +~ i'c:rAgW1R
actions fuss., snow these countries they are wrong.
AS tbs military buildup of Vicaragua's owe forest
continues, we shall oventu.ally have to react sogardlssa
.we bavt;s more coiaprehensive Nicaragua atrategy..
on this point until th$ buildup is clearer and until
public and Worldwide opinion -- to delay our reaction
_~-~: economiQ assistance. But it is better -- for oar
countries, while we continue to provide aubatantiawl
to the teeth.: and potentially intervening in .other
cannot permit Nicaragua to become another Cuba, armed
or whether or not nicarnqua in arming otbera. we
The irttsragenoy group has developed four option*.
INTLLL,.ITIM: '~?"..? "..? 3SN ENT DOES NOT PROVID$
CO~ICLUsIV3 pfd '*4A~ "' ~~v ?g CUL TLY ABETTING
V IOLZNC3, ALL FOUR ARS AVAXLAELE:
to try, to deal with all the above considerations.
..
1. post ne~mcn~ o n Determination on ESP ndin
additiona~ ov enca on ak:pi o; For vio ence nOther
county ea. Resumes m t;r amen oz PL-fig t _
m on coma ins Aug ell or oossibl
cve o >ant
assistance (Lo Mi on rar.a n2 raua>en c d
Ne t Rr
PL-9 nor evelopQant ass stance are au ject to the
statutory determination. Would avoid a confrontation,
~_. and provide time to obtain better evidence of Nicaragua's
intentions. . In the interim, a liraited aaow t of
PL-490 ($3 million) would Chow our interest in maintain..
ing oae9 relations. Resumption of assistance would
be difficult to defend in Congress. .
or atoy.q d. We would further state that, nevertheiese,
2. Strong Statement, no Determination. A strong
public s atozent +.ou~ ~??, n,a oils ca