IRAQ

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP09T00207R001000100009-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 23, 2011
• Sequence Number: 9
• Content Type: MISC

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ittad Qolam Reza Foruzesh
Mohammad Ali Najafi
Bijan Namdar-Zangeneh
Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati
Dr. Iraj Faze!
Mohammad Hadi
Nejad-Hoseinian
Sarajuddin Kazeruni
Mohammad Reza Nematzadeh
Hojatolislam All
Falahian-Khuzestani
Abdollah Hamid
Nuri-Hosein-Abadi
Dr. Sayed Mohammad
Khatami-Ardekani
Nojatolislam Mohammad Esmail
Shoshtad
Hosein Karnali
Mohammad Hosein Mahlujchi
Telephone Mohammad Qarazi
epress is provided for in the 1979 constitu-
d to violations of public morality and
r impugning the reputation of individuals.
e opposition press has been stifled. Over
ere shut down in August 1979 and drastic
interviews with government officials and
reporters apply for press cards every
August 1980 Ayatollah Khomeini called
rship and on June 7,1981, an additional
were banned. Among them were Mizan,
ition paper, run by Mehdi Bazargan;
weed by Abol Hasan Bani-Sadr; and
-I-* organ of the Tudeh Party. Subsequent-
1981, the Majlis passed a law making it
to use "pen and speech" against the gov-
ts provisions, the radical daily Azadegan
;June 1985.
are among the dailies published at Teheran:
.50,000); Ettela'at (Information 250,000); Khorassan
ehemn Times, in English; Abrar (Rightly Guided),
n December 1981 the domestic facility, Pars News
the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA); follow-
of Reuters' Teheran office, AgenaeFranee-Preare
the only remaining Western bureaus maintain-
The Soviet agency TASS, East Germany's ADN,
News Agency (Xinhua) are also represented at
U. Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting provides
two networks and home-service radio broadcasting
ign langu
Broadcasting
-
ages.
ser v ices
--
~8overnmentcontrolled Radio Ne t-e-Melli. There
9 million television receivers in 1989.
IRAQ
INTERGOVERNMENTAL REPRESENTATION
The United States severed diplomatic relations with Iran
on April 4, 1980.
Permanent Representative to the UN: Kamal KHARRAZI.
IGO Memberships (Non-UN): CCC, CP, IC, IDB, Intelsat, Interpol,
NAM, OPEC, PCA.
IRAQ
Republic of Iraq
al-Jumhuriyah al-'Iraqiyah
Political Status: Independent state since 1932; declared a
republic following military coup which overthrew the mon-
archy in 1958. The present constitution is a substantially
amended version of a provisional document issued Septem-
ber 22, 1968.
Area: 167,924 sq. mi. (434,923 sq. km.).
Population: 16,278,316 (1987C), 17,288,000 (1990E).
Major Urban Centers (1977C): BAGHDAD (3,236,000);
Basra (1,540,000); al-Mawsil (1,220,000); Kirkuk (535,000).
Official Languages: Arabic, Kurdish.
Monetary Unit: Dinar (market rate April 1, 1990, 1 dinar
= $3.22US).
President of the Republic, Prime Minister, and Chairman
of the Revolutionary Command Council: Saddam HUS-
SEIN (HUSAYN); designated by the RCC on July 42,
1979, succeeding Ahmad Hasan al-BAKR on July 16.
Vice President of the Republic: Taha Muhyi al-Din
MA'RUF; designated by the RCC on April 21, 1974.
Vice Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council:
`Izzat IBRAHIM; designated by the RCC on July 16,1979,
succeeding Saddam HUSSEIN.
Historically known as Mesopotamia ("land between the
rivers") from its geographic position centering in the Tigris-
Euphrates Valley, Iraq is an almost landlocked, partly
desert country whose population is overwhelmingly Mus-
lim and largely Arabic-speaking, but includes a Kurdish
minority of well over a million in the northeastern region
bordering on Syria, Turkey, and Iran. Most Muslims, by
a slim majority, are Shiite, although the regime has long
been Sunni-dominated. Women comprise about 25 percent
of the paid labor force, 47 percent of the agricultural work
force, and one-third of the professionals in education and
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IRAQ 306
health care; traditionally minimal female representation
in government was partially reversed at the 1984 National
Assembly balloting, when the number of women deputies
rose from 14 to 80 (32 percent). In addition, a moderate
interpretation of Islamic law has given women equal rights
in divorce, land ownership, and suffrage.
Agriculture, which was characterized by highly concen-
trated land ownership prior to the introduction of land-
reform legislation in 1958, occupies about two-fifths of the
population but produces under one-tenth of the gross na-
tional product. The most important crops are dates, barley,
wheat, rice, and tobacco. Oil is the leading natural resource
and accounts for over half of GNP. Other important natu-
ral resources include phosphates, sulphur, iron, copper,
chromite, lead, limestone, and gypsum. Manufacturing
industry is not highly developed, although petrochemical,
steel, aluminum, and phosphate plants were among heavy-
industrial construction projects undertaken in the 1970s.
In recent years the country has experienced severe economic
difficulty as the result of depressed oil prices and the heavy
cost (including shortfalls in oil output) attributable to war
with Iran. However, economic reforms launched in 1987,
coupled with postwar optimism, helped propel GDP growth
by 10 percent in 1988, the first positive rate since the early
1980s.
Political background. Conquered successively by Arabs,
Mongols, and Turks, the region now known as Iraq became
a British mandate under the League of Nations following
World War I. British influence, exerted through the rul-
ing Hashemite dynasty, persisted even after Iraq gained
formal independence in 1932; the country continued to fol-
low a generally pro-British and pro-Western policy until
the overthrow of the monarchy in July 1958 by a military
coup that cost the lives of King FAISAL II and his leading
statesman, Nuri al-SA`ID. Brig. Gen. `Abd al-Karim KAS-
SEM (QASIM), leader of the revolt, ruled as head of a left-
wing nationalist regime until he too was killed in a second
coup on February 8, 1963, that brought to power a new
military regime led by Lt. Gen. 'Abd al-Salam `AREF
('ARIF) and, after his accidental death in 1966, by his
brother, Gen. `Abd al-Rahman`AREF. The'Aref regime
terminated in a third, bloodless coup on July 17, 1968,
which established (then) Maj. Gen. Ahmad Hasan al-
BAKR, a former premier and leader of the right wing of
the Baath Socialist Party, as president and prime min-
ister.
Under Bakr a number of alleged plots were used as ex-
cuses to move against internal opposition; the most prom-
inent took place in June 1973 when a coup attempt by Col.
Nazim KAZZAR, head of national security, led to numer-
ous arrests and executions. Domestic instability was fur-
ther augmented by struggles within the Baath and by rela-
tions with the Kurdish minority. The Kurds, under the
leadership of Gen. Mustafa al-BARZANI, resisted most
Baghdad governments in the two decades after World War
II and, with Iranian military support, were intermittently
in open rebellion from 1961 to 1975. A 1970 settlement with
0 Miles 300
the Kurds broke down over distribution o
revenues and exclusion of the oil-producing
from Kurdistan. In May 1974 Iraq and Ir
mutual withdrawal of troops along their co
pending a settlement of outstanding issues,
army subsequently launched a major offend
rebels and over 130,000 Kurds fled to Iran,
hostilities. Concessions were ultimately made
in an agreement concluded between the two
in March 1975 during an OPEC meeting at`
a "reconciliation" treaty being signed at"
following June. Iraq agreed to abandon a
claim to the Shatt al-`Arab waterway at its so
ing frontier on the basis of agreements conch
the British presence in Iraq; Iran, in return,
all aid to .the Kurds, whose resistance mom
sided. In mid-1976, however, fighting agai
tween Iraqi forces and the Kurdish Pesh M
ostensibly because of the government's n
massive deportation of Kurds to southern
replacement by Arabs.
On July 16,1979, President Bakr announ
Lion from both party and government offices
sor, Saddam HUSSEIN, had widely been co
strongman of the regime, and his accession'
of the Baath and the Revolutionary Co
(RCC) came as no surprise. Earlier in the
Communist Party (ICP) had withdrawn fro
old National Progressive Front (see Politi
low) following what Hussein himself had t
ing of Communists from the government, W
late July of a failed "conspiracy" against the
provided further evidence that he had effecti
opponents from the RCC.
Although former president Bakr was kno
periencing health problems, his resignation
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relations. After adhering to a broadly pro-
e that included participation in the Baghdad
is successor, the Central Treaty Organization
,Iraq switched abruptly in 1958 to an Arab na-
became increasingly cordial after 1958, while
links with the United States (and temporarily
) were severed in 1967. In 1979, however, Bagh-
against Iraqi Communists, veering somewhat
West, particularly France, for military and
t aid. The change in direction was reinforced
in 1981-1982. Following a June 7, 1981, Israeli air raid
against Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor, then being built out-
side Baghdad, France indicated that it would assist in re-
constructing the facility, while on November 17, 1982,
President Hussein stated that his government might be will-
ing to reestablish diplomatic relations with the United
States should Washington end its pro-Israeli bias and
demonstrate an interest in resolution of the Persian Gulf
war.
Relations with Arab states have fluctuated, although
Iraq has remained committed to an anti-Israel policy. A
leading backer of the "rejection front", it bitterly denounced
the 1977 peace initiative of Egyptian President Sadat and
the Camp David accords of September 1978, after which,
on October 26, Syria and Iraq joined in a "National Charter
for Joint Action" against Israel. This marked an abrupt
reversal in relations between the two neighbors, long led
by competing Baath factions. The "National Charter"
called for "full military union" and talks directed toward
its implementation were conducted in January and June
1979. At the latter session, held at Baghdad, presidents
Assad of Syria and Bakr of Iraq declared that their two
nations constituted "a unified state with one President, one
Government and one Party, the Baath" but the subsequent
replacement of Bakr by Saddam Hussein, whom the Syri-
ans had long considered an instigator of subversion in their
country, coupled with Hussein's accusations of Syrian in-
volvement in an attempted coup, abruptly terminated the
rapprochement.
Relations with Teheran have long been embittered by
conflicting interests in the Gulf region, including claims
to the Shatt al-'Arab and to three islands (Greater and
Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa) occupied by Iran in 1971,
as well as by Iranian support for Iraq's Kurdish rebels. Fol-
lowing the advent of the Khomeini regime, Iraq bombed
a number of Kurdish villages inside Iran, and on September
22, 1980, having repudiated the 1975 reconciliation treaty,
invaded its eastern neighbor. Despite overwhelming Iraqi
air superiority and early ground successes, the-Iranian
military, reenforced by a substantially larger population
with religious commitment to martyrdom, waged a bitter
campaign against the Western-supplied Iraqi forces, the
brief campaign projected by Hussein soon being reduced
to a stalemate. In the course of the protracted conflict,
numerous Iraqi cease-fire proposals were rebuffed by
Teheran, which called for the payment of $150 billion in
reparations and Hussein's ouster. It was not until a failed
siege of the Iraqi city of Basra, coupled with an increas-
ingly intense political struggle within Teheran, that
Ayatollah Khomeini called for a suspension of hostilities
on July 20, 1988, in the immediate wake of which Iraq suc-
ceeded in driving Iran's depleted troops back to prewar
borders. Both countries have since observed the ceasefire
of August 20, although formal peace negotiations have
been stalled by Iran's continued insistence on reparations
and Iraq's resumption of its pre-1975 claim to full control
of the Shatt al-`Arab waterway. In early 1989 Iraqi officials
warned that if the dispute continued at impasse they would
seek to divert sufficient water from the Shatt al-'Arab to
establish a new deep channel via Khor al-Zubair and Khor
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od to differences within the RCC in regard to three poli-
1) containment not only of the Kurds but, in the after-
f the Iranian Revolution, the increasingly restive
` community, led by Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-
Kuntil his execution in April 1980; (2) an Iraqi-Syrian
'lion plan (see Foreign relations, below), aspects of
president Hussein found objectionable; and (3) sup-
of the Iraqi Communist Party, including the
val from the cabinet of its two ministers. Although
,amnesty was proclaimed on August 16, 1979,
Shiite, and Communist opposition to the Hus-
overnment persisted and appeared to expand fol-
-,Baghdad's September 17, 1980, abrogation of the
' .ers agreement and the invasion five days later of
uzistan Province, yielding a debilitating conflict
to preoccupy the regime for the next eight years
t relations, below).
tution and government. Constitutional processes
ely nonexistent during the two decades after the
up ,.despite the issuance of a provisional basic law
the establishment of local governing councils and
011.
ttyenmg of a legislature. It was not until June and
Assembly and a Kurdish Legislative Council,
ely.The RCC was not, however, dissolved, effec-
.remaining concentrated in its chairman, who
td to serve concurrently as president of the Repub-
by a vice president and a Council of Ministers,
dent has broad powers of appointment and is also
der in chief of the Armed Forces. The judicial sys-
ea~ied by a Court of Cassation and includes five
,appeal, courts of the first instance, religious
- d revolutionary courts that deal with crimes in-
security.
ncession to northern minority sentiment, the
974 were granted "autonomy [as] defined by
in 1976 the country's 16 provincial governorates
ded to 18, three of which were designated as
utonomous Regions.
1989 it was announced that a new constitu-
abe'adopted prior to the National Assembly
April l; in late March, however, the vice chair-
indicated that its contents would be de-
the next Assembly sitting. In January 1990
'fiussein announced that the document (which
been considered by the Assembly) would be
i
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Abdullah (see map). Such an undertaking, which would
require Kuwaiti approval, would render ocean-going ship-
ment from the Iranian ports of Abadan and Khorramshahr
impossible.
Current Issues. The August 1988 ceasefire was greeted
in Iraq by three days of national celebration as the govern-
ment, despite no territorial gains and a reported $60 billion
war debt, claimed victory over Iran. Subsequently, specula-
tion that President Hussein would relax his grip on domes-
tic political and economic activity was supported by a call
for multiple party registration and the promotion of private
sector ownership of formally state-run enterprises. How-
ever, Baghdad's privatization drive did not include either
the oil- or armament-producing industries, both of which
the government sought to increase in efficiency and pro-
ductivity. Nor did efforts at reconciliation extend to the
Kurdish population, which Baghdad had accused of trea-
sonous behavior throughout the war. In the wake of the
ceasefire, government troops quickly penetrated Kurdish
areas and by early 1989 some 70,000 of their inhabitants
were reported to have fled into Iran and Turkey. At mid-
year Baghdad announced that it was clearing all inhabitants
from a 20-mile security zone along both the Iranian and
Turkish borders. A government spokesman insisted that
the action was not part of an "Arabization" program and
denied reports that some 200,000 Kurds had been sent to
the south.
By mid-1990 no discernable progress had been registered
in UN-mediated negotiations on a peace treaty with Iran.
Iraq called for the unconditional release of war prisoners
on "humanitarian" grounds, while Iran insisted that an ex-
change could not be considered in isolation from mutual
troop withdrawals from occupied territory and the settle-
ment of boundary issues. As a result, it proved necessary
to extend the mandate of the UN Iran-Iraq Military Ob-
server Group (UNIIMOG), which had been assigned re-
sponsibility for truce supervision, for six-month periods
from September 1989 and March 1990, respectively.
POLITICAL PARTIES AND GROUP'
Since the 1968 coup the dominant force within hi,
been the Baath, which under the National Action Cli
of 1973 became allied with the Iraqi Commune
(ICP) and, in 1974, with three Kurdish groups in a N,
Progressive Front. In March 1979 the Front becam e
moribund when the Communists withdrew.
Following the onset of the Gulf war in Septem
various opposition elements announced the fo
antigovernment groupings, all receiving suppo
abroad. On November 28 the ICP, the Democra
of Kurdistan (DPK), and the Unified Socialist
Kurdistan (USPK) signed a charter establishing;
cratic Iraqi Front committed to establishment o
tion government and Kurdish autonomy, the sevv,
ties to the "world capitalist market", and soli
anti-Zionist and socialist governments. Earlier, oh
ber 12, a National Pan-Arab Democratic Front,
encompassing seven different groups, including
otic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) as well as Beath
dissidents, was formed at Damascus, Syria. Fi
November 17,1982, opposition elements based at
Iran, established a Supreme Council of the Id
tion of Iraq, led by Hojatolislam Sayyid Mu
HAKIM, to work for Hussein's overthrow. Th
Council was believed to encompass a variety of
tions, the most prominent of which was the
al-Da`wah.
During a meeting at Teheran in November;
had concluded an agreement to coordinate thh
against Baghdad, the DPK indicating that it
cussed the possibility of cooperation with the
Council. Subsequent military forays by these
groups in 1987 and 1988 were successfully r
government forces, while a declaration of gen
for the dissidents in both 1987 and 1989 was
by alleged executions of returnees.