ON U.S. ROLE IN CHILE RECALLED

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP09T00207R001000020010-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2011
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: October 17, 1974
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Approved For Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09TOO207RO01000020010-2
1 ; .:'CS 19711,
3 ((.i t ti' tt i 4 . i
1l.' ~ly1i..S iJ h U~.A I I 13,_1 t/
Ex-Intelligence Aide Asserts
C.I.A. and State Dept. "Neat'.
Along' Mill Nixon Plan
By SEMI LOUR M. HERSH
WASHINGTON, Oct. 16-Ray
S. Cline, a former high-level
intelligence official in the
Nixon Administration, said to-
day that he was dubious about
the ultimate wisdom of the `Ad-
ministration's covert interven-
tion against President Salva,lor
Allende Gossens of Chile h::t.i
that he supported it because,
he feared more serious inter-
vention by the Soviet Union. I
Mr. Cline, who was inter-i
viewed by telephone, is the'
first high official to permit his
name to be used in confirming
published reports that the role
3f the Central Intelligenr-e
Agency in the effort to oust tl.e
Marxist Government included'
the direct financing of a nura-
her of anti-Allende trade groups
and labor unions, including
'Rr istanre Strikes'
1- :Jf t%12 ninnev ",c:a5 in-
1, riled i, ldreia! sups'', r of
tilt, ~~r" i 7..ine inert an e he truchrrs in their resistance,
strikes against the Ali,'nde:
Government," ^,1r. Cline
think it was very logical to en
able those t?roups to keep ali,?e
econnmicaliy so that we could
maintain a core of private;
entrepreneurs until the 1176
l
i
e
e t
on s.
Die"-io:ed by C.I.A. Chief
The extensive C.I.A. role inll
Chile hecanne 1-:nr"w,vn Sera. 9
when lr was reported that the
eg"ncv dir, ctnr, William E.
Colby, iiad told a Congressional
committee tlr?t u8-million ins
clandc=tine funds was autho.1"
ized fer operations against the
Allenr;e Government betwren
1970 and 1973. Dr' Allende died'
in a military coup that over-
threw his Government in Sep-
temher. 1973.
Mr. Cline served as director
of the State D;:partment's Bu-
reau of Inteilinence, and was
directly involved in much of
the planning and discus~in:is
That 'vent on in the 40 Com-
mittee, the top-level intelligence
board that oversees all covert
operations of the intelligence
agency. Before ioining the Strtel
Department, from which he re-
tired last year, Mr. Cline served
more than 20 years with th;'.
agency, - eventually becoming
its deputy director for intelli-
gence.
His account of the assistance
to labor groups flatly contra-
dicts ,,both the public and pri-
vate descriptions of the C.I.A.
role presented by, President
Ford ' and Secretary of, State
Kissinger.
At a televised news confer-
ence on Sept_ 16, Mr. Ford said
that 'Dr. Allende had been at-
tempting to suppress opposi-
tion newspapers and politicians.
He added that the "effort that
was made in this case was to
help and assist the preservation
of opposition newspapers and
electronic media and to pre-;
serve, opposition political par
ties."
Program Termed Broader
In the interview, however?
Mr. Cline ,,aid the program-i
as adproved by the 40 Commit-1 -
tee, he noted-was far broader.)
"What the C.I.A. was trying;
to do," he said, "was to see that
at least 50 per cent and proba-
bly 60 per cent of the electorate
would he disillusioned by the
time of the presidential elec
tions in 1976" - when, under
the Constitution, Dr. Allende
could not run again.
Despite warnings about the d
Allende Government's inten-'
tons relayed in the intelligences
reports, he said, many high of-i
fic ials did not believe that clan-
destine operations would ac-
complish the "goal in mind"-I
to keep a center coalition alive)
until 1976.
"State and the C.I.A. were
dubious but naturally wend
along," Mr. Cline said, because
the White House-either Nixon
and Dr. Kissinger, or both-
decided the push the program."
"They key role in this whole
thing was in the White House,"
he added, "hut it's impossible
to tell whether only one or'
both were enthusiastic about
it because the orders carne)
ti;rough Kissinger and the 40
Committee. It was a National'
Security Council decision ands
r,nt a decision made by the
C.i A. or the State Depart-i
rr.ent."
t
"~?'~ll "the former State Do-
parti ne r t of ieiai ade d, "by
1973 they 1'.-ere tot illy
lusione.'i v::a? him." ,,Jr. .Clines
was alludin", to the prot-'as
and strikes in the last months
of the Allende Government.
"I. decided to speak out he-
cause I feel that there's such
a superficial understanding as!
to why the United States has
tried to assist democratic po-
litical organizations abroad,"
Mr. Cline asserted.
"I'm pot hapnv about the
way I can defend them because
I think our strategy was not
unreasonable or immoral. It
was our duty to preserve insti-
tutions which we call ? free"
He explained that the ulti-
mate goal of the clandestine
activities was to enable the
center coalition factions of the
Christian Democratic party to
survive the Allende period.
"Aral" he said. "I think the
center groups did survive, as
thev might not have under a
proloneed Allende Comm, ni-
regim-."
0058
Approved For Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09TOO207RO01000020010-2