CRISIS PRE-PLANNING GROUP (CPPG) FRIDAY, JANUARY 17, 1986 SITUATION ROOM WHITE HOUSE 5:30 P.M.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00874R000200180002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 26, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 17, 1986
• Content Type: MISC

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Crisis Pre-Planning Group (CPPG)
Friday, January 17, 1986
Situation Room White House
5:30 p.m.
I. Introduction
II. Intelligence Assessment
A. Situation report
Chairman
CIA
B. Current and anticipated Soviet next steps
C. Outside intervention
III. Diplomatic Situation
A. Status of U.S. response to Ryadh
B. Discussions with YAR
State
C. Exchanges with other governments, e.g. UK, PRC, Egypt,
France
IV. Next Steps
All
A. Can the U.S. deter Ethiopian Cuban and/or Soviet
intervention
B. Likely Saudi response to our initiative
C. Offer of humanitarian and/or other assistance to
successive regime
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ADDIS ABABA 0295 DTG: 172135Z JAN 86 PSM 046698
SIT937 TOR: 017/2228Z
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OP IMMED
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DE RUEHDS 40295 0172146
0 172135Z JAN 86 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3962
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 1516
AMEMBASSY SANAA IMMEDIATE 1254
AMEMBASSY CAIRO 2597
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN 0067
AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI 3697
AMCONSUL JEDDAH 1583
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0074
AMEMBASSY LONDON 2751
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1634
AMEMBASSY RIYADH 0113
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
C ONFIDENTIALADDIS ABABA 00295
LONDON FOR RAPHEL
CENTCOM FOR POLAD
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MOPS, YS, SA, ET
SUBJECT: INFORMATION REGARDING SITUATION IN ADEN
AS OF 2300 JANUARY 17
1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. AT DINNER HOSTED BY DCM FOR VARIOUS MILITARY
ATTACHES AND DIPLOMATS JANUARY 17 THE FOLLOWING WAS
ASCERTAINED. WE ARE AWARE THAT PERHAPS MUCH OF THE
FOLLOWING IS KNOWN BY CERTAIN ADDRESSEES BUT FORWARD
THE INFORMATION FOR WHAT WE VALUE ADDRESSEES MIGHT
FIND USEFUL.
3. ALGERIAN EMBASSY HAS BEEN DEMOLISHED WITH ONE OF
ITS CLERKS KILLED. THE CLERK WAS KILLED -NEAR HIS HOME
AND NOT AT EMBASSY.
4. UK EMBASSY HAS NOT BEEN SERIOUSLY DAMAGED THOUGH
THE RESIDENCE OF COM HAS. THE BRITISH HAVE TWO RAF ?
PLANES ON STANDBY WITH OVERFLIGHT CLEARANCE FROM THE
ETHIOPIANS TO EVACUATE THEIR STAFF TO DJIBOUTI.
5. ITALIAN EMBASSY HAS BEEN SERIOUSLY DAMAGED. THERE
IS NO REPEAT NO INFORMATION REGARDING AN EVACUATION
OF THEIR STAFF.
6. FRG EMBASSY HAS BEEN DAMAGED AND THEY ARE TRYING
TO MOVE OUT THEIR PERSONNEL TO DJIBOUTI, PROBABLY
IN CONJUNCTION WITH UK.
7. FIGHTING CONTINUES NEAR THE PORT ACCORDING TO
VARIOUS KNOWLEDGEABLE SOURCES IN ADDIS ABABA AND A
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LARGE AMMUNITION DUMP DESCRIBED AS NEAR THE PORT AND
THE DIPLOMATIC ENCLAVE HAS BEEN DESTROYED.
8. GDR MILITARY ATTACHE HAS CONFIRMED THAT ETHIOPIAN
PARATROOPS AT SHASHEMENE HAVE BEEN ON ALERT FOR
MOVEMENT INTO THE PDRY BEGINNING 0/A JANUARY 14.
THE TROOPS HAVE NOT MOVED AND HE DOES NOT REPEAT NOT
EXPECT THEM TO BECOME INVOLVED. (COMMENT: WE AGREE
WITH THE APPRAISAL OF THE GDR ATTACHE., FROM ANOTHER
SOURCE WE HAVE BEEN INFORMED THAT THERE IS NO REPEAT NO
UNUSUAL ACTIVITY AT DIRE DAWA AIRPORT WHICH WOULD LEAD
US TO BELIEVE THAT THIS STRATEGIC AIRPORT IS OR WILL BE
USED FOR MOVEMENT OF ETHIOPIAN TROOPS INTO THE PDRY
AT THIS TIME. CHEEK
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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9569
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN 9873
AMEMBASSY LONDON 0849
AMEMBASSY PARIS 8444
USMISSION USNATO 9184
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 5551
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA IMMEDIATE 0906
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 1113
AMEMBASSY AMMAN 2934
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 0192
AMEMBASSY CAIRO 3970
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 2874
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 1455
AMEMBASSY RIYADH IMMEDIATE 0707
AMEMBASSY RABAT 0951
AMEMBASSY SANAA IMMEDIATE 0792
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 5240
AMCONSUL JEDDAH 2539
AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0523
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0474
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 1057
AMEMBASSY MANAMA 0444
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0498
AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 1499
AMEMBASSY DOHA 0196
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
DIG: 1715
TOR: 017
C ONFIDENTIALSECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 00942
E. 0. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MOPS, PREL, UR, YE, UK
SUBJECT: SOVIET ASSESSMENT OF SITUATION IN SOUTH YEMEN
REF:A)SANAA 367. B) MOSCOW 00706
1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: UK EMBOFF PROVIDED READOUT JANUARY 17
ON BRITISH CONTACTS IN MOSCOW WITH THE SOVIETS ON
THE SOUTH YEMEN CRISIS. ACCORDING TO THE EMBOFF,
THE SOVIETS ARE COOPERATING IN EXCHANGE OF
INFORMATION AND PLANNING FOR EVACUATION OF CITIZENS,
AND ARE TRYING TO PROMOTE RECONCILIATION BETWEEN
THE WARRING SIDES. OUR BRITISH COLLEAGUES DO
NOT BELIEVE THE SOVIETS WILL INTERVENE, AS THEY DO
NOT SEE THEIR INTERESTS THREATENED, WHOEVER WINS.
AFTER A TWO-DAY HIATUS, COVERAGE OF THE COUP
RETURNED TO THE SOVIET MEDIA AS POLITBURO MEMBER
GEYDAR ALIYEV MET WITH PDRY COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
CHAIRMAN ATTAS, WHO ARRIVED IN MOSCOW FROM
NEW DELHI.
3. DESPITE THEIR EXPRESSIONS OF CONFIDENCE TO THE
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BRITISH, THE SOVIETS MAY WELL BE CONCERNED LEST
TURMOIL IN THE PDRY ROB THEM OF THEIR PRIMARY
FOOTHOLD ON THE ARABIAN PENINSULA. IF THE
LEVEL OF VIOLENCE CONTINUES TO ESCALATE,
WE WOULD NOT RULE OUT A LIMITED EFFORT BY
MOSCOW TO BEEF UP THE PHYSICAL SECURITY OF
ITS EMBASSY, COMMUNICATION INSTALLATION, AND
OTHER SENSITIVE FACILITIES, IN THE PDRY. AT
THE SAME TIME, WE SHARE OUR BRITISH COLLEAGUES'
ESTIMATE THAT A SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION
TO AFFECT THE OUTCOME OF THE COUP IS HIGHLY
UNLIKELY GIVEN THE EXPECTATION THAT SOVIET
INTERESTS CAN BE PROTECTED BY OTHER MEANS AND
THE MAJOR DIFFICULTIES MOSCOW WOULD FACE IN
MOBILIZING AND SUSTAINING THE FORCES
NECESSARY TO ENSURE A RAPID AND SUCCESSFUL
INTERVENTION. END SUMMARY.
REPORTED SOVIET COOPERATION, CONFUSION
4. UK EMBOFF JANUARY 17 PROVIDED READOUT OF UK
CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIET MFA ON THE CRISIS
IN SOUTH YEMEN, INCLUDING A JANUARY 16 CALL
ON FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KORNIYENKO
BY UK AMBASSADOR CARTLEDGE (UK EMBOFF ASKED
THAT THE FACT THIS MEETING TOOK PLACE BE
CLOSELY HELD J. ACCORDING TO THE EMBOFF, THE
SOVIETS ARE BEING VERY COOPERATIVE IN EXCHANGING
INFORMATION ON THE SITUATION AND IN PLANNING
EVACUATION OF SOVIET AND WESTERN CITIZENS FROM
ADEN. EMBOFF RELATED THAT THE SOVIETS ARE NOT
FULLY INFORMED ABOUT THE SITUATION AND ARE UNCERTAIN
WHAT THE OUTCOME OF THE FIGHTING WILL BE. HE
SAID THE SOVIETS WERE NOT SURE WHETHER THE FOUR
REPORTED COUP LEADERS REPORTEDLY EXECUTED ON
THE FIRST DAY HAVE ACTUALLY BEEN KILLED. THE
SOVIETS WERE ALSO NOT SURE WHO WAS LEADING
THE COUP ATTEMPT, ALTHOUGH THEY BELIEVED IT
WAS DEFENSE MINISTER OASIM.
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MOSCOW 0942 DIG: 171540Z JAN 86 PSN: 046010
SIT890 TOR: 017/16012
DISTRIBUTION: PUBS SIT /003
OP IMMED
STU6913
DE RUEHMO #0942/02 0171548
0 171540Z JAN 86
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9570
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN 9874
AMEMBASSY LONDON 0850
AMEMBASSY PARIS 8445
USMISSION USNATO 9185
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 5552
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA IMMEDIATE 0907
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 1114
AMEMBASSY AMMAN 2935
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 0193
AMEMBASSY CAIRO 3971
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 2875
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 1456
AMEMBASSY RIYADH IMMEDIATE 0708
AMEMBASSY RABAT 0952
AMEMBASSY SANAA IMMEDIATE 0793
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 5241
AMCONSUL JEDDAH 2540
AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0524
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0475
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 1058
AMEMBASSY MANAMA 0445
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0499
AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 1500
AMEMBASSY DOHA 0197
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
C ONFIDENTIALSECTION 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 00942
E. 0. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MOPS, PREL, UR, YE, UK
SUBJECT: SOVIET ASSESSMENT OF SITUATION IN SOUTH YEMEN
SOVIET MEDIATION
5. UK-EMBOFF SAID THE SOVIETS WERE TRYING TO PROMOTE
RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE OPPOSING FACTIONS.
THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR JANUARY 16 MET WITH
REPRESENTATIVES OF EACH SIDE, BUT THE
MEDIATION ATTEMPT FAILED AND FIGHTING
RESUMED. ACCORDING TO UK EMBOFF THE SOVIETS HERE
HAVE INDICATED THAT MOSCOW DISSUADED QADHAFI FROM
GIVING ASSISTANCE (A LINE WHICH TRACKS WITH
SOVIET EMBOFF'S STATEMENT TO FRG EMBOFF REFTEL).
EVACUATION PLANS
6. UK EMBOFF TOLD US THAT THE SOVIETS, THE FRENCH,
AND THE BRITISH ARE CURRENTLY WORKING ON PLANS TO
EVACUATE SOVIET AND WESTERN CITIZENS FROM ADEN.
THE FIGHTING IS ENDANGERING EVERYONE: BOTH
THE UK AND SOVIET EMBASSIES HAVE BEEN HIT,
WHILE THE WEST GERMAN EMBASSY HAS BEEN DEMOLISHED.
ACCORDING TO THE BRIT, THESE COUNTRIES ARE
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CONSIDERING EVACUATING WOMEN AND CHILDREN FROM
BEACHES DURING A LULL IN THE FIGHTING.
DOUBTS OF POSSIBLE SOVIET INTERVENTION
7. THE UK EMBOFF SAID HE DID NOT BELIEVE THE
SOVIETS WOULD INTERVENE IN SOUTH YEMEN, ALTHOUGH
THEY PREFERRED ALI NASIR MUHAMMAD. ACCORDING
TO THE BRITISH, THE SOVIETS BELIEVE THAT
THEIR INTERESTS WOULD BE PRESERVED NO MATTER
WHO WINS. IN THE BRITISH VIEW, THE SOVIETS
SAW THE COUP ATTEMPT AS RESULTING FROM PERSONAL
FEUDS RATHER THAN POLITICAL OR IDEOLOGICAL
DIFFERENCES. MOREOVER, BOTH SIDES IN THE CURRENT
FIGHTING HAVE CLAIMED THEY WANT TO MAINTAIN
CLOSE RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. THE
UK EMBOFF SPECULATED THAT THE SOVIETS DID NOT KNOW
ABOUT THE COUP ATTEMPT BEFOREHAND--I.E. THAT
THE PLOTTERS KEPT THEIR PLANS SECRET FROM THE
MULTITUDE OF SOVIET OFFICIALS IN ADEN, IN
PART BECAUSE ANY COUP COULD UNDERMINE SOVIET
EFFORTS TO BROADEN RELATIONS IN THE GULF AND
ESTABLISH RELATIONS WITH SAUDI ARABIA.
RENEWED SOVIET MEDIA ATTENTION
8. MEANWHILE, THE SOVIET CENTRAL RUSSIAN-LANGUAGE)
MEDIA JANUARY 17 CARRIED ITS FIRST REPORTS ON
THE CRISIS SINCE JANUARY 14. PRAVDA PUBLISHED
A NEUTRAL TASS REPORT FROM KUWAIT. ACCORDING
TO TASS, THE OPPOSING SIDES HAVE NOT BEEN
ABLE TO CARRY OUT A CEASEFIRE UNDERSTANDING IN
A NUMBER OF AREAS, COMMUNICATIONS WITH OTHER
COUNTRIES ARE TENUOUS, AND THE WHEREABOUTS OF
VARIOUS PARTY AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS ARE
UNCERTAIN. THE DISPATCH CONCLUDES THAT "STEPS"
HAVE BEEN UNDERTAKEN TO END THE FIGHTING,
NORMALIZE THE SITUATION, AND RENEW GOVERNMENT
OPERATIONS.
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MOSCOW 0942 DTG:171540Z JAN 86 PSM 045016
SIT891 TOR: 017/1603Z
DISTRIBUTION: PUBS SIT /003
OP IMMED
UTS0349
DE RUEHMO #0942/03 0171549
0 171540Z JAN 86.
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9571
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN 9875
AMEMBASSY LONDON 0851
AMEMBASSY PARIS 8445
USMISSION USNATO 9186
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 5553
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA IMMEDIATE 0908
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 1115
AMEMBASSY AMMAN 2936
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 0194
AMEMBASSY CAIRO 3972
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 2876
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 1457
AMEMBASSY RIYADH IMMEDIATE 0709
AMEMBASSY RABAT 0953
AMEMBASSY SANAA IMMEDIATE 0794
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 5242
AMCONSUL JEDDAH 2541
AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0525
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0476
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 1059
AMEMBASSY MANAMA 0446
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0500
AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 1501
AMEMBASSY DOHA 0198
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
C ONFIDENTIALSECTION 03 OF 03 MOSCOW 00942
E. 0. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MOPS, PREL, UR, YE, UK
SUBJECT: SOVIET ASSESSMENT OF SITUATION IN SOUTH YEMEN
ALIYEV--PDRY OFFICIALS MEET
9. ACCORDING TO ANOTHER PRAVDA ARTICLE, PDRY COUNCIL
OF MINISTERS CHAIRMAN ATTAS, FOREIGN MINISTER DALI,
AND MINISTER OF TRADE AND SUPPLY FADLI ARRIVED
IN MOSCOW JANUARY 16 FROM NEW DELHI. PRAVDA
REPORTED THAT POLITBURO MEMBER GEYDAR ALIYEV AND
"OTHER OFFICIALS" MET THE SOUTH YEMENI PARTY
AT THE AIRPORT. ALTHOUGH THE PRAVDA REPORT
DESCRIBED THE VISIT AS A "STOPOVER," OUR
UK COLLEAGUE TOLD US THAT THE PDRY OFFICIALS
ARE STILL IN MOSCOW.
COMMENT
10. THE ALIYEV-ATTAS MEETING UNDERSCORES MOSCOW S
SERIOUS CONCERN OVER THE CURRENT TURMOIL IN THE
PDRY, IN PART BECAUSE OF THE IMMEDIATE THREAT
TO SOVIET PERSONNEL AND INSTALLATIONS. MOREOVER,
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DESPITE THEIR EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT THE EVENTUAL
WINNER WILL HAVE TO RETAIN CLOSE TIES TO MOSCOW,
THE SOVIETS MAY WELL BE APPREHENSIVE THAT AN
UNFORESEEN TURN IN THE STRUGGLE COULD ULTIMATELY
ROB THEM OF THEIR PRIMARY FOOTHOLD ON THE
ARABIAN PENINSULA. IF VIOLENCE CONTINUES TO
ESCALATE, WE WOULD NOT RULE OUT A SOVIET EFFORT
TO BEEF UP THE PHYSICAL SECURITY OF THEIR EMBASSY,
COMMUNICATIONS FACILITY, AND OTHER SENSITIVE
FACILITIES IN THE PDRY. HOWEVER, IN THE ABSENCE
OF EVIDENCE OF A MAJOR BUILD-UP OF SOVIET FORCES
IN THE AREA AND A CLEAR THREAT TO SOVIET
INTERESTS THERE, WE SHARE THE BRITISH ASSESSMENT THAT
A SOVIET INTERVENTION TO AFFECT THE OUTCOME OF THE
COUP IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY. THE SOVIETS ARE WELL
AWARE THAT SUCH AN INTERVENTION WOULD INVOLVE
POTENTIALLY HEAVY POLITICAL COSTS AND RISKS OF
ESCALATION. IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, WE BELIEVE
THE SOVIETS WOULD BE EXTREMELY WARY OF MILITARY
MOVES WHEN THEY RETAIN OTHER OPTIONS FOR
PROTECTING THEIR INTERESTS AND DO NOT HAVE
MILITARY FORCES DEPLOYED IN THE AREA SUFFICIENT
TO ENSURE THAT AN INTERVENTION WOULD BE
RAPID AND EFFECTIVE. HARTMAN
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THE SITUATION IN SOUTH YEMEN 25X1
17 January 1986 .
President Hasani's forces appear to have established cnntrnl fluor most
areas of Aden, Some
rebel forces remain noleo UD in trip nnrt ind the Tawahi area of the city:
troops in the garrisons in Little
Aden, who had remained neutral during most of the conflict, have
thrown their support to Hasani.
Damage to facilities in Adpn from the fighting is extensive.
I tribal supporters of both sides are
mobilizing north and northeast of the capital and that sporadic
fighting between tribal militia units is occurring in other areas
of the country.
In our judgment the fighting, which has temporarily tapered off, is at a
critical juncture:
With Hasani apparently in control of Aden his primary opponents
may flee the country, with their tribal backers falling in line
behind the government.
Alternatively, the rebels could opt to rally their tribal forces
north of the capital and make a renewed grab for power. If they
do, the fighting likely will spread to areas near the borders with
North Yemen and Saudi Arabia.
The conflict in South Yemen has been building since October when neither
of the two leading factions proved strong enough to eliminate their opponents
at the ruling Party Congress:
All leading South Yemeni politicians are leftists, but relatively
moderate President Hasani, supported by the provincial governor
Muhammad All Ahmad, has been trying to improve relations with
moderate Arab states and to open the country to the West. We
believe both men are alive and leading the government forces.
President Hasani has been opposed by a hard-line faction led by
former President Ismail, Deputy Premier All Antar, and Minister of
Defense Qasim. The status of the rebel leaders remain unclear but
we believe that at least the Minister of Defense was leading rebel
forces on Thursday.
-- All the these leaders represent powerful South Yemeni tribes.
Tribal affiliations are very important in South Yemen and
ultimately determine the loyalty of military and militia units.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
SPOT COMMENTARY: South Yemeni Situation
17 January 1986
1600 EST
Soviet efforts to arrange a ceasefire are not succeeding. Press reports
indicate fighting is continuing in Aden, although no rebel air strikes have
been reported today. President
Hasani's forces have control of much of the capital but that rebel forces
remain in the port and the Tawahi area. The evacuation of diplomatic
personnel from Aden involving Soviet ships began late Friday(
Comment: Rebel forces appear to be on the defensive and pro-government
forces may be preparing a major assault on the main rebel base at Al Anad
airfield. We expect that heavy fighting may resume this weekend as Hasani's
forces attempt/to eliminate rebel pockets in the capital.
An Ethiopian military intervention on behalf of Hasani would serve Soviet
purposes in "defending" a client state without using its own troops, which
would provoke a strong negative response in Saudi Arabia and other states in
the region. An intervention also would play to Mengistu's pretensions to be a
"defender of socialism." Moreover, Hasani and Mengistu have a close personal
relationship. Ethiopian intervention, however, could provoke intervention by
North Yemen, which also supports Hasani but would be very distrustful of
Ethiopian intentions.
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SECRET
A. Intelligence Assessment
G. South Yemen's Importance to the USSR
H. Possible Options for Supporting the Moderates
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South Yemen's Importance to the USSR
Syria is the Soviets' most important client in the Arab world, but South
Yemen is their closest. Whereas in Syria, Moscow has a presence throughout the
military but almost nowhere else, in South Yemen, the Soviets--along with their
East European and Cuban allies--permeate the entire government, party, and
military structure. The Soviets have approximately 1500 military and 500
economic advisers and technicians in South Yemen. The USSR is integrally
linked?politcally, militarily, economically, and ideologically?with the PDRY,
the first and only Marxist government in the Arab world. Only one
in the Middle East, Babrak Karmal's regime in Afghanistan, is more
the Soviets for its existence than is South Yemen.
government
dependent on
The Soviets' interests in the PDRY--a dismally poor country of little more
than two million people--stem from its Marxist orientation and its strategic
location. The Soviets value the PDRY as the only thing they have to show for
almost seventy years of trying to foster the growth of Marxist regimes in the
Arab world. They promote South Yemen as a model for other Middle Eastern
states to follow and work with it to aid leftist movements in the region. Aden
Is a haven for Middle Eastern Communists, leftist Palestinians, and the
remnants of Marxist insurgents who once fought in neighboring Oman and North
Yemen.
South Yemen's location at the confluence of the Red Sea and the Indian
Ocean gives it military significance for the Soviet Union. Naval ships of the
Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron make regular use of the port facilities at Aden*,
*Since 1980, Soviet Indian Ocean ships have made an average of about 75
visits annually to Aden. The port, however, is heavily congested with
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and Moscow keeps two IL-38 naval reconnaissance aircraft at al-Anad airfield,
north of Aden, on a continuous basis. These aircraft provide the Soviets with
a continuous aerial surveillance capability in the northern Indian Ocean, the
Red Sea, and the Arabian Sea, and are used most frequently to monitor US naval
activity in the region, especially the movement of aircraft carriers.
In addition, the Soviet naval communications facility that was originally
installed in Somalia was moved to Salah al-din, just northwest of Aden, in
1978. A signal intelligence facility that allows continuous monitoring of
communications throughout the Middle East and Indian Ocean region was
established at Salah al-din in 1981.
Prior to this week's attempted coup, Moscow's relations with Hasani
appeared to be solid. The Kremlin had misgivings about his opening to the West
and moderate Arabs, but the two sides seemed to have resolved any major
differences on this issue by late 1983. Frictions over PRDY displeasure with
the level of Soviet economic aid are constant but were no threat to the overall
relationship. The Soviets probably saw the pro-Moscow Ismail's return to the
PDRY as a useful "insurance policy" to keep Hasani honest, but we do not
believe they favored his grab for the leadership. From Moscow's vantage point,
Hasani, though not as ideologically "pure" as Ismail, probably is viewed as
loyal and more adept than Ismail at governing the PDRY.
commercial traffic, and Soviet combatants usually use the anchorage off South
Yemen's Socotra Island or the port facilities the Soviets have on Ethiopia's
Dahlak Island.
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