SOVIET INFLUENCE OF AFGHAN EDUCATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00096R000200190003-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 11, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: April 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Soviet Influence
on Afghan Education
Secret
NESA 86-10020
April 1986
363
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence 25X1
Soviet Influence
on Afghan Education
This paper was prepared by I Ithe
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. It
was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, South Asia Division, NESA
Secret
NESA 86-10020
April 1986
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Summary
Information available
as of 2 January 1986
was used in this report.
Soviet Influence
on Afghan Education
achieve these goals are slim.
Soviet education programs in Afghanistan are designed to refashion
Afghan society along Communist lines and eliminate the influence of
Islamic tradition. Moscow is attempting in the short term to increase
support for an unpopular regime and ideology. In the longer term it is
seeking to create a cadre of pro-Soviet Afghans capable of assuming
middle- and upper-level government posts. We believe that, because of
cultural factors and poor security, the prospects that the Soviets will
ministries.
Communist doctrine permeates Afghan education. Soviet officials in the
Afghan Ministry of Education remodeled the Afghan education system
along Soviet lines in 1978 and continue to direct it. Ideological indoctrina-
tion also occurs in the military, KHAD (the Afghan intelligence organiza-
tion), the ruling People's Democratic (Communist) Party, and government
schools, themselves, or their families.
Fighting between the resistance and progovernment forces limits regime
education programs to a few urban centers and a small number of rural Af-
ghans. Even in areas controlled by the regime, the majority of Afghans are
reluctant to participate:
? Most Afghans see little need for nonreligious education; more than 90
percent are illiterate. The Afghans' distrust of programs of the Commu-
nist regime is even greater than their distrust of previous governments'
programs.
? Afghans fear that resistance forces will direct reprisals against regime
success in developing regime supporters.
Moscow has sent more than 10,000 Afghans to the USSR and Eastern
Europe for educational and training programs. These programs have
developed the Afghans' expertise and Russian-language capabilities, but
heavy doses of political training, poor treatment from Soviet instructors
and the local population, and the Afghan regime's inability to give
graduates suitable positions when they return alienate some students. The
recent focus on Afghan youths of elementary school age, who are more
vulnerable to indoctrination-especially when separated from their parents
and traditions during years of training in the USSR-may have some
iii Secret
NESA 86-10020
April 1986
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The Soviets are probably achieving some success in meeting their short-
term goal of establishing a limited educational infrastructure in Afghani-
stan. The ultimate objective of using an education system on the Soviet
model to shape Afghan society along Communist lines has little chance of
success, in our opinion. Kabul's inability to control much of Afghanistan
outside the capital and traditional Afghan distrust of education will
indefinitely frustrate the regime's educational and other social programs.
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Changes in the Formal Education System 1
New Education Programs 5
Educational Programs Outside the School System 6
Military 6
The Literacy Program 7
Afghan Students in the USSR 7
Outlook and Implications 9
Afghanistan's Education System Before and After the Revolution 11
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Soviet Influence
on Afghan Education
The Soviet Union has been actively trying to control
the education of Afghans, either directly or through
the regime and party programs, since the Communists
took power in April 1978. During its first month in
office, the Communist regime changed school curricu-
lums-adding material translated from Soviet texts
and some written by Soviet experts, replacing high
school principals with members of the People's Demo-
cratic (Communist) Party, and creating a new second-
ary school in Kabul with Russian as the language of
instruction. The Afghan education system remains
under strong Soviet influence.
Kabul's lack of control in much of the country limits
the impact of the Communist education system. The
regime consistently exercises power in less than one-
third of the country, and fewer than 100 government-
controlled schools operate in a handful of cities and
villages,
We estimate that less than 10 percent of the children
of primary and secondary school age attend classes.
Most Afghans traditionally have not sent their chil-
dren to any school, and even fewer now enroll them in
regime-sponsored classes. Students in regime schools
tend to be children of party members, government
officials, or military personnel:
? Most Afghans are farmers or herdsmen who see
little need for education. Less than 10 percent of all
Afghans are literate,
The regime's goal is that Communist ideology and
principles should permeate Afghan education. The
US Embassy in Kabul noted in 1984 a law on middle
schools declaring that "inculcating a revolutionary
spirit in the youth, strengthening their devotion to the
principles of the party, and preparing them to defend
the achievements of the April Revolution" were pri-
mary goals of the school system.
Kabul seeks to emphasize Communism at all levels of
education. A Western journalist reports that in 1984
the study of Communism was compulsory in all
schools in Kabul. A source of the US Embassy in
Kabul reported that study of Communism is initiated
in the second grade. Political ideology classes that
stress Communism range from three to six hours per
week, and students at all levels are required to pass
them to graduate.
Changes in the Formal Education System
Curriculums
The Soviets have revamped the Afghan education
system by imposing curriculums almost identical to
those used in the Soviet Union. Afghan officials, with
the aid of Soviet advisers in the Ministry of Educa-
tion, have developed 10 curriculums aimed at imple-
menting a unified teaching program and upgrading
the level of political consciousness of the students and
? Afghans have traditionally distrusted government
schools and distrust the current regime's programs
even more than those of previous governments.
? Most Afghans fear reprisals from resistance ele-
ments if they enroll their children in government
schools or cooperate in regime programs.
? Many parents disdain the Communist ideology that
has replaced Islamic studies.
teachers,
Since 1978 new courses that strongly resemble or
duplicate those in Soviet schools have been installed in
Afghan elementary, middle, and high schools. In 1980
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We find that, to implement their goals in Afghani-
stan, the Soviets have adopted a strategy that stresses
the importance of using local languages, blocking
development of Afghan nationalism, and undercutting
the traditionally strong role of Islam.
Local Languages Versus Afghan Nationalism
The Soviets, as they did in Muslim areas of the
USSR in the 1920s and 1930s, are encouraging the
use of local languages in education programs. The
Soviets, in our view, expect that emphasizing ethnic
identity through language will preserve the splits in
Afghan society, setting back the development of Af-
ghan nationalism that might ultimately challenge
Soviet hegemony in the country. Local languages-
including Uzbek, Turkmen, and Baluch-are lan-
guages of instruction from the first grade. They were
not taught before the Communist takeover. Students
learn one of two main languages-Dari is favored
over Pashtu-later on.
Russian language training takes place at all levels of
education. A US Embassy source in Kabul reported
in 1982 that Russian language training starts in the
first grade in some experimental schools.
Russian-language teachers are Soviets and that each
student receives one hour of Russian instruction per
day.
the regime shortened the existing 12-year school
system to parallel the 10-year system then used in the
USSR. In 1984 the US Embassy in Kabul reported
that an Afghan Ministry of Education document
prescribed that students from the seventh grade to
graduation were to study such subjects as "Socialism,
The Dream of the World's Working Class," "The
Struggle of the Two World Systems (Communism and
Capitalism)," and "The Three Principal Forces of the
Revolution."
Soviet and regime officials also have revised the
curriculums of Kabul University. By 1980 required
courses for university students included historical and
The regime has severely curtailed-and in many
schools stopped offering-classes in foreign lan-
guages other than Russian.
1984 English, French, and Turkish were dropped
from the foreign languages department.
Minimizing Islam
The Soviets and the Afghan regime have also at-
tempted to reduce the traditionally strong role of
Islam in the schools. The regime has closed many
schools operated by mullahs and reduced the number
of hours of Islamic instruction in the secular schools.
A paper presented at a pedagogical conference in
Kabul in 1983 argued that social science teachers in
Afghanistan must deemphasize Islam and direct the
youth to the study of Communism.
Soviet political training has replaced religious in-
struction in the secondary schools, according to a
source of the US Embassy in Kabul. Instruction in
Islamic theology, once taught four times a week at
the Kabul Military High School, is limited to one
hour per week and does not include study of the
Koran.
although religion is taught in
some of the lower grades, Communist-trained offi-
cials are the instructors.
dialectical materialism, the history of revolutionary
movements, "scientific" sociology, and Russian lan-
guage. The regime added mandatory military courses
for university students in 1982,
including 11 hours of
classroom instruction in military topics each week.
Textbooks and Materials
Textbooks have been substantially revised to include
pro-Soviet and pro-Communist themes.
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advisers began to distribute teaching materials trans-
lated directly from Soviet texts, replacing West Ger-
man materials.
Soviet scholars have reinterpreted and rewritten Af-
ghan history to bring it into line with Communist
theory and have used these efforts to produce new
Afghan textbooks.
Soviet scholars drafted a new history of Afghanistan
and translated it into several Afghan languages. The
book stresses that Afghanistan's history is dominated
by the struggle of the working classes against imperi-
alism and that the country's independence is owed
largely to the "fraternal assistance" of the Soviet
Union.
lessons for the world history and
history of Afghanistan courses were prepared by
Soviet advisers in the school's political department.
The texts stress Afghanistan's cultural and historical
ties to Soviet Central Asia. Little mention is made of
the country's traditional links to Iran, the Indian
subcontinent, or the Middle East.
The USSR publishes numerous textbooks and other
materials used in the Afghan educational system.
Many originate in the Soviet Muslim areas adjoining
Afghanistan. Publishers in Tashkent, capital of the
Uzbek SSR, for example, prepare materials in Uzbek
and other languages, and the Tajik SSR sends books
to the Kabul medical faculty.
Afghan bookstores, which supply textbooks to schools
and other organizations, also feature other books
published in the USSR, according to the US Embassy
in Kabul. Emphasis appears to be placed on children's
stories, with colorful books such as "Tales About
Lenin" in great supply. Embassy officials noted they
had yet to find any children's books-other than
textbooks-that had not come from Moscow.
The Soviets and Afghan party members monitor
libraries and cultural centers to ensure that only pro-
Soviet material is available, according to US Embassy
sources.
frequent searches of schools, libraries, dormitories,
and private homes for materials espousing views
contrary to Communism and destroyed all they found. 25X1
These efforts have little effect on most Afghans. US
Embassy officials report that during their visit to
Kabul's main library in 1985 only employees were
present.F____1 25X1
Faculty and Staff
After the Communist takeover in April 1978, a large
number of Soviet advisers took posts in the Afghan
Ministry of Education and, following the Soviet inva-
sion in 1979, were assigned to the Ministry's Curricu-
lum and Textbook Department, according to Afghan
press accounts. Soviet personnel currently in the
Afghan Ministry of Education approve all important
policies and help design and implement new curricu-
lums.
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We believe several hundred Soviet teachers, instruc-
tors, and advisers play key roles in Afghan education.
Soviets teach 25X1
most of the Russian-language courses and head politi-
cal and social education departments in secondary
schools. Soviet advisers are particularly pervasive in 25X1
higher education, especially at Kabul University. By
1985 the regime had closed the US-built School of
Engineering. Since 1981 the regime has permitted
engineering students to enroll only at Kabul Polytech-
nical Institute, built and supplied by the Soviets. In
1980 the Soviets established the State Institute of
Medicine in Kabul. The Institute works closely with
the Tajik State Medical Institute in the USSR, which 25X1
provides lecturers, textbooks, materials, and refresher
and postgraduate training.F____1 25X1
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regime supporters have replaced up to 80 percent of
the university faculty members who were teaching in 25X1
1979. Many of the former teachers have emigrated;
others have been jailed, executed, or demoted. A US
Embassy source reported in the early 1980s that
Soviets were assigned as deans to all faculties and that
there was a Soviet rector of Kabul University, in
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The Polytechnical Institue in
Kabul, built with the technical
assistance of the Soviet Union,
is a major educational institu-
tion for training engineers in
addition to the Afghans already occupying those
posts. A US Embassy source in Kabul reported in
1983 that 30 Soviet advisers worked at the medical
school. By 1983 four Cubans were added to the
Spanish department, and five advisers from East
Germany were assigned to the university, according to
another Embassy source.
Afghan professors at Kabul University are controlled
by the ruling party. a
joint committee of students and faculty that initially
made decisions about teacher promotions, scholar-
ships, seminar topics, and research programs at the
university was gradually reduced to two or three party
members. Feuding between members of the Parcham
and Khalq factions of the party produces tension and
occasional fisticuffs among faculty and students,
Soviets also teach and advise at technical and profes-
sional schools. An Afghan-Soviet agreement, signed
in mid-1985, specified that the USSR will send more
than 90 experts to Afghanistan to organize training at
10 technical colleges to be built in the next five years.
To ensure that Afghans entering teaching careers are
regime supporters, the regime has instituted ideologi-
cal training programs and often sends trainees to
places like Tashkent, according to the US Embassy
and Afghan press accounts. In 1981 the regime
established a teacher training institute in the Ministry
of Education to replace Western teachers with Soviets
and to better implement the new Soviet-inspired
education program. Afghan teachers are also required
to attend special political seminars. The regime press-
es teachers to join the party and participate in other
social organizations affiliated with the party and the
regime.
Soviet advisers and professors dominate Afghan edu-
cation conferences. Of 66 papers presented at a
conference of the State Institute of Medicine held in
Kabul in 1985, for example, 48 had one or more
Soviet authors, according to documents obtained by
the US Embassy in Kabul. Five of 10 editors of the
collection of conference papers were Soviets. All of
the students presenting papers at a 1982 conference
had both a Soviet and an Afghan faculty adviser-the
Soviet adviser always had the higher rank.
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Nonregime Training of Afghans
A few insurgent groups have established schools,
mostly for religious training, in the areas they control
in the countryside. Most Afghans distrust nonreli-
gious education, viewing it as corrupting to the young
and contrary to local tradition:
? The Jamiat-i-Islami operates about 20 schools in
Balkh Province that teach reading and religion and
indoctrinate children in antiregime and pro-Jamiat
propaganda.
? Herat Province insurgent councils, under the lead-
ership of Jamiat commander Ismail Khan, run
schools in their areas.
Ittihad Islami, the resistance coalition formed among
the major insurgent groups in Peshawar in 1985, is
attempting to counter Soviet inroads in Afghan edu-
Nevertheless, an
attend Pakistani schools.
apparatus exists or development o a satisfactory
education system. There are 251 primary schools and
12 secondary schools in the camps and two schools in
Peshawar for females. All refugee camps offer
schools for the first through the sixth grades. A few
non-Afghan organizations-including the UN High
Commission for Refugees, the Interaid Committee (a
Pakistani Christian organization), and the Interna-
tional Rescue Committee (private, US backed)-also
have set up a small number of schools. Instruction in
all these schools is controlled by the main Afghan
resistance parties in Peshawar. Few Afghan youths
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cation.
it operates the Afghan Education Committee,
w ose mission is to provide schools, teachers, and
textbooks for rural areas in Afghanistan. Because of
insufficient funds and the lack of qualified teachers,
only about 20 percent of requests for new elementary
schools could be filled by late summer 1985.
The schools propagate the religious views of the
resistance groups that control them. The teachers,
who are poorly trained, emphasize Islamic theology.
There is no unified curriculum and little or no
administrative control.
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have done little to encourage improvements in educa-
tion for the refugees. Afghans who attend Pakistani
schools are subject to a quota, must pay tuition, and
must be able to speak Urdu or English. Pakistan has 25X1
been reluctant to allow Afghans to attend Pakistani
universities.
The educational programs for Afghan refugees in
Pakistan also suffer from serious deficiencies, attrib-
utable to Afghan attitudes and Pakistani neglect,
New Education Programs
The regime has initiated new education programs in
day-care centers, nurseries, and kindergartens, most
of them built in Kabul since the Communist takeover,
according to journalistic accounts. Many are associat-
ed with work places, such as the Kabul Bus Institute,
where in 1984 the regime established a nursery for
children below 3 years of age and a kindergarten for
those 3 to 6.
Low enrollment has reduced the impact of the regi-
me's education and indoctrination program. In Kabul,
probably the most secure city, we estimate that fewer
than 25 percent of eligible first graders are enrolled.
The thousands of rural Afghans who have migrated to
Kabul traditionally do not send their children to
school. Some parents who view education favorably
are reluctant to enroll children because they fear
insurgent reprisals; others resent the regime's indoc-
trination efforts.
The Afghan Government is attempting to increase
elementary school enrollment. The regime has or-
dered the Central Statistical Administration to keep
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accurate birth records and age data to identify those
children who should be in school, according to press
reporting.
Educational Programs Outside the School System
Outside the formal education system, the Soviets
attempt to indoctrinate Afghans through training of
military and KHAD (the Afghan intelligence organi-
zation) personnel, adults in literacy programs, and a
wide spectrum of party-led activities, including mili-
tary training for government officials. Despite strong
and persistent regime pressure, not many Afghans
participate in these programs, and even fewer accept
the Communist ideology, in our view.
Military
The regime views political indoctrination as an impor-
tant part of military training. A Department of
Political Affairs has been established in the Ministry
of National Defense. A political officer attached to
units down to company level conducts political train-
ing. many
troops are illiterate and do not understand or are not
interested in political education, but every soldier
must attend at least four hours of political indoctrina-
tion each week-more time than is spent in combat
political ideology courses account for six
hours of the military school week, while only five
hours are used for classroom military instruction.
Soviet instructors are present at all levels of Afghan
military education.
four Soviet
brigadier generals were sent to advise and assist their
Afghan counterparts at that school.
faculty members at the Kabul Military
High School, whose graduates form the core of
Afghan military officers, were required to attend
weekly classes given by Soviet political officers.
KHAD
Ideological training is especially important for mem-
bers of KHAD.
all classes in KHAD training programs
held in the USSR emphasized Communism, and a
student could not pass courses without the "proper"
political attitude. KGB
officials do the recruiting, looking first for individuals
who are sympathetic to Soviet goals. Approximately
3,600 KHAD personnel attended three- to six-month
courses in Tashkent in 1983,
The National Fatherland Front
The National Fatherland Front, a regime-sponsored
umbrella organization, promotes party goals and
Communist themes in its educational programs. The
Democratic Youth Organization of Afghanistan, the
Democratic Women's Organization of Afghanistan,
trade unions, and associations for writers, artists, and
other groups are part of the Front. The Soviets view
these organizations of urban activists as important
recruiting and training grounds for future party lead-
ers
President Babrak Karmal has called on the Front to
provide classes and materials to enhance the political
and ideological training of teachers and students, and
to carry out activities among the party committees
and social organizations in the schools, according to
press accounts. The youth organization, patterned
after the Soviet Komsomol, carries out an aggressive
program, seeking recruits for the Afghan Pioneer
program-created in 1980 for children 10 to 15 years
old and patterned after its Soviet counterpart. The
women's organization operates almost exclusively in
Kabul and has had little success in breaking down
traditional and religious barriers to a larger social and
educational role for women.
Front programs aimed at bringing youth into Com-
munist organizations have not succeeded, in our view.
in late 1984
the regime mounted a campaign in Afghan high
schools to increase membership in the youth organiza-
tion, threatening students who did not join with
expulsion, jail, or conscription. The effort backfired
because of strong resistance by parents and students.
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This class is being taught by a member of the
Democratic Youth Organization, a member
organization of the regime-sponsored National
Fatherland Front. The Front provides political
and ideological training for women, youths, and
Shortly thereafter, Babrak Karmal Appeared on Af-
ghan television, blamed a misguided party official for
the error, and permitted children who had been
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estimate that annually some 10,000 Afghans, includ-
ing about 2,000 military personnel, attend Soviet
institutions for training and education. The Soviets
also emphasize political training courses for party
members, middle-level regime officials, teachers, ad-
ministrators, and foreign trade officials,
In 1984 the Kabul press reported
that Afghans were attending 66 educational institu-
tions in 24 locations in the USSR.
the majority of facilities are in Tashkent,
Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev.
The Soviets and the Afghan regime have recently
emphasized sending 7- to 9-year-old Afghans for a
decade of instruction in the USSR.
during the last four months of 1984,
more than 700 youths departed Kabul for Tashkent,
and another 300 left for the
USSR in August 1985. Most of these students are
children of party members or come from regime-
controlled orphanages.
Approximately two-thirds of those who left in late
1984 were from Kabol and Nangarhar Provinces. The
regime, probably realizing the need for greater influ-
ence in the rural areas, approved a plan in early 1985
to send to the USSR some 600 youths from Afghan
tribes near the Pakistani border and Shia minority
groups in central Afghanistan,
expelled or jailed to return to school.
A much touted six-year nationwide literacy campaign
is being used to promote political indoctrination. C
course content is
almost wholly political. One brochure used in a
literacy class, published in Moscow, shows the teacher
writing the first word of the lesson-Lenin. Regime
claims of more than 1 million participants in the
campaign probably are exaggerated.
Most Afghans seek higher and technical education in
the USSR to escape military service, attend higher
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quality programs than those available in Afghanistan, 25X1
particularly in medical and technical fields, and enjoy
a higher standard of living,
A smaller number go because they are party
members and expect better jobs and salaries when
they return. The regime has more than enough appli-
cants for the approximately 3,000 scholarships avail-
able each year for study in the USSR. The number of
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In our judgment, the extensive Soviet programs to
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train and indoctrinate Afghans in the USSR have
produced limited results and have sometimes proved
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Afghan children at Kabul Air-
port before their departure for
00
mne~i~
only students well connected to the regime elite are
getting the eagerly sought scholarships to Eastern
Europe. These countries probably grant several hun-
dred such scholarships each year.
Afghan students returning from the USSR are placed
throughout the bureaucracy. According to the Soviet
press, the Afghan Irrigation Minister stated in late
1985 that 90 percent of his ministry's personnel had
been trained in the USSR. Afghan military officers
who receive technical training in the USSR are
reported to be more qualified than their counterparts
who have not.
Training in the USSR does not guarantee ideological
commitment.
Afghans trained in the USSR maintain the
same pol itical views that they had beforehand.
1983 a group of 70 Afghan military students return-
ing from the USSR had had a fight with their Soviet
instructors. The Afghans criticized Soviet treatment
of them and ridiculed the constant emphasis on
"Leninism" throughout their training.
Soviets when they studied in the USSR.
cases of physical at-
tacks on Afghan students, refusal of services, and
condemnation by instructors, presumably a reaction
to increasing Soviet casualties in Afghanistan.
as of mid-1985 Afghan
dices against non-Europeans.
students were required to live in separate dormitories
and attend separate classes, and were not permitted to
leave their compounds except in organized group
excursions. The US Embassy in Kabul indicates that
most Afghans, like most Third World students trained
in the USSR, are antagonized by strong Soviet preju-
Many returnees from the USSR choose to work in
nongovernment fields unrelated to their Soviet train-
ing. A US Embassy officer in Kabul in summer 1984
reported meeting three young men who had studied in
the Soviet Union-two sold Japanese stereos, and the
third was unemployed. One asked the Embassy officer
how to obtain a visa to the United States.
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Afghan Students in the USSR a
Postsecondary and Military
Technical
1983 8,800 650
1984 8,300 2,000
the Afghan Government. We believe the Soviet expe-
rience in Central Asia, Eastern Europe, and Mongolia
gives the current leaders reason to hope that in the
long term they can attract and train a core of
opportunists and ideologues willing to do their
bidding.
As long as security is poor in many parts of the
country, Afghans will be reluctant to participate in
regime education activities. The programs will contin-
ue to focus on the cities and areas under regime
control, but we expect the regime to increase its
efforts to entice and bribe the tribes and local groups
in rural areas to participate. In our view, any gains in
rural areas will be temporary. Traditional Afghan
values-including the predominance of local and trib
The figure for postsecondary and technical students is an estimate
of full-time students in the USSR at the end of each year at concerns, distrust of any central government, the
The figure for military students is Islamic faith, and deep-seated anti-Communist re-
reported departures for training in the USSR. sentment-all undercut Soviet and regime goals.
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In our view, it will take many years for the Soviets to
produce a significant change in Afghan attitudes
through education and indoctrination. First, to rebuild
and control the schools, the Soviets and the regime
would have to establish control over more of the
countryside and fully secure the major cities. Second,
most Afghans have little interest in formal education,
regard the Kabul regime as a puppet of foreign
invaders, and distrust nonreligious education. Finally,
many, if not most, Afghans who are being educated in
the USSR will probably reject Soviet values either
because of bad personal experiences at the hands of
Soviet citizens or simply because Soviet values con-
flict with Afghan traditions.
The Soviets almost certainly realize they are making
little progress toward their goal of building an ideo-
logically motivated and effective cadre. We do not
believe, however, that this will deter their efforts to
indoctrinate Afghans through education programs,
either directly or through the regime and party
apparatus. In our view, they expect significant results
from their efforts only after the generation that they
are now training enters the middle and upper levels of
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Appendix
Afghanistan's Education System
Before and After the Revolution
Afghanistan's education system has always been dis-
mal by Western standards.
the system met the needs of only a fraction of
Most students are women, though the number of
women enrolled probably is less than in 1978 because
fewer schools exist and enrollments have dropped
sharply. Most eligible men have fled the country,
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tt a people before the Communist takeover in 1978.
Despite two decades of government expressions of
concern over illiteracy, less than 20 percent of Afghan
youth had access to schools under pre-Communist
governments. Of those enrolled, more than 80 percent
attended substandard primary schools, which lacked
adequately trained teachers and such basic materials
as pencils and paper,
Much of Afghanistan's population lived-and lives-
in rural areas that have been only marginally associat-
ed with the government in Kabul. The relatively few
village schools were operated by local mullahs who
did little more than teach young boys recitations from
the Koran and other religious lessons. Girls received
almost no instruction. Secondary school enrollment
accounted for barely 4 percent of the total enrollment.
Of those fortunate enough to graduate, few could gain
admission to a university.
Afghanistan nevertheless had been improving its
schools during the 1960s and 1970s.
the number of
elementary and secondary schools doubled in the 10
years before the April 1978 revolution, reaching a
total of 2,700. The government was implementing a
new curriculum developed with the help of Columbia
University.
Since the Soviet invasion, we believe the school
system has ceased functioning everywhere but in a
few major cities. the
regime operated only 28 secondary and 50 primary
schools in 1985. Kabul University-the only major
university in the country-saw enrollment drop from
14,000 in 1978 to 6,000 in 1983,
joined the resistance, or been conscripted.
The regime recently began to grant high school
diplomas to males only after the graduates completed
two years of service in the Afghan armed forces,
effectively limiting entrance to the universities.=
the few remaining males
have connections with the party elite.
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