REPORT ON EUROPEAN SDI BRIEFING 20 TO 24 JANUARY 1986

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T01145R000100130001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 3, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30 : CIA-RDP87TO1145R000100130001-2
3 February 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Soviet Analysis
THROUGH: Chief, Strategic Issues Group, SOVA
Chief, Strategic Forces Division, SOVA/SIG
FROM:
Chief,
SUBEJCT:
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20 to 24 January 1986 25X1
Report on European SDI Briefin
1. During the period 20 to 24 January 1986, I travelled to Europe as
part of a SDI briefing team. The team was 25X1
headed by im nuimes, a e , ana included representatives from ACDA,
OSD-Policy, and the SDIO. The team's purpose was to brief selected neutral
European governments on the SDI program and its role in the US policy. My
role on the team was to discuss Soviet strategic defense programs. Our stops
included Helsinki, Stockholm, Zurich, Bern, and the Vatican. State Department
representatives at each of these locations were responsible for developing an
agenda, which usually included official classified briefings to local
government personnel and p ublic unclassified visits with media members
private citizens. 25X1
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2. The Helsinki portion of the trip was perhaps the low point of the
visit. Although our arrival in Finland was announced in one of the local
papers on the morning of our first presentation, our briefings, both official
and public, raised little comment. We were greeted with a great deal of
warmth and hospitality, but the response to substantive matters was reserved
indicating, I believe, that SDI is not much of an issue in this part of the
world, or perhaps, that minds in Helsinki are made up. For example, USIA had
scheduled a two-hour meeting with the Finnish media. Although the meeting was
well covered and reported in a neutral way in a number of newspapers and on
Finnish television, it broke up approximately 30 minutes early due to a lack
of further questions. (The highlight of this meeting was its setting, the
USIA library. We happened to be seated in one of the book sections directly
under two large signs that read "Fiction." We, as well as several of our
questioners, picked up on the interesting juxtaposition.)
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87TO1145R000100130001-2
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3. Stockholm was perhaps the most challenging stop on the trip. The
Embassy there did an excellent job in arranging a variety of appointments that
included several sessions with the Ambassador, well attended briefing sessions
with Swedish MOD officials and the Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute (SIPRI), and a two-hour interview with six Swedish journals. The
highlight of this portion of the visit was a dinner hosted by the DCM that
included several Swedish parliament members--one pro-SDI and the other against
it, and MOD and MFA officials
4. Our reception in Stockholm was cordial, with one notable exception,
and the questions on a high plain. Most dealt with the effect of the SDI
program on strategic stability. I do not believe the role of Swedish
industrial involvement came up. This, of course, has been a topic of great
concern in other parts of Europe. We did get a rather snarling question on
"manufactured Soviet arms control violations" from a senior SIPRI researcher
5. Our Swiss appointments included a two-hour visit with an association
of Swiss manufacturers, lunch with a dozen or so journalists, and a well
attended briefing for MOD and MFA officials. The emphasis in Switzerland was
on how Swiss business could get in on a research program that lacked official
Swiss sanction. Although this was foremost in the minds of the manufacturers,
it concerned the Government officials as well. The team was warned not to get
Swiss hopes too high in this regard. I think US Embassy officials in
Switzerland are well aware of the problems the Swiss face in winning any
contracts, especially now that the UK (and soon the FRG) is on board.
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6. The trip concluded in the Vatican. This portion of the trip began
with an hour long meeting with the Ambassador who was concerned that our visit
would rekindle Vatican uneasiness over the number of high-level SDI "salesmen"
who have briefed the topic over the past 12 months. He stated that each visit
seemed to the Vatican to be an attempt to elicit public support for the
program. Numerous Vatican officials have told the Ambassador privately that
it would be impossible for them to support a military program, which
potentially takes food from the mouths of the poor. Jim Holmes told the
Ambassador, and later our Vatican hosts, that our purpose was not to seek
converts for the effort but to carry out the President's promise to inform and
consult regularly with allies, friends, and neutrals alike. We received a
warm reception and a polite hearing from a 10 or so Vatican representatives.
Our audience consisted of both clergy and non-clergy with most of the latter
category coming from scientific positions at the Vatican Observatory. It was
headed by a cardinal who, according to the Ambassador, was an important
confidant of the Pope. Our audience's questions and comments generally sought
clarification on points made during the briefings and did not really reflect a
lot of concern on its part. We were told by the DCM at a follow-up meeting
that our Vatican hosts appreciated the briefings and found the presentation of
Soviet activity especially useful. Moreover, the cardinal was to give the
Pope a rundown of our meeting that evening. In short, the Ambassador was
quite pleased with the outcome.
point, my fears that the salesmanship part of the mission would pressure me
into briefing meterial that went beyond what we could support were
unfounded. Jim Holmes gave me maximum flexibility and reminded our audience
that Soviet strategic defense activity was only a part of the impetus for the
SDI program. We were careful
violations
stops. In is regard, Jim Holmes took an interesting swipe at Jesse Helms,
and others like him, during a session with Swiss journalists. I suspect that
the State Department cable channels reflected some Embassy "surprise" at his
comment. Administratively, the trip went smoothly. 25X1
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My Vatican 25X1
presentation was marred by a cancelled courier trip, which left me without
briefing aid A
lthough I was able to wo
rk 25X1
around this, it is clear that this persuasive evidence was a key part of the
SDI story. Frankly, without it, the team's presentations lack at least 25X1
interest if not substance.
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP87T01145R000100130001-2