NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY TUESDAY 27 MARCH 1984

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00970R000200010064-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 18, 2011
• Sequence Number: 64
• Publication Date: March 27, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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National Intelligence Daily
Tuesday
27 March 1984
-I up-3ecret-
r'.Pdc Alin AA-r179 lY
27 March 1984
Copy ') o G
jL )) Intelligence
Director of
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Top Secret
Contents
El Salvador: Preliminary Election Results .............................. 1
Guinea: Succession Prospects ................................ .......
Philippines: Status of Assassination Investigation ................ 4
Mozambique-South Africa: Crackdown on ANC .................. 6
Sierra Leone: President's Illness .... .................. 6
Egypt-Sudan: Movement of Aircraft ......................................
China: More ICBM Silos Under Construction ........................ 8
Netherlands: Possible New INF Proposal .............................. 9
UK: Reductions in Falklands Garrison .............................. - 9
Sweden-USSR: Trade Commission Meeting .......................... 10
Spain-USSR: Royal Visit Planned .......................................... 10
Belize: Increased Marijuana Cultivation .................................. 11
Special Analysis
Iran: Capabilities Near the Strait of Hormuz .......................... 12
Top Secret
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Top :Secret
Voting prevented by
insurgents
Insurgent concentration
Top; Secret
North MANAG
Pacific Ocean
F .on ~duras
North Pacific Ocean
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EL SALVADOR: Preliminary Election Results
Top Secret
Incomplete results of the presidential election indicate that
Christian Democrat Duarte probably will have to face ultrarightist
The US Embassy reports that, with more than half of the votes
counted, Duarte is building a strong lead with 47 percent of the vote,
followed by D'Aubuisson with 29 percent. Conciliationist candidate
Guerrero is third with about 17 percent. These figures are based on
unofficial data supplied by Christian Democratic Party headquarters, 25X1
but the Embassy regards them as reliable.
Insurgents prevented voting in a total of 44 municipalities,
according to the Embassy. Nevertheless, the number of valid votes
may be 1.1 million, nearly as high as in the Constituent Assembly
elections in 1982. Despite various problems with the electoral
procedure, the Embassy says most observers were impressed with 25X1
Comment: If the current trends continue, Duarte will need little
additional support to get a majority in the runoff. His chances will be
greatly increased if Guerrero decides to support him in the second
round, which is likely to occur within 30 days of the final tally.
Government military operations over the past few weeks evidently
succeeded in keeping the insurgents off balance and in preventing
them from launching coordinated actions to disrupt the electoral
process. The guerrillas had claimed they controlled over 70 towns
where voting would be denied.
Top Secret
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GUINEA: Succession Prospects
President Toure's death yesterday in the US during emergency
heart surgery could result in a power struggle, afford possible
opportunities for Soviet and Libyan meddling, and increase regional
tensions.
Guinea's constitution calls for the Council of Ministers, which is
led by 60-year-old Prime Minister Beavogui, to run the government
pending popular elections. A candidate has to be chosen by the
country's only party, and elections have to be held within 45 days of
the President's death.
Comment: Toure ruled for 26 years. During that time, he allowed
no individual or group to develop enough strength or experience to
replace him easily.
The death of Toure probably will intensify factionalism and tribal
rivalries and accelerate economic deterioration. These problems
eventually could prompt a military coup-perhaps by the lower
ranks-to end infighting or rule by an ineffectual successor.
Cabinet ministers in the party's political bureau are the most likely
candidates to succeed Toure. Unless senior officials can agree on
Beavogui or some other compromise candidate, more radical
socialists-led by Toure's 47-year-old brother-in-law Mamadi Keita-
are likely to vie for power with pragmatists led by Toure's brother,
Ismael. Meanwhile, hundreds of thousands of Guinean exiles could
complicate matters through possible subversive activities.
Whoever succeeds Toure probably would not reverse
immediately Guinea's relations with the West. Keita allegedly favors
moving in this direction, but more cautiously than does Ismael Toure,
with Beavogui somewhere in the middle.
Moscow and Tripoli would like to see Guinea return to a radical
course. They probably will try to exploit any prolonged period of
political uncertainty to achieve this end. The USSR remains Guinea's
principal military supplier, provides 365 economic and military
advisers, and seeks access for TU-95 long-range naval
reconnaissance aircraft and naval basing rights in the country.
The potential for instability and foreign meddling will cause
Liberia and Ivory Coast to seek renewed assurances of Western
support. Toure's death also may jeopardize Conakry's ability to host
the next OAU summit, which is tentatively scheduled for May.
Moreover, it could reopen the divisive issue of who should become
the next OAU chairman, perhaps with the result that Ethiopian leader
Mengistu will retain the post.
Tot) Secret
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Top Secret
PHILIPPINES: Status of Assassination Investigation
Increasing evidence suggests that the government is trying to
impede the work of the board of inquiry into the assassination of
Benigno Aquino in order to prevent the emergence of damaging
testimony before the National Assembly elections in May. Armed
Forces Chief of Staff General Ver, citing an urgent matter of national
security, missed a scheduled appearance to testify before the board
yesterday. Another military witness refused to testify last Friday. In
addition, a member of the board told US officials that Labor Minister
Ople has put pressure on the board to delay a planned trip to the US
to interview witnesses until after the elections.
Comment: President Marcos is concerned about the effect of the
inquiry on his party's election prospects. The board is angry at official
stalling tactics, and it almost certainly will act forcefully to retain its
standing as an independent body. Last week it ordered the arrest of
two men who had refused.to testify. If Ver does not appear later in the
week as scheduled, the board could consider using its subpoena
powers against him-a move that would embarrass the President.
Top Secret
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Top Secret
Raids on the homes of 12 ANC members in Maputo over the
weekend publicly demonstrate Mozambique's intention to abide by
the commitment it made to restrain the insurgents under provisions of
the recent nonaggression pact with South Africa. Four people were
detained and some weapons were confiscated in the raid.
Comment: The ANC probably will try to intensify its military
campaign to prove that it remains a credible force. It has used
Mozambique as its main staging area for attacks against South
Africa. The group is now likely to increase use of Botswana and
Zimbabwe, despite efforts by those governments to limit its activities.
To lessen their dependence on black governments in the region, ANC
guerrillas also probably will try to build up an infrastructure in South
Africa.
President Stevens, who is in his 80s, was evacuated this weekend
to London for emergency medical treatement.
Comment: If Stevens dies or is incapacitated, the poor health and
unpopularity of his most likely successors could lead to a protracted
power struggle or a takeover by the Army. At the outset, however,
either a civilian or a military regime would be likely to continue the
country's moderate, pro-Western policies.
Top Secret
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Top Secret
EGYPT-SUDAN: Movement of Aircraft
The movement of Egyptian F-4s to Aswan on Sunday reflects
Cairo's increasing concern about Khartoum's vulnerability to another
Libyan airstrike. US military officials in Cairo report that two of the
seven F-4 fighters being sent to Aswan encountered maintenance-
related difficulties, and two others are being sent as replacements.
The fighters are intended to compensate for continuing delays in
sending an Egyptian air defense unit to Sudan.
Top Secret
7 27 March 1984
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that two new CSS-4 ICBM
silos are under construction in a previously known ICBM deployment
area near Jingxian. Four other CSS-4 ICBM silos have been seen
under construction, two in the Jingxian area and two near Lushi. The
CSS-4, which has a range of 14,500 kilometers, is operational at two
silos near Luoning. Support facilities like those of Jingxian and Lushi
are under construction near Huaihua.
Comment: All known CSS-4 construction sites are heavily
camouflaged and are in rugged terrain, making them difficult to locate
and identify. If construction patterns seen at Lushi and Jingxian are
repeated, two or four ICBM silos may be under construction near
Huaihua. Additional CSS-4 silos may have gone undetected in other
areas of China. The silos now under construction probably will be
completed over the next two to four years.
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NETHERLANDS: Possible New INF Proposal
The Netherlands Government is seeking NATO's support for a
new INF initiative that would eliminate the need for a decision on
deployment of INF missiles on Dutch soil. According to the US
Embassy, the proposal calls for a reduction in Soviet missile forces
while NATO builds up, with the Alliance committing itself to ceasing
deployments when a balance is reached. The Belgians reportedly
have been approached by the Dutch on the idea and have rejected it.
A Belgian official says the plan would not commit The Hague to
deploying the missiles if the Soviets refused to go along.
Comment: The government has promised to make a decision on
INF by the end of June and is.now searching for a politically palatable
compromise. The Dutch have said an arms control agreement would
make a decision unnecessary, and they probably believe their plan
will steer NATO in that direction. The other Allies, however, almost
certainly will join the Belgians in rejecting the proposal. The Dutch
probably will decide ultimately that efforts to obtain parliamentary
agreement on less than the full complement of 48 missiles is the least
damaging alternative
The UK plans to begin reductions soon in its garrison on the
Falkland Islands from the current level of over 6,000 personnel to
approximately 2,000 by mid-1985.
Comment: Most of the forces to be withdrawn probably will be
engineer units that have been clearing minefields, repairing war
damage, and constructing permanent facilities for the garrison. A new
airfield near Stanley is scheduled to be completed next year. If the
islands were to be threatened again, it would allow the British to rely
on rapid reinforcement by air of their remaining ground and air units.
London may try to make use of the withdrawals as evidence of its
willingness to take steps to reduce tension.
Top Secret
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Top Secret
SWEDEN-USSR: Trade Commission Meeting
Swedish and Soviet officials begin annual trade talks today amid
troubled relations resulting from suspected Soviet submarine
intrusions, the expulsions of three Soviets last year, and the USSR's
attempts to secure computer technology through Sweden. The US
Embassy in Stockholm says the Swedes will seek assurances that
trade will be based solely on economic considerations. They also will
try to improve economic and technological cooperation and to reduce
their persistent trade deficit resulting from large imports of Soviet oil.
Comment: Despite efforts by senior members of Prime Minister
Palme's government to revive trade in 1983, economic relations are
likely to remain depressed. The Soviets recently rejected a Swedish
firm's bid for work in the Tallinn Port expansion project, a move
Stockholm believes was in retaliation for Swedish firmness. The
Swedes probably will reject proposals to extend a Soviet gas pipeline
from Finland to Sweden's east coast. The USSR presumably is
content with its favorable balance of trade with Sweden, and
Stockholm admits it has no specific proposals to offer that would be
economically attractive to Moscow.
SPAIN-USSR: Royal Visit Planned
The visit of the King and Queen of Spain to the USSR on 12 May,
which was reported on Sunday by the Spanish press, will be the first
by a Spanish head of state. The Soviets reportedly told the Spanish
Foreign Ministry that, by the time Juan Carlos arrives, the Soviet
president will have been appointed.
Comment: The visit will symbolically complete the process of
establishing normal bilateral relations that began shortly after
Franco's death. Although the Soviets have not been pleased with the
Socialist government's increasing willingness to remain in NATO, they
will impress upon the King their desire for closer ties. General
Secretary Chernenko and other Soviet officials probably will not raise
major issues in order to avoid spoiling the political impact of the
King's visit.
Top Secret
10 27 March 1984
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Top Secret
Mexico--
North
Pacific
Ocean
Riq Ma
tgnWay
"BELMOPAN
GuatemaIa
ombia
J` ~Punta
". Gorda
(Chetumal
Marijuana cultivation)
W new field clearing
Staan Creek
Sapodilla
Cays
Gulf of
Honduras
'uerto
arrios
TURNEFFE
ISLANDS
Caribbean
Sea
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Top Secret
BELIZE: Increased Marijuana Cultivation
xtensive marijuana
cultivation in northern Belize and clearing activity to increase the
growing area. The US Drug Enforcement Administration estimates
that Belizean shipments to the US this year will approach 3,000 tons,
unless a portion of the crop is eradicated. Prime Minister Price
recently suspended the successful spray eradication program in a bid
to appease party factions and farmers opposed to using herbicides.
The US Embassy reports that he ordered the military to destroy fields
by hand instead.
Comment: If Belize exports close to 3,000 tons, it would overtake
Jamaica as the second-largest supplier of marijuana to the US, after
Colombia. By expanding cultivation, farmers hope to offset losses
incurred last year, when spraying destroyed an estimated 90 percent .
of the crop. Price faces a tough bid for reelection this year and is
unlikely to risk provoking party dissent or public controversy by
resuming the spraying during the campaign. The Army has too few
men to eradicate enough marijuana to reduce crops substantially.
Top Secret
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Too Secret
Special Analysis
IRAN: Capabilities Near the Strait of Hormuz
Iran has not substantially strengthened its forces near the Strait of
Hormuz, despite its threats to choke off, oil exports from the Persian
Gulf if Iraq attacks Khark Island. Iranian efforts to use mines or aircraft
to close the Strait would fail if challenged by Western naval forces.
Iran could choose instead to wage a prolonged campaign of harassing
ships in the Gulf, hoping to wear down the West. Tehran already has
plans for airstrikes or suicide boat attacks on tankers and other
shipping in the Gulf. The Arab states in the Persian Gulf have tried to
increase their readiness to meet the Iranian threat, but they remain
vulnerable.
Iran occupies a number of islands in the Strait of Hormuz-
Hormuz, Larak, Hengam, and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs.
during the past year the Iranians have made
only minor improvements to their forces on these islands. Most of
their recent construction has been for defensive purposes.
unoccupied.
Tehran has only about 70 operational fighter aircraft in its Air
Force. It thus lacks the ca abilit to carry out sustained, lar a-scale
air operations in the Gulf. Iranian
fighter aircraft in the Gulf are still at normal strengths, with about six
F-4s at Bushehr and two to four more at Bandar-e Abbas.
Iran's naval capability in the Gulf
is low and probably declining. only one of the three destroyers and
two of the four frigates at Bandar-e Abbas appear seaworthy. Four of
the 11 patrol boats at Bushehr could put to sea, but it is doubtful that
any of the Harpoon antiship missiles aboard these ships would work.
continued
Top Secret
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Top Secret
Persian Gulf Military Deployment
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United
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Top Secret
0 ? 100 Kilometers
I - Boundary representation .a
~
0 too Miles not necessarily authoritative.
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Top Secret
Defenses Against Iranian Attack
The Arab states in the region have increased their military
readiness to meet the Iranian threat.
the United Arab Emirates had sent Mirage fighter aircraft to bases
near the Strait by late December. In January the Omanis reportedly
asked the British to send minesweepers to Oman in the event of a
crisis. Saudi Arabia raised the alert status of its quick reaction fighter
aircraft near the Gulf on 18 February.
The air defenses of the Gulf states, however, could not prevent
some Iranian aircraft from reaching important targets. Only about 10
of the 95 fighter aircraft and three of the 14 surface-to-air missile
units on the Persian Gulf probably, would be able to respond to a
surprise attack.
Top Secret
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Top Secret
Outlook
Iran's fear of foreign intervention and dependence on
transportation through the Gulf suggest that Tehran would try to close
the Strait only as a last resort. Even if it decided on such a course,
Tehran lacks the military means to kee the Strait permanently closed
if challenged by Western naval forces.
Iran instead may be considering a strategy of prolonged
harassment in the Gulf. Its air and regular naval forces probably could
make intermittent attacks on unescorted tankers and other shipping.
Iran could augment such attacks with suicide boats and terrorist
operations by Shia dissidents in the area.
Such a strategy, if unopposed, would hamper international
shipping and might discourage some ships from entering the Gulf.
Tehran could compound the problems by making-or claiming-
repeated attempts to mine the Gulf, to force minesweeping
operations each time. Tehran would calculate that it could outlast
Western resolve and that the West would not invade for fear of a
Soviet reaction)
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