SOUTHERN AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M00539R000800990025-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 25, 2011
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: June 17, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP
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SUSPENSE 19 June 85
Date
tiqutive ecre ary
7 June 85
Date
3637 (10.81)
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17 June 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: National Intelligence Officer for Africa
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Southern Africa
Executive Registry
85- 2412
I want talking points on the attached material to take up with
McFarlane on Thursday, together with any relevant intelligence or
insights which John Helgerson and may be able to provide. 25X1
William J. Casey
Attachments:
..X1
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De artnielt o State
f/J / INCOMING
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INFO SSI-91 CIA-91 /992 AS RVH
CIA - EYES ONLY DCI & NIO - ADDED.PER NPLATT_S/5.6/13/85
------------------- F- --------------------------12/22152
ACTION OFFICE AF-91
INFO TF2-91 SWO-91 SSO-01 SSS-91 SSI-01 SS-04 S-92 D-91
P-01 INR-01 SP-01 OCT-01 CATB-01 /018 AS GMT
OCT PASS NSCE
INR EYES ONLY ABRAMOWITZ; S/P EYES ONLY RODMAN
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DIST AUTH BY READ BY
DISTRIBUTED BY
E XSE C (S/S- I )
DEPEXSEC DATE/TIME
REPEATED TO
BY DATE/TIME
SENSITIVE
THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT MAY BE SEEN ONLY BY THE ADDRESSEE AND IF NOT
EXPRESSLY PRECLUDED. BY THOSE OFFICIALS UNDER HIS AUTHORITY WHOM HE
CONSIDERS TO HAVE A CLEAR-CUT "NEED TO KNOW." IT MAY NOT BE
REPRODUCED, GIVEN ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION. OR DISCUSSED WITH
NON-RECIPIENTS WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT.
ADDRESSEES OUTSIDE THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE SHOULD HANDLE THE DOCUMENT
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS AND WITH CURRENT DEPARTMENT
OF STATE INSTRUCTIONS ON NODIS.
WHEN THIS DOCUMENT IS NO LONGER NEEDED. THE RECIPIENT IS RESPONSIBLE
FOR SUPERVISING ITS DESTRUCTION AND FOR MAILING A RECORD OF THAT
DESTRUCTION TO THE DIRECTOR, S/S-I ROOM 7241. TEL. [phone].
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ccr_UT
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ACTION NODS-00
INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 /000 W
------------------ 341030 122159Z /12 62
0 122040Z JUN 85 ZFF4
FM AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 9085
SE C R E T CAPE TOWN 01261
E. 0. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PNAT. PGOV, MOPS, SF. AO." US
SUBJECT: SAG'S REPLY TO 'SYNTHESIS'
1. (S) ON SHORT NOTICE EVENING JUNE 12, FOREIGN MINISTER
BOTHA SUMMONED DCM TO RECEIVE SOUTH AFRICA'S RESPONSE
TO OUR SYNTHESIS PAPER. (AMBASSADOR WAS UNABLE TO
EXTRICATE HIMSELF FROM A CONCURRENT SPEAKING COMMITMENT).
ACCOMPANIED BY POLOFF. DCM WAS USHERED INTO PIK'S OFFICE
WHERE THE MINISTER HANDED HIM AN 11-PAGE DOCUMENT
ENTITLED "SOUTH AFRICAN RESPONSE TO THE UNITED STATES
'SYNTHESIS' ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE CUBANS FROM ANGOLA."
PIK SHRUGGED AND SAID THAT HE HAD NOTHING MORE TO ADD;
THE DOCUMENT STOOD BY ITSELF. HE DECLINED TO VERBALLY
SUMMARIZE ITS CONTENTS. LESS THAN A MINUTE AFTER SITTING
DOWN. HE STOOD. SMILED AND BADE HIS VISITORS FAREWELL.
DFA DIRECTOR GENERAL RAE KILLEN. DFA SOUTH WEST AFRICA
OFFICE DIRECTOR DAVE STEWARD AND MINISTERIAL ASSISTANT
PIERRE DIETRICHSEN WERE PRESENT.
THE SOUTH AFRICAN RESPONSE BEGINS BY EXPRESSING ITS
"DEEP CONCERN" OVER THE "CLEAR DEVIATIONS" IN THE U. S.
POSITION ON CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL: IT GIVES NUMEROUS
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PAGE 03 OF 13 CAPE T 81261 00 OF 05 1221552 C02/02 004961 NODE,:?
EXAMPLES OF PREVIOUS USG INSISTENCE ON "SIMULTANEOUS" CTW
AND SOUTH AFRICAN FORCE REDUCTION IN NAMIBIA UNDER
UNSCR 435. THE DOCUMENT ALSO REITERATES THE SAG' S
UNDERSTANDING WITH THE USG THAT "NOTHING SHOULD BE DONE
TO JEOPARDISE UNITA' S POSITION" AND RELAYS DR. SAVIMBI' S
FEARS THAT THE U.S. "BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION" WOULD DO JUST
THAT.
THE SAG'S SPECIFIC PROPOSALS INCLUDE:
-- SIX WEEKS AFTER THE DATE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF
UNSCR 435. ALL BUT 24.806 CUBANS WILL HAVE WITHDRAWN:
AFTER NINE WEEKS. ALL BUT 16, 000 AND AFTER 12 WEEKS,
ALL BUT A MAXI MUM OF 3. 000.
-- ALL CUBANS WILL MOVE NORTH OF THE?13TH PARALLEL
FROM THE DATE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF UNSCR 435: THE RESIDUAL
3.008 WILL WITHDRAW ABOVE THE 18TH PARALLEL WHERE THEY
MAY REMAIN FOR A MAXIMUM OF 24 MONTHS.
-- SOUTH AFRICA AND SWAPO WILL CEASE ALL HOSTILE
ACTS, AND SOUTH AFRICA "WILL MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR SWAPO
TO PURSUE ITS POLITICAL OBJECTIVES IN THE TERRITORY BY
PURELY PEACEFUL MEANS. "
-- SOUTH AFRICA AND ANGOLA WILL RESPECT EACH OTHER'S
TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND SOVEREIGNTY.
2. (S) FOLLOWING IS THE FULL TEXT OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN
RESPONSE:
BEGIN TEXT:
SOUTH AFRICAN RESPONSE TO THE UNITED STATES "SYNTHESIS"
ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE CUBANS FROM ANGOLA
A. INTRODUCTION
CCPDCT
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THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT WISHES TO PLACE ON RECORD ITS
DEEP CONCERN OVER THE CLEAR DEVIATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
"BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS" FROM THE POSITION WHICH THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT HAD PREVIOUSLY ADOPTED ON THE WITHDRAWAL
OF CUBAN FORCES FROM ANGOLA.
SOUTH AFRICA'S COOPERATION ON SOUTHWEST AFRICA AND ANGOLA
HAS THROUGHOUT, BEEN BASED INTER ALIA ON A MUTUALLY
PERCEIVED NECESSITY OF COUNTERACTING SOVIET INTERVENTION IN
THE REGION. FROM THE VERY OUTSET OF ITS DISCUSSIONS WITH
THE CURRENT UNITED STATES ADMINISTRATION. THE WITHDRAWAL OF
CUBAN FORCES FROM ANGOLA HAS BEEN A PRIME OBJECTIVE OF BOTH
COUNTRIES. ONE OF THE ELEVEN POINTS SUBMITTED TO SECRETARY
OF STATE HAIG BY FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA ON 14 MAY 1981 WAS
"THE REMOVAL OF MILITARY FORCES OF THE SOVIET UNION
AND ITS SURROGATES FROM THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN REGION".
AT A JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE THE SAME DAY SECRETARY OF STATE
HAIG MADE THE FOLLOWING COMMENT:
"I THINK WE HAVE STATED WITHOUT RESERVATION THAT THERE
IS AN EMPIRICAL INTER-RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE
SITUATION IN ANGOLA AND ... NAMIBIA."
DURING DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE, WILLIAM P. CLARK'S VISIT
TO SOUTH AFRICA FROM 10-13 JUNE 1981. THE CUBAN PRESENCE
IN ANGOLA BECAME THE DECISIVE ELEMENT IN THE DISCUSSIONS.
HE STATED. INTER ALIA. THAT
"THE PRESENCE OF THESE FOREIGN TROOPS ON AFRICAN SOIL
WAS TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE TO THE UNITED STATES ...
(WHICH) PROPOSED TO TAKE SEVERE ACTION BEFORE THE END
OF THE YEAR TO GET THE CUBANS OUT."
INDEED, THE UNITED-STATES INDICATED THAT IT WOULD FORCE THE
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PAGE 05 OF 13 CAPE T 01261 00 OF 85 1221552 C02/02 004961 NOD
CUBAN SERPENT TO WITHDRAW ITS TAIL FROM ANGOLA BY TAKING
ACTION AGAINST ITS HEAD.
DURING DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE CLARK'S VISIT TO SOUTH
AFRICA AN IMPASSE DEVELOPED ON 11 JUNE 1981 CONCERNING THE
PROPOSED DEPLOYMENT OF UNTAG UNDER THE TERMS ENVISAGED BY
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT OF 29 AUGUST 1978. AS A
RESULT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S DECISION ON 21 APRIL 1981
NOT TO ALLOW A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE DTA TO ADDRESS IT.
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THIS PRIVILEGE HAD BEEN ACCORDED TO
SWAPO, THE DTA LOST ALL FAITH IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S
ABILITY TO BE INVOLVED IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF UNSCR 435
IN AN IMPARTIAL MANNER. IT ACCORDINGLY REFUSED TO ACCEPT
THAT ANY UN FORCES ("BLUE HELMETS") COULD BE DEPLOYED IN
THE TERRITORY DURING THE PROPOSED TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. THE
POLITICAL PARTIES OF SOUTHWEST AFRICA WERE EOUALLY CON-
CERNED ABOUT THE HOLDING OF FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS IN THE
TERRITORY ONCE SOUTH AFRICA'S FORCES HAD BEEN REDUCED TO
1.500 IN TERMS OF THE UN PLAN. WHILE LARGE NUMBERS OF CUBAN
FORCES WOULD STILL BE DEPLOYED ACROSS THE BORDER IN ANGOLA.
THE UNITED STATES AGREED WITH SOUTH AFRICA AT THE TIME THAT
THIS WOULD GIVE SWAPO A STRONG PSYCHOLOGICAL ADVANTAGE.
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES SOUTH AFRICA SUPPORTED THE DTA'S
VIEW THAT NO UN FORCES SHOULD BE ALLOWED IN THE TERRITORY
BUT AGREED TO ACCEPT MILITARY CONTINGENTS FROM INDIVIDUAL
STATES IN THE UNIFORMS OF THEIR DEFENCE FORCES.
IT WAS AT THIS POINT, AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THIS
DEADLOCK, THAT MR. ELL I OT ABRAMS. A MEMBER OF THE
OFFICIAL US DELEGATION, ASKED MINISTER BOTHA IF THE
SITUATION WOULD CHANGE IN THE EVENT THAT THE CUBANS WERE
WITHDRAWN FROM ANGOLA, TO WHICH THE MINISTER IMMEDIATELY
REPLIED THAT SUCH A DEVELOPMENT WOULD BRING ABOUT A
COMPLETELY NEW SITUATION.
IN A FURTHER REACTION TO THIS DEVELOPMENT MINISTER BOTHA
CG('-DFT
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PRESENTED MR. CLARK IN WINDHOEK THE NEXT DAY, 12 JUNE 1981
WITH.SIX?POINTS IN WHICH HE ACCEPTED THE UNITED STATES'
"AFFIRMATION THAT THE CUBANS MUST AND SHALL LEAVE
SOUTHERN AFRICA. WE UNDERSTAND THAT STEPS TO BRING
THIS ABOUT WILL BE INITIATED IN THE NEAR FUTURE."
THIS FIRM UNDERSTANDING FORMED THE BASIS OF SOUTH AFRICA' S
WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT THE DEPLOYMENT OF AN UNTAG ELEMENT IN
SOUTH WEST AFRICA AND ACCORDINGLY RESOLVED THE IMPASSE IN
THE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND THE UNITED STATES
I N JUNE 1981.
DURING THE COURSE OF ITS DISCUSSIONS OVER MORE THAN FOUR
YEARS WITH THE UNITED STATES, SOUTH AFRICA HAS CONSISTENTLY
REQUIRED THAT THERE SHOULD BE A FIRM AGREEMENT ON THE WITH-
DRAWAL OF THE CUBANS FROM ANGOLA PRIOR TO THE IMPLEMENTA-
TION OF RESOLUTION 435. IT REPEATEDLY SPELLED OUT ITS
INSISTENCE THAT CUBAN WITHDRAWAL SHOULD TAKE PLACE ON A
SIMULTANEOUS AND PARALLEL BASIS WITH THE REDUCTION OF ITS
OWN FORCES IN TERMS OF UNSCR 435. THUS, IN FOREIGN
MINISTER BOTHA'S LETTER TO SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ ON
3 SEPTEMBER 1982 HE WROTE
"YOU WILL RECALL THAT IT HAS BEEN AGREED THAT THE
CUBAN WITHDRAWAL WILL TAKE PLACE CONCURRENTLY WITH THE
REDUCTION OF SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES IN SWA/NAMIBIA. THE
LAST CUBANS WILL THEREFORE HAVE TO LEAVE ANGOLA AT THE
TIME THE SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES ARE REDUCED TO THE
MINIMUM FORESEEN IN THE SETTLEMENT PLAN--I.E. 12 WEEKS
AFTER THE COMMENCEMENT OF IMPLEMENTATION. AS YOU
KNOW, THE SETTLEMENT PLAN PROVIDES FOR A REDUCTION
AND NOT A WITHDRAWAL OF SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES."
AT NO TIME DID THE UNITED STATES CONTRADICT THIS POSITION.
ON THE CONTRARY IN STATEMENT AFTER STATEMENT IT EXPRESSED
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THE VIEW THAT CUBAN WITHDRAWAL FROM ANGOLA AND THE
REDUCTION OF SOUTH A~RICAN FORCES IN SOUTH WEST AFRICA.
SHOULD TAKE PLACE ON A SIMULTANEOUS BASIS.
THUS. FOR EXAMPLE. ON 5 JULY 1981 SECRETARY OF STATE HAIG
INFORMED MINISTER BOTHA THAT ONCE SOUTH AFRICA HAD PROVIDED
THE UNITED STATES WITH A DATE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
SETTLEMENT PLAN
LU
"WE WOULD UNDERTAKE TO USE THAT DATE TO SEEK A
SPECIFIC COMMITMENT TO A SCHEDULE FOR CUBAN TROOP
WITHDRAWAL COORDINATED WITH THE TRANSITIONAL SECURITY
ARRANGEMENTS IN NAMIBIA. OUR OBJECTIVE WOULD BE
PHASED WITHDRAWALS COORDINATED WITH THE ARRIVAL OF
UN-TAG AND THE DRAWDOWN OF YOUR FORCES AS PROVIDED IN
THE UN PLAN."
IN A FOREIGN POLICY ADDRESS ON 9 MAY 1982 PRESIDENT REAGAN
NOTED THAT
"THE SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL OF CUBAN FORCES.FROM
ANGOLA IS ESSENTIAL TO ACHIEVING NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE.
AS WELL AS CREATING LONG- RANGE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE IN
THE REGION."
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ON 14 MAY 1982 ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE CROCKER STATED
THAT
WE HAVE BEEN CLEAR IN EXPRESSING THE BELIEF THAT A
SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL OF CUBAN AND SOUTH AFRICAN
FORCES IS NECESSARY IF THERE IS TO BE AN OVERALL
SETTLEMENT. "
ON 21 MAY 1982 SECRETARY OF STATE HAIG AGAIN INFORMED
MINISTER BOTHA THAT HE HAD MADE IT CLEAR TO HIS COLLEAGUES
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ON ANGOLA, I STRESSED THAT CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL ...
SIMULTANEOUS WITH THE DEPARTURE OF SOUTH AFRICAN
FORCES FROM NAMIBIA IS ESSENTIAL."
ON 29 AUGUST 1982 SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ REPEATED THE
POSITION OF HIS PREDECESSOR:
"I WANT TO STATE ... AGAIN CLEARLY ... OUR POSITION ON
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL AND
THE NAMIBIA INDEPENDENCE PROCESS.
IT IS THAT CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL FROM ANGOLA MUST
TAKE PLACE PARALLEL WITH PHASE III OF THE NAMIBIA
PROCESS. WHICH INCLUDES WITHDRAWAL OF SOUTH AFRICAN
FORCES FROM NAMIBIA."
THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT WAS ACCORDINGLY SHOCKED ON
21 MARCH 1985 WHEN DR. CROCKER PRESENTED IT WITH A "BASIS
FOR NEGOTIATIONS" IN TERMS OF WHICH ALL OF THE CUBAN FORCES
COULD STILL BE IN ANGOLA AT THE TIME OF THE PROPOSED
ELECTION IN SWA/NAMIBIA IN TERMS OF RESOLUTION 435, BY
WHICH TIME ITS OWN FORCES IN THE TERRITORY WOULD HAVE BEEN
REDUCED TO 1.500. IN ADDITION. 6 000 CUBANS WOULD BE ABLE
TO REMAIN IN ANGOLA FOR UP- TO 24 MONTHS AFTER THE COMMENCE-
MENT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF UNSCR 435.
IN TERMS OF THIS FORMULA CUBAN FORCES WOULD BE IN A
POSITION TO INFLUENCE THE ELECTION IN SWA AND ONE OF THE
MAIN REASONS FOR SOUTH AFRICA'S INSISTENCE ON THEIR
WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE NEGATED. THE US PROPOSAL WOULD ALSO
DEPRIVE SOUTH AFRICA OF ITS ONLY CONCRETE GUARANTEE THAT
THE CUBANS WOULD. INDEED. BE WITHDRAWN. NAMELY THAT IF
THEY INTERRUPTED THE WITHDRAWAL OF THEIR FORCES FROM ANGOLA
SOUTH AFRICA WOULD CEASE THE REDUCTION OF ITS FORCES IN
SWA/NAMIBIA. THE US SUGGESTION THAT THE PROCESS COULD BE
VERIFIED BY UN OBSERVERS IN ANGOLA PROVIDES NO GUARANTEE
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WHATSOEVER THAT THE ANGOLANS WOULD HONOUR THEIR COMMIT-
MENTS. Z
ANOTHER CENTRAL ELEMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA'S UNDERSTANDING
WITH THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN THAT NOTHING SHOULD BE
DONE TO JEOPARDIZE UNITA'S POSITION. ONE OF THE SIX
PRINCIPLES WHICH MINISTER BOTHA CONVEYED TO DEPUTY
SECRETARY OF STATE CLARK ON 12 JUNE 1981 STIPULATED THAT
"IT>IS ACCEPTED THAT SAVIMBI WILL BE ASSISTED
APPROPRIATELY. FURTHERMORE SOUTH AFRICA SHOULD NOT BE
FORCED OUT OF SOUTH WEST AFRICA IN SUCH A WAY THAT
SAVIMBI CANNOT BE ASSISTED."
HOWEVER, SOUTH AFRICA UNDERSTANDS THAT DR. SAVIMBI IS OF
THE OPINION THAT THE IDEAS CONTAINED IN THE UNITED STATES'
"BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS" WOULD SERIOUSLY JEOPARDIZE UNITA'S
POSITION. HE FEARS THAT IF SWAPO WERE TO WIN THE UN-SUPER-
VISED ELECTION UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE THE VAST MAJORITY
OF THE CUBAN FORCES WOULD STILL BE IN ANGOLA. ITS MPLA
ALLIES WOULD, IN ALL LIKELIHOOD. BE ABLE TO ATTACK HIM FROM
THE REAR THROUGH SOUTHWEST AFRICA. IN OTHER WORDS. SOUTH
WEST AFR-ICA WOULD THEN BECOME A STAGING GROUND FOR ATTACKS
AGAINST UNITA' S MAIN BASES.
SOUTH AFRICA IS AWARE OF THE EXTREME PRESSURE TO WHICH THE
US ADMINISTRATION IS BEING SUBJECTED OVER ITS POLICY TOWARD
SOUTHERN AFRICA. IT CAN UNDERSTAND THE US WISH TO ACHIEVE
AN ACCELERATED AGREEMENT ON CUBAN WITHDRAWAL. HOWEVER. IT
HOPES THAT IN THE UNITED STATES' HASTE TO REMOVE THE
TROUBLESOME OUESTION OF SWA/NAMIBIA FROM THE INTERNATIONAL
AGENDA, IT WILL NOT AGREE TO A COMPROMISE AGREEMENT ON
C U B A N WITHDRAWAL W H I C H WOULD L E A D T O T H E C O N F I R M A T I O N I N
POWER OF THE UNELECTED MARXIST-LENINIST MPLA IN LUANDA.
AND THE ENTRENCHMENT OF SOVIET INFLUENCE IN A LARGE PART OF
SOUTHERN AFRICA. IMPORTANT AFRICAN LEADERS SHARE SOUTH
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AFRICA'S CONCERNS IN THIS REGARD. THE SOUTH AFRICAN
GOVERNMENT HAS NO DOUBT WHATSOEVER THAT SHOULD THE UNITED,
STATES PROPOSAL BE IMPLEMENTED IT COULD LEAD TO A LARGE
SCALE CONFLICT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA WHICH WOULD SERIOUSLY
DAMAGE THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES. SOUTH AFRICA AND
ALL THE PEOPLES OF SOUTHERN AFRICA.
B. UNITED STATES "SYNTHESIS"
AGAINST THIS BACKGRO~NO THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT HAS
GIVEN CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO THE POINTS CONTAINED IN THE
UNITED STATES DOCUMENT TITLED "BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS".
ITS FOLLOWING RESPONSE TO THESE POINTS REPRESENTS THE
MINIMUM REOUIREMENT FOR A FIRM AGREEMENT ON THE WITHDRAWAL
OF THE CUBANS FROM ANGOLA AND FOR THE SECURITY OF THE
PEOPLES OF SOUTH WEST AFRICA, SOUTHERN AFRICA AND THE RSA.
1. WITH A VIEW TO MAINTAINING STABILITY ALONG THE SWA/
ANGOLAN BORDER, AND FOLLOWING THE DISENGAGEMENT OF
SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES FROM SOUTHERN ANGOLA. ALL SIDES
REAFFIRM THEIR COMMITMENT TO CARRYING OUT THE
PRINCIPLES OF THE LUSAKA AGREEMENT.
2. SOUTH AFRICA WILL INFORM THE UNITED NATIONS
- SECRETARY-GENERAL THAT IT WILL IMPLEMENT UNSCR 435 IN
SWA/NAMIBIA, AND REDUCE ITS FORCES FROM SWA/NAMIBIA
FOLLOWING THE TIMETABLE ANNEXED TO UNSCR 435, ON
CONDITION THAT ANGOLA COMPLIES WITH THE PRESENT AGREE-
MENT. AND ON CONDITION THAT THE CUBANS WHO WITHDRAW
FROM ANGOLA. WILL NOT BE REPLACED BY OTHER HOSTILE
FORCES AND WILL NOT BE REDEPLOYED ELSEWHERE IN AFRICA
WHERE THEIR PRESENCE MAY PRESENT A THREAT TO SOUTHERN
AFRICA. ALL PARTIES WILL DO THEIR UTMOST TO ASSURE
THAT THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS PROCEEDS IN AN ORDERLY
AND PEACEFUL MANNER AND THAT THE PRESENT AGREEMENT IS
IMPLEMENTED IN A BONA FIDE MANNER. THE RETENTION OF
SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS OF CUBANS UNDER THE GUISE OF THEIR
CCf DCT
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HAVING OBTAINED ANGOLAN CITIZENSHIP WILL BE UNACCEPT-
ABLE.
SOUTH AFRICA AND SWAPO WILL INFORM THE UNSG THAT THEY
WILL CEASE ALL HOSTILE ACTS AS SOON AS THIS AGREEMENT
HAS BEEN CONCLUDED. SWAPO WILL AT THE SAME TIME CEASE
ALL ACTS OF COERCION AND INTIMIDATION AGAINST THE ?
PEOPLE OF SOUTHWEST AFRICA AND SOUTH AFRICA WILL MAKE
IT POSSIBLE FOR SWAPO TO PURSUE ITS POLITICAL
OBJECTIVES IN THE TERRITORY ,Y PURELY PEACEFUL MEANS.
THIS DOES NOT PRECLUDE SOUTH AFRICA AND SWAPO FROM
DECLARING AT ANY MOMENT A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES
BEFORE THE CONCLUSION OF THIS AGREEMENT.
SOUTH AFRICA GIVES ITS SOLEMN ASSURANCE TO ANGOLA
THAT DURING AND AFTER THE NAMIBIA INDEPENDENCE
PROCESS, IT WILL RESPECT THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND
SOVEREIGNTY OF ANGOLA AND WILL NOT PERMIT ITS
TERRITORY, OR TERRITORY UNDER ITS CONTROL. TO BE USED
FOR THREATS OR ACTS OF FORCE DIRECTED AGAINST THE
TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OR SOVEREIGNTY OF ANGOLA ON
CONDITION THAT ANGOLA WILL RESPECT THE TERRITORIAL
INTEGRITY OF SOUTH AFRICA AND NAMIBIA AND. WILL NOT
- PERMIT ITS TERRITORY TO BE USED FOR THREATS OR ACTS OF
- FORCE. OR PREPARATIONS FOR ACTS OF FORCE DIRECTED
- AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF SOUTH AFRICA AND
- SWA/NAMIBIA DURING AND AFTER THE SWA/NAMIBIA
- INDEPENDENCE PROCESS.
5. THE RSA AND ANGOLA AGREE THAT THE REDUCTION OF SA
FORCES FROM SWA/NAMIBIA AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE
CUBANS, INCLUDING PARA-MILITARY ELEMENTS FROM ANGOLA
WILL OCCUR ON A PARALLEL AND SIMULTANEOUS BASIS, IN
.SUCH A MANNER THAT SIX WEEKS FROM THE DATE OF THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF UNSCR 435 ALL BUT A MAXIMUM OF
24.000 CUBANS WILL HAVE WITHDRAWN FROM ANGOLA; AFTER
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NINE WEEKS ALL BUT A MAXIMUM OF 16.609 CUBANS WILL
HAVE WITHDRAWN: AND AFTER TWELVE WEEKS ALL BUT A
MAXIMUM OF 3,999 CUBANS WILL HAVE WITHDRAWN.
6. ALL CUBANS WILL BE WITHDRAWN ABOVE THE 13TH PARALLEL
FROM THE DATE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 435.
THE RESIDUAL 3.999 CUBANS WHO MAY REMAIN IN ANGOLA
AFTER THE 12TH WEEK FROM THE START OF IMPLEMENTATION
OF UNSCR 435 WILL BY THAT TIME KITHDRAW NORTH OF THE
10TH PARALLEL OF SOUTHERN LATTITUDE WHERE THEY MAY
REMAIN FOR 24 MONTHS AFTER THE START OF IMPLEMENTATION
OF UNSCR 435.
i
7. AFTER THE BEGINNING OF IMPLEMENTATION OF UNSCR 435.
CUBAN FORCES STATIONED IN ANGOLA WILL BE ASSIGNED TO
GARRISONS AND THEIR MISSION LIMITED TO PERIMETER
SECURITY SUPPLY, AND TRAINING OPERATIONS.
8. VERIFICATION OF THIS PROCESS WILL BE ASSISTED BY A
LIMITED NUMBER OF INDEPENDENT OBSERVERS IN ANGOLA AS
DESIGNATED BY THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL AND
AGREED TO BY SOUTH AFRICA AND ANGOLA. THESE OBSERVERS
WILL CONFIRM DEPARTURES OF THE CUBANS AND INVESTIGATE
COMPLAINTS.
9. THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS WILL PASS A
RESOLUTION IMPLEMENTING UNSCR 435; THAT RESOLUTION
WILL TAKE INTO ACCOUNT AGREEMENTS REACHED BETWEEN
- ANGOLA AND THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA. BETWEEN THE SECRETARY-
GENERAL AND SWAPO. BETWEEN THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND
SOUTH AFRICA. AND BETWEEN THE USA, THE CONTACT GROUP
AND SOUTH AFRICA ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF UNSCR 435 AND
THE INDEPENDENCE OF NAMIBIA. THESE AGREEMENTS MUST BE
MADE AVAILABLE TO THE PARTIES INVOLVED AND MUST BE
APPROVED BY THEM FOR INCLUSION IN THE SAID UNSC
RESOLUTION, BEFOREHAND. AS A RESULT OF THE SECURITY
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COUNCIL'S IMPLEMENTING RESOLUTION. THE UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY COUNCIL WILL GUARANTEE RESPECT OF THESE
COMMITMENTS. WHICH WILL CONSTITUTE A SINGLE. BINDING
ACCORD.
END TEXT. NICKEL
S.FCRFT
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ACTION NODS-4-0
INFO LOG-00 ADS-09 /000 W
------------------366470 3020162 /70/41
0 3018362 MAY 85 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8406
S E C R E T PARIS 22058
NOD IS
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER
E.0. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL. SF. UR. US. WA. XA. X1
SUBJECT: DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIETS ON SOUTHERN AFRICA
1. (S ENTIRE TEXT)
2. SUMMARY: IN SEVEN HOURS OF TALKS, SOVIET DELEGATION
LEADER VASEV AND I FRANKLY ASSESSED THE DIPLOMATIC STATE
OF PLAY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. WHILE CONCEDING NOTHING ON
THE SUBSTANCE OF SOVIET POSITIONS, VASEV CAME PREPARED
FOR SOME INTERESTING GIVE-AND-TAKE. PARTICULARLY IN A TWO-
HOUR ONE-ON-ONE AT THE END OF THE DAY. WHILE. UNWILLING
TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE LEGITIMACY OF ANY LINKAGE BETWEEN THE
CUBAN TROOP PRESENCE IN ANGOLA AND A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT.
VASEV PROVED WILLING TO ENGAGE IN AN EX-
CHANG'E ON POSSIBLE WITHDRAWAL TIMETABLES. THE MEETING
PROVIDED A USEFUL OPPORTUNITY TO REITERATE OUR CONFIDENCE
THAT WE ARE ON THE RIGHT TRACK, AND PERHAPS TO REINFORCE
SOVIET CONCERNS ABOUT THE DURABILITY OF THEIR POSITION IN
THE REGION. ON THIS BASIS, I BELIEVE THE MEETING ACCOMPLI-
SHED THE OBJECTIVES WE SET FOR IT. END SUMMARY.
rrnnrT
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3. AS YOU AND GROMYKO HAD AGREED VASEY AND I MET FOR
APPROXIMATELY SEVEN HOURSON MAY 30. HE WAS ACCOMPANIED
BY TWO STAFFERS FROM HIS THIRD AFRICAN DEPARTMENT AND AN
OFFICER FROM THE MFA' S USA DIVISION. WITH ME WERE AF/S
DIRECTOR GELBARD, AF LEGAL ADVISOR ELY. EUR/SOV OFFICER
TEFFT. EMBASSY PARIS AFRICA WATCHER CHESHES EMBASSY
MOSCOW OFFICER NAPPER. AND TRANSLATOR ZARECHNAK. THE
MEETING WAS DIVIDED INTO THREE SEGMENTS: A MORNING SET-
PIECE EXCHANGE, A LUNCHEON FOR BOTH DELEGATIONS. AND
ALMOST TWO HOURS OF PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN VASEV AND
ME TO CLOSE OUT THE DAY. THIS WAS THE FIRST OF MY FOUR
EXCHANGES WITH THE SOVIETS ON SOUTHERN AFRICA IN WHICH
MY INTERLOCUTOR MADE A REALPFORT TO HAVE THE KIND OF
UNSTRUCTURED PRIVATE DISCUSSION IN WHICH GIVE-AND-
TAKE IS POSSIBLE.
4. FROM THE OUTSET. VASEV SEEMED INTENT ON A SERIOUS
EXCHANGE RATHER THAN SIMPLY A STERILE REHASH OF ESTABLI-
SHED POSITIONS. HE OFFERED TO CONDUCT THE ENTIRE
MEETING IN ENGLISH, THUS DOUBLING THE TIME AVAILABLE FOR
DISCUSSION. VASEY BROUGHTA BRIEF PREPARED PAPER AND
REFERRED T-0 IT OCCASIONALLY, BUT DID NOT READ FROM IT
AT LENGTH AS IL'YCHEV HAD IN PREVIOUS MEETINGS. HE
SEEMED IN COMMAND OF HIS MATERIAL, DID NOT HESITATE TO
SPEAK FRANKLY AND AT TIMES (PARTICULARLY IN THE MORNING
FORMAL SESSION) RESORTED TO SOME PRETTY TOUGH AND
OBJECTIONABLE DISTORTIONS OF OUR POSITIONS. AT THE SAME
TIME, I DIDN'T FEEL THAT HIS PRIMARY OBJECTIVE FOR THE
MEETING WAS TO SCORE DEBATING POINTS. RATHER IT SEEMED
THAT HE WAS SERIOUSLY INTERESTED IN AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS
AND PARTICULARLY IN GAUGING OUR SELF-CONFIDENCE ABOUT
OUR SOUTHERN AFRICAN DIPLOMACY. HE CONCEDED NOTHING
ON THE SUBSTANCE OF SOVIET POSITIONS. AND UNDERINED
THAT WE WILL NOT HAVE SOVIET SUPPORT AS LONG AS WE
^7~ P
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PAGE 04 OF 08 PARIS 22058 86 OF 03 3026122 C07/18 002489 N0 D41
PROCEED ON THE COURSE ON WHICH WE HAVE SE T OUT. THAT
SAID. THE EXCHANGE WAS MORE INTERESTING THAN PREVIOUS
MEETINGS OF ITS KIND. AND AT TIMES HIGHLIGHTED WHAT AP-
PEARED TO BE SERIOUS SOVIET CONCERN ABOUT THEIR POSI-
TION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. FOR THIS REASON ALONE. I THINK
THE MEETING ACHIEVED THE OBJECTIVES WE SET FOR IT.
THE MORNING SESSION
.
5. IN MY OPENING STATEMENT I RESTATED OUR BASIC OBJEC-
TIVES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: GREATER STABILITY FOR EVERY
NATION; INDEPENDENCE FOR NAMIBIA ON THE BASIS OF SECU-
RITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 435; REMOVAL OF FOREIGN FORCES: AND
A CLIMATE WHICH WILL PROMOTE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, ECONO -
MIC DEVELOPMENT AND MOVEMENT TOWARD A MORE JUST SOCIETY
IN SOUTH AFRICA ENDING A SYSTEM OF LEGALLY ENTRENCHED
RACISM. IN OUR CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS. ALL PARTIES HAD
ACCEPTED THE PRINCIPAL ELEMENTS OF A PACKAGE SETTLEMENT.
INCLUDING INDEPENDENCE FOR NAMIBIA AND CUBANTROOP WITH-
DRAWAL. THE NATIONS OF THE REGION WERE NOW GRAPPLING WITH
QUESTIONS FUNDAMENTAL TO THEIR SECURITY. I EXPRESSED
CONFIDENCE IN OUR APPROACH. SAYING WE SAW NO ALTERNATIVE
WHICH PROVIDES FOR A JUST AND LASTING SETTLEMENT IN THE
REGION.
6. IN HIS 45-MINUTE REPLY. VASEV RESTATED FAMILIAR
SOVIET POSITIONS. MAKING THE FOLLOWING NOTABLE POINTS:
?- THE US SHOULD NOT "APPEASE" SOUTH AFRICA.
THE US SHOULD NOT LINK A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT TO CUBAN
TROOP WITHDRAWAL, BUT PROCEED WITHOUT DELAY ON
IMPLEMENTING SCRES. 435.
-- THE USSR BELIEVED THE ANGOLAN PACKAGE POSITION
WAS A "REALISTIC PROPOSAL" FOR THE SOLUTION OF THE
CCPDCT
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SITUATION IN AND AROUND ANGOLA.
Z
-- SOVIET OFFICIALS HAVE HAD MEETINGS WITH SOUTH
AFRICAN OFFICIALS PRIMARILY AT THE UN. IN WHICH THE
SOUTH AFRICANS CLAIMED -REGIONAL SUPERPOWER" STATUS.
THE SOVIETS REJECTED THIS ASSERTION.
7. IN OUR SUBSEOUENT DISCUSSION I TRIED TO ZERO IN ON
THE CONTRADICTIONS INHERENT IN VASEV'S STATEMENT THAT
THE USSR SUPPORTS THE ANGOLA PACKAGE AND AT THE SAME TIME
WANTS TO MOVE FORWARD SEPARATELY WITH A NAMIBIA SETTLE-
MENT. WITH INCREASING DISCOMFORT. VASEV TRIED TO
RATIONALIZE WHAT ARE CLEARLY CONTINUING DIFFERENCES WITH
THE ANGOLANS ON THE LINKAGE ISSUE. HE ADMITTED CONTRA-
DICTIONS IN THE SOVIET POSITION. BUT CLAIMED THAT THE
SOVIET UNION WOULD OBJECT TO ANY PACKAGE WHICH "DOWN-
GRADES" THE NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT ISSUE. HE MADE A REPEA-
TED PITCH FOR"CONSTRUCTIVE COOPERATION" WITH THE US ON
SOUTHERN AFRICA BUT WOULD NOT ADDRESS SPECIFIC MEASURES
TO ACHIEVE THAT GOAL, EXCEPT TO PROCEED WITH IMPLEMENTA-
TION OF RES. 435. OBVIOUSLY WITH HIS DEBRIEFING OF THE
ANGOLANS IN MIND. HE URGED THAT WE NOT PRESS THE ANGOLANS
TO MAKE MORE CONCESSIONS AND INSTEAD FOCUS ON SOUTH AFRI-
CAN FAILURE TO MOVE FORWARD. VASEV ALSO SEVERAL TIMES
STATED THAT MOSCOW CONSIDERED "CONSTRUCTIVE COOPERATION"
IN THE REGION COULD HAVE POSITIVE EFFECTS ON OTHER
BROADER ISSUES.
THE ONE-ON-ONE
8. THE MOST INTERESTING AND PRODUCTIVE DISCUSSIONS
TOOK PLACE. IN THE ONE-ON-ONE FOLLOWING LUNCH. AS WE SAT
IN THE RESIDENCE OVER COFFEE AND WALKED IN THE GARDEN
OF THE RESIDENCE. YASEY RETURNED TO SOME OF THE
CrPDCT
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MORNING TOP)-CS AND TOUCHED ON SOME SENSITIVE AREAS WHICH
HE OBVIOUSLY?DID NOT FEEL COMFORTABLE IN ADDRESSING
BEFORE NOTETAKERS:
--ANGOLAN RESPONSE TO OUR SETTLEMENT IDEAS: VASEV
PREDICTED THAT THE ANGOLANS WOULD NOT*RESPOND DEFINITELY
TO OUR IDEAS UNTIL THEY KNOW MORE ABOUT HOW SOUTH AFRICA
WOULD RESPOND. MORE NUANCED THAN THE USUAL SOVIET ASSER-
TION THAT THE ANGOLANS WILL GO NO FURTHER, VASEV'S IMPLI-
CIT ACKNOWLEDGMENT THAT THEY MIGHT SEEM TO REINFORCE
THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE SOVIETS MAY NOT HAVE A GOOD FEEL
FOR LUANDA'S BOTTOM LINE.
-- NATIONAL RECONCILIATION: VASEV ACKNOWLEDGED
THE NEED FOR AN "ETHNIC DIALOGUE" AND EVEN FOR PARTICI-
PATION BY "ELEMENTS" OF UNITA IN THE LUANDA GOVERNMENT.
HE SAID IT WAS A TRAGEDY THAT THERE WERE NO LONGER
OVIMBUNDU (SAVIMBI'S TRIBE) CADRE IN THE MPLA. AND ASSER-
TED THAT ANGOLA'S FUTURE DEPENDED UPON "TRIBAL". NOT
"IDEOLOGICAL" INTEGRATION. I REJECTED HIS CLAIMS THAT
WE HAD SET "UNITA CONDITIONS" AS AN ELEMENT OF OUR
DIPLOMACY. RATHER. I SAID THAT ONLY THE ANGOLANS COULD
RESOLVE THEIR CIVIL WAR, BUT THERE COULD OBVIOUSLY BE NO
PEACE FOR THE COUNTRY UNTIL THEY DID SO.
-- TIMETABLE FOR CUBAN WITHDRAWAL: AFTER TORTUROUS-
LY TRYING TO DRAW A DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE OBJECTIVES
OF "SURVIVAL" OR "SECURITY" FOR THE MPLA REGIME. VASEV
UNEXPECTEDLY PROVED WILLING TO ENTERTAIN A SERIOUS DIS-
CUSSION OF A TIMETABLE FOR CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL. HE
ASSERTED THAT WE HAD SUGGESTED AN EIGHT-MONTH TIMETABLE
FOR WITHDRAWAL OF THE BULK OF CUBAN TROOPS AND THAT SUCH
A SHORT PERIOD OFFERED ANGOLA "NOTHING AT ALL". I
REPLIED THAT THE PERIOD WE HAD SUGGESTED FOR WITHDRAWAL
OF THE BULK OF THE CUBAN TROOPS WAS ONE YEAR AND REITER-
ATED THAT WE REMAINED READY TO NEGOTIATE AND CONFIDENT
UPUT
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OF OUR APPROACH. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS EXCHANGE WAS
NOT THAT VASEV OBJECTED LO DETAILS OF OUR PROPOSAL. BUT
THAT HE WAS WILLING TO ENTERTAIN A SERIOUS DISCUSSION
OF THE ISSUE AT ALL.
-- VASEV REPEATED EARLIER EFFORTS TO DEFINE
"CONSTRUCTIVE COOPERATION" AS MEANING US AND USSR
AGREEMENT ON UN SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA TO
AHIFYF SEPA! F IMPCEMENLALLONROF"RES- 435. BUT I
MADE CLEAR WE HAD NO INTENTION OF GOING THIS ROUTE.
HE DROPPED THIS TIRESOME REFRAIN TOWARD THE END OF OUR
EXCHANGE. "I UNDERSTAND YOUR POSITION CLEARLY." HE
MADE NO ATTEMPT TO ARGUE THAT AFRICAN OR DOMESTIC
PRESSURES WOULD FORCE OUR HAND. HE DID NOT REJECT MY
FORMULATION THAT IT WAS WORTH CONTINUING TO SEEK THE
MISSING -EL-EMENT THAT MIGHT ENABLE THE MPLA TO MOVE
FORWARD. I POINTED OUT THAT THIS MIGHT BE EASIER IF
THE MPLA ANSWERED THE MAIL AND SPECIFIED ITS CONCERNS.
CONCLUSION
9. JUDGING FROM THE SUBSTANCE AND TENOR OF THE ENTIRE
EXCHANGE. THE SOVIETSCLEARLY RECOGNIZE THAT WE RETAIN
THE DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVE. WHILE THEY REMAIN UNCONVINCED
THAT WE WILL ULTIMATELY SUCCEED. VASEV SEEMED LESS CON-
FIDENT THAN DID IL' YCHEV IN PREVIOUS SESSIONS THAT MOSCOW
HAS A GOOD HANDLE ON THE DIRECTION AND MOMENTUM OF OUR
DIPLOMACY.. AT THE CLOSE OF THE MEETING, I TOLD VASEV THAT
I WOULD BE REPORTING TO YOU. AND WE AGREED TO THINK OVER
CAREFULLY WHAT EACH OF US HAD SAID. WHILE MAKING NO
COMMITMENT, BOTH OF US AGREED NOT TO RULE OUT THE POSSI-
BILITY THAT WE MIGHT MEET AGAIN. WE ALSO AGREED TO TAKE
A SPARE PRESS LINE, CONFIRMING THAT WE HAD MET AND
DISCUSSED THE SECURITY SITUATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA AND
THE ACHIEVEMENT OF NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE.
CrrQGT
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10. DEPARTMENT PLEASE REPEAT EMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE.
MARESCA
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