RECENT SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000507410001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 28, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 27, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central Intdl nce Agency
16
DIRRTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
27 March 1985
Recent Soviet Activity in the South Pacific
Summary
After a decade of stalled economic and political initiatives aimed at the
nine independent South Pacific island states, changing regional circumstances
are providing a somewhat more fertile ground for Soviet offerings. The
altered regional economic conditions and more skillful Soviet targeting may
help Moscow to conclude fishing agreements with Kiribati and Tuvalu sometime
over the next twelve months. If the Soviets succeed, they may be able to make
economic inroads among the other states. This would further Moscow's
objectives to prevent the West, Japan, and China from having exclusive
influence in the region and to ensure Soviet access to local fish resources.
Meanwhile, Moscow's cautious handling of the New Caledonia secession movement,
probably indicating a Soviet decision not to put Franco-Soviet relations at
risk, suggests that Soviet political initiatives in the region are likely to
remain limited over the near term. Nevertheless, continued disagreements over
military natters within the ANZUS treaty framework may encourage the Soviets
to step up efforts to foster the growth of local antinuclear sentiments and to
employ surrogates to build influence with the South Pacific states.
This memorandum was prepared byl the Third World
Activities, Office of Soviet Analysis with a contribution from
NPSA. It has been coordinated with the Office of East Asia Analysis, ,
and ALA. Questions and comments are welcome and may be addressed to the
thief, Third World Activities, SOYA
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Moscow's Goals
Moscow's regional objectives in the area defined by the nine independent
island states of the South Pacific include:
-- Establishing an economic and political presence in the area over the
near term to deny the West, Japan and China a zone of exclusive
influence.
-- Gaining access to offshore fish resources in the near term, owing to a
projected rise in Soviet fish consumption, Moscow's increased long-
distance fishing capabilities, and the limits imposed on Soviet
offshore fishing by developed states.
-- Nourishing indigenous antinuclear sentiments to build support among
the island states for a highly restrictive variant of a South Pacific
nuclear-free zone.
Nevertheless, the area has not been targeted as part of the Soviet
military buildup and modernization in Asia of the past two decades. It
apparently occu ies a relativel low position in Soviet strategic
calculations.
We judge therefore that the Soviets are not
prepared to pay a ig price for increased influence, given the region's
minimal importance for their global concerns. Soviet tics most likely will
continue to focus on low-cost targets of opportunity.
Soviet Economic Activities
Soviet economic offerings to South Pacific island states between 1976 and
1980 were refused, owing to modest increases in aid from traditional donors
and the reluctance of newly independent island governments to deal with
Moscow. The invasion of Afghanistan and the I(AL shootdown fueled the
islanders' political antipathy towards the USSR, and until last year Moscow
apparently had decided that any new economic initiatives were bound to be
rejected out of hand. Currently, however, memories of previous Soviet
transgressions seem to be fading. Moscow now appears poised to exploit
growing tensions between the US and the economically vulnerable South Pacific
island states over maritime issues--especially tuna fishing--with proposals
for fisheries cooperation.
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The Soviets last fall also discussed a fishing agreement with Kiribati,
and the two sides held their first negotiating session early this year.
Tabai supports a fishing agreement with the USSR on economic grounds.
Embassy Wellington recently reported that Kiribati Presid-ent
Political Initiatives
Moscow continues to make low level political overtures to the island
ministates but has yet to display a sustained interest in such endeavors or a
willingness to commit substantial resources. Efforts to sound out Vanuatu on
the prospects for establishing diplomatic relations in late 1983 and early
1984, using the Soviet journalist Victor Louis as a channel, were sidetracked
S et
t ovi
h
h
of nonalignment as keeping one's distance from both superpowers.
e
en
owing to General Secretary Andropov's illness and death. W
ambassador to Australia finally managed to get a visa for a private visit to
Vanuatu last spring, the prime minister and other high foreign affairs
officials studiously avoided any meetings. To date Vanuatu--the only
nonaligned state in the region--has adhered rigorously to its interpretation
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Moscow continues to give exten media la to anti-nuclear sentiments
he South Pacific island states 25X1
The vie 25X1
press remains critical o U policy in Micronesia, alleging a acto
annexation and militarization of the Pacific Island Trust Territories. Soviet 25X1
offers of scholarships for South Pacific nationals since the mid-1970s,
however, have found few takers. Nor is there evidence in hand to suggest that
Moscow has made head 'n establish' 7 local front groups or influencing the
South Pacific media. - 25X1
Moscow meanwhile has established diplomatic ties with only four of the
nine states--Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Tonga and Western Samoa--and still has no
resident missions. The Chinese, by comparison, have embassies in three states
(Fiji, Western Samoa, Papua New Guinea) and modest aid programs. Local trade
union bodies on the whole remain resistant to Soviet penetration, despite
ongoing visits to Moscow and East Europe by South Pacific officials.
Outside Actors and Soviet Interests: Vietnam and Cuba
Two of Moscow's close allies, Vietnam and Cuba, maintain diplomatic
relations with Vanuatu and have hinted at closer ties although thus far both
maintain rather low-profile relationships. F __1
effect.
Constraints
We judge that a number of obstacles to expanded Soviet influence in the
region continue in force, including:
-- The pro-Western orientation of most of the ministates since
independence.
-- The continued influence of pro-Western opinion leaders such as Fiji.
-- The strength of local Christian churches.
-- A continued flow of aid from the West and Japan.
The goodwill the US built up in the region during World War II apparently
remains an important factor, giving US economic assistance a large multiplier
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To date, however, there are no signs of a major investment by Hanoi in
forging links to the South Pacific island states. Vietnam's internal economic
difficulties probably preclude any significant allocation of resources to
military or economic aid programs for the region. Moscow's own relatively low
priority for the South Pacific apparently minimizes Soviet interest in using
the Vietnamese as a conduit. Problems of distance, transportation, and poor
communications--as well as the absence of a fit between the Vietnamese and the
South Pacific economies--also make close bilateral economic ties unlikely for
the near future.
Cuba has had diplomatic relations with Vanuatu since early 1983 but still
has no resident mission. Official conta s over the past two years,
nevertheless. have been extremely rare.
Prospects
We judge that changing circumstances already provide more fertile ground
for Soviet economic offerings than at any time since the island states gained
their independence in the 1970s. Other trends that probably would provide
opportunities for Moscow include:
-- Increased perceptions of local economic vulnerabilities by ministates
such as Kiribati and Tuvalu, arising out of ongoing trade imbalances,
growing budget deficits, a sense of limited economic alternatives, and
pessimism about the prospects for increased Western aid.
-- A rising sense of economic nationalism, as reflected in the recent
threat by the Solomon Islands to withdraw from regional fishing
negotiations with the US until Washington agreed to remove the tuna
embargo on Solomon Island products imposed in the wake of the August
1984 seizure of a US tuna boat.
-- Differences between the US and its Antipodean allies over security
matters that, as perceived by the island states, may weaken the
region's military links to the US and will almost certainly produce
new pressures from local antinuclear activists to close ports
Moscow almost certainly will try to gain a propaganda advantage from
recent criticism of US actions by South Pacific forum members such as Papua
New Guinea. If targets of opportunity increase and signs of strains in US
waterways to US warships possibly carrying nuclear weapons.
security relationships with New Zealand and Australia multiply, Soviet
assertiveness in the South Pacific region probably will rise.
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Meanwhile, the Soviets will likely maintain a low diplomatic and military
profile in the region, relying on expanded econanic ties to inprove their 25X1
access and further their objectives. They probably will, for example,
continue to urge South Pacific governments not to allow political differences
to stand in the way of mutually profitable economic ties.
Covert activities and the use of Cuban or Vietnamese surrogates always
constitute a potential avenue of influence for the Soviets. To date, however,
Moscow's surrogate activities apparently remain highly circumscribed--probably
out of concern over reinforcing the antipathy toward the USSR already present
in the region. The Soviets, for example, probably will refrain from such
actions as open contacts and material assistance to the Kanak
seccessionists. They probably calculate that the uncertain benefits such aid
might confer on the Soviet position in the region would not be worth the
damage such initiatives almost certainly would inflict on Moscow's ability to
take advantage of emerging economic opportunities in the South Pacific area.
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SUBJECT: Recent Soviet Activity in the South Pacific
Internal Distribution
Or ig - DCI
DDC I
SA/DCI
ED/DCI
Executive Registry
DDI
Senior Review Panel
OCPAS/IMD/CB
Vice Chairman, NIC
NIO/USSR
NIO/EA
PDB Staff
C/DDO/SE
C/DDO/EAD
C
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PAS
DDI
DDI
DDI
DDI
/ODO/SE
/DDO/EA
B I S/AGk
C/OEA/SEA
C/OEA/SEA/IB
D/OGI
D/ALA
D/SOVA
C/SOYA/PA
C/SOVA/TF
C/SOYA/SF
C/SOVA/EA
C/SOVA/DI
C/SOVA/SE
C/SOVA/TW
C/SOVA/TW/A
C/SOVA/TW/T
C/SOVA/TW/M
SOVA/TW/A
SOVA/TW/A/Typescript file
D/OEA
DDI/SOVA/TWA/AA
(10 Mar 85)
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 Fort George eade, Maryland
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SUBJECT: Recent Soviet Activity in the South Pacific
Ambassador Jack Matlock
Senior Staff Member, USSR-Eastern Europe
Room 368, Old EOB
Gaston Sigur
Senior Staff Member, Asia
Room 302, Old EOB
Colonel Tyrus Cobb
Staff Member
Room 373, EOB
David Laux
Staff Member, Asia
Room 302, EOB
State Department
Robie M. Palmer
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
European and Canadian Affairs
Room 6219
William Brown
Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asia/Pacific
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Room 6205
Thomas W. Simons, Jr.
Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs
Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs
Room 4217
Lynn Pascoe
Deputy Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs
Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs
Room 4310
Richard J. Dols
Director, Office of Pacific Island Affairs
Room 4310
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SUBJECT: Recent Soviet Activity in the South Pacific
External Distribution (Continued)
State Department
Mark E. Mohr
Deputy Director, Office of Reqional Affairs
Room 4210
Robert Downen
Special Assistant, Office of Regional Affairs
Room 4210
Morton Abramowitz
Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Room 6531
Peter Colm
Bureau of Inelligence and Research
Room 4843
Robert H. Baraz
Director, Office of Analysis for the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe, INR
Room 4758
John J. Taylor, Director
Office of Analysis for East Asia and Pacific, INR
Room 8840
Allen Kitchens
Chief, Southeast Asia and Pacific Division
Office of Analysis for East Asia and Pacific, INR
Room 8647
Paula Causey
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Room 8647
Jay Kalner
ACDA/S P
Room 4485
Department of Defense
DIO, European and Soviet Political Affairs
Room 2C238, Pentagon
Jay Sloan
DIO, East Asia and Pacific Affairs
Room 2C238, Pentagon
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SUBJECT: Recent Soviet Activity in the South Pacific
External Distributiond (Continued)
Department of Defense
LTGEN William Odom
HDQA (DAMI-7A)
Department of the Army
Room 2E464, Pentagon
Linda Wetzel
Policy Assistant for USSR-EE Affairs
OASD/ISP/EUR-NATO/Regional Policy
Room 11)469, Pentagon
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