POST MORTEM ON NIE 11-4-57;TRENDS IN SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND POLICIES, 1957-1962 DATED 26 NOVEMBER 1957

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00400R000300030034-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 25, 2012
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: February 4, 1958
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/25: CIA-RDP82-00400R000300030034-4
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IAC-D-57/91
4 February.. 1958
Post-Mortem on NIE 11-4-57:
Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1957-1962
dated 26 November 1957
1. In NIE 11-4-57 as in its predecessor, NIE 11-4-56, most of
the major issues lay in the military field. The chief bone of con-
tention was the current strength and future development of the Soviet
heavy bomber and tanker force, together with the degree to which its
size and composition would be influenced by the advent of other ad-
vanced weapon systems. Some differences of view were also
encountered on political and economic matters.
1. Findings
2. General. Our intelligence on the USSR continues to
improve gradually. The quantity of available overt information is
increasing as the Soviet leaders adopt a more open attitude towards
their own people on various topics, as Western contacts with both
leaders and populace increase, as the scope of statistical secrecy is
narrowed, and as the USSR achieves successes which it considers
worth bragging about. It continues to be difficult to keep abreast of
the relatively rapid pace of change, but we have at least become
accustomed to the fact of rapid change and are allowing for it in our
analyses. Despite all this, however, the problem of intelligence on
the USSR continues to be extremely difficult because many of the
normal sources of information are severely restricted by continuing
strict security controls.
3. Political intelligence. Official and unofficial information
relating to the June and October purges has improved our knowledge
of various groupings and attitudes which existed within the top Soviet
leadership prior to the purges.
T
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IAC-D-57/91
4. February 1958
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5. Our estimates of Soviet foreign policy intentions continue
to depend largely on deductions from the general Soviet posture. It
is difficult to anticipate particular maneuvers of Soviet policy without
greater knowledge of Soviet plans, and it perhaps could not be done
not even then because of the flexibility of current Soviet policy. In-
formation on Soviet relations with the European Satellites is mores
lthough frequently contradictor
In con-
trast, data on Sino-Soviet relations remain scarce, and it is possible
that there may be fairly significant maneuverings or frictions within
the framework of Sino-Soviet unity of which we know nothing.
6. Economic intelligence. While certain progress has been
made in the study of Soviet military expenditures, we could still use
much more information on the prices the military establishment pays
for goods and on detailed production rates, particularly for military
end items. Furthermore, a re-examination of the concepts and
techniques employed in the cost analysis is desirable. The scope of
Soviet budgetary accounts and the reconciliation of estimated military
outlays with these and other Soviet material accounts also require
further information and analysis. In assessing the economic.impact
of Soviet defense expenditures, we tend to use primarily a highly
aggregative measure--the ratio of total defense expenditures to gross
national product; this should be supplemented by other techniques
which might disclose important specific impacts. Also, further
effort should be made to refine our dollar comparison of Soviet and
US defense outlays.
7. While the new industrial organization was introduced too
recently to be evaluated fully in this estimate, its economic effects
and possible political consequences will be a major intelligence
target during the coming year.
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IAC-D-57/91
4.' February :1958
8. Military intelligence. Though our data on the Soviet
military establishment remain inadequate, intelligence on current
military strengths and capabilities has improved somewhat during
the past year, both through the exploitation of new sources and the
cumulative analysis of information from continuing sources.
9. Scientific intelligence. There continues to be a general
improvement and refinement of our evidence
subjects,
However, in the im-
portant fields of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles it is somewhat
better.
10. The IAC agencies are requested to:
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/25: CIA-RDP82-0040OR000300030034-4
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IAC-D-57/91
4 'F ebruary 1958
a. Take appropriate action to overcome the intelligence
deficiencies discussed above.
b. Make a special effort to improve our intelligence on
Soviet research and development, production, and deployment
of advanced weapons systems.
E. Improve and refine our analysis of the cost and
economic impact of the Soviet military establishment, and
of comparative US-Soviet defense outlays, in anticipation of
NIE 11-4-58.
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/25: CIA-RDP82-0040OR000300030034-4