SHIFT IN SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THIRD WORLD INSURGENCIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90G01359R000200030031-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 13, 2011
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: October 3, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/13: CIA-RDP90G01359R000200030031-1
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DDI #04588-85
3 October 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, SOVA
Director, ALA
Director, NESA
Director, OEA
FROM Deputy Director for Intelligence
SUBJECT Shift in Soviet Activity in Third World
Insurgencies
1. I believe we have been neglectful in identifying a more
aggressive Soviet approach over the past months in fighting
insurgencies in their client states. Now that we are looking,
there seems to be evidence not only of a more active Soviet role
over the past several months in advising and even engaging in
combat operations in Angola but also in Mozambique and
Cambodia. Beyond this, we have seen over the past year or so a
new Soviet aggressiveness in Afghanistan and a much more active
and direct involvement of Cubans in combat operations in
Nicaragua.
2. In Angola, it seems to me a good case can be made that a
decision was made a couple of years ago that more aggressive
action would have to be taken to prevent its fall to UNITA and
that the subsequent $1.5 billion worth of arms shipped over the
last two years or so was intended to prevent a UNITA victory and
turn the tide. The Soviets may have hoped that the Cubans and
Angolans themselves could make effective use of this equipment
but following the failure of the fall offensive last year, the
Soviets realized that they would have to take a more direct role
themselves. Thus the increased involvement in directing combat
operations, devising new tactics, and DerhaDs even direct
engagement seen in recent months.
3. It seems to me that a case also can be made that, either
during the last few months of Chernenko's rule or early in
Gorbachev's, there was a decision to resist more aggressively the
insurgencies in the Soviet client states as well.
4. I have reviewed our publications since January and find
that while we have reported on Soviet activities in each country,
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/13: CIA-RDP90G01359R000200030031-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/13: CIA-RDP90G01359R000200030031-1
no one appears to have looked more broadly to see if there were
any connections or patterns to this greater direct Soviet role
and to identify a possible policy decision months ago to alter
Soviet tactics in these conflicts. 25X1
5. Now, I realize we may not be able to prove all of this,
but it makes a logical and persuasive story and, at minimum,
should have been advanced as a possibility. Instead, we have
tended to discount Soviet willingness to do precisely what they
are doing in places like Angola and have continued to judge that
for them to make any appreciable difference in the outcome of
these conflicts would require substantial reinforcement and use
of their own forces. In Angola, this judgment has been shown to
be wrong -- the Angolans have in fact not only stabilized their
own situation but for now have made a little headway against
UNITA. 25X1
6. I would appreciate your getting together to consider
this subject and giving me your views on a priority basis (by COB
Tuesday). The NIC Threat Outlook will probably be out within the
next week tying these diverse developments together. I am
disappointed that the Directorate was not out in front in
identifying this change in Soviet strategy or approach even as a
possibility. 25X1
7. We still seem incapable of looking at trends across
regions and offices -- or even across continents in the same
office. With all the concerns about accounts being sliced too
narrowly, why can't each office, on an ad hoc basis, ask two or
three good, imaginative people every so often to take time to
test different hypotheses or ideas on important problems like
this? Why are we so weak at looking for and testing trends and
patterns? 25X1
/2
cc: ADDI
D/CPAS
D/MPS
C/MPS/PES
2
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/13: CIA-RDP90G01359R000200030031-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/13: CIA-RDP90G01359R000200030031-1
DDI #04588-95
3 October 1985
SUBJECT: Shift in Soviet Activity in Third World Insurgencies
DDI/RMGates~
- D/SOVA
- D/ALA
- D/NESA
- D/OEA
- ADDI
- D/CPAS
- D/MPS
- C/MPS/PES
DDI Registry
DDI Action Log
DDI Chrono
3
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/13: CIA-RDP90G01359R000200030031-1