REMARKS OF DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS TO THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000100830021-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 1, 2010
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: October 24, 1980
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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.EMBARGOED FOR RELEASE UPON DELIVERY October 24, 1980
2:00 P.M.,OCTOBER 25, 1980
Office of the White House Press Secretary
THE WHITE HOUSE
REMARKS OF DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
TO THE
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
BROWN PALACE HOTEL
DENVER, COLORADO
October 25, 1980
The Quest for Global Security: The Third Phase
I propose to take your time today to talk about the newest --
and one of the most challenging -- aspect of America's 35-year-long
quest to advance peace and global stability. I want to discuss the
Carter Administration's efforts to develop a framework for regional
security in the vital and turbulent Southwest Asian area that encom-
passes the Persian Gulf and the Middle East.
Those efforts are in their early stages. Yet they are part of an
essential and enduring American commitment to promote a climate of
stability in the world within which change can work to productive
instead of destructive ends.
Rapid and unsettling change is one reality of our age. It is
not a condition we can reverse. It can not be explained away by
familiar but simplistic theories that perceive all protest as
Communist inspired or attribute all upheaval to supposed American
weakness or Western disarray.
Political change, by its nature, is diverse in origin and
varied in its practical impact on international relations. The
changes American power and purpose must address include demographic,
economic, social and political ones. They arise, in large part,
from the dramatic awakening of peoples who once were passive subjects
but are now active and restless participants in a political
process that has become global but not yet orderly.
If any single event marks the beginning of this sweeping
process of change, it is the end of World War II. The war destroyed
not only major European powers but the Eurocentric world order
which had provided the framework for both international rivalry
and development. Out of its collapse, the United States emerged
as the predominant world power, but not the only one.
It confronted, then, as it still does, a rival -- the Soviet
Union. And that rival then seemed in a position to gain control
over Europe and Asia whose defenses and economies were in ruins.
It was in that context that the United States undertook the
challenge of containing Soviet power. Soviet pressure on Berlin
aroused American fears of a Communist advance to the Atlantic
Ocean. The Red victory in China at the same period posed the
prospect of Communist domination even over Japan.
Thus, in response to clearly perceived challenges between
1945 and 1955, America undertook the first major phase in its
involvement in the world. We committed ourselves both to restoring
and to securing Western Europe. Out of that engagement came the
North Atlantic Treaty and the Marshall Plan. Together they made
possible the restoration of Europe as a viable force in world
affairs.
STAT
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Beginning at about the same time, but lasting longer, America
launched its second major undertaking: The pursuit of stability
in the Far East. Initiated with the Korean War, that pursuit
also found expression in the mid-Fifties in the U.S.-Japanese
peace treaty and the resulting defense relationship. The effort
to create stability in the Far East, however, was more prolonged,
more complex.
Later, it involved us in the painful, debilitating Vietnam
conflict. Nonetheless, by the late Seventies, with the normali-
zation in American-Chinese relations, it could be said that a
viable system of deterrence, involving a security relationship
with both Japan and South Korea and a closer understanding with
China, emerged; and similarly provided for the deterrence of
Soviet ambitions.
International peace and stability thus came to rest on the
American commitment to the independence and security of two central
strategic zones: Western Europe and the Far East. American
interests were seen to be automatically engaged by threats to
either of these two central strategic zones. American power
was seen ready to meet the threat of either westward or eastward
expansionism.
In part to overcome and to outflank these two strategic zones,
the Soviet Union under Khrushchev and later under Brezhnev launched
a series of maneuvers, primarily in the Third World. The expansion
of Soviet influence into Cuba as well as into certain areas of
Africa expressed this strategy in part, but Soviet gains were
largely peripheral, occasionally reversed, and never sufficient
to threaten either of the two central strategic zones.
Although recognized by some much earlier, a third strategic
zone assumed in recent years vital importance to the United
States and its allies: the region we call Southwest Asia today,
including the Persian Gulf and the Middle East. Western Europe
and the Far East depend on this region for their economic well-
being. Their relationship to it and to its oil resources
increasingly defines it as the third central strategic zone, one
of vital interest to us as well as to our paramount allies.
For a number of years this region was shielded from Soviet
influence by a tier of states, stretching from Turkey across the
Caspian Sea and through Afghanistan, which served as a buffer
protecting the essentially pro-Western Pakistan. Iran was the
pivotal country in the tier. It provided the hinge for a security
system sealing the Persian Gulf off from the Soviet Union.
In the second half of the Seventies, this zone has come
under increasing external threat. It was to some extent outflanked
by the appearance of Soviet military presence in South Yemen and,
by proxy, in Ethiopia. The Taraki coup in Afghanistan in March
1978 opened the door to direct Soviet involvement and then to
the Soviet military occupation of that country in late 1979 and
early 1980.
At the same time, the countries of the region exemplify the
reality of change which I discussed earlier. Those countries
face an increasing threat from within -- the fragility of local
regimes under the pressures of modernization and under the stimulus
of an Islamic renaissance. The fall of the Shah is the most
evident example. The Iran-Iraq war, which started last month, has
further contributed to the possibility of regional turmoil which
could spill over into a number of states on the Persian Gulf
littoral and thereby shut off a fourth of the world's production
of oil. And, of course, in this unstable setting, new openings are
created for Soviet political and military intrusion.
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It was in response to this strategic reality that President
Carter proclaimed as early as January 1980 what has come to be
called the Carter Doctrine: "An attempt by any outside force to
gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an
assault on the vital interests of the United States of America
and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary,
including military force." The net result of this statement was
a new and historically important commitment of the United States,
one which has long-term implications for the decade of 1980.
It reflects the recognition that the central challenge of this
decade is likely to be as massive and enduring as that confronted
by American leadership in the first post-World War II decades.
At that time we had to safeguard and reconstruct Western
Europe while deterring Soviet aggression. Today we have to find
the right mix of military and diplomatic initiatives to secure
a region which is absolutely vital to us, but in which we cannot
mechanically duplicate the lessons derived from the shaping of
the Atlantic Alliance.
We will need to deter Soviet expansionism; we will need to
create a security framework; we will need quietly to help find
solutions for regional disputes; and we will need to develop a
variety of formal and informal relationships in a region sensitive
to any foreign presence, where proud and suspicious nations have
only recently freed themselves from colonial influence.
Accordingly, we cannot build a replica of NATO in the Persian
Gulf region. The political and economic conditions of the region
do not permit it. The values and cultures there would not tolerate
it. The need to foster positive change instead of rebuilding
security inside a familiar pattern makes repetition of old
formulas irrelevant.
Nor can we build a security framework there by ourselves.
Others must help, not only friendly states within the region but
our European and Asian Allies as well. Their vital interests are
even more immediately engaged than ours. We must take the lead,
however, because a potential Soviet threat can only be met effec-
tively if we lead the response.
A security framework for the region cannot be only or primarily
a military structure, although the military component is critical.
It must also represent diplomatic and economic components. Over
the past nine months the Carter Administration has taken a number
of initiatives and steps which lay the foundation for an emerging
structure to shore up both the region's independence and prospects
for peace. It is a beginning, but our progress is encouraging,
and I want to report to you on what has been accomplished.
On the military side, we have proceeded with two major,
complementary efforts.
First -- in order to have the capability to present the
Soviet Union with a credible deterrent and to reassure our Allies
in the area -- we must be able to project U.S. forces into the
region. I emphasize the projection of U.S. forces, because it is
not our intention to station U.S. ground forces there or to build
large U.S. bases. We must, however, be able to come to the aid
of our friends if they are threatened and when they seek our help.
Because doubt has been publicly expressed about the serious-
ness of our efforts in this regard, let me provide some concrete
details. The President has convened the National Security Council
itself several times over the past nine months to pursue this
effort and the Council's Special Coordination Committee, which I
chair, has held 18 sessions to consider our programs and their
progress in developing the concept of the regional security frame-
work and in enhancing our ability to deploy our forces rapidly
if needed.
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To date, we have accomplished the following:
-- A Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force has been established.
Its command is located at MacDill Air Force Base in Florida.
-- Forces have been identified to train for deployment
contingencies. They include two and one-third Army
divisions, a Marine division plus more than four wings
of ground-based fighter aircraft, and three aircraft
carrier battle groups.
-- Seven pre-positioning ships with mechanized equipment,
ammunition, fuel and other supplies have been deployed
in the Indian Ocean. They allow us to put a mechanized
brigade of 12,000 troops on the ground in the region on
very short notice, a few days.
-- Three hundred jet transports and 500 turboprop transports
are available for airlift.
-- The Congress is reviewing an Administration request to
purchase eight fast roll-on, roll-off, freight and
troop carriers which could reach the Suez Canal
from the East Coast in 11-12 days. These ships could
be in use within weeks once they are authorized by the
Congress.
Three exercises of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force
in the United States have been conducted.
Exercise deployments of small parts of the force to the
region are scheduled for this fall.
-- Deployment times have been reduced significantly.
Tactical air forces can be in the region within hours,
a battalion within 48 hours, and a division within
two weeks.
-- Finally, we have made arrangements with four countries
in the region for the use of facilities to support an
American presence.
I believe this list demonstrates that, since last December,
when the President decided to seek facilities in the area, we have indeed
taken a number of important steps to enhance the security of the region.
We have moved, in short, to acquire the ability to project U.S. forces
rapidly if the region is threatened.
At the same time, however, it has to be emphasized again that
the political circumstances of the region are very different from
those of Europe. We must be continually mindful of the national
and political sensitivities of the countries concerned. But
taking these important realities into account, it is evident that
in the last nine months we have made genuine progress in developing
a U.S. force projection capability for the region.
All of this, I hasten to add, is but the beginning. The
region involved is beset by profound conflicts. These conflicts
are mostly indigenous in character, but they can be exploited by
an external adversary to his own ends. We have to be alert to
that reality, and we have to recognize that there will be no quick
or easy fix. It will take many years and a sustained effort,
political as well as military, to create the needed stability
so that southward pushes, threatening to our national security,
are contained. We are engaged in that effort, in all seriousness,
realizing the importance of the stakes involved and realizing
that this is not a matter for partisan politics, but a matter
of genuine national security.
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As a parallel part of our military effort, we have been
willing to assist in improving the defense capabilities of coun-
tries in the region. We continue our long-standing support for
Israel's security. In fact, our total economic and military aid
to Israel in the last four years amounts to almost half of all
U.S. aid to Israel since its creation. Additionally, we have
provided arms to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and North Yemen.
We are providing training to military personnel from several
states in the region. To the extent possible, we prefer to help
states in the region defend themselves. That is their preference
as well, and we encourage it.
Both of these military efforts affect our NATO capabilities.
We have therefore begun working out a formula for a rough division
of labor with our NATO allies to lessen the competition for scarce
military resources.
In the economic component of our security framework, oil is
key. Our policy at home and with our allies has reduced consumption,
slowed the price rise, and built up stocks. That is why, even
with Iran and Iraq out of the production picture, we are confident
that we face no immediate supply crisis.
We have also encouraged the wealthier states in the region to
provide poorer states with both economic and military assistance
to help them resist external efforts at political destabilization.
We have asked our allies in Europe to provide economic assistance
to these same states. Germany, for example, has assumed a signi-
ficant role in providing such help to both Turkey and Pakistan.
Thus energy conservation and enhanced energy production,
economic assistance to regional states by regional states, and
Western economic assistance combine to form a three-point eco-
nomic strategy for the security framework.
The work that has been done this year to develop a credible
structure for regional security in Southwest Asia has an importance
that extends beyond the region. At that level, of course, it
reflects a major American commitment -- one we can expect to
prove as enduring as did those to Europe and to the Far East.
But beyond the region, the pursuit of security remains a
global engagement.
By moving as we have to contain a possible Soviet push into
Southwest Asia, we also position ourselves to work for a more
constructive and positive relationship with the Soviet Union
itself. It was Western, and especially American, resolve in
Europe and in the Far East which built the basis from which
detente began. Similarly, our ability to deter Soviet pressure
against this third area of vital Western interest provides us, as
well, with the foundation for a stable dialogue with Moscow.
We do not seek to rekindle the Cold War by moving the contest
to a new region. We seek a genuine relaxation of tension based
on reciprocity and mutual restraint.
We do not seek an arms race in Southwest Asia any more than
we seek one in the field of strategic arms. To the contrary, in
both cases, our purpose and our goal remain genuine arms control.
The President is determined to pursue ratification of the SALT II
Treaty.
To some extent, indeed, the election campaign has become a
referendum on that policy and on the Administration's firm belief
that strategic arms control serves the country's national security
interests. SALT II, once ratified, provides the groundwork for
the challenging task of further quantitative and qualitative
limitations in strategic weapons -- the agenda for SALT III.
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Our larger purpose, in brief and in conclusion, is to create
a stable framework of deterrence, so that peace can not only be
preserved but can be transformed into active cooperation between
the major powers of the world. Within that framework, we can
accommodate the changes that are inevitable.
We can help guide the process of global change toward
institutional arrangements we can now only dimly perceive and only
imperfectly imagine. We can use the balance of power to help
rectify the imbalances -- of wealth, of technology, of literacy,
of health -- which will otherwise threaten our way of life and
our survival.
But we can only move constructively on that set of challenges
if we move resolutely and effectively to address the challenge
in Southwest Asia. Should we fail there, the balance of power
from which we must build stability could be irretrievably lost.
The dependence of both Western Europe and the Far East on
the Persian Gulf area is such that we cannot afford to fail. The
third central strategic zone is critical to the survival of the
other two and thus to our own ability to preserve global peace.
That's what is at stake. That is why I have taken your time
to explain our efforts at this early stage in their development.
That is why I believe your understanding of them is vital to our
success in this new engagement.
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