AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE OF COMMUNIST CHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001400030020-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 13, 2007
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: March 22, 1965
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2007/02/13: CIA-RDP80B01676R001400030020-4
Approved For Release 2007/02/13: CIA-RDP80B01676R001400030020-4
 Approved For Rase 2007/02/13: CIA-RDP80B01676R01400030020-4
is march 1965
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Discussion with Secretary McNamara and Secretary Vance
concerning Aerial Reconnaissance over. Communist China
1. 1 reported that recent problems with the drones causing the
loss of 3 of them and the MIG 21 attack on the March 14th U-Z mission,
which apparently (though not absolutely confirmed) involved 3 air-to-air
missile firings, led to the conclusion that.,
a. The use of U-2's over Communist China is becoming
increasingly hazardous because of SAMS and MIG 21 attack
techniques;
b. The recent problems with drones may cause an hiatus
in the activity which would necessitate use of U-Z's for South
China coverage of priority targets east of Kunming.
With respect to drones, the case of the troubles has not as
yet been determined but it I. fell ~Ad the
X11
manufacturer that a ChiC ooze jammft of the drone u ance system is
highly unlikely. {In a separate connversatioa onfirmed
this; said 4 or 5 drones were ready; a team was We-T50 to examine
trouble; production of new drosses - I per week.)
2. USIB, in considering **problem on march 17th, reaffirmed
the necessity for continuing aerial reconnaissance of South China.
Secretaries McNamara and Vance concurred in this judgment.
3. Therefore it was decided too continua the use of U-Z's on
priority targets west of Kunming and to extend this coverage to all of
South China if drone operations are temporarily stood down. There
was no disagreement that the need for intelligence outweighed the risk.
It was further agreed that we should proceed immediately
with all preparatory steps necessary to operate the OXCART over
Communist China, flying out of Okinawa. It was agreed that we should
proceed with all construction and related arrangements. However this
decision did not authorize the deployment of the OXCART to Okinawa
nor the decision to fly the OXCART over Communist China. The decision
would authorize all preparatory steps and the expenditure of such funds as
might be involved.
 Approved For Release 2007/02/13: CIA-RDP80B01676R001400030020-4
! S
NOTE: After some discussion it was decided that
Okinawa was preferable to Formosa and no steps are
to be taken in anticipation of deploying the OXCARX to
Formosa unless it is considered advisable to prepare a
runway to provide an alternate emergency landing base.
6. With respect to reliability, I expressed grave concern over
the reliability of the plane, pointing out that at speeds of MA CH 3 - 3.Z
and at 80, 000 feet, we have encountered a series of unanticipated
difficulties and that I did not think that the plane was fully *debugged.
I indicated a number of planes would be ready for operations by
September, one plane might be ready considerably in advance of that
date, but that I would give no positive estimate until I had gone to the
site with a number of experts and reviewed the situation carefully myself.
7. These decisions authorize all arrangements and the expenditure
of funds necessary in connection with anticipated operations of the
OXCART out of Okinawa by either CIA or the Air Force. UDCI should
confer with Secretary Vance or his designee concerning these arrangements.
Planes themselves should not be deployed and the final decision to fly
the planes over Communist China will not be made at this time.
The question of pilot pay should be discussed by DDCI and
Secretary Vance. The question of secrecy of operations should be
thoroughly explored before decision made on the CIA -Air Force problem.
JAM / mib
 Approved For Release 2007/02/13: CIA-RDP80B01676R001400030020-4
Approved For Release 2007/02/13: CIA-RDP80B01676R001400030020-4