THE INTELLIGENCE CONTROVERSY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-01208R000100100082-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 2, 2011
• Sequence Number: 82
• Publication Date: January 1, 1978
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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JANUARY 1978
n a simpler era, intelligence ac-
tivities consisted of the clandes-
tine collection of information about
foreign countries, usually for mili-
?tary purposes, and were considered
a fact of international life. Robert
Benchley could amuse many and
upset few with the observation:
"Every country has spies in every
other country, and every other .
? country knows about them. It is
merely a form of international cour-
lesy, like exchange professors . :
In fact, they give a. rather nice
cosmopolitan air to the streets."
World War Two and the Cold
War drastically altered the in-
telligence profession in two funda-
mental respects. First, there is the
continuing technological revolution
in techniques of intelligence, gen-
erally viewed as a desirable de-
velopment. Thanks to electronic
interceptions of communications
and photographs from satellites, in-
formation once unobtainable by
any means is now routinely made.
available to analysts, and they,
with the indispensable aid of com-
puters, arrive at conclusions with a
degree of accuracy-which not too
many years ago would have been
deemed impossible.
The Central Intelligence Agency
and the Defense Department's in-
telligence components allot the
largest parts of their budgets to"col-
lection by technological means.
The US and the USSR have im-
plicitly sanctioned such activities
to monitor each other's adherence
to agreed arms levels. The SALT I
Agreement specifically provided
that neither country would inter-
fere in the operation of the other's
"national means" for verification.
1. he second change gave the in-
telligence profession a totally
new dimension, and this has not
been so easily accommodated. As
perceptively described some fifteen
years ago by Margret . Boveri,
"What one may call 'classical' es-
pionage was essentially a wartime'
activity which consisted of bringing
home enemy secrets, most often
military ones. Today, in what we
choose to call peacetime, espio-
nage. goes on in every aspect of
life-cultural, political, intellec-
tual, and military-and in the
camps of any and all potential and
actual enemies and even of one's
allies. It has -active aims which
were entirely missing.in classical
espionage, the sowing of confusion
among enemy public opinion and
the' undermining of the - enemy's
way of life."
These "active aims," or covert
operations, have come to include
such actions as influencing elec-
tions in foreign countries, eco-
nomic warfare, coups d'etat, and,
perhaps, assassinations. In the pre-
face to a new book, The In-
telligence Community: History','
Organization, and Issues, the
editor states: "The effectiveness
and morality of US foreign in-
telligence activities has.,.;.. been
the subject of widespread con
troversy, discussion, and 'debate
over the past decade." In an intro-
duction to the same book, Senator
Frank Church (Chairman of the
Senate Select Committee to Study
Governmental Actions with Re-
spect to Intelligence Activities,
which issued its final report in
April 1976) says more specifically,'
that there "has never been any
question about the propriety and
necessity ... of . gathering - and
evaluating foreign intelligence .
nor about the means to acquire
such information ... What has be-.
come contrgversial has to do in-
stead with'the so-called covert op-_^
ONTIN?, I,D
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 erations of the CIA .. .
Thus, the "subject of wide-
spread controversy, discussion,
and debate over- the past decade"
has, for the most part, been one ac-
tivity, covert operations, of one
agency, the CIA. The issue has
gone beyond the question of moral-
ity. It has become clear that no re-
sponsible legislator believes that
the United States, in today's
world, should give up its covert ac-
tion capability any more than it
should undertake 'unilateral disar-
mament. The issue has become
that of control, with the Congress.
determined to assume a far
stronger and more direct regulatory
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fo tithe than exclusively in and Execut Di?
-iverector Lyman :' telligence activities" except with' I Kiktick Ji:
;rpar,r., wrtes "Of all the
presidential approval and. sub- controls and review mechanisms
sequent reporting to appropriate over the intelligence community
,
congressional committees, it effec ' potentially the most powerful is the
tively recognized that the CIA ' Congress . . The issue is not so : .'
exclusively intelligence activities."- : reluctance of the members of Con-
The contradiction between the gress to get into sensitive :.in-
need for secrecy where intelligence telligence 'matters . . ." According
and related activities are concerned to jlit Lli G
ournaseseelb, who
and the congressional supervision spent several years as a Senate aide
.
essential to our democratic system and as a Defense Department offi
has not been reconciled Mord ciai the "f ih
.e an,acts tat many liberals
realize that some contradictions subcommittees because they do not
.
cannot be reconciled, and there- I want to be tagged in the future with'.
fore, have to be accommodated. It having tacitly approved an opera-
is often forgotten that our demo- tion, even if they agreed _to it, or.
c
ritic system not only tolerates because theyt t b fi
, wanoeree to crt-
kit#
areas, among them the ballot, the Revelations which were part of
,
grand 'jury, and doctor-patient, it the fallout from Vietnam and
client relationships...: in may 1976i Senate Resolution
'Jon Intelligence Activities,. was
passed, 72-22, with six not voting.
Senator Church said: -"This is a
time for a. new beginning The
creation of a new permanent in-
telligence oversight committee is.
an. absolutely necessary first step
toard establishing an agreed-upon
Procedure by which problems of
:national importance that are neces-
The very legality of the CIA's
engaging in covert action was
long a point of contention. At the
same time, the inherent contradic-
.'.:tion between the requirements for
secrecy and the nature of congres-
sional supervision remained an ob-
stacle. to the devising of a mech-
anism for congressional supervi-
sion of intelligence activities,' in-
cluding covert operations.
Most frequently cited as CIA's
authority for covert action is Sec-
tion 102(d)(5) of the National Secu-
rity Act of 1947 (which brought the'
CIA into being), which instructs
the agency to "perform such other
duties relating'to.intelligence as the
National . : Security Council may
from time ' to time direct" Also
cited are the "inherent powers" of
the President in foreign affairs and
as
a Commander-in-Chief; and the
Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the
Foreign Assistance .Act of 1974.
Those objecting to citation of the
National Security Act of 1947 insist
that, if it had been the intent of the
Congress to authorize the CIA to
engage in covert activities, it would
have so stated. Debate about the
"inherent powers" of the President
is as old as the presidency. (In-
terestingly, in 1846 the eleventh
president, James Polk, sparked the
first crisis over the use of the
Executive Branch for covert ac-
tivities, when he refused to give the
House Foreign Affairs Committee
' Daniel ' Webster's expenditures
The Hughes-Ryan Amendment
,
`:ironically, was intended and desig-
nated as "Limitations on In-
telligence Activities.". But in for- '
A significant question was 'not
Z Xasked for a long time: Since the
Congress could have established
stronger control over the CIA and
covert action any time it so desired,
.
why had it not done, so 'thirty,
twenty, or even ten years before?
The answer is obvious, if. not reas-
Suring: Until recently, the Con.'
gress has not wished . to assume
such control-and the concomitant
responsibility. .
In May 1976, 'Senator Church
reminded his colleagues that, -less
than ten years after the creation
of the CIA, Senator. Mansfield,
had introduced--unsuccessfully--a
resolution to create a Joint
Con- gressional Committee on In
telligence Activities and that,in the
two decades' following, more than
200 similar 'proposals had been
made, also 'without success. As
Senator Leverett Saltonstall admit-
ted in April 1956: "It is not a'ques-
tion of reluctance on" the part of
CIA officials to speak to- us. In-
stead, it is a question of our reluc_
tance, if you will, to seek informa
tion and knowledge on subjects
which I personally; as a member of
Congress and . a citizen,. would
rather not have . .99
Outside observers arrive at much
the same conclusion, although..ex
pressing themselves more bluntly
..especially outside observers who
have previously been on the inside.
isanly secret in. character can be,
addressed within the constitutional
-11?`?ua acniesinger, Jr., ex-
pressed the concern of many,
,tvhen he wrote: "A joint congres-
sianaI committee could ...help;
but, though such a committee can
and ' should review targets and
11 - priorities, it cannot really oversee
the day-to-day detail of clandestine
operations." He went. on to en-
dorse a proposal made by Franklin
Lindsay, a former high-ranking
CIA official.. In January '1915,
Lindsay suggested that ". , a more
effective way to apply the sort of
mature judgment needed would be
to create a review committee of
men seasoned in foreign affairs
who have reached a career position
where they can put in the substan-
tial time necessary to think through
the risks of covert operations and .
the possibility of accomplishing the-
same ends by overt means. Such a.
5,OkTJ N-i
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.review committee would buttress
and support the ... highest level
policy approving process." - .
There are many sound ideas as to
what the next step should be. All of
them, however, will be of academic
interest only if something positive
and effective is not done, and done
soon, about restoring the damaged
self-respect and shattered morale
of a dedicated group of individuals
who- necessarily work in the
shadows so that their fellow citi-
zens may walk in the light. Colum-
nists Rowland Evans and Michael
Novak have referred to "the be-
leaguered Central Intelligence
Agency,", its. "vulnerability as
Congress's favorite whipping
post," and the fact that "the four-
year victimization of the CIA has
left deep wounds." One retired
CIA officer refers to headquarters
at Langley simply as "a disaster
area."
None of the foregoing is meant to
imply that carver intelligence offi-
cers object to investigations into
past illegalities. They are as in-
terested as anyone-more than
most-in exposure of the tiny
minority which may have commit-
ted assorted excesses. Nor has in-
creased congressional supervision
met with objections within the
CIA. On the contrary, at least four
former Directors of Central
Intelligence-McCone, Helms,
Bush, and Colby-have publicly
stated that this would be welcome.
And David Phillips, President of
the Association of Retired In-
telligence Officers, testified before
the Congress that 98 per cent of
'that organization's membership fa-
vored An [oversight] committee.
As succinctly stated by Leslie
Gelb, just "as it was wrong to pin
American involvement in Vietnam
on the lies of the Pentagon, so it
makes little sense now to blame
CIA for 30 years of covert opera-
tions. In both cases, the causes
were rooted in the national Ameri-
can consensus behind the waging of
the cold war. And in neither case
will the nation profit from the ex-
perience unless this is recognized."
~n the light of the past decade's
traumatic experience, the in-
telligence community would be
well advised to look toward the fu-
ture and make suitable prepara-
tions. Inevitably, the pendulum
will start to swing in the opposite
direction, * and orthodox in-
telligence activities, not covert ac-
tion, will come under critical
scrutiny.. And the target entity will
probably. be some organization
other than the CIA, with the Na-
tional Security Agency a logical
S
choice.
One can almost hear the chair-
man of a House Committee open-
ing a meeting with the words: "We
find ourselves this morning not
going after the CIA ... but being
rather interested in the
"The path ahead will
not be an easy one,
especially for those
senators and .
representatives who
accept service on new,
more directly involved.
congressional
oversight committees
in the area of
intelligence. Ultimately,
their task may well
prove as vital as that of
those whose activities
..they are regulating."
NSA ... because allegations have
been made to the effect that the
NSA . . ." One can almost see a
headline in the newspaper: "Con-
trols on NSA Reported Sought."
'As a matter of fact, the chairman of
a House Committee has already
spoken the above cited words; it
was in 1975, and the congressman
was Otis Pike. And that headline
has appeared in a newspaper-the
New York Times of March 7, 1976.
Until comparatively recently,
the NSA enjoyed special status. So
secret is the agency that, compared
with it, the CIA, in the words of
Time, "is as open as a New Hamp-
shire town meeting." Established
by Executive Order in 1952, the
NSA's existence was not even
acknowledged until 1957. It is the
one federal agency completely
exempt from the Freedom of In-
formation Act. Its annual budget is
estimated as nearly double CIA's.
and its employees around the world
may number more than 'eighty
thousand. The NSA has two pri-
mary missions: protecting US
communications from foreign ex-
ploitation, which is to say, com-
munications security (COMSEC);
and exploiting foreign communica-
tions to provide information to the
United States Government, that is,
signals intelligence (SIGINT).
The NSA has begun to lose its
special status, its troubles probably
beginning in June 1975, when the
Rockefeller Commission's Report
revealed that the NSA has fed
1,100 pages of material on Ameri-
can citizens into the CIA's "Oper-
ation Chaos," which was aimed at
uncovering 'foreign influences
among US radical groups. The fol-
lowing October, Lt. Gen. Lew
Allen became the first NSA direc-
tor to testify in public about the
agency's activities, when he ap-
peared before Church's Senate
committee. He testified that, from
1967 to 1973, the NSA had inter-
cepted international calls or cables
of 5,925 foreign nations-and of
1,680 Americans. S
With due respect to the first and
fourth amendments, it is difficult, if
not impossible, to draw visible
lines in a shadow world. Between
1967 and 1973, for example, -the
NSA had several watch lists, cov-
ering the requirements of several
US agencies. "At the height of the
watch list activity," Gen. Allen
stated, "there were- about 800
names on the [total] watch list, and
about one-third of these 800 were
from the narcotics list. We estimate
that over this six-year period,
about 2,000 reports were issued by
the NSA on international narcotics
trafficking and about 1,900 reports
were issued covering the three
areas of terrorism, Executive pro-
tection, and foreign influence over
US groups." Saying, "I am not the _
proper person to ask concerning
the value of the product from these
four special efforts," Gen. Allen
added, "We are aware that a major
terrorist act in the United States
was prevented." [Emphasis add-
ed.] .
F or the. present, the controversy
has subsided. While it raged, it
wrought considerable havoc, but it
did let some light into unnecessar-
ily dark corners. Now, in its after-
math, determined individuals are
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' applying the lessons' painfully
learned. A streamlining of the in-
telligence community has begun. A
new congressional regulatory, or
oversight, mechanism is taking
shape. Under a new Executive Or-
der, which will have been issued by
the time this reaches' print, it is
likely that the national intelligence
estimate, upon which. the President
relies heavily to make policy deci-
sions, will represent a blend of sev-
eral positions, rather than an exclu-
sive distillate of the CIA's percep-
tions. And the President, in August
1977, gave. the Director of Central
Intelligence the power to decide on
- the final budget for the several in-
telligence agencies. In the past, a
committee made this decision, and
the Director of Central Intelligence
controlled only the CIA budget
(which, it may surprise some, rep-
resents less than fifteen per cent of
the total US intelligence budget).
The path ahead will not be an
easy one, especially for those
'accept service on new, more. di-
rectly involved congressional over-
sight committees in the area of in-
telligence. Ultimately, their task.*
may well prove as vital as that of
those whose activities they are reg-
ulating. Certainly, it will be ? as
thankless, in addition to which the
congressional overseers will not.
enjoy the benefit of anonymity. - ,
. Schooled in compromise as a
way of professional life, .these con-
gressional overseers of intelligence
and covert action will have to ac-
custom themselves to an area
where there are no middle roads,
only decisions which demand to be
made without delay and offer sim-
ply a choice between alternatives
which may differ only in degree of
unpleasantness. If they are fortu-
nate, they. will never find them-
selves in the nightmarish position
of Churchill and his closest-. ad-
visors on November 14, 1940. Be-
-cause the British had acquired -a
device with which they were able
to crack the "unbreakable" Ger-
man code (the "Ultra" secret, only
recently revealed), they had ad-
vance warning of a devastating air
raid to be made on a city. To have
ordered evacuation or taken.other
action to save the city' or its in-
habitants would have risked letting
the Germans know that the Allies
were aware of their most secret or-
ders and plans, often, before the
German field commanders con-
cerned. The decision was to pro-
tect the secret, and Coventry was
demolished, with accompanying at-
rocious civilian casualties...
From time to time, the congres?-
sional intelligence overseers may
have to remind themselves that the
Constitution they have sworn to
uphold consists of more than the
first ten amendments. In the first . .
sentence of the Preamble, for
example, two of the six objectives
of ?'ordain[ing] and establish[ing]
this Constitution of the United
States America" were to "insure
domestic tranquility" and "provide
for the common defense.".. In this
age of intercontinental ballistic
missiles, nuclear weapons, and in-
ternational terrorism, support of
these two objectives involves a
formidable task and an awesome
responsibility. But the task cannot
be shirked. nor the responsibility.
avoided, except at a cost few, if
any, would care to.calculate, much
less advise us to pay. "rte"
S. 1. Nadler, FSIO-retired, Seri ed in
Tientsin, Singapore, `Taipei, Brreno.c
Aires; Ankara, and Washington. Dur-
brg World War Two, he was an Aiinr
Officer, assigned to, the OSS in China.
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