MILITARY THOUGHT: WAYS OF MORE EFFECTIVELY COMBATTING ENEMY MEANS OF NUCLEAR ATTACK IN AN OFFENSIVE OPERATION, BY COLONEL B. STRELCHENKO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A029700550001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 27, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 19, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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Ways of More Effectively Combatting Enemy Means
of Nuclear Attack in an Offensive Operation 50X1-HUM
by
Colonel B. Strelchenko
At the present time nuclear weapons have penetrated
into all types of armed forces and arms of troops. Our
probable enemy has created a broadly ramified and technically
equipped system of using nuclear weapons. Success in com-
batting these weapons cannot be achieved by haphazard fire
effect against one or another objective, but by the system-
atic and well thought-out destruction of the most important `v
centers of the whole system. For this purpose, it is
essential to oppose to the enemy system for the use of
nuclear weapons an efficient organization for combatting Y
his means of nuclear attack;.. this will permit the pre-
empting of his use of nuclear weapons rather than merely
the launching of counterstrikes. The timely destruction
of the enemy's means of nuclear attack will ensure the
maintenance over him of the fire superiority gained before
the offensive, right up to the fulfilment of the tasks
levied on the troops.
The analysis of a number of exercises has shown that
the organization and implementation of combatting the
enemy's means of nuclear attack have still not assumed the V
proper place in the work of commanders and staffs, and that
the enemy's nuclear weapons have not become the main ob-
jective for destruction. Such means as cruise missiles,
aviation, artillery, PVO weapons and tank large units
operating separately from the main forces are hardly used
at all for the destruction of the enemy's nuclear weapons,
and the dispatch of special'reconnaissance-diversionary'
groups for this purpose is of a sporadic nature.
Usually not more than 10 to 15 percent of,-the over-
all number of nuclear weapons are expended for the
destruction of the enemy's means of nuclear attack, while
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up to 65 to 70 percent are expended for the destruction of
tanks and infantry. Moreover, the weapons assigned are
often those in the hands of the batteries on duty (dezhurnyye)
at the particular moment. These areas a rule, of lower yield,
and the result is the non-fulfilment of the task of destroy-
ing the objectives.
-ne page missing?
..carry out with the forces of that arm of troops which
has been ordered to fulfil the given fire mission.
In order to avoid separation of the means of reconnais-
sance from the means of destruction, and also to prevent
division of the process "reconnoiter the objective - destroy
it at once", it is essential to organize and conduct re-,,4
connaissance to the entire depth of the range of fire of
the means of destruction in the possession of the given
troop echelon. Research has shown the following ranges to
be necessary: for a division - about 100 km, for an army-
about 400 to 450 km, for a front - about 1000 km. Together
with this, the main efforts of reconnaissance must be con-
centrated at a depth of about 40 to 50 km from the main
line of resistance, i.e., in the zone where more than 90
percent of all the enemy's means of nuclear attack are
found.
In order to increase the capabilities of reconnaissance A
prior to the adoption of new technical means, it is advisable
to incorporate into the TO&E of a division - a flight (zveno)
of MI-4 helicopters; into the TO&E of the chief of missile
troops and artillery of an army - a squadron of fire-adjust-
ment aircraft with an operating radius of 400 to 500 km;
and into the TO&E of the chief of missile troops and artillery
of a front - one more separate fire-adjustment and reconnais-
sance aviation regiment (OKRAP) with an operating radius of
about 1000 km.
The destruction of the enemy's means of nuclear attack
as the main objective also requires a radical change in
the approach to planning and conducting an operation,
Right from the adoption of the decision for the operation,
the main attention of the troop commander of
a front (or army) must be devoted to the destruction of the
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enemy's means of nuclear attack. The main robl f
-F 111 or
solution here is the correct assignment of a
rge unimissile
large units (or units) and their procedure for the use of
nuclear weapons. These theoretical propositions will not
arouse doubt on the part of anyone, but in actual fact
they have been put into practice quite differently in the
exercises of the past years.
It is believed by some that the commander of a front
(or army)) together with his staff solves all the basic
problems of the combat use of nuclear weapons, including
the determination of the coordinates of the centers of
the bursts, the yield of the nuclear ammunition and the
executor of each nuclear strike. Only the commander of
a front (or army) gives the order (or permission) for the `,/
launching of each nuclear strike against each specific
target.
There is also another opinion according to which the
commander of a front (or army) makes the decision, dis-
tributes the nuclear weapons in accordance with the tasks
of the operation, and also establishes for the subordinate
formations (or large units) the procedure for using these
weapons. The chief of missile troops and artillery of the
front (or army) and the commander of the air army organize
combat reconnaissance (dorazvedka) of the objectives in-
tended for destruction, determine the yield of the nuclear
weapons and designate the executors of the nuclear strikes.
The question arises as to which will contribute more
to the successful combatting of the enemy's means of
nuclear attack - strict centralization of the use of nuclear
weapons or granting a certain amount of independence to
those to whom the executors of nuclear strikes are immediately
subordinate?
Since a basic principle of the use of nuclear weapons
in an operation is their employment en masse, it follows
that the planning of mass (group) nuclear strikes must be
centralized in the hands of the troop commander of a front
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With regard to single nuclear strikes against the
enemy's means of nuclear attack, however, the principle of
such strict centralization is not suitable; it would increase
the time from the moment of discovering a target to the
moment of its destruction by that period required for the
front (or army) commander to reach a decision. Calculations
show that for the destruction of tactical means of nuclear
attack (or an absolute majority of them)a delay in launching
the strike of even five to eight minutes will reduce the
probability of their destruction from 80 percent to 50 per-
cent.
The use by the enemy of nuclear/missile weapons under
conditions where he has gained fire superiority is so serious
in its consequences that we must adopt all measures to prevent
him from seizing this superiority, by the launching of pre-
emptive nuclear strikes by our missile troops against his
means of nuclear attack. One of the measures which will
facilitate this is assigning the rightto launch a single
nuclear strike against the enemy's means of nuclear attack
to the chief of missile troops and artillery of a front (or
army) and to the commander of a division of the first echelon,
with subsequent notification to the troop commander of the
front (or army).
On the decision of the troop commander of a front (or
army), provision must be made for putting a certain number of
nuclear weapons of operational-tactical designation at the
disposal of the chief of missile troops and artillery of the
front (or army), and of tactical designation at the disposal
of the commanders of the divisions of the first echelon.
Such an approach will, in our opinion, increase the
responsibility of the chief of missile troops and artillery
of a front (or army) for the success of the operation (ot
battle), will aid him in developing sound initiative, make
him the principal organizer of combat with the means of
nuclear attack and, most important, will speed up the des-
truction of the enemy's nuclear weapons.
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The question of how many nuclear weapons to allot for
this purpose has great bearing. on the conduct of successful
combat with the enemy's nuclear means. It has already been
stated above that in exercises the greater part of nuclear
weapons has been expended up to the present time on the
destruction of the enemy's troop groupings. This has led
to such paradoxical situations as when even means of nuclear
attack which have been discovered have not been destroyed.
Thus, in one of the exercises a front discovered 28 missile
troop objectives on the enemy side, but inflicted nuclear
strikes on only 5, while at the same time not one discovered
troop concentration failed to be fired on.
The enemy's means of nuclear attack must become the
main objectives of t1ie_:use of nuclear weapons. The expenditure
of nuclear weapons for the destruction of the enemy's means
of nuclear attack will depend in each specific instance on
the situation, and most of all on the availability of nuclear
weapons within a front and the number of the enemy's means of
nuclear attack which have been reconnoitered. As a first
approximation, the calculation of the required number of nu-
clear weapons must be made in accordance with the number of
launchers designated for combat, taking account of their
uninterrupted readiness throughout the entire operation.
Let us examine this problem in more detail.
The necessity for the immediate destruction of the
enemy's discovered means of nuclear attack and the relatively
long time for preparing a missile for launching have fore-
ordained the use of on-duty missile subunits, which will be
at the maximum degree of re.adines.s. If it were possible for
all missile subunits to open fire immediately on receipt
of their mission, then obviously it would not be necessary
to designate on-duty subunits. Consequently, the striving
to fulfill a fire mission in the shortest time has become
the determining factor in t e creation of a -net of on-duty
missile subunits with various ranges of fire.
The number of on-duty missile subunits in a front
depends on the nature, targets and tasks of the impending
operation, the composition of the front missile troops, the
50X1-HUM
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availability of nuclear weapons and the expected quantity of
the enemy's means of nuclear attack. The specific number of
on-duty subunits of operational-tactical missiles is determined
by the decision of the front troop commander, and of subunits
of tactical missiles by the decision of the army commander.
The criterion for this must be security from destruction of
various objectives in any area of the assigned zone of re~-
sponsibility and security of continuity of combat, with
respect to displacement an maneuver in the course of the
operation.
The breadth of the zone of responsibility should be
larger than the front (or army) zone, taking in the zones of
the adjacent units to the left and right by a magnitude equal
to one-half the range of fire of the missile for which the
calculation is being made. Within an assigned zone, with
the goal of guaranteeing the fulfilment of a given fire
mission, the sectors of fire must overlap by a distance
'equal to approximately one-half the range of fire of the
adjacent launchers, thereby achieving double coverage of
each sector of fire.
Let us examine a specific example of these propositions,
Let us suppose that a front, having in the first echelon of
its operational formation three combined-arms armies, is
advancing in a zone of about 500 km. Each army is operating
on an independent axis in a zone of 120 to 150 km. The
decision has been made for a gradual increase in the direction
of the adjacent unit, amounting to 100 km for operational-
tactical missiles and 20 km for tactical missiles. Calcu-
lations show that under these conditions at every given
moment there must be at the peak degree of readiness n the
front no less than three operationa -tactical missiles and
in each army four or five tactical missiles. The front will
have a total of 15 to 18 on-duty launchers.
The question arises as to the reestablishment of on-duty
batteries which have expended their missiles, which is
essential to the maintenance of the continued readiness of
each siting area.
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In our view it is advisable to organize the operations
of the on-duty batteries as follows. In a battalion,one
battery must be at the maximum (15 to 20 minutes) degree of
readiness, the second battery must be at 35 to 40 minute
readiness and the third must be receiving 'a., missile at
the unloading point or completing its maneuver within the
siting area. On receipt of the command to launch a missile,
the commanding officer of the battalion will pass it on to
the on-duty battery which is at the maximum degree of readi-
ness (15 to 20 minutes) and he also gives the order to the
second battery to put itself into 15 to 20 minute readiness.
The third battery, having received a.' missile, assumes 35
to 40 minute readiness, and the second battery, after 15 to
20 minutes, i.e., the time necessary for launching the nu-
clear-missile strike by the first battery, assumes 15 to 20
minute readiness. A battery which has launched a nuclear-
missile strike against a target goes to get another missile.
We have lingered in detail over the problem of re-
organizing the on-duty battery in order to show that in
each siting area,for the one launcher at the maximum degree
of rea ness,there must be no less than two other launchers
at a lesser degree of readiness. It follows from this that
in a front, at each siting area, the number of launchers in-
tended for combatting the enemy's means of nuclear attack
must be three times the number of launchers ready for firing
at any given moment. In our example it should be equal to
45 to 54 launchers.
In order to ensure uninterrupted combat with the enemy's
means of nuclear attack in the course of an operation, it is
essential that the number of launchers in motion be no less
than the number in the forward siting area. Proceeding from
here, the overall number of launchers in a front and of
missiles for them,with nuclear charges, must be doubled, and
in our example would consist of no less than 90 to 108
launchers, of which no less than 18 would be operational-
tactical and 72 to 90 would be tactical.
In order to make possible the allotment of such a
number of launchers for combat with the enemy's means of
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50X1-HUM
nuclear attack, it is necessary to sharply increase their
number within a front, and in connection with this, even to
alter the organizational structure of the missile troops.
The particular complexity and importance of combatting
the enemy's nuclear means require that it be carried out
with a definite system, including missile units (or subunits)
constantly ready for action with nuclear charges of a definite
yield, a reliable system of communications, and the latest
methods of combat reconnaissance 1 ( reconnaissance) (dorazvedka
/azvedka7). All this must be united in the same hands, under
a single command, with sole personal responsibility. The full
scale of such unity can be realized in missile divisions, the
creation of which, it seems to us, is alrea Ty -an urgent ne-
cessity. The organization of missile divisions in a front
and army will sharply increase the effectiveness of combat
with the enemy's means of nuclear attack, facilitate the
introduction of electronic --comput.irig.. machines (EVM) into
missile troop control, reduce the gap in the number of means
of delivering nuclear weapons to the target, which` exists in
our army and in the US Army, and permit the accomplishment of
maneuver by nuclear weapons without maneuver of the launchers.
In order to ensure the destruction of the enemy's means
of nuclear attack which directly influence the conduct of
battle by a motorized rifle (or tank) division, it is desirable
to increase the number of tactical missiles in these divisions
by two or three times, and at the same time to increase their
range of fire to 50 to 60 km.
The fulfilment of a fire mission of destroying the enemy's
means of nuclear attack is possible only when the yields of
the nuclear charges on hand correspond to those required. In
connection with this itis highly advisable to create standard
nuclear ammunition, the use of which in all cases will ensure
destruction of an objective. As shown by calculations such
standard yields are: for tactical missiles - 25 kt,and for
operational-tactical missiles - 100 kt. For special assign-
ments it is necessary to supply the units (or subunits)
designated for combatting the enemy's nuclear means with the
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above-mentioned standard nuclear ammunition from the front
missile-technical battalion (FRTB). The standard yields of
nuclear ammunition will decrease in ratio with improvements
in the missiles, and most of all with the decrease of dispersion
(errors of shot).
Analysis of the status of the enemy's means of nuclear
attack and research into problems of organizing combat with
them permit. the conclusion that it is not advisable to use
only nuclear strikes for the destruction of all of the enemy's
tactical means of nuclear attack. It is essential in com-
batting them to draw on other means as well, and most of all
on tube artillery.
Simultaneous with the assignment to the artillery of a
task of destroying a discovered enemy nuclear target, or
immediately after opening fire on it, it is essential to
begin the task of preparing a nuclear strike by the tactical
missile nearest to the objective. The launching of this
missile will be carried out according to the results of the
artillery fire, which must be controlled.
These are the basic ways of increasing the effectiveness
of the use of missile troops and artillery to combat the
enemy's means of nuclear attack. An important role in this
combat is played by aviation, chemical weapons, PVO troops,
airborne troops and tank large units operating separately
from the main forces. The correct apportionment of tasks
among all these forces and means will greatly enhance the
success of combat against the enemy's means of nuclear
attack. Let us therefore dwell briefly on the planning of
this.
Combat with the enemy's operational-tactical means must
be planned on the scale of a front, and with his tactical
means on the scale of an army. Proceeding from the importance
of combat with the enemy's means of nuclear attack and the
variety of means drawn upon for this, we consider it ad-
visable to work out a separate "Plan for Combat with the
Enemy's Means of Nuclear Attack" both in front and army
headquarters. This plan, which would be one of the basic
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documents in the planning of an operation, would reflect:
--the organization of reconnaissance of the enemy's means
of nuclear attack and the procedure for the use of intelligence
data;
--the basic apportionment of tasks to armies, missile troops,
aviation, PVO troops, airborne troops and other arms,of troops;
--the number of nuclear weapons allotted for combat and
their approximate apportionment to the tasks of the operation;
--the procedure for carrying out combat reconnaissance;
--the tasks of the radio units of special designation;
--the organization of communications with the weapons at
the maximum degree of readiness;
--the procedure for launching single nuclear strikes against
the enemy's means of nuclear attack (if this should be required
by the situation).
A front headquarters must coordinate the problems of
combatting the enemy's means of nuclear attack,.. with the adjacent
fronts and with the missile'large-units of strategic desig-
nation which are accomplishing tasks in the''zbne of the front.
The chief of missile troops and artillery of the front,
the commander of the air army, the chiefs of the operations
and intelligence directorates of the front headquarters
and the chief of the communications troops of the front must
directly participate in the working out of the plan.
On the basis of an extract from the overall plan.,the
staff of the missile troops and artillery of the front works
out the "Plan for the Use of the Front Missile Troops and
Artillery", in which the tasks of the missile troops and
artillery in combatting the enemy's means of nuclear attack
are separately laid out.
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