LOCAL POPULATION INDIFFERENT TO GUERRILLA SUPPRESSION; TIBET TRAINS MEN TO FIGHT COMMUNIST GUERRILLAS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00809A000600310807-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 15, 2011
• Sequence Number: 807
• Publication Date: June 8, 1950
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600310807-1
COUNTRY
SUBJECT
HOW
PUBLISHED
WHERE
PUBLISHED
DATE
PUBLISHED
CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL CONFIBEN
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPORT
INFORMATION FROM
FOREIGN DOCUMENTS OR RADIO BROADCASTS CD NO.
Military - Guerrilla activities
Daily newspapers
Canton; Hong Kong
26 Apr - 15 May 1950
THIS DOCYNINT CONTAIN/ INFORMATION A/IICTIU Till NATIONAL DE-INII
0, THIS ONITIO ITATII WITHIN Till ^IANINI 01 IIPION491 ACT 50
I. S. C.. iI AND )A. M AWINOIO. IT/ TIANINIIIION ON THI IIYILATON
OI ITS COIITINTI IN ANY NANNII TO AN ONAWTHONITIO PINION II PRO'
IIIITIO IT LAW. IVIOOOCTON of THIS TOI% II INOHIIITIO.
DATE OF
INFORMATION 1950
DATE DIST. Jun 1950
NO. OF PAGES 2
SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
LOCAL POPULATION INDIFFERENT TO GUERRILLA SUPPRESSION;
TIBET TRAINS MEN TO FIGHT COMMUNIST GUERRILLAS
OUTLINES REASONS FOR BANDIT-SUPPRESSION FAILURE -- Canton Nan-fang Jih-pao,
26 Apr 50
Kwangsi -- It was expected that the bandit-suppression campaign launched
by our bandit-suppression force between 12 and 29 March 1950 in Ssu-lo Haden
in Kwangsi Province would net at least 100 bandits. However, the force was
able to capture or annihilate only 13 bandits in the five attacks launched against
them during-this period. In three of the five attacks, moreover, our force
found itself attacking bandit hideouts which had already been vacated. The
failure of this force to accomplish its mission was due mainly to the follow-
ing reasons:
1. Lack of cooperation between the force and the local governments.
For the most part, local governments felt that the responsibility of suppressing
the bandits was charged to the bandit-suppression force and that their duty was
only to supply the force with the basic intelligence information on the bandits
in their areas. Lack of a prearranged plan of liaison between the two also con-
tributed greatly to the failure of the campaign. In addition, the fact that the
campaign was launched during the peak of the spring harvest season caused many
farmers to adopt a passive attitude toward it.
2. The force could not place the local armed units under unified command
during the campaign. ,This made it impossible to coordinate attacks against
bandit hideouts. As a result, the bandits generally obtained information that
they were being attacked and fled the area before the force was able to launch
a surprise attack against them.
3. The discipline of the local troops was very poor. Their misbehavior
caused the masses to flee whenever the campaign force approached their villages.
For example,, when an attack was launched against the bandit hideout in Na-t'ao
village, the local troops maliciously killed chickens, ducks, hogs, etc.;. and
robbed the local inhabitants of their personal belongings, thus creating animosity
which spread throughout the area. When the members of the bandit-suppression
force attempted to stop them, the local armed troops refused to heed their advise..
CLASSIFICATION
STATE NAVY, NSRB
ARMY' AIR FBI
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600310807-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600310807-1
CONFIDENTIAL
20,000 MEN TO BE TRAINED IN TIBET -- Houg Kong Shih-pao, 10 May 50
New Delhi, 9 May -- A newspaper in this city has reported that the Tibetan
government is recruiting about 20,000 men to be trained for use against Com-
munist guerrilla activities in Tibet. Another source has revealed that about
8,000 Tibetans are receiving Communist indoctrination in the area neighboring
that controlled by the Panchan Lama.
A member of the diplomatic circle here reported that the Communists will
not attempt to invade Tibet in 1950, as announced by Mao Tse-tung last year,
since the Peiping government is too busy with battles on other fronts. Ob-
servers here believe that the next few months will be limited to Communist
fifth column and other activities to create disorder and confusion among the
one million subjects of the Dalai Lama.
PREDICTS TAIWAN INVASION WITHIN 3 MONTHS -- Hong Kong Shih-pao, 15 May 50
Taihoku, 14 May -- At a press interview given on 14 May, a high-ranking
KMT military spokesman predicted that the Communists will attack Taiwan within
3 months. The Communists, he said, must launch their invasion within this
period or the weather will force them to postpone it until next year. The
postponement of the invasion, he further stated, will bring the following
grave consequences to the Communists:
1. The existence of Taiwan will be not only a constant threat to the
Communists but will also be a very demoralizing factor. It will undoubtedly
abet anti-Communist movements on the mainland which will hamper the establish-
ment of Communist authority. As long as Taiwan remains free from Communist
control, moreover, the poverty stricken masses of China will continue to oppose
the Communist regime.
2. In the bast the Communist generally instituted a land-reform measure
just before launching an all-out offensive to win the support of the masses.
At present, the Communists are attempting to establish peace and order in the
areas south of the Yangtze River. The postponement of the invasion for another
year may find the Communists without the means of winning over the support of
the masses for the operations, since land-reform measures will be completed by
that time.
3. The Communists are now facing economic and financial crises. As a
result, they are in no position to postpone the invasion until next year.
4. If Taiwan is permitted to remain outside its control, the CCP govern-
ment will continue to face difficulties in winning recognition as the de. jure
government of China. Failure to occupy Taiwan will undoubtedly lead to diplo-
matic difficulties with the USSR and other democratic nations.
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CONFIDENTIAL
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600310807-1