DANILOFF FORGOT A REPORTER CAN'T DO HIS COUNTRY A FAVOR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000201640014-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 23, 2012
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: October 12, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

I I I! II .:LILLLLIIII l]L(1I111 I 1I11,IlLILllIIIIVLVLVIIl C Il~IIllLlll_Llli_L1L1 L 111. I .1_ i . L .
Si ,Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/23 CIA-RDP90-00965R000201640014-7
V1 r:? A D WASHINGTON POST
?AB 12 October 1986
5
Country a Favor
Can't Do His
Danioff. Forgot
A Reporter
By Dusko Doderf
THE NICHOLAS DANILOFF case contains an
important but little-noted lesson for the press: in;
a place like Moscow, doing a favor.for the U.S.,,
Embassy can get you in big trouble.
It's clear now that Nick Daniloff wasn't a spy. It is+
equally clear that he was used by the CIA station in.
Moscow, which was seeking to establish contact with a
potential intelligence source, a supposedly dissident
priest named "Father Roman." Like many other Amer-
ican correspondents, Daniloff felt he was doing a helpful
thing by delivering a letter from Father Roman ad-
dressed to the U.S. Embassy and subsequently giving
CIA operatives Father Roman's telephone number.
Daniloff believes now that he made a mistake. He's-
right. He did. A reporter shouldn't get involved-even`
briefly and indirectly, as Daniloff did-in intelligence.
gathering. His mistake was compounded by the CIA's,
clumsy handling of the case, which gave the KGB what;
it regarded as evidence of Daniloffa involvement
American espionage.
In a place like Moscow, an American reporter must
carry a white flag, making it abundantly clear that he
has nothing to do with any government; including his
own. As a practical matter, Moscow correspondents
must do so for their own protection and the protection
of their Soviet friends and contacts. They must also
uphold the professional standards that make the Amer
ican press so different from the Kremlin's government
controlled media.
Daniloff is not the first American correspondent to;
make such a mistake. Having served as a correspondent;
in Moscow for more than seven of the past 18 years; la
know several colleague who have made similar this
takes. I made such mistakes myself.
It was one such mistake that brought me into my first-
serious encounter with the KGB.'
In August 1983 I wrote a story about a secret- study.
of Soviet economic problems. The Novosibirsk paper,
as the document came to be known, was printed in sev-
enty numbered copies. I had obtained a copy of it in
April 1983 from an aide to one of the leading Kremlin
personalities. It revealed the tone and substance of the
internal debates on economic reforms.
The paper was written by a yana -Lasiavsicaya, a
member of the Academy of Sciences and a prominent
member of the Novosibirsk group of economic reform-
ers. This and other papers contending that the existing
system itself was the main reason for declining Soviet
economic performance were distributed to the offices
of top officials.
My story created a minor stir in the West. Almost-
instantly I had the feeling that the police were closing in
on me. I sensed it everywhere, inside our compound
and driving around Moscow. My telephones began to
act up. The police guard inside our compound rushed to
his booth when he saw me coming out 'of my office.
I had anticipated all this and had kept the document
hidden for four months before writing the story because
I knew that would make it harder for the KGB to dis-
cover my source. For the same reason, I had not men-
tioned in my story the author of the document or the
fact that it came from the Novosibirsk branch of the
Academy of Sciences.
Looking back, I now feel that I made one mistake,
which may have raised the KGB's suspicions. Back in-
April, when I first obtained the dock=
ument, I had shown it to a few trusted
colleagues to get their views.
My mistake, I think, was that I had
also given, a copy to a friend at the
U.S. Embassy. I had not thought
through the consequences of such a
move. Looking back, I must have felt
that it was important that somebody
in the American government be
aware of its cow -in order to as-
sess the changes contemplated by the
new Soviet Leadership.
It never occurred to me at that
point that I was doing something im-
proper and potentially self-
incriminating, that I was supplying
information to the U.S government
before. I had written a story for my
newspaper. All too`frequently in Mos-
cow we tended to view the world in
simple terms=-us and them-rand the
instinct to go with our pack was occa-
sionally . so strong that it overruled
judgment and experience.
The Soviets may have gotten sus-
picious on August 3, 1983. With my
story causing something of a one-day
sensation, I was. being besieged by
phone calls and visits from foreign
diplomats and correspondents who
wanted to know more about my
scoop. The only people who failed to
phone and seek additional details were
the American diplomats at the Mos-
cow embassy.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/23: CIA-RDP90-00965R000201640014-7
 i ~1 _ _ III~'I I I ~_ II III III 111 IILI-Ldl-I 1.11111 II-IJ EJ 111. .1 1 I I
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/23: CIA-RDP90-00965R000201640014-7
In the claustrophobic world of Mos-
cow, where we were under fairly
close police acratiny most of the time,
the conspicuous lack of American in-
terest may inadvertantly, have sig-
nalled the KGB that the U.S. Embassy
already had this particular document
This, in turn, meant either that I had
already given it to the embassy or that
the embassy had leaked it to me in
order to embarrass the Soviet Union.
In either case, my role seemed du-
bious. I decided that day never again
to given any confidential information
to U.S. officials in Moscow.
The KGB pressure was palpable. A
Soviet journalist friend hinted to me
over drinks at the Press Club that I
was suspected of having espionage
connections-to which I gave the
standard reply, a series of four-letter
words.
I had been the recipient of several
leaks before August 1983--one or
two of those containing
embarrassing information.
incident with the Novosibirslf-
created. more. problems for me thantlj
airy: other action, perhaps because it
reinforced Soviet suspicions that
American journalists would share
valuable information with the U.S.
embassy.
That, it seems to me, was Daniloffs
problem too. Except that his actions
seem. to have assumed even. more
sinister proportions in the minds- of
KGB-eounter4nbdfigence officaab,
He had arrived ht=.t as
U.S.Ngtae & World Report
correspondent in 1981. By late
1984, Daniloff explained to me this
week, he' became aware of- polite e&
forts to entrap him.
In December 1984, Danded, AVae
approched by a Russian Ortiiodo '
priest, Father Roman,,
wonderful ? fellow who was
narily pleasant." He was, Dare to said, '
the type of "guy who would be inter-
esting to get to know."
Father Roman had phoned Danilaff,
then stopped by his office, something
that was possible since Danilof's office
was located in a building that was not
guarded by police, as are most other
foreigners' compounds in Moscow.
Daniloff suggested they take a walk and
they walked for about one hour. Father
Roman told Daniloff that he bad served
a term in a labor camp on a trumped-up
charge of stealing icons.
Diniloff took Father Roman's phone
number. There was one thing that
made Daniloff wonder about his new
contact. He asked him how he had ob-
tained the number for the U.S. News &
World Report bureau in Moscow, a
reasonable question since there is no
telephone book in the Soviet capital.
Father Roman's answer was curious,
although not entirely implausible, Darn-
iloff recalled. He said'that he had a
friend vdw had a friend that worked as
a sec reury in the press department of
A mForeign Mmistry
onth later, Davidoff said, he re-
ceived a call from Father Roman, who
informed him that he would send Dan-
doff "some material about young people.
and the Russian Orthodox Church."
The next day, Jan. 22, 1985, Daniloff
found a letter addressed to him in his
mailbox. When he opened it, he found
inside anotet guvelope addressed to
U.S. Ambajisdp ,kttbir. Nodman.
Daniloff took the'letter to the U.S.
y. It contained yet another in-
k, 'the CIA director. When it was
umied a' the embassy, Daniloff said, it
a , that the contents "contained
ii rination of interest to the CIA" The
ViOc- was' handwritten- naniloff said
could not read the handwriting."
The Pi's c
later Dacvloff was called to DuAo ey, orrrespondent in Moscow
the embassy by a senior political officer from 19141 to 1985, is the author of "Shadows and
and ,100 to the "glass house," as the Whispers " to be pubr!ssbed this fahi
secure room designed to thwart elec-
tronic'surveillance is called. They were
joined there by another diplomat who
Daniloff quickly understood to be the
CV,3tat;ivn chief, He was asked details
about Fa>flier Roman The only thing
D` `c9lfdtt'previde; he said, was the
pia number.
A few6 later a curious thing
happened. State Department analysts
had reached the conclusion that Father
Roman was a bogus priest and in effect
a KGB plant. The CIA, however, con-
Untied to maintain active interest in
Father Roman When Davidoff was
called again to the embassy and taken
to the "glass horse," he was advised by
a U.S diplomat friend that the State
Department believed the contact with
the priest was a KGB trap. "My advice
to you is to be very careful," the dip.
lomat said. After that warning, Daniloff
completely disassociated hi nse;If from
the Father Roman case.
Why did Daniloff provide Father Ro-
m
the an's phone number to the CIA' With
d
journalist~ ism that a Pm*m when he ground
helps intelligence operas
make contact with a potential intelli-
gence source. Yet the request made in
the "glass house" seemed harmless and
inconsequential Danim "How could I say no, don't'
give you the phone number?"
What Daniloff did not expect was
that the CIA would be so sloppy, that
his role in the affair would be men-
tioned in two comrmnii a CIA
~ priest, and hm with the
phone call. was arrested in Moscow Last
Aug 30, Deam1og was confronted* his
KGB lnterroWor with a letter fns n a
CIA af5oer to the. bogus prie*jntro-
ducing himself as a "fiiend of NiLelai."
Undoubtedy, this was a blow to
Danilaff's confidence. Inside the Lefor-
tovo. prison, Danitoff said, he adopted
the position of "minimal cooperation"
with the KGB. He signed the protocols
of interrogation, but registered his dis-
sent. And he regretted his original de-
cision to deliver the letter to Hartman.
"If I knew then what I know now,"
said Daniloff,'"I would have burned that
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/23: CIA-RDP90-00965R000201640014-7