BRADLEY ON CONTRA-AID

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000100710002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 28, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 2, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/28: CIA-RDP90-00552R000100710002-2
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IINF sE 114 .a
Bradley on Contra-Aid
BALTIMORE SUN
2 April 1986
Senator Bill Bradley, D-N.J., was the only East-Coast liberal Demo-
crat to support President Reagan's request for $100 million to aid
"contra" guerrillas fighting the Nicaraguan government. His explana-
tion of his vote is excerptedfrom the March 27 Congressional Record.
MR. PRESIDENT, I am going to
vote for military aid to the
"contras," though I will do
so with misgivings and reservations.
I have opposed military assist-
ance in the past. I did so because I
believed - and still believe - that
the best hope for peace and democ-
racy in Central America is construc-
tive collaboration with our Latin
neighbors to contain threats to our
collective security Interests there.
Instead of collaborating in a part-
nership to enhance our collective se-
curity, the administration has alien-
ated and alarmed many of the very
nations on whose active, sustained
support the region's stability ulti-
mately depends. In particular by
slighting the Contadora process, the
administration has undermined the
mechanism these countries set up to
contain Nicaragua's territorial ambi-
tions by political rather than mill-
tery means.
In the final analysis, then, the
threat to the region's security, and
ultimately to ourselves, is greater to-
day than it was when Ronald
Reagan took office.
Unfortunately, enlisting key Lat-
in American states, especially Mexi-
co, in support of democratic revolu-
tion in Nicaragua would have
required a more generous vision and
a more sophisticated approach to po-
litical and economic leadership than
this administration was apparently
capable of. For the United States to
be taken as seriously interested in
the region's future - in democracy
and partnership, not just sporadic
adventurism to impress domestic
audiences - the Amencan govern-
ment needed to do much more to
help the area develop and grow.
Nowhere is this more true than in
Mexico. If the administration's real
fear Is that Nicaragua will engulf
Central America and unleash a com-
munist, or at least anti-American
revolution in Mexico, the President
has done little to avert it and much
to promote it. Our economic policies
have weakened Mexico, not
strengthened it. Mexico's economy
has been badly mismanaged, there
is no doubt about that. But the Unit-
ed States, with the IMF, decided aus-
terity was the answer to Mexico's
problems, especially its huge foreign
debt burden. The Mexicans were
supposed to run their economy
through a wringer.
United States economic policies
have weakened Mexico's political
spine. And they continue to under-
mine other fragile democracies in
Latin America. If we want these
countries' cooperationn on regional
s? urity matters. , , I believe we do,
we had better rethink our debt policy
- quickly. Not austerity, but
growth. Not unilateralism, but part-
nership. Not authoritarian military
regimes, but democracy. Not despair,
but hope. This is what America
must hold out to our Latin neighbors
if we are serious about converting
them to our causes.
But here we are. The administra-
tion's failed policies have alienated
potential allies, facilitated consolida-
tion of the Sandinista regime, and
may have precipitated the outbreak
of a regional war. Indeed, even as we
debated this question, fighting
[broke out] between the "contras"
and the Sandinista forces within
Honduras after a Sandinista inva-
sion.
Given these circumstances, we
face a genuine dilemma. We know
the Sanidinistas will try and destabi-
lize fledgling democracies in Central
America. We are all aware they have
sent weapons through Honduras to
the insurgents in El Salvador. And
while I do not believe the Sandinis-
tas are a threat to our borders, they
do pose a threat to their democratic
neighbors. It is in our interest to help
these democracies, politically and
economically. But they need time to
grow and prosper and the best hope
for buying them that time is to sup-
port the "contra" opposition.
I believe the Nicaraguan people
deserve a chance at democracy.
That chance will be denied them if
the Sandinistas are allowed to con-
solidate their totalitarian regime. By
aiding the "contras," we are putting
pressure on the Sandinistas to mod-
erate their repressive system and
keep some pluralism alive.
In the final analysis, the Presi-
dent has left us little choice but to
back the "contras." Once the Sandi!
nistas have quashed the domestic
opposition, what is to stop them
from subverting their neighbors or
bringing in Soviet Mig's and
submarines as Cuba has done for
years? The only thing that could
stop that is American force. But be-
fore I have to face a vote to send
American boys to fight In the jungles
of Nicaragua, I need to know I did
everything possible to avoid that out-
come.
But in voting for this $100 mil-
lion, I am not signing a blank check.
I will need to see that the "contras"
are promoting values Americans be-
lieve in - democracy, human
rights, free markets. I will also need
to see that the Nicaraguan people
support the "contras" and believe
they are committed to, and capable
of, producing democracy....
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/28: CIA-RDP90-00552R000100710002-2