DDI RESERVATIONS TO DRAFT REVISION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 10501--NSSM 113

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83-01022R000100040033-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 16, 2000
• Sequence Number: 33
• Publication Date: January 19, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved 2R000100040033-4
19 January 1972
DDI Reservations to Draft Revision of Executive Order 10501--
NSSM 113
I concur in the proposed memorandum to the NSC Staff
especially the changes recommended in paragraphs lb and ic..
My reservations concern how we implement specific portions
of the proposed Executive Order. Strict compliance with certain
procedures in this Executive Order concerning accountability for
classified materials would increase the volume of paper work in
this Agency enormously. This in turn would delay the processing
of classified materials and the production of finished intelligence
and would require a very large increase in CIA's clerical staff,
especially in those components responsible for the receipt,
dissemination, storage and retrieval of documents.
After reviewing the proposed Order in light of these difficulties,
I believe there are three possible courses of action:
1. We could comply with these procedures with the
inherent delays and the requirement for increased
clerical manpower.
2. We could seek exemptions from several provisions
of the Order, particularly those dealing with the
accountability, logging, and inventory of classified
materials.
3. We could concur and agree that we would try to
comply with the spirit of these sections of the
Order but that the Director would authorize the
Director of Security to permit continuation of
current procedures throughout the Agency with
the understanding that those units concerned with
the processing of classified materials would
attempt to develop economical procedures that
would bring practices closer to the letter of
the Order. Nevertheless, the Director and
Director of Security should recognize that this
course of action would make us vulnerable to a
charge of noncompliance if our procedures were
to be examined b those bent upon a r ct
Approved Fc ,.g Pat?Q'~g4/,~5,~ jqWRDP83-O'~022R000100040033-4
 Deputy Director for Intelligence
Approved For Release 2001/04/05: CIA-RDP83-01022R000100040033-4
Approved For Rase.20Ql./Q4105-:_..CIA-R:DP83-0i&22ROO0100040033-4
It is my opinion that Option 1 is out of the question because
of operational needs as well as manpower and budgetary resources
required. Option 2 would probably not be acceptable to the
Administration because it would appear to undermine the intended
impact of the Order. On this basis, I propose that CIA concur
with the understanding that we will be able to implement the
Order along the lines of Option 3.