CODEL WILSON: BRIEFING ON THE MILITARY SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00135R000500980014-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 7, 2010
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: August 21, 1983
• Content Type: CABLE

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OEXA/LLD
INCOMING
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TOR: 211452Z AUG 83
RR RUEAIIB
ZNY CCCCC ZOC STATE ZZH.
STU9701
RR RUEHC
DE RUESMG #3626/01 2311645
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 191547Z AUG 83
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7643
INFO RUEHGT/AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA 7787
RUEHSJ/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE 7373
RUEHSN/AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR 8008
RUEHTG/AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA 7766
RUEOEHA/USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PN
BT
C 0 N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 3626
EO 12356: DECL: 8-18-89
TAGS: OVIP MOPS NU HU ES
SUBJECT: CODEL WILSON: BRIEFING ON THE MILITARY SITUATION
2. SUMMARY: SENATOR WILSON WAS BRIEFED BY COMANDANTE
ANTENOR ROSALES ON THE MILITARY SITUATION CONFRONTING NICARAGUA.
ACCORDING TO ROSALES, THE COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY
FORCES DO NOT REPRESENT A THREAT TO THE REVOLUTION,
AND THE GRN COULD CONTINUE TO DEAL WITH THEM, THOUGH
AT HIGH COST. ROSALES SAID THAT THE GRN HAD THE ABILITY
TO ARM 50,000 MEN, AND PLANNED TO BUILD ITS DEFENSIVE
ARMY TO THAT NUMBER. HE STATED THAT THE MILITARY
CONSCRIPTION ACT WAS FOR THE PURPOSE OF GETTING EVERYONE
INTO THE MILITIA,AND THAT ONLY 200 CUBAN MILITARY
ADVISORS WERE IN THE COUNTRY.THE INSURGENCY IN EL SALVADOR
WAS IN NO WAY DIRECTED FROM NICARAGUA, HE ASSERTED,
ALTHOUGH THE GRN ACKNOWLEDGED ITS SOLIDARITY WITH THE
SALVADORAN REVOLUTIONARIES. END SUMMARY.
3. SENATOR PETE WILSON AND AMBASSADOR OUAINTON
WERE BRIEFED AUGUST 11 BY NICARAGUAN ARMY CHIEF OF
OPERATIONS, COMANDANTE ANTENOR ROSALES, ABOUT THE
CURRENT MILITARY SITUATION IN NICARAGUA. ROSALES
PROVIDED THE SENATOR WITH A MAP UPON WHICH HAD BEEN
OUTLINED THE AREAS OF COMBAT OPERATIONS OF
THE COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY FORCES. THE MAJOR REAS
WERE ALONG THE NORTHERN BORDER, ALONG THE
SOUTHERN BORDER, SCATTTERED ON THE EAST COAST, AND IN
THE INTERIOR THROUH JINOTEGA TO THE MATAGALPA REGION.
THE MAP ALSO SHOWED WHERE CONTRA BASES WERE SAID TO BE
IN HONDURAS AND IN COSTA RICA.
4. ROSALES REPORTED THAT THE CONTRAS USED HIT AND RUN
TACTICS AGAINST THE NICARAGUAN FORCES, BUT THAT, THEY
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DID NOT REPRESENT A DANGER TO THE REVOLUTION NOTWITH-
STANDING THEIR IMPORVED ARMAMENTS, FOREIGN AID,
AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT. HE SAID THAT UNFORTUNATELY
THE NICARAGUANS WERE FORCED TO DIVERT RESOURCES FROM
HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND OTHER AREAS TO PROVIDE FOR
DEFENSE.
5. ROSALES SPOKE BRIEFLY ON CONTRA CAPABILITIES. HE
SAID THAT THE CONTRAS HAD MILITARY EXPERIENCE. THEY
WERE WELL ARMED AND TRAINED, HAD A COHERENT IDEOLOGY
(ANTI-COMMUNISM) AND A SANCTUARY IN HONDURAS FROM WHICH
TO OPERATE. ALTHOUGH THEIR MORALE WAS GOOD THEY HAD
SUFFERED MANY LOSSES AND WERE FATIGUED. HE CLAIMED
THAT THEIR MAJOR PROBLEM WAS ONE OF LOGISTICS AS THE
TERRAIN MADE IT DIFFICULT TO RESUPPLY THEIR AREAS OF
OPERATION. ROSALES REITERATED THAT THE
CONTRAS WERE NOT A THREAT, AS EVIDENCED BY THE FACT
THAT THEY HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO CONTROL ONE BIT OF
TERRAIN, OR TAKE AND HOLD A STRETCH OF ROAD FOR MORE
THAN SIX HOURS. ON THE OTHER HAND, ROSALES SAID THAT
BECAUSE OF THE ROUGH TERRAIN AND THEIR SANCTUARY
IT WAS VERY DIFFICULT TO ANNIHILATE THOSE FORCES.
6. DISCUSSING FOREIGN MILITARY AID TO NICARAGUA AND
THE GRN' S ABILITY TO DEAL WITH THE CONTRAS, ROSALES
SAID THAT THE SANDINISTA MILITARY WAS IN NEED OF MORE
HELICOPTERS, BECAUSE THE FEW.MI-8'S AND ALLOUETTES
THEY HAD WERE NOT ENOUGH TO FIGHT THAT TYPE OF BATTLE.
ROSALES CLAIMED THAT THE ARMY HAD U.S., FRENCH, AND SOVIET
HELICOPTERS AND SOME FOREIGN TECHNICIANS, AND
WAS VERY FIRM IN STATING THAT THERE WERE ONLY 200
CUBAN MILITARY ADVISORS.
7 ROSALES CLAIMED THAT THERE WAS A GREAT DIFFERENCE
BETWEEN THE MILITARY SITUATION OF NICARAGUA AND
EL SALVADOR, WHERE THE ARMY HAD A STRONG REAR ECHELON
OF TROOPS, AND WHERE THE INSURGENTS OPERATED
COMPLETELY WITHIN EL SALVADOR'S BORDERS. THERE, HE SAID,
THE ARMY WAS CONDUCTING THE WAR, WHEREAS IN NICARAGUA
THE GOVERNMENT USED MILITIAS AND RESERVES TO DO THE
FIGHTING. THE COMANDANTE SAID THAT THOSE GROUPS HAD
BEEN THE ONES TO CARRY MOST OF THE WEIGHT OF THE WAR,
AND THAT THE RATIONALE FOR THIS WAS TWOFOLD: FIRST,
BECAUSE MILITIAS AND RESERVES WERE ORGANIZED IN A
TERRITORIAL MANNER, THUS THEY COULD OPERATE WHERE THEY
LIVED; AND SECOND, THE REGULAR FORCES OF THE
ARMY WERE BEING USED TO DEFEND MAJOR STRATEGIC AND
POPULATED AREAS SUCH AS MANAGUA.
ED 12356: DECL: 8-18-89
TAGS: OVIP MOPS NU HU ES
SUBJECT: CODEL WILSON: BRIEFING ON THE MILITARY SITUATION
8. ACCORDING TO ROSALES, THE PATRIOTIC MILITARY SERVICE
LAW CONSISTED OF TWO PHAES: REGISTRATION AND
CONSCRIPTION. IT WOULD PROVIDE THE GRN WITH THE
ABILITY TO ORGANIZE AND PREPARE THE PEOPLE FOR ENTRY
INTO THE ARMY. THE MILITIA WOULD ALWAYS HAVE TO BE
10 TO 20 TIMES AS LARGE AS THE REGULARS IN ORDER TO
DEFEND THE COUNTRY. THE PROPOSED LAW MEANT THAT ALL
NICARAGUANS WOULD BE OBLIGED TO DEFEND THE FATHERLAND.
IN ITS IMPLEMENTATION, ROSALES SAID THAT NICARAGUA
WOULD THEN HAVE THE CAPACITY TO DEFEND AND RESIST ATTACK
FROM ANY COUNTRY. ROSALES STATED THAT THERE WAS NO PLAN
TO BUILD AN OFFENSIVE ARMY BECAUSE THERE WERE NOT ENOUGH
RESOURCES TO CONSTRUCT IT, AND BECAUSE AN ARMY IN AND
OF ITSELF WOULD NEVER BE ABLE TO DEFEND THE REVOLUTION.
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JUST CAUSE, AND NICARAGUA WOULD NOT BREAK RELATIONS
WITH THEM. HOWEVER, THERE SHOULD BE NEGOTIATIONS FOR
A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO AVOID A DIRECT MILITARY CON-
FRONTATION. HE SAID THAT THE FMLN GUERRILLAS WERE NOT
DIRECTED FROM NICARAGUA, AS COMMANDERS HAD TO BE
CLOSE TO THE BATTLE FRONT. WHILE THE CHARGE HAD BEEN
MADE, THERE HAD NEVER BEEN ANY PROOF OF IT'OR OF THE
ALLEGED ARMS TRAFFIC TO EL SALVADOR.
11. THE ARMY'S PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER, SUB-COMMANDANTE
SANCHEZ (WHO ALSO ATTENDED THE MEETING), ADDED THAT THE
CONTRAS WERE A SPEARHEAD FOR A WAR WHICH NICARAGUA
WAS EXPECTING AND PREPARING FOR. HE INSISTED THAT THE
NICARAGUAN ARMY WAS ONLY CAPABLE OF RESISTING COMPARABLE
FORCES IN THE AREA, AND THAT THE ARMY WAS CONVINCED
THAT IT DID NOT NEED CUBAN ASSISTANCE TO CONFRONT ANY
OTHER COUNTRY.
12. COMMENT: ROSALES WAS ANXIOUS TO CAST THE
NICARAGUAN ARMY AS SOLELY DEFENSIVE IN NATURE, AND TO
SHOW THAT THE CONTRAS WERE NOT A MILITARY THREAT TO
THE GRN'S POWER. AS A SIGN OF HIS GOOD WILL TO THE
SENATOR, ROSALES GAVE HIM THE MILITARY BRIEFING MAP
ANNOTATED WHERE THE CONTRA OPERATIONS WERE SAID TO BE
TAKING PLACE. OF SPECIAL NOTE WAS HIS COMMENT ON
THE TOTAL PARTICIPATION OF THE PEOPLE IN THE ARMY WHICH
ONCE AGAIN DEMONSTRATED THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE FSLN
SEES THE ARMY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POPULAR MOBILIZATION
AND INDOCTRINATION. END COMMENT.
OUAINTON
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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