MEETING ON SOUTHEAST ASIA, 1100 HOURS, 28 NOVEMBER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001400020001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 4, 2007
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 28, 1964
• Content Type: MFR

Approved For Release 2007/05/06: CIA-RDP80B01676R001400020001-6
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N Review Completed.
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f FOR T18 REC
SUBJECT: -Meeting on Southeast Asia, 1100 hours, 28 November
General. Carter represented Mr. McCone.
I. All Principals were present except Mr. Bail and Mr. McCone.
2. Prior to the meeting, General 'Wheeler pointed out that the
other words, we must assiduously avoid any press contacts.
to talk to the Press in any way nor to give any backgrounders. In
should be taken out first prior to any commencement. of a long-range
program.. Likewise, Secretary Rusk pointed out that the Pres*nt
was quite disturbed about what appeared to be continuing leaks of
policy discussions. Secretary Rusk enjoined everyone present not
Joint Chiefs of Staff felt strongly as a body that the MSG's and the PGt
3. Papers were handed out as follows:
Tab A - Subject: "Scenario for bnmediate Action Program.17
(Prepared by Bundy Working Group.)
Tab B - "Draft Statement to GVN. It (Prepared by Gener
Taylor)
Tab C - "Military Annex. it (Prepared by Mr. McNaughton
Tab D D. List of Questions (Prepared by General Taylor)
4. Secretary Rusk pointed out that although planners and operators
maximum flexibility on a decision-by-decision basis as events occurred.
be careful not to back the President into any such corner and to give him
wanted decisions to cover periods several months in advance, we must
5. Mac Bundy pointed out this would be difficult "hut we must be sure
that the President was alerted to all problems that he would have to face
up to whether or not they might occur in the light Of subsequent events.
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6. General Taylor pointed out that be was much encouraged over
events in the past 24 hours as indicative that the Huong government
seemed to be getting its feet on the ground. He stated-that his proposed
statement to the GYN would be made initially or, a Top Secret basis and
only to Huong Suu, Vien, and Khahn. Bundy said Taylor's statement
should be so phrased that the GYN would know that it they did certain
things then we would follow by doing certain things, and that the opt
was ours,. not theirs. Likewise, we should put a time, schedule on
accomplishment of those things we wanted GYN to dc,
. Rusk was hesitant about any calling of a leadership meeting
because of the high-noise level it would raise prior to the convening
of Congress and would create many problems. He stated that the
President -$had ruled against General Taylor seeing any of the congress-
sional'leadership (except Senator Humphrey) until after the President
had made his decisions, probably next week.
8. McNamaraa, said we must take care of the critical problem ol
how we surface the new developments on infiltration since this could
a political bomb shell. `heeler pointed out that he understood'
P hound was coming to this country before too long and hoped to make
speech before the UN on infiltration.
9. Rusk said that the UN would probably meet long enough to
appoint a committee to study Article 19 and then to report to the
Assembly, and therefore Assembly activities would probably be pushed
over into March, and there r. sight not even be an Assembly if the Article
19 matter is not cleared up.
10. Mac Buuidy said we must make it clear to the President
exactly what our plans are and spell out clearly what: the first month' a
activities would be under these plans. He stated that the President
had discussed the various options and was generally familiar with them.
'W'heeler insisted that the President be informed that the SCS opted for
much faster, harder action and unanimously so, but they would, of
course., do whatever the President decided.
U. There was then discussion of greater participation by "other
flags. '' specifically on the part of the Philippines, and the Australians,
and possibly New Zealand, with more support from Thailand. These
would be in the form of combat advisors or possibly even small combat
units. McNamara said he wanted no Koreans and no Nationalist Chinese
and that what he is really looking for is symbolic support, particularly
r circumstances where some of these third country nationali
ended and killed as is happening to the United States every day.
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 Mclllama:ra said he told Hasluck that the united States had no intention
of going it alone in Southeast Asia and if the Australians did not help
more they might find us withdrawing.
a2. There was a general discussion of the need i.or constructing
t 4%-_ --
permanent jet air f{eIds b
u
.it./4 YAZlG.iL. Armu~ and taxi making further studies.
are
"aylor sai?i h~~ w
l
d
oo
prepare an
le to his paper indicating e
xpiicj ' in detail just what we epected
the C to do and the timetable
mentioned s on which it should, be cane. He
$
u
h
c
t
rng$ as. increases in armed forces, increased
dior~-latsc re
?
p-
eseYrtauves overseas, improved police. forces,
imDlx cation of
d
i
a
aa
nistraion, removal of incompetents, etc., etc.
13. There was involved and lengthy discussion of the stoppage of flow Of dependents as well as the removal of dependents presently
in, VN. The various pros and cons were thrown back and forth and
it was decided that this .s a major policy. decision which they were
not yet prepared to consider.
14. A discussion then ensued of Tab C. Option C (Graduated
pressure) of the ilits
i. A--
.
y ex. McNamara stated that tk
four items would probably take lac A i
n
yN a txr g the first 3v days. He
also stated that the Situation ins
-ocxid
stable in its oresant not,- in his opinion, remain
r.,r-ris~~t.,.., __ ~,. _.a, _
..... gaL ve?rer or Would
get worse, but we would not have the status quo. He also stated that
if the ESOTt patrols were' resumed (and there was much discussion
of this) and they were attacked by air, he would propose tthe ake fields. General Taylor stated that there were threeaso s
for the fEs OTO patrols, i. e., intelligence collection, assertion of
our marittme
&-",w# and to provoke incidents. We must weigh
advantages and timing in the I-),* f it
IV a three of these reasons.
(MeNaughton mentioned the paper that he and the Joint Staff had prepared
on the value of DF-SOTO patrols for intelligence collection. Several
people mentioned that this was a fine study -` I was not familiar with
it so made no. comment.
15. The following decisions were made:
follows: a. Five papers were to be prepared for the president as
 proved For Release 2007/05/06: CIA-RDP80BO1676R001400020001-6
,he general concept
(Z) Actions during first 30 days
(3) What to say to GV T
(4) What to say to the public
?(5) What to say to third countries.
//.
(undy undertook to work on all of these during the weekend
staff.
b.. One man to work fulltime to prepare a report on infiltration
and to get the Jorden report ready. The problem here is how to present
both to the public. It was agreed that Chet Cooper would be assigned by
Bundy to do this job.
c. Prior to Tuesday, the Principals should agree on the
concept of Tab I of Military Annex, i. e. , what type of reprisals would
be used against what type of VC provocative*.
d. The next meeting would be at 11:00 a. zn. on Monday and
papors would be distributed by Bill Mundy as soon as they were completed.
M 'ars hall S. Carter
Lieutemant General, LISA
Acting Director
Distribution:
- Orig - D CI(A'j"- - - Y Lei a.X c-~ 9 ~c w-r~
2_1-DDCI
3 --1 - ER via Ex Dir
L1_57 E - DD/P (Mr. Helms; Mr. Colby)
6-7 2 - DD/I (Mr. Cline;
Annrnirar1 Pr%r PalancA 9nn7/ntitnn r.LA-RnPRnRn1n7RRnn14 nnn9nnnl-n
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