BATTLING THE INTELLIGENCE GAP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000200700001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 8, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 3, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000200700001-5
AR'~~i,LF x".77 717 70 BOSTON GLOBE
`IT IS FRUSTRATING
? the intelligence ga
Battling
to amid a morass o ' compUUcattons
Gathering CAA in the Mi die East have compounded the.
by Ben Bradibe Jr. difficulty of keeping track of terrorists
Globe Staff ff there: the withdrawal of the Palestine
The first time President Reagan met Liberation Organization from Lebanon in
with leaders of the American intelligence 1982 and the 1983 bombing of the US em-
2ommunity. within a week of assuming bassy in Beirut.
office in 1981. one of those present recalls Seven CIA agents were among the 63
that Reagan was bluntly told the quality persons killed in the embassy bombing.
of US intelligence on worldwide terrorism including Robert Ames, widely viewed as
was sorely deficient. The president or- the agency's leading expert on the Middle
dered that it be improved. East. Although the United States has for
Tens of millions of dollars have been years officially refused to deal with the
spent toward that end, but now, in the PLO because of its own use of terrorism
wake of the TWA hijacking - the latest in, and its hostility toward Israel, sources
a string of terrorist attacks directed said the CIA had been able to establish a
against the United States - many are valuable network of contacts among the
asking, to what effect? organization's leaders and guerrillas
re of
"We're still five years behind where the PLOutrLebanon. Tne thus rubbed
we should be," said Sen. Patrick Leahy of in-
(D-Vt.), vice chairman of the Senate Select Washington tdoings in source the in-
re-
Committee on Intelligence. in a telephone formation ashin hinersignificant has not been
interview. "Once you've got a terrorist sit- builirnt up similar of si mila ta Shiite cnetworkommunity.
uation where they've taken hostages, the built s in the the in community. experts far eneral options available are extremely limited. of intelli ence than it can produce."
The only way can be successful ' Turner, director of the
htopave it it a be real fore it happens. That's where whera is t e we e said more Central Stansfield Intelligence Agency during the
h problem."
Carter administration. "To know the in-
In recent days, the Reagan adminis- ner workings of every terrorist group in
tration itself has offered up what critics the world is far beyond our capability.
consider tacit acknowledgment of funda- There are too many of them. They're too
mental intelligence deficiencies on terror- fanatic. You cannot just penetrate them
ism. overnight. They put up too stern a test of
"The problem is who is perpetrating your loyalty. We've got to look on that as
these deeds, who their accomplices are, a job which we should try to do, but one
where they are located ...," said Reagan which will never produce a high degree of
at his June 18 press conference. "It is results,"
frustrating, but as I say, you have to be
William Case ,current director of in
able to pinpoint the enemy. You can't just telligence, said in an April sPeec at
start shooting without having someone in
your sights." the Fletcher School of Law -and Diploma-
cy that terrorist groups are very tough
Calls for retaliation in the hijacking - nuts for intelligence to crack. That is al
and in other cases such as the bombings most self-evident. They are small, not
of the US embassy in Beirut and the the easily penetrated and their operations
Marine Corps barracks there - have been are closely held and compartmented.
muted by the question of precisely who Onl a few le in the organizations are
Washington should retaliate against, as riv to s c o ra ons, a move
well as by policy considerations of wheth- quic y and p ace a verb high premium
er doing so would kill many innocent ci- on secrecy and surprise.
vilians and set off another round of repri-
sals Bobby Ray Inman, who was Turner's
for the original reprisal. deputy from 1982 to 1983 and director of
According to the Central Intelligence the National Security Agency for four
Agency, worldwide terrorist incidents ears bona that, agreed that trrfour
rose from about 500 in 1983 to more than groups are an "incredibly difficult target.
700 in 1984. Last year there were 355 ter- you just can't throw difficult
your
rort bombings around the world. But hands and say it's too hard. The track re-
O
-
surveillance forte of US intelligence. electronic date is the absolute paucity of spe-
surveillance through satellites, is of little cord to information a advance about terror-
premiuinfor- m m is is ist activities." Inman also stressed that in
use against
about terrorists.
terrorism, gathering
mation tracking terrorist groups., collaboration
ents
placed on human beings. But two ev
ON Q!!;^' 3 July 1985 ?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000200700001-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000200700001-5
between the intelligence services of West-
ern allies becomes very important, "and
my reading is that a number of countries
have been reluctant to help us for fear of
being retaliated against. We're the great
enemy."
According to a Washington consultant
who advises the Pentagon and the CIA on
intelligence gathering on terrorists, there
is another reason US allies are reluctant
to share Information: their fear that be-
cause of congressional oversight and oth-
er mid-1970s reforms, the CIA cannot
adequately protect foreign sources and
methods from leaks and disclosure in the
press.
In the late 1960s and through most of
the 1970s. revelations of past intelligence
abuses and the political. climate of the
times forced fundamental changes in the
way the CIA and other US intelligence
agencies did their work. Congress estab-
lished oversight committees and budgets
were sharply cut. But in the latter part of
the Carter administration and through-
out the Reagan years, the pendulum has
swung back so that many of those cuts
have been restored - and expectations for
better performance have risen according-
ly.
A year ago. the administration decided
to set up counterterrorist groups to be
able to take preemptive or retaliatory ac-
tion against terrorists, but key members
of the intelligence community are said to
have believed that the groups could not
be controlled and would cause trouble for
the United States. There was special
doubt over the ability to take such action
in Lebanon.
In March of this year, a car bombing
irk Beirut that had been, directed at a
Shiite leader suspected of leading terrorist
activities against Americans killed 80
persons and wounded 200. The Washing-
ton Post reported that the attack was car-
ried out by a group with ties to Lebanese
intelligence and the CIA, but that the CIA
had had no advance knowledge of the
bombing. This action by a breakaway
faction of Lebanese intelligence revealed,
according to intelligence observers, the
hazards - and the difficulty - of fighting
terrorism.
"We have not developed a coherent
policy on how to reconcile our own aspi-
rations and ideals with the need for more
protection," said Sen. William Cohen (R-
Maine). a member of the Senate Intelli-
gence Committee. "I don't think we've
learned very much since Iran ... I think
we have to develop a policy on prevention,
security and response. Are we prepared to
attack sites where innocent people may
be killed? Are we prepared to endure at-
tacks domestically? These are issues
which have not been debated."
z
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000200700001-5