KISSINGER: ON FOREIGN POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-01208R000100050016-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 22, 2011
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: July 31, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/23: CIA-RDP90-01208R000100050016-1
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Kissinger. On foieig~Ollcy
By Ro
bert Bendiner
Henry A. Kissinger has probably exercised
greater power than any U.S. secretary of state.
Having served under Presidents Nixon and
Ford, the eider statesman is returning to
government service. President Reagan has
named Kissinger chairman of a bipartisan
commission aimed at seeking support for the
administration's policies in Central America.
In this exclusive interview, . Kissinger otters
opinions on subjects ranging from the role of
the CIA in Latin America to the secret of
diplomacy. The interview was conducted short-
ly before Kissinger's appointment to the com-
mission on Central America.
Bendiner: Traditionally, historically, foreign
policy has been made by the president and his
secretary of state. But now we have a National
Security Council and a CIA and a Defense Depart-
ment, as well as the Senate and even to -some
extent the House of Representatives, all taking a
very active hand in the process. Are there too
many cooks for the good of the broth?
Kissinger: Let's make a distinction between the
management of .foreign policy in the executive
branch and the management of foreign policy as
between the executive and legislative branches.
With respect to the executive branch, it is impossi-
ble today for any one man or one department to
encompass all the disciplines and interests that
have to be reflected in foreign policy. Inevitably, a
president has to consider many aspects of a
problem and also take into account advisers who
reflect still other aspects that have not occurred to
him.
This process contains a twofold danger. First, in
order to settle a problem, the president may
accept the least common denominator by way of
bureaucratic compromise. Secondly, each issue
tends to be dealt with on its individual merits.
There is not necessarily among the various
contenders for presidential attention a representa-
tive speaking for the most important of all aspects
of foreign policy: the relationship of various
measures to each other over an extended period of
time. A sense of nuance and of strategy is very
difficult to develop in the modern government.
As between the Congress and the executive
branch, there is no doubt, in my mind at least,.
that the Congress is asserting an excessive influ-.
ence over the day-to-day tactical management of
foreign policy.
Q: Are you thinking of things like Congress'
refusal to appropriate money for some Central'
American states unless they improve their human
rights record?
decisions would fall into this lcategory, butpI can
mention one from the period I was in .office-just
to take the discussion away from immediate
controversies. We were attempting to negotiate an
agreement between Greece and Turkey on
Cyprus. The Congress, in the middle of the negoti-
ations, voted an embargo on arms to Turkey. The
end result was that the negotiations- stopped en
tirely, and to this day the Cyprus' situation is
totally stalemated. Now I can't prove ,that those
negotiations in 1974 would have succeeded, but
with every passing month the position of those
who occupied the territory became more firmly
established.
Q : What do ? you see as the proper role for some
of the agencies that were not created for the
purpose of making policy like the`CIA?
A: I don't want the CIA to be involved in policy-
making at .all. The CIA should. be confined to
making factual:analyses:of political situations and.
to, giving its ' views about the likely consequences'
of proposed courses 'of action- Now that second
role is admittedly close to the area -of ' poli
cy making, but I am extremely . distrustful of
getting the CIA involved in the policy process as a.
-chief player, because there is the great danger;
that Intelligence will then tend to follow policy
rather than guide it 'with objective information. I
would think a major effort has to be made to keep
Intelligence .and policymaking. as far apart :as
possible.
'Q: Would you say that that has been achieved?
Is that the relationship between the CIA and the
[State) Department?
A: No, I'm afraid it's gone the other way. I
shudder every time I see a CIA report published
in order to support a policy, because that really
means there is a subconscious pressure on the
.,agency 'to write reports that fit in with official
'preconceptions. Furthermore, no CIA report
should ever. be declassified for any purpose until
maybe 10 years after the event.
The CIA analysts should write their reports for
the president of the United States, and the presi-
dent should never use them in a public forum to
support. his position. He might use their informa-
tion but he should not identify it as coming from
the CIA.
Q: Could you say whether this is the tack that
you took with regard to the CIA? Say, in Latin
America?
A: More or less. You know, when the CIA tells'
you that the consequence of a communist govern-
ment in Chile will be to upset the political equili.
brium in neighboring countries, this is an implicit.
policy recommendation. That cannot be helped.
But as a general proposition, I think separation of
..policymaking and Intelligence is the tack that I
took. If I did take another one from time to time,
it was wrong.
Q : Is open diplomacy possible, and if .not, how
'far can secrecy be carried in a democratic state?
A:.`I don't believe the question permits a clear-
cut answer. In a democracy the results of negotia-
tions obviously have to be made available to the
public. Except in the rarest of cases, secret
agreements will not stand the test of crisis if the i
public has not been informed about them. So,
clearly, the results of negotiations should be,
public. The process by which these results are
achieved generally should have a private phase
and then it, may have a public phase.
I believe that it is terribly important in a
negotiation for one's interlocutor to understand
- one's real purpose.. In fact, that is infinitely more
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/23: CIA-RDP90-01208R000100050016-1