WHY INTELLIGENCE GATHERING STUMBLES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-01208R000100040019-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 22, 2011
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: October 24, 1984
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/23: CIA-RDP90-01
208R000100040019-9
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
24 October 1984
1A111-3-Y intelligence gathering
By David D. Newsom day in areas of upheaval
past may be of little such as Beirut, sources of the
value. Ev
five
a
offi \TCE more, in the debate over the security of ficials were still in touch ow stini an and Lebanese of
Americans in Beirut, attention is being focused on I ficials they had long this nation's
Rho were willin
America
to t
l k
g
nst
a
capacity toll
and were close to most of and the the sources of vio-
intelligence, lence. Information was exchanged
coect and use sesecurity of
Why did we not 1'siow in advancce of the plans to bomb Americans often assured. Most of these traditional
he embassy y did or the no 'ins? v ae we? sources have lost touch or de
the government have the info
Or Did rmation and not meoane in ing the shadowy The task of pen rre
he ~ t p more risk and its less of
ay's not terrorism
along? Was it passed along and not dsed? Did high offiCertain of results, not only. for US
tod
cials ignore it? intelligence officers, but for their contacts as well. Evalu-
Americans expect our intelligence services to know in I at Eg ne suit is even more difficult.
advance of threats to our interests and people. They are, It des of reliable information coming, for ex-
in fact, putting their trust in a chancy and imperfect pro- ' ample,
cess. Inai~ridual mistakes in the gathering and evaluation inis not Oalways clear, e Pted
mean-
Is eid have undoubted] been made, ve rationstaons; the cry ptic,
of inte li g Conversations can be one Inter -
M yet the problems may lie elsewhere: in the sheer volume of infor- pretatin Inform tion ifrom nium numerous so hen one -
:nation, the preference for tried and true sources, and the conflicting signals: de-
politics of evaluation. sources may give The in. Each community must de?
At any given time, a huge volume of information is r~ne the true mmeanning. Each element nt may y then tend to'
flow in g into Washington frm around thfw support its own sources and its own view of events. Valu-b able
is lost
tting several channels: the CIA, the State DepartmentnDe- througheburea cratic and sometimes political
fense agencies, the National Securi~ ~ information to the policymaker
involved, the FBI. While every effort gis made to alert oveWheninformaton is finally wowed and d conctubattles .
those in crisis areas to relevant _
relating to Beirut, for example may lcome from information
O~y a po Cymakms may not immediately
far away. ~ accept l~cva~li'dity and act. The -
portion of the total information may be available ; fitting their Y S prefer theothe sources
to officials on the spot in time for tto act. own view of an issue. Furrther,he actions
the Information coming in to or them
hie dictated by the information may be diplomati
call, mlli
sized and considered aril gton will be orga- ~Y financially, and politically out of the question
y in part. Much of it will consist In the amount of information received by the US, it is
of rumors, reports from unevaluated sources, intercepted :. possible to make a case that almost any event was fore-
Communications waiting processed, n by someone. That, however, is not the important'
com un electronic to be and data from question. What is meaningful is whether accurate infor-
P and photographic equipment re- nation was sifted, assessed, received 'in time, and be-
quiringprocessing, interpretation, and collateral Confir lieved by those with the ca
oration. In times of stress the fl
a
it
ill
p
c
ow w
y to act and whth ,
be supld
eer
pemente existed, for them, feasible courses of action
by snippets from those who want to appear informed,
want to
Th
k
a
m e mischif lk
e, areooing for money, or l
merely
think they know something. Nevertheless, each item
must be looked at and evaluated.
Items that are cryptic or unclear when first received
may have more meaning in hindsight, often leading to.
claims that US officials w
i
f
ere
n
ormed id
n avance. The
question arises: Given the lives and interests at stake,
why not act on every report of possible attack? To do so
would keep personnel and families in a constant state of
tension, seriously hampering the working
sies and, over time, reducing the credibility of the intelli
gence process of our embas-
.
The intelligence analyst
the in Washington tends to put
greatest credence on known, traditional sources. To-
e judgment of individu
l
m
a
s
ay Occall b!
sionay.e rightfully blamed for "intelligence failures." More often.
however, the answers lie in an inevitably complicated
system in which chance may play as great a role as facts,
talent, and judgment.
David D. Newsom is associate dean and director
of the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at
Georgetou~r University.
-i,~ Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/23: CIA-RDP90-01208R000100040019-9