WHY THE CIA OFTEN SUCCEEDS

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP90-01208R000100010051-6
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
1
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
February 22, 2011
Sequence Number: 
51
Case Number: 
Content Type: 
OPEN SOURCE
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PDF icon CIA-RDP90-01208R000100010051-6.pdf81.51 KB
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"STAT 3 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/22 : CIA-RDP90-01208R000100010051-6 THE CAMPAI&LER Winter 1972-73 /Ch W h.y tho V 1~ I~~IlIl ~-P.~~~~~u1~ by JI('r>tyle?Go!!Iiu r, Jr. Recently, in dosages ranging from the MIT-"Club of Rome" Limits-of Growth, through the publications of .John D. Rockefeller III'sburgeoning Zero- Grow?thmove- ment, and Harman Kahn's.latest best-seller, intellectual and semi intellectual readership circles are being de- luged with an eerie genre of literature coming to be called "futurology." Although the collection reeks of the traditions of Nostradamus, Churchward, and L. Ron Ijubbard, most of the research behind these publications is sponsored in dead seriousness by such. CIA-type agencies as the RAND Corporation, Ford Foundation, and a proliferation of only less celebrated institutions throughout the advanced capitalist sector. Those agencies are not wasting their time and funds; In a certain sense, the stuff works. Two of the papers presented at the recent Linz con- ference attempted to unravel some of the recent output. The first, by Columbia University's Edward W. Said( 1), offered a scholarly overview of a sophisticated U.S. Mid-East policy developed, in part, by the RAND Cor- poration. The second, which veered off its track at the end, was the provocative review offered by Lund Uni- versity's Research Director for the Division of Social Phychology and Conflict Research, Lars Dencik. (2 ) The Labor Committee delegation's differences with Dencik provide the point of departure for an account of why CIA operations so often succeed. Dencik characterizes the genre: "So called future research is not only humbug, it is not only the last spasmodic attempts by a senile po- sitivistic social science to get out of its hopeless impotency, not only a Meath-throe in the holy of late capitali gym, On the contrary, it is somethingto look out for in the strulg,gle against imperialism, since what `future research' really is, is an instrument of power in the hands of the most important forces of imperialism." (3) So far, so good. Our issue with him was made clear during, the plen- ary discussions of his paper and oral presentation. During. that presentation and subsequent exchanges, he emphasized the need to combat futurology by debunking it. According to both his replies to several queries on on the point and the internal evidence of his paper and presentation, he locates the main significance of the genre in its use for journalistic"brainwashing of large populations. Said's reporting on the Arab counter-insurgency programs locates Deneik's mistake. Futurology studies may have an incidental significance as they provide the direct propaganda for influencing mass opinion; their important application - and purpose -lies else- where. All important futurology studies represent A STATEMENT OF OPERATIONS POLICY, TO BE I11- PLEMENTED AS FIELD WORK CONDUCTED BY TRAINED TEAMS OF COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPER- ATIV ES. The CIA's Vietnam Hamlet program could easily provide the material for a futurology best-seller of the Kahn type. The policy would be used by such a writer to paint a picture of Southeast Asia in the year 2000 A. D., a culture developed around the principle. of "local control." The significance of such a book would not be .hat identified by Dencil. Its import would be the elab- aration of a policy being conducted in South Vietnam by .'punter-insurgency teams. The Limits of Growth and Blueprint for Survival COYl. 1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/22 : CIA-RDP90-01208R000100010051-6