AN ALTERNATIVE THAT PUTS PRESSURE ON BOTH SIDES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000100390003-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 2, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: April 21, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Approved For Release 2010/12/02 : CIA-RDP90-00552R000100390003-7
AF,TI =.8
011 PIGS
WASHINGTON POST
21 April 1985
nlz
Michael D. Barnes
An Alternative That Puts
Pressure on Both Sides
The objectives of U.S. policy toward Nica-
ragua should be to enhance the security and
stability of Central America by achieving re-
ciprocal and verifiable security arrangements
with Nicaragua and by promoting political
pluralism and the observance of human
rights in Nicaragua.
There is now a consensus in Congress that
current policies are not achieving-and hold
no real prospect of achieving-these objec-
tives. In recognition of that growing consensus,
President Reagan has dropped his proposal
that Congress release an additional $14 million
for military aid for the contras. This week,
Congress will consider alternative approaches.
Along with my Democratic colleagues Lee
H. Hamilton and James R. Jones, and my Re-
publican colleagues Hamilton Fish Jr., Jim
Leach, Ed Zschau and Willis D. Gradison Jr., I
have prepared a bipartisan alternative that I
believe can, and will, command broad support
in Congress and among the American people.
Our alternative is designed to support regional
peace efforts and give diplomacy a chance to
work, while at the same time maintaining pres-
sure on the Sandinistas to change policies that
we feel destabilize the region.
The policy set forth in our resolution is to
seek peace in Nicaragua and Central America
through the Contadora process, which provides
an appropriate 21-point framework for achiev-
ing U.S. objectives. As part of a regional settle-
ment, it should be U.S. policy to encourage a
cease-fire and peace talks among the combat-
ants in Nicaragua.
Our resolution points out that there are
disturbing trends in Nicaragua's foreign and
domestic policies, including restrictions on
individual and press freedoms, the subordina-
tion of government functions to party con-
trol, close Soviet-Cuban ties and a military
buildup, and efforts by the Sandinistas to ex-
port their influence and ideology. There are
also serious human rights violations by both
the Nicaraguan government and the contras.
We believe that Congress should monitor
events in Nicaragua carefully, and that prog-
ress in reversing these trends should be a key
element in future congressional decisions with
respect to Nicaragua and Central America as a
whole. Actions by the Sandinista government
and its opponents will weigh heavily in deter-
mining those decisions. If progress is made,
the United States should consider improving
ties with Nicaragua, including expanded trade
relations and the provision of technical and
economic assistance.
Our alternative continues in effect the exist-
ing prohibition on funding for military or para-
military operations in Nicaragua until such
time as Congress enacts a joint resolution re-
pealing that prohibition. Meanwhile, our reso-
lution provides $10 million for humanitarian
assistance for 'refugees who are outside of
Nicaragua, regardless of whether or not they
are associated with the contras. The assistance
could not be used for provisioning combat
units. To ensure that the assistance is not rrus-
used in that or any other way, we provide that
it be channeled through one of the two recog-
nized international relief agencies with experi-
ence in the area: the U.N. High Commissioner
for Refugees or the International Committee of
the Red Cross. As a sign of our commitment to
the Contadora process, we also provide that $4
million will be available for the costs of imple-
menting a Contadora agreement.
Our alternative requires the president to
continue to report periodically to Congress on
the situation in Nicaragua, and it gives the
president another opportunity, after the begin-
ning of the new fiscal year on Oct. 1, to re-
quest further action by Congress. The resolu-
tion would bind Congress to give any such re-
quest expedited consideration, just as it is now
doing with respect to the president's request
for $14 million in military aid for the contras.
We believe that this alternative serves U.S.
peace and security interests in several impor-
tant ways. It gives a strong impetus to the
Contadora process, which will make an agree-
ment much more likely than if a plan is "made
in the U.S.A." It puts pressure on both sides in
the Nicaraguan conflict to enter into a dialogue
leading to reconciliation and an opening of the
political system, because after Oct. 1 the presi-
dent can force Congress to reconsider the
situation, and neither side will want to be held
responsible for lack of progress. The alterna-
tive offers incentives for those on both sides of
the conflict who desire such a dialogue and
reconciliation to get together. It criticizes both
the Sandinistas and their opponents where
criticism is due.
Our alternative makes eventual U.S. inter-
vention in Nicaragua less likely. It combines
restraint with the engagement of our diplomat-
ic, political and economic resources squarely
on behalf of our interests. Equally important, it
provides a way out of our own domestic im-
passe, and the deep divisions that current
policy toward Nicaragua have engendered.
The writer, a Democratic representative from
Maryland, is chairman of the Foreign Affairs
subcommittee on Western Hemisphere affairs.
Approved For Release 2010/12/02 : CIA-RDP90-00552R000100390003-7