MANEUVERING MANILA ISN'T SO EASY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000302170007-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 27, 2012
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: August 29, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Si,-'1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/27: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302170007-5
? ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGLgg.----Ai
Maneuvering
By PAUL GIGOT
MANILA?This tropical city is 10,000
miles from Washington, but judging by the
U.S. visitors it could be Capitol Hill.
Rep. Jack Kem_p dropped by for a chat
with President Ferdinand Marcos last
week, joining a troupe that has included
CIA boss Marn Casey; former U.N. Am-
bamador Jeane Kirkpatrick; Adm. Wil-
liam Crowe, chairman-designate of the
Joint Chiefs; Sens. John Kerry and John
Melcher,? Rep. Stephen Solarz, plus as-
gorted State Department biz shots.
They've all come to assess the troubles in
the Philippines firsthand, and, more im-
portant, to continue a two-year effort to
urge Mr. Marcos to "reform" his strug-
gling 20-year-old rule.
They have all mostly been whispering
into the wind. Despite nearly two years of
prodding, Mr. Marcos still stubbornly re-
sists most of the changes that both the
U.S. and many Filipinos believe are
needed to ensure a democratic transition
from the Marcos era.
U.S. Influence Limited
As this fact sinks in, you can be sure
that some Americans will begin to call this
a "failure" of U.S. policy. They will then
demand that the Reagan administration
take more drastic action, such as with-
drawing all support from the Philippines.
The New York Times is already taking this
line. Americans on the left claim to favor
"nonintervention," except for authoritar-
ians who have long been U.S. allies; then
they hunt for "leverage" that can produce
miracles of political change.
If only it were so easy. Events over the
past two years in Manila suggest that U.S.
influence with Mr. Marcos and in the Phil-
ippines generally is very limited. Most of
the reforms that have taken place have re-
sulted from Filipino, not American, pres-
sure on Mr. Marcos. The lesson is that, un-
less the U.S. is willing to commit troops or
support a coup, the fate of authoritarians
and their countries is beyond much U.S. in-
fluence.
This isn't the first case of such stymied
U.S. influence. Washington won't sell arms
and seems to have quit backing multina-
tional-agency loans to Chile, but the Pino-
chet dictatorship appears undeterred.
South African Premier P.W. Botha has just
demonstrated that he, too, can ignore the
threat of U.S. sanctions. Yet this lack of le-
verage is all the more striking in Manila,
because ties with the Philippines are
among America's strongest anywhere. The
U.S. has two big military bases north of
Manila and has long been generous with
aid. Filipinos and Americans fought to-
WALL STREET JOURNAL
29 August 1985
Manila Isn't So Eas \
gether in World War II, and even today
Filipinos visit or emigrate to the U.S. by
the tens of thousands each year. One local
parody of the Philippine left goes like this:
"Yankee, go home (and take me with
you)."
Yet even here, a determined dictator
can deflect American pressure. Take mili-
tary reform, a high U.S. priority. Most
people agree that the Philippine military
needs better discipline and morale to pre-
vail against the growing communist insur-
gency. To do that, most people also agree,
it needs to replace top officers corrupted
by Mr. Marcos's patronage.
The symbol of this effort is Gen. Fabian
Ver, who rose under Mr. Marcos from
chauffeur to chief of staff. Gen. Ver is
among those charged with conspiring to
kill Benigno Aquino two years ago. Mr.
Marcos has put him on "temporary leave"
during the trial. The U.S. doesn't want
Gen. Ver reinstated, in part because his
successor, Fidel Ramos, is a well-regarded
West Point graduate who has started to
clean up the military. American emissar-
ies have told Mr. Marcos this to his face
and Sen. Melcher even said it publicly.
Yet Mr. Marcos insists that if Gen. Ver
is acquitted, he'll get his old job back de-
spite U.S. wishes. Philippine cabinet mem-
bers say the best the U.S. can hope for is a
compromise in which Gens. Ver and
Ramos both resign. Yet this would merely
open the chief-of-staff post to another
Marcos protege, Gen. Josephus Ramas.
Two other top Filipino generals who would
also have influence after Gen. Ver's depar-
ture happen to be relatives of First Lady
Imelda Marcos. The net effect on the mili-
tary would be zero.
Similar obstacles have prevented eco-
nomic reform. Mr. Marcos is a champion
economic meddler, and the U.S. wants
changes that let the market work. Mr.
Marcos has at least bowed to a standard
International Monetary Fund austerity
package. But on major issues he stone-
walls. Two of his favorite cronies or their
surrogates continue to dominate the sugar
and coconut industries, for example, and
the reason goes to the heart of Mr.
Marcos's power. If Mr. Marcos abandons
his top cronies, he loses major sources of
political funding. He also sends a signal to
every other client.
"It's the padrone mentality. He has to
take care of his own," says someone who
knows Mr. Marcos well. "If he cuts off
one, then every rat will leave the sinking
ship."
It's also instructive to look at where Mr.
Marcos has agreed to reform, because
Americans have had little to do with it.
Mr.-Marcos agreed last year to scrap a
succession plan that would have made it
vi
easy for his ambitious wife to grab power.
He was responding, though, to pressure
from businessmen and voices in his own
political party. "The U.S. was irrelevant,"
says Arturo Tolentino, an architect of the
compromise.
A reform movement independent of Mr.
Marcos has also developed this year
among junior officers in the military. Yet
U.S. diplomats admit the movement
caught them by surprise, while the Filipino
reformers say they'll do anything to avoid
being associated with the U.S. "We re-
member Diem in Vietnam," says one.
Similar fear of American taint makes it
difficult for the U.S. even to help ensure a
fair election. An independent citizens
group known as Namfrel did yeoman work
making 1984's assembly efectIons the fair-
est in decades. It needs both more money
and more manpower to make the next
election truly honest, however, and the CIA
conceivably could help. Rut Jose Concep-
cion, Namfrel's chief, considers any such
funding the kiss of death, because it would
damage the group's reputation for indepen-
dence. "[That rumor' causes me all kinds
of trouble," he says.
Faced with these realities, Filipino op-
positionists and American moralists will
surely demand that the Reagan adminis-
tration press Mr. Marcos further. One idea
is the "carrot-and-stick" proposal of Rep.
Solarz, threatening aid cuts unless Mr.
Marcos makes specific reforms.
A hint of how well this works occurred
earlier this year when Mr. Solarz pushed
aid cuts through the U.S. House. (Most aid
was later restored in a House-Senate con-
ference.) Mr. Marcos's defense minister
quickly proposed that the U.S.-Philippine
bases treaty be abrogated, while Mr.
Marcos took the unsubtle step of having a
medal (left over from World War II)
pinned on his chest by the Soviet ambassa-
dor. Some of this was surely bluff, but it is
always possible that Mr. Marcos could
start playing ultranationalist and snub the
U.S. altogether.
Dealt Out of the Game
Another idea is a show of U.S. moral in-
dignation? a complete withdrawal of aid
and a retreat from the bases. This would
surely damage Mr. Marcos's domestic
standing, but to an uncertain end. In the
happiest scenario, the democratic opposi-
tion triumphs. But what if it doesn't? Mr.
Marcos, his back to the wall, might him-
self crack down, or elements in the mili-
tary assert themselves, or the growing
force of the hard left play its hand. What-
ever happens, America wouldn't be a
player because it already will have dealt
itself out of the game.
Conbnual
! Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/27: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302170007-5
I
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/27: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302170007-5
None of this means the only U.S. choice
is to sit on its hands and wait for the revo-
lution. Public and private statements of
the kind regularly made by Ambassador
Stephen Bosworth here at least tell Filipino
democrats we're on their side. And what-
ever leverage our aid does provide can be
earmarked to free more of the economy
and train a better military. But unhappy
as it may be, the truth is that U.S. influ-
ence is limited. The Philippines isn't any
longer an American colony; the days when
we could select leaders or anoint the next,
better general are long gone.
Mr. Gigot is editorial-page editor of The
Asian Wall Street Journal.
! Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/27: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302170007-5