REMARKS PREPARED FOR DELIVERY BY THE HONORABLE HAROLD BROWN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000100780005-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 28, 2010
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: July 28, 1980
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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HOLD FOR RELEASE
IM4111~*MI-Iff W ~ EL M i
OFFICE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PUBLIC AFFAIRS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. - 20301
PLEASE NOTE DATE
DELIVERY
OF
ADDRESS
No.
312-80
EXPECTED
AT
12:30
P.M.(PDT)-
3:30 PM
(EDT)
OX
5-0192
(Information)
MONDAY,
JULY
28,
1980
OX
7-3189
(Copies)
REMARKS PREPARED FOR DELIVERY BY
THE HONORABLE HAROLD BROWN
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
TO THE COMMONWEALTH CLUB OF
CALIFORNIA
OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA
MONDAY, JULY 28, 1980
A strong defense has always been, in principle, an integral
part of the foundation upon which our society is built. As the
Preamble to the Constitution recognizes, to "provide for the
common defense" is one of the most basic and solemn obligations of
government. But, during the century that followed the War of 1812,
we faced little threat from outside. The situation since has been
quite different, even when, as between the World Wars, we were not
aware of that. fact.
As nations pursue their foreign poiicy goals in the inter-
national arena, they rely on a variety of diplomatic, economic,
military, and political resources. Each nation calls upon, and
each situation calls for, a different mixture of these necessary
tools.
For a nation with the responsibilities of the United States,
however, one ingredient is absolutely essential, and that is
military strength. Military power alone, no matter how great,
cannot solve all of our international problems. Nor can it make the
world over according to our design. But, without adequate military
strength, even the most imaginative application of our vast diplo-
matic, economic, and political resources has little chance of
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sustaining our basic security and physical integrity--let alone
the position and influence required for the well-being of the
American people and that of others as well. Without adequate
military strength, our other tools of international politics would
be--and would be seen by others to be--at best marginal, at worst
hollow and ineffective.
With adequate military strength, we are in a position to
exploit our unequaled diplomatic, Economic, and political assets.
Given our superpower status, our defense requirements are
global. They can, nonetheless, be stated quite simply. Deterrence--
preventing war and preserving peace--is the primary purpose of our
military strength. We must be able to deter--and, if necessary, to
repel--any attack on our vital interests or those of our friends and
allies.
Such deterrence requires that a potential attacker judge
that his likely gains are not worth the losses he must expect.
Therefore, to preserve the peace and to protect and defend our
vital interests, our military forces must be second to none. And I
can confidhntly say to you that today they are second to none.
That is not to say that we are without capable rivals and
adversaries, or that we live in a world without threats. In fact,
it is because the opposite is true that we need to continue to build
up our military strength.
For the United States, the central military realities in the
world today are the effects of the relentless and massive growth in
Soviet military power over the past 20 years, and the demonstrated
willingness of the Soviets to use this power--not only within the
boundaries of the Warsaw Pact, but also on the homelands of their
o?-her neighbors and, so far through the use of surrogates, in
distant lands as well. All elements of the Soviet military
apparatus--ground, sea, and air forces, conventional and nuclear
alike--have mushroomed in the past two decades. The price for this
expansion has been steep; it has been financed by regular increases
in Soviet defense spending of four percent or more above inflation
every year for 20 years and by continuing and painful sacrifices in
virtually every non-military sector of the SovieL economy and Soviet
life.
When this Administration took office, we inherited a military
po:;ture and a defense budget that simply had not kept pace. In
the eight years preceding President Carter's inauguration, real
defense spencding--after inflation--had declined by more than
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35 percent. In particular, spending on our strategic nuclear
deterrent also had declined in 20 percent.
While it is true that the Soviets began their buildup from a
position far behind us, the trend lines were clear and ominous.
Only by changing course could we prevent the growing Soviet military
capability from surpassing our own (which had remained relatively
level) and in time leading to a dangerous Soviet military superiority.
Since taking office in January 1977, this Administration
has increased real defense spending every year, resulting in an
overall increase of 10 percent. And under our Five Year Defense
Plan, real defense spending will have increased more than 27 percent
by the end of President Carter's second term. I am particulary
proud of our record, and I think it will stand up favorably in
proper comparison with what others have done, not what they saw or
what they promise.
In the end, of course, it is military capabilities, not military
spending, which determines the real balance of strength between
the United States and the Soviet Union. Today, we are engaged in a
determined enhancement of our military capabilities to enable us to
pursue successfully our three basic security objectives:
1) to deter nuclear attack on the United States, by
ensuring that our strategic nuclear forces remain
essentially equivalent to those of the Soviet Union;
2) to deter both conventional and nuclear war in Europe,
by maintaining the overall military balance between
NATO and the Warsaw Pact; and
3) to be able to come quickly and effectively to the
aid of friends and allies in other parts of the
world.
We are making real and substantial progress in all three
areas.
Strategic nuclear forces. We are moving full speed ahead on
strengthening all three legs of our TRIAD of land-based missiles,
submarine-launched missiles, and bombers.
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Four years ago, there was no program for a mobile ICBM--no
final decisions had been made on the MX missile or on how to deploy
it. One alternative was to put a new ICBM in fixed silos; the other
was to make it mobile by deploying it in covered trenches. The
former would, we saw, clearly become vulnerable in the early 1980s,
in the same way as Minuteman, to the increased numbers and accuracy
of Soviet ICBM warheads. As to the latter, soon after we took
office, an independent technical evaluation concluded that it was
vulnerable to blast waves propagating along the trench.
Today, the missile itself is in full-scale engineering develop-
ment, and we have a survivable and workable basing scheme. In terms
of both the number of warheads and their accuracy, the MX will equal
or outmatch the best ICBM in the Soviet arsenal; in survivability,
which is a major, but non-threatening, military advantage, the MX
will be far ahead of anything the Soviets have.
Four years ago, the TRIDENT submarine program was bogged down
in contractor disputes and way behind schedule. Today, the ship-
builders' claims have been resolved to the government's advantage,
the first TRIDENT will undergo sea trials this year and will join the
fleet next year. Ten other boats are programmed to follow in rapid
succession. We have already begun to equip our POSEIDON submarines
with the longer-range, more accurate TRIDENT I missile, and by 1982,
12 of them will be armed with this powerful weapon system.
Four years ago, the only major proposal to modernize our
bomber force was the B-i. In 1977, we cancelled this program
because it was clear then--and it is even clearer today--that
by the time the B-1 could have been off the assembly lines and
deployed at our SAC bases, improved Soviet air defenses would have
made this aircraft dangerously vulnerable. Quite simply, the B-1
was obsolete and a waste of money. Instead, we chose to modernize
the bomber force by exploiting some of the most advanced and effec-
tive military technology in the world--the air-launched cruise
missile. Four years ago, no long-range, air-launched cruise
missiles were included in the defense program. Today, we have
flight tested two designs, selected the contractor, and are well on
our way to equipping our B-52s with over 3,000 of these very highly
accurate, long-range cruise missiles, which will be able to penetrate
Soviet defenses not only in 1982, when the first full squadron will
be ready, but through the 1980s and beyond. At the same time, we
have the exploratory programs necessary to develop a new bomber to
meet any requirements for the 1990s.
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NATO and Europe. Four years ago, the defense posture of our
most historic alliance was in serious trouble. In the first year
of this Administration, we developed and proposed a Long Term
Defense Program for NATO; the next year, it was accepted. Fol-
lowing U.S. leadership, Alliance members have committed themselves to
increasing defense budgets by three percent a year--above inflation
--through the mid-1980s, in order to bolster our conventional
capabilities, especially in the early stages of a war in Europe.
Today, in the United States, we are meeting the three percent
commitment, and so is the Alliance considered as a whole.
Last year, the Alliance agreed to modernize and upgrade our
long-range theater nuclear forces by deploying 572 PERSHING II
missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles, in order to offset
Soviet advances in this area. Today, this program is underway and
on schedule.
NATO is responding in a determined and coordinated fashion
to the military competition posed by the Warsaw Pact. Never in the
history of the Alliance has its military solidarity been greater
than it is today.
Non-NATO contingncies. The chaos in Iran and the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan have emphasized that the challenges to our
vital interests and our security are not confined to one geographic
locale. As a world power with global interests and a global network
of allies, the United States must be able to respond quickly and
effectively to military challenges anywhere in the world.
Power projection is not new for the United States, but the
demands change over time. Today, they are greater than at any
time in recent memory. That is why we are engaged in a systematic
and siqnificant enhancement of our capabilities to move forces
rapidly to distant trouble spots. Of special concern--because of
our dependence, and our Allies' even greater dependence, on imported
oil--is the Southwest Asia-Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean region.
Four years ago, we did not have adequate capability to respond
to threats in this vital region as quickly and effectively as our
interests required. Our intensified effort involves a number of
different programs.
We are prepositioning in the Indian Ocean enough equipment,
supplies, fuel, and water to support an augmented Marine Amphibious
Brigade and several Air Force fighter squadrons. Ultimately, we
will expand this to a capability sufficient to support three such
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brigades for four weeks. We have increased our continuing naval
presence in the region; the U.S. naval forces currently in the
Indian Ocean are by far the strongest ever to sail those waters. We
are negotiating access rights to key local port and airfield facili-
ties in the event of a military threat requiring a U.S. response,
and have already concluded such agreements with Kenya and Oman. We
are expanding our airlift and our fast sealift capabilities, the
former primarily through the development of the new CX cargo
aircraft, the latter through acqui-Htion of high-speed commerical
container ships. We have established a Rapid Deployment Joint Task
Force to assume planning and operational responsibilities for those
forces from all services that have been designated for rapid deploy-
ment. And we are successfully persuading our allies to assume more
of the defense burden in their own regions as we shift resources to
Southwest Asia-Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean contingencies.
In combination, these measures will make clear to the Soviets
that, if they plan further aggression in that vital region, they
cannot safely assume that the only troops they would have to fight
would be local ones. The United States' message is clear: we have
both the will and the ability to defend our vital interests.
This defense program I have outlined is comprehensive. It is
balanced. It is carefully designed to meet our real military needs.
The goals of, and even the criteria for, our military capability
are relatively simple. But, putting together a realistic defense
strategy and program is a very difficult business. The problems are
complex; the proposed solutions are numerous, never perfect, often
expensive. In the real world, meeting our defense needs is not a
matter of taking everything we have and increasing it by 10 percent
or 20 percent or 40 percent. There is no magic formula. There is
no quick fix. And there is no pot of gold with which to buy all we
might want, of everything we might need, to meet whatever might come
up.
Having full-time responsibility for the security of over 220
million Americans and countless millions of others around the world
is a serious business, one in which words and actions have real
meaning and real consequences.
Those who hold such high positions have a solemn obligation to
tell the truth about national security to the American people.
Sometimes the truth is palatable, sometimes it is not. But it has
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been my experience in government that, when confronted not with a
myth and a promise, but with the truth, the American people recognize
it for what it is and accept it.
Some have said that the Soviet Union has already achieved
military superiority over the United States. These voices speak
only of American weaknesses and Soviet strengths. They would have
us--and others, I might add--believe that we are weaker than, in
fact, we are.
The truth is that we are second to none. Our military power,
coupled with that of our allies, is not exceeded by any combination
of nations on earth. Our strengths are abundant, if occasionally
ignored by some. In contrast to the Warsaw Pact, our allies are
allies by choice. They make real contributions to our collective
security, and their allegiance in time of war is unquestioned. Our
technological prowess is the envy of every military power, and we
will continue to exploit it to our advantage, as we have with the
cruise missile, our incredibly accurate precision-guided munitions,
and antisubmarine warfare capability.
Some have promised American military superiority over the
Soviet Union.
The truth is that comprehensive military superiority for either
side--absolute supremacy, if you will--is a military and economic
impossibility--if the other is determined to prevent it. There can
be no return to the days of the American nuclear monopoly. There
can be no winner in an all-out arms race. Neither side can win such
an arms race, because neither side would or needs to concede it to
the other. It is wishful thinking of th highest order to assume
that the Soviets would drop out of a nuclear arms race early, or
that they would shrink from imposing additional, even unimaginable
hardships on their civilian society, in order to stay in the race.
Desirable and attractive as the goal of across-the-board
supremacy may be in the abstract, a hard-headed assessment of what
its pursuit might mean is sobering.
? First, it would mean the end of arms control. By defini-
tion, strategic superiority and arms control are incom-
patible--a race to superiority is an attempt to achieve a
real military advantage, one which the losing party would
never accept in a formal arms control agreement. We will
not negotiate from a position of inferiority, and neither
will the Soviets.
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? Second, it would mean an uncontrolled, open-ended, and
very expensive arms race. The sums involved would he
enormous even in absolute terms, let alone in the face
of a proposed massive--30 percent--tax cut.
? Third, in the context of real world constraints of finite
resources, the tendency (as has occurred in the past) would
be to skimp on conventional forces and to concentrate on a
race in strategic weapons.
? Fourth, this, in turn, would channel the competition
into the most dangerous arena--the one most likely to lead
to nuclear war. At some point along the line, in a world
in which East-West relations would be strained beyond
anything in recent memory, one side--its resources
stretched to the limit--might believe that the only way to
prevent the other from achieving superiority would be to
strike first.
In contrast, this Administration's policy is one of peace through
strength. We need a strategic force that convinces the Soviets they
cannot gain from a nuclear war any advantage that compares with the
losses they will surely suffer. At the same time, we need to be
ahead in some conventional capabilities (such as naval forces) but
we do not need to match the Soviets tank for tank or soldier for
soldier.
Unlike the pursuit of across-the-board supremacy, our policy
promotes international stability, while protecting our vital interests.
0 First, it is compatible with arms control. Lasting
national security depends on a strong defense coupled with
sensible arms control; the two are complementary, not
incompatible. In this way, the legitimate security
interests of both sides can be preserved, and the vital
effort to place some limits, some constraints on this
deadly competition can continue.
? Second, through arms control, which places upper limits
on the size and capabilities of the Soviet force, and
through sensible choices of our own, can avoid spending
vast sums of money on an unnecessarycrategic arms race.
0 Third, we are, therefore, able to balance our defense
resources appropriately between strategic and conventional
forces, and thus meet our real defense needs.
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Fourth, we can preserve a stable strategic military
balance--one in which neither side has an
strike first. A stable balance is a peaceful That most famous of European observers of America, Alexis
induce
Tocqueville, once warned us against "the propensity which
s abnnuee
a
democracies to obey impulse rather than prudence, ast ab
mature design for the gratification of a momentary p
The impulse and the passion for military superiority must be
seen for what they are: unrealistic, simplistic, dangerous. On the
other hand, the prudent and worldaasoitliseandlas it
this Administration's
will be.
We will preserve our national security. We will improve our
capabilities as necessary to maintain the approximate military
balance that exists today between the United States and the Soviet
Union.
We will stay ahead in those capabilities
andaaccuracy,
us--for example, in naval forces, in
in anti-submarine warfare, in tactical air effectiveness,
computers and satellites and propulsion engines. We will continue
to draw upon our broad strengths--our technological genius, and
industrial might, our powerful and loyal allies, of the American
quality of our military people,
American offset
of
people in support of adequate
advantages. We will not make
the Soviets'--nor should we.
We will continue to make steady and sustained increases in
defense spending to build the capabilities we need. We will buy
only the weapon systems that best serve our needs, not nteryto seek
glamorous weapon system that comes along. `,JWenwill continue inne SALT II
equitable and verifiable arms control ag rder to
Treaty--to limit the growth in Soviet military poowweerr, , thine orirs of
place some constraints on this compen,to redu
unnecessarily
unintended conflict, and to avoid spending resources
in an uncontrolled strategic arms race.
Prudence and the mature design--not impulse and the momentary
passion--are the hallmarks of a strong and a sane secity
ident
policy. I have explained what this Administration, under onr P
will
Carter's leadership, has provided for four yea le what we
continue to provide in the future. The American peop
I believe will--settle for no less.
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