SECRET CURB BY CONGRESS ON COVERT AID IS DISCLOSED

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP90-00552R000100620031-0
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
1
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
June 23, 2010
Sequence Number: 
31
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
May 17, 1983
Content Type: 
OPEN SOURCE
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PDF icon CIA-RDP90-00552R000100620031-0.pdf92.16 KB
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/23: CIA-RDP90-00552R000100620031-0 ARnCLE : r~ r ~ _ i 1~1fi`' _ 9? / Secret Curb by Congress on Covert Aid Is Disclosed By MARTIN TOIL Special to Me New Ycet T1ms WASHINGTON, May 16 - Congress a year ago secretly restricted the use of covert money for Nicaraguan rebels to supporting operations to intercept ship- ments of arms to insurgents in El Salva- dor, according to a report by the House Select Committee on intelligence made public today. ? - - The report described a running con- flict between the committee and the Ad- ministration, which it said tailed to heed both public and secret limitations on the use of money imposed by Con- gress and its committees. The secret limitation, approved by a House-Senate conference in April 1982, was contained in a "classified annex" that accompanied t)& authorization bill, the report said. At that time, the House intelligence committee consid- ered but rejected legislation to cut off all covert money for the Nicaraguan rebels. Last December, Congress for. malty adopted an identical restriction prohibiting covert money for the pur- pose of overthrowing the Sandinist Gov- ernment of Nicaragua or provoking a military exchange between Nicaragua and Honduras. Move to End Covert Aid "Both proved ineffective as moderate curbs on insurgent activity or U.S. poli- cy " the report said. "Hostilities within Nicaragua intensified. There was no discernible effect on the arms flow. Throughout, executive branch officials made little effort to mask U.S. support, going so tar in April 1983 as to encour- age media discussion." The report accompanied an amend- ment to the intelligence authorization for the 1983 fiscal year, adopted earlier this month, which would cut off all cov- ert aid to the Nicaraguan rebels and in- stead provide money for '.friendly na- tions" in the region to help intercept the flow of weapons to the insurgents in El Salvador. The report was prepared by Representative Edward P. Boland, chairman of the committee, on behalf of the Democratic majority. The report traced the committee's hardening attitudes in a conflict with the Administration that began with the fast use of covert money for the Nicara- guan rebels. "From the committee's first brief- ing, in December 1981, on the program to support and- Sandinista insurgency, serious concerns were expressed by members of the committee," it said. "These concerns went to the number and tactics of the insurgents to be sup- ported, whether these insurgents would be under U.S. control and the possibility of military clashes between Nicaragua and Honduras." Five days after the first briefing, Mr. Boland, Democrat of Massachusetts, reiterated those concerns in a letter to "the principal executive branch brief- er " the report said. "He emphasized that the concerns were shared by mem- bers of both parties and asked that they be addressed by senior policy makers.,, Nor did the committee's concerns abate after Congress adopted a prohibi. tion an covert aid for the purpose of de- stabilizing the' Sandinist Government, the report said. "Committee members were expressing renewed distress at the number of insurgents supported by the program, the serious nature of fighting then occurring within Nicara- gua, and the lack of success in meeting the program's goals t, 'In this period, also, executive branch briefers discussed other goals and gave different emphases to the pro- gram than those originally described to the committee," the report said. 'The United States has allied itself with insurgents who carry the taint of 'the last Nicaraguan dictator Somoza," the report said, referring to Anastasio Somoza Debayle, who was overthrown by the Sandinistas in 1979. "It has, in ef. fact, allowed the spotlight of interna- tional opprobrium to shift from Sandin- ista attempts to subvert a neighboring government to a U.S. attempt to sub- vert that of Nicaragua." On El Salvador, the report said the troubles there "have their root cause is the serious economic, social and politi- cal shortcomings of the long-eri- t renched Salvadoran social order." "U.S. aid to El Salvador is weighted toward helping to zestsucaire Salvado. ran economic, social and political models, but it is a sad fact that such re- forms are impractical in a climate of unrest and denial of basic services," the report said. "Both are caused by the activities of Salvadoran who, unwilling to limit their attacks to military targets, have launched suc- cessful and very damaging attacks on the power, water and transportation in- frastructure of El Salvador." STAT Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/23: CIA-RDP90-00552R000100620031-0