HOW THE SOVIET ARMY CRUSHED AFGHANISTAN
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP90-00552R000100140012-4
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
1
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
June 23, 2010
Sequence Number:
12
Case Number:
Publication Date:
January 14, 1980
Content Type:
OPEN SOURCE
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/23: CIA-RDP90-00552R000100140012-4
STAT
TIME
c_; p _ __ 14 January 1980
F1 -V 7 , Tr m.
90 U S he A ~.:6 ka I
But rebels may find ways to fight back
When you are wounded and
left on Afghanistan 's plains,
And the women come out
to cut up what remains,
Just roll to your rifle and blow out
your brains
And go to your God like a soldier.
That was Rudyard Kipling's tribute
to Afghanistan, a barren moonscape of a
land at the "crossroads of the world," and
to its proud and savage people. Conquered
by Alexander the Great in the 4th cen-
tury B.C. and by Genghis Khan in the
13th century A.D., Afghanistan in the
Victorian era served as a buffer between
Imperial Russia and the British raj. The
Afghans accepted it all, but they exacted
a bloody price. For generations, the Hin-
dus of India prayed for deliverance from
"the venom of the cobra, the teeth of the
tiger and the vengeance of the Afghan."
Today the target of the Afghans' an-
ger is the Soviet force of 50,000 troops
who have invaded and seized control of
their land. ' Shoravi Padar Lanath!"cried
beggars and shopkeepers alike in the
streets of Kabul, Afghanistan's shabby,
snow-covered capital. The curse ("God-
damn the Russians!") replaced morning
pleasantries in the city's ancient bazaar.
"Afghanistan is no more," lamented a
bootblack in the shopping district of Share
Nau. "We have lost everything."
And so it seemed. A week earlier, in
a lightning invasion, four Soviet divisions
moved into Afghanistan, the iron fist be-
hind a coup that ended the three-month-
old regime of President Hafizullah Amin.
The unfortunate Amin, 50, who had
turned out to be a more independent-
minded nationalist than Moscow wanted,
thus became the third leader of Afghan-
istan to be overthrown and killed within
the past 20 months. In his place the So-
in central Kabul to the Darulaman Pal-
ace, seven miles away, taking his elite
guard and eight tanks along with him. It
was too late, and the defense was too
weak. That same night. the Soviets be-
gan their airlift of troops into Kabul.
Between Dec. 24 and 27, at least 350
Soviet aircraft landed at Kabul Interna-
tional Airport and at Bagram airbase, 25
miles north of the capital. The planes had
been mustered from bases throughout the
Soviet Union; they carried an airborne di-
vision from near Moscow and support
troops from Turkestan. On Dec. 27, Rus-
sian airborne troops stormed the Daru-
laman Palace. Amin was captured and
shot, along with some of his relatives. The
only other serious clash was a skirmish
outside Radio Afghanistan. just across
from the U.S. embassy. In both fights, Af-
ghan troops loyal Ito Amin resisted as best
roops oya they could and inflicted about 250 casu-
alties, but they were no match for the So-
viets. By the next day, Dec. 28, the cap-
ital was entirely in Soviet hands. Amin,
whom the Soviet press had treated with
respect until only a few days earlier, was
_now being described as "a man who was
in the service of the CIA" and a "usurp-
er" who condemned former President Ta-
raki to death.
EXCERP,IL
viets installed Babrak Karmal, 50, a for-
mer Deputy Prime Minister who had long
been considered a Russian protege.
The Soviet seizure had apparently
been taking shape for several months.
Moscow had disliked the truculent Amin
ever since he had replaced a Soviet fa-
vorite, Noor Mohammed Taraki, in the
coup of Sept. 15. As the Muslim insur-
gency kept gaining strength in the coun-
tryside, Moscow proposed to Amin that
Soviet combat forces be brought in to put
down the rebellion. Amin refused.
On Dec. 24, the Soviets made a last at-
tempt to persuade Amin to cooperate, but
again he said no. Apparently seeking to
protect himself, or perhaps on Soviet or-
ders, he moved from the People's House
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/23: CIA-RDP90-00552R000100140012-4
STAT