KREMLIN WATCHERS HAVE ONE PROBLEM: TOO LITTLE TO WATCH

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP91-00587R000100440005-0
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RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
1
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
February 10, 2011
Sequence Number: 
5
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Publication Date: 
February 11, 1985
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OPEN SOURCE
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PDF icon CIA-RDP91-00587R000100440005-0.pdf132.33 KB
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STAT WASHINGTON - With Soviet Pres- ident Konstantin U. Chernenko in frail health and Moscow apparently tracing for a renewed leadership contest, attention again has focused en the small band of American gov- ernmental and academic experts who make a career of trying to pene- trate the Kremlin's cult of secrecy. Known as, Kremlinologists, these specialists handicap the obscure So- viet power race much the way a horse player tries to pick winners at the track. It is a dicey job at best, and even its: practitioners acknowledge that there are wide gaps in their knowl- edge. One academic expert on the Soviet Union dismisses the whole process: "Anyone who pretends to know the full views of the Soviet elite is practicing voodoo science." Nevertheless, it is an important job. Even leaders who hold power for a short time can have a profound influence on Soviet policy and Wash- ington-Moscow relations. So it is clear why U.S. policymakers consid- er it vital to know as early as possible just who is up and who is down in the Kremlin. "'I think the Sovietologists are asked by the press and policymakers to perform miracles of prediction that would not be demanded of them if they were analyzing American politics," said Thane Gustafson, di- rector of the Soviet project of Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies. "Pundits hedge their bets on changes in IU S.) congressional com- mittee chairmanships, but Sovietolo- gists are criticized when they guess wrong." The Kremlinologist's task is almost unbelievably difficult. There are no more closely held secrets in the Sovi- et Union than those involving the inner politics at the top levels. of the Communist Party. "Ilasicaily the technique is three yards and a cloud of dust," Gustafson said. "It involves painstaking exami- nation of the minute differences in the way the Soviet press covers the activities of the leadership. Watch to see who is. in the pictures in the newspal?r r, Keep track of television Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/10: CIA-RDP91-00587R000100440005-0 PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER GT D:1mw 11 February 1985 Kremlin watchers . , problem: [LL[ 1,' rN ~G _ A E R1E X_ too little_to wr--w-otch coverage." II)' Norman Kempster Pure Kremlinology is a specialized A &rec. r,,-,,s segment of the larger study of the Soviet Union. Most academic experts on university campuses and at think tanks insist they are not, in the strict sense of the word, Kremlinologists because they do not have the time or the patience to do the tedious work that is required. Most Kremlinolo- gets work for the US. government, primarily the CIA and the State De- partment's intelligence and Re- search Bureau. The main sources of information are Soviet newspapers and the tran- scripts of radio and television broad- casts, along with the speeches of par- ty leaders. Very little information of interest to the Kremlinologist is clas- sified. Harry Gelman a former CIA ana- vst who is now on the staff of the Center for the Study of Soviet Inter- national Behavior at the Rand- Uni-versity of i ornia, LoS nge es, said much Soviet press coverage is pure propaganda. But, be said, "when you get a speech by one leader asserting that certain circles have a mistaken view, that's" very informative, and it isn't the kind of thing they say for people outside. It, is indicative that a real argument is going on. Sometimes people disagree on the significance of these things, but this is the son of thing we look for." "The Soviet society is divided into neat compartments," said Dimitri K Simes, a Soviet defector who is on the staff of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "The compart- ment that is particularly closed to outsiders is the party apparatus. "In the 40 years since World War II, there have been lots of defectors and emigres - some quite close to power - but they were journalists, academ- ics and' intelligence officers - but not a single party apparatchik." Malcolm Toon, former U.S. ambas- sador to the Soviet Union who served three diplomatic tours in Moscow, recalled the confusion that accompa- nied the ouster of Nikita S. Khru- shchev as communist Party leader in 1964. "The next day there was supposed to be a big celebration in Red Square." he said. "The embassy had political officers stationed around the city to watch for the portraits going up. About 6 p.m., our man in Red Square_ saw a big portrait of Khrushchev going up. About an hour later be saw it coming down. Even sitting in Moscow, reading the press and watching television, you could not be sure. "The White House was annoyed because we did not predict the change, but I said: 'If Khrushchev himself did not know, bow could an . American official know?"' The big question today among Kremlinologists is who will succeed Chernenko, 73, should the Commu- nist Party leader die or be forced to step down because of ill health. The two leading candidates are thought to be Mikhail S. Gorbachev, 53, and Grigory V. Romanov, 60, both mem- bers of the Politburo. Toon does not think it matters very much. "You can be sure that There will not be much of a change no matter who takes over," he said. "I think it's a mistake to get too excited about Gorbachev taking over. Whether it's Gorbachev or a man a little bit older like Romanov, you are talking about , people who have been identified with the collective leadership for six years. Unless you have a radical change in the composition of the Politburo and a radical change in the Central Committee, I don't think you will see a major change in policy." Helmut Sonnenfeldt, former coun- selor at the State Department and before that chief of the department's Office of Research on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, said: "Western analysts seem to attach themselves to an individual Soviet leader as the person to watch in the future. This now seems to be Gorba- cbov." . But Sonnenfeldt, a guest scholar at the Brookings Institution in Wash- ington, said the opinions of Western analysts often reinforce each other, sometimes masking signs that point in the other way. "It's a very occult business," be said. American Kremlinologists try to divide candidates for Soviet leader- ship along policy lines. Current thinking classifies Gorbachev as a reformer and Romanov as a conser- vative. But Simes, the Soviet defector, said he thinks such classification often misses the point. Personality often has more impact than policy, he said, and distribution of other party jobs may be more important yet. "Just like, on Capitol Hill, it's most. -1y personality and patronage," he i sii]d. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/10: CIA-RDP91-00587R000100440005-0