CAN CIA CRATOLOGY ULTIMATELY OUTSMART KREMLIN'S SHELLOLOGY?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00587R000100260033-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 26, 2011
• Sequence Number: 33
• Publication Date: January 10, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/26: CIA-RDP91-00587R000100260033-9
e `~ i'1~.E f E PI EDl
Can CIA Cratology
Ultimately Outsmart
i Kremlin'sShellology?
Studyof Crates on Soviet Ships
Is a Big Help in Espionage
If Shell Game Isn't Played
By ROBERT S. GRt:rrNaEPceR
S:aff Reporter of THE WALL STREET J OURNAL
WASHINGTON - Would James Bond
study pictures of crates to figure out what
the Russians are up to?
Not likely. Crates don't do much for the
image.
But the Central Intelligence Agency has
elevated crate espionage to a science. It is
called cratology, the tongue-in-cheek name
intelligence analysts have given to the
study of crates and other containers used
by the Soviets or their allies to ship mili-
tary hardware around the world.
Currently, cratologists are keeping a
close watch on some crates that arrived at
the Bulgaria Black Sea port of Burgas last
July. The analysts believe the crates,
shipped from Libya, contain five L-39
Csechoslova}:tan aircraft that may be
bound for Nicaragua. Keeping track of
these crates on photographs is easy be-
cause the Libyans built the crates from
two different shades of wood. "They're a
piece of cake to pick up." one U.S. official
brags.
Original Development
Cratologists have been monitoring such
shipments ever since Moscow started de-
livering arms to Third World nations a]-
most three decades ago. Experts study pic-
tures, usually taken by surveillance satel-
lites at different angles, to determine the
dimensions and shapes of crates. They
then compare the crates with similar pack-
ages they have seen earlier whose contents
have been identified.
Sometimes, cratologists build scale
models of the packages and their sus-
pected contents to see whether the cargo
would fit in the container. Such models
were used during the 1962 Cuban missile
crisis to help convince President Kennedy
that the cratologists' assessments were ac-
curate.
Cratology has played a largely secret
role in several other U.S.-Soviet diplomatic
flaps. During a routine examination of sur-
veillance photographs in 1978, analysts no-
ticed something unusual about crates being
loaded aboard ship at a Soviet Black Sea
port. Cratologists knew that' most Soviet
aircraft are broken down into three sec-
WALL STREET JOURNAL
10 January 1985
tions for crating and shipping: a crate for
the wings, one for the fuselage and a third
for the tail assembly. Some of the crates
showed the characteristics of MiG-21 pack-
ages, yet the crates were larger.
New Model of MiG
Intelligence analysts tracked the ship as
it traveled south to the Mediterranean Sea
and across the Atlantic to the Cuban port
of Cienfuegos. When the crates were un-
packed, intelligence sources on the ground
confirmed the cratologists' suspicions: The
Cubans had received MiG-23 aircraft, a
more advanced fighter than the MiG-21
that hadn't vet been introduced into the
Western Hemisphere until then. The arri-
val of new weapons in Cuba "caused a fair
amount of flutter in the Carter administra-
tion," a former intelligence official says.
If cratology has a father, it probably is
Arthur Lundahl, who retired in 1973 as di-
rector of National Photographic Interpre-
tation Center. Mr. Lundahl, who did photo
interpretation for the Navy in World War
II, was recruited by the Central Intelli-
gence Agency in 1953 to organize the
agency's photographic-intelligence activi-
ties. He set up shop above a Ford auto
dealership in Washington. "It was a flea-
bag place," he recalls.
Photographic technology has advanced
so far that cameras on today's satellites
and spy planes can photograph details as
small as the numbers on a license plate.
Photo reading, at the same time, has
evolved into "photo-grammetry," or the
science of discerning exact dimensicns
from photographs. And analysts who spend
part of their time studying photographs of
crates and other containers have been
dubbed cratologists.
In the mid-1950s, the Soviets began ship-
ping arms to Egypt, Syria. Ghana and
other Third World clients. Most of the ship-
ments consisted of the same items: 1I ' iG
aircraft. T-34 tanks and artillery pieces.
Because these items were bulky, they were
transported above deck, packed in crates,
making them easy targets for the CIA's
photographic eyes. Analysts began catalog-
ing these items and soon were able to iden-
tify them from the crates.
which the early findings were discussed
somebody said, "Hey, we've invented a
new science here-cratologyl"
?tfr. Cline says that his analysts also
discovered that the tents used by Soviet
personnel in Cuba were different from the
Cubans' tents, which had a one-foot-wide
gauze ventilation band around the top. U.S.
analysts using surveillance photographs,
therefore, could track the movements of
the Russian technicians in the field who
were assembling the missiles. "We began
calling it tentology." Mr. Cline quips.
Officials don't like to discuss cratology
for fear of revealing too much information
about their surveillance, photo-analysis
and computerized information-processing
capabilities. To the dismay of the intelli- I
gence community, that secrecy was
pierced in early November when certain
government officials leaked reports that
crates containing MiG-21s might be on
their way to Nicaragua.
The crates had first been photographed
by satellite in late September at the Soviet
port of Nikoloyev, but then a heavy cloud
cover obscured the satellite's view for
three days, according to intelligence offi-
cials. When the next pictures were taken,
the crates were gone and a ship laree i
enough to accommodate them below deck,
the Bakuriani, also had left port. When the
ship headed for the Nicaraguan port of
Corinto in early November, stories about
its suspected cargo were leaked. However,
the crates weren't unloaded in Corinto.
What happened to the crates that set off
the recent crate crisis': Some analysts
speculate that the Soviets, pressured by
the publicity, decided the delivery would
be too provocative. Other analysts say the
crates were never loaded on the ship.
Rather, they say, the photograph showed
crates of MiGs being returned to the So-
viets for repairs, a common practice for
Third World nations.
A third theory suggests that the Soviets
may, at times, turn the science of crato-
logy to their advantage. Richard Helms, a
former CIA director, speculates that per-
haps the Soviets have converted cratology
into a giant shell game, in which they
move empty crates about in an effort to
test U.S. reactions. Even as you read this,
tl-e shellologists may be busily at work in
the Kremlin.
In 1962, analysts studying satellite
photos of crates being shipped to Cuba by
the Soviets gave the Kennedy administra-
tion its initial warning that a major arms
buildup was under way. Dino Brugioni, a
CIA photo analyst at the time, says crato-
logists identified shipments to Cuba of Ko-
mar guided-missile patrol boats, MiG-21s
and IL-2S "Beagle" bombers. Alerted by
these early signs, U.S. intelligence ana-
lysts discovered in mid-October that Mos-
cow was delivering missiles to Cuba.
touching off the Cuban missile crisis.
Ray Cline, then deputy director of the I
CIA, recalls that at a staff meeting during I
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/26: CIA-RDP91-00587R000100260033-9