MATRIX ON US-SOVIET SUMMITS, 1943-79

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R001704330012-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 10, 2010
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: July 25, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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25 July 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Matrix on US-Soviet Summits, 1943-79
1. This is a good analysis, but not very useful because not many people
will work their way through it. What is needed is a narrative on each occasion
starting at Vienna which would be highlighted that in June 1961 there was a
meeting in Vienna -- two months later the Berlin Wall, atmospheric testing,
and then the Cuban missile crisis. In July 1967 there was Glassboro -- 11 months
later there was Czechoslovakia, etc.
2. I think what is needed is a thumbnail sketch with about 10 sentences
on each situation.
William J. Casey
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24 July 1985
Memorandum for: Deputy Director for
Intelligence
DDZ-
of the Domestic Policy
Division prepared the attached matrix in
response to your request for a survey of
the goals and results of previous US-
Soviet summits. As you will note, we had
to be selective in deciding what to include
in column 4 (Subsequent Developments). We
tried to include the most important post-
summit developments and--at the same
time--keep the presentation as brief as
possible.
Deputy
Director,
S OVA
Office of Soviet Analysis
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Conference Expectations and Agenda
1. TEHRAN Agreement on an occupation regime
November 1943 for Germany
Big Three
Roosevelt & Stalin Agreement on the political future
(with Churchill) of Eastern Europe, particularly
US-SOVIET SUMMITS, 1943-79
Immediate Results
Various proposals--no agreement
Informal recognition of USSR's
right to have "friendly"
governments on its borders
Agreement to recognize USSR's 1939
borders with Poland in the East and
compensate Poland in the West
2. YALTA
February 1945 for Germany
Big Three
Roosevelt & Stalin
(with Churchill) Agreement on the political future of
Eastern Europe
Agreement to open second front in
Spring 1944
No final agreement--zones of
occupation set up as temporary
measure
Signing of Declaration on Liberated
Europe providing for free elec-
tions and governments represent-
ative of all democratic elements
Roosevelt wished to preserve
allied cooperation to facilitate
creation of postwar world organ-
ization (eventually became the UN).
Stalin wanted Allies to set a date for
opening a second front in Europe.
Agreement on an occupation regime
Subsequent Developments
The Red Army moved rapidly westward to take
control of Eastern Europe, establishing a
de facto occupation zone.
Soviet authorities set up "friendly"
governments according to their own
definition--Communist-dominated and
pro-Soviet.
Soviets eventually agreed to join in
forming the UN.
Allies landed in Normandy in June 1944.
Occupation regime became a point of
cl5ntention among the allies. Zones
became permanent divisions.
Soviet occupation authorities in Eastern
Europe unilaterally determined which
parties met the criteria for participation
in national governments. Sovietization
of Eastern Europe followed.
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Conference
Expectations and Agenda Immediate Results
Poland was to have free elections
with anti-Nazi and "democratic"
parties participating.
Poland's Western border was set
at "Oder-Neisse" line.
Stalin wanted substantial reparations Figure of $10 billion accepted
from Germany and US assistance in as basis for negotiation on
postwar Soviet reconstruction, reparations. US decided not to
discuss assistance pending evidence
of Soviet compliance with other
agreements.
Roosevelt wanted Soviet assistance in USSR was promised lower Sakhalin
final conquest of Japan and an and Kurile Islands and concessions
agreement on-UN voting procedures, at China's expense. USSR promised
to declare war on Japan within 3
months of VE day. USSR was given
three seats in UN and permanent
right of veto.
3. POTSDAM Basic outline for a peace treaty
July- August 1945 with Germany
Big Three
Truman & Stalin
(with Churchill and
then--after Churchill's
election defeat--Atlee)
Allied Control Council was set
up to coordinate occupation
policies. Zones of occupations
were confirmed. Negotiation of
peace treaty was delegated to
Council of Foreign Ministers.
Subsequent Developments
Ambiguity of the agreement on Poland's
border was the cause of problems. There
are eastern and western branches of the
Neisse River, and the Soviets insisted
on setting the border at the western
branch.
US Congress prohibited use of lend-
lease aid for reconstruction in March 1945.
USSR declared war on Japan on schedule
August 8, 1945.
Breakdown of allied cooperation
in administering Germany
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Conference
4. GENEVA
July 1955
Big Four
Eisenhower, Khrushchev
& Bulganin (with Eden
and Faure)
Expectations and Agenda Immediate Results Subsequent Developments
Truman wanted assurance of Soviet Stalin brushed aside allied Continued Sovietization of Eastern
compliance with the Declaration on concerns. Europe
Liberated Europe.
Stalin wanted agreement on reparations Agreement on reparations: each Disputes over occupation policies
from Germany, reversal of the US power to take reparations from led to cutoff of reparations to
government's cutoff of lend lease, and its own zone; additional the USSR from Western zones.
US assistance in Soviet postwar reparations were to be provided to
reconstruction, the USSR from Western zones
Discussion of German reunification and No agreement
peace settlement
(The conference took place two months
after the signing of the Austrian State
Treaty, which provided for the
reunification and neutralization of
Austria.)
Discussion of disarmament: Soviet No agreement--issues of verifi-
proposal--disband NATO and Warsaw Pact cation and intrusion are major
alliances and withdraw foreign troops, obstacles.
US counterproposal--open the skies over
both countries to aerial surveillance
Discussion of the situation in Eastern Soviets refused to discuss.
Europe
Discussions of the situation in China Americans refused to discuss.
and Formosa
Getting acquainted
"Spirit of Geneva"--a' temporary
improvement in the atmospherics
of East-West relations
Soviet ultimatum on Berlin, November
1958 (Khrushchev gave the West six months to
come to an agreement with the USSR and East
Germany on "normalizing" the status of
West Berlin).
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Conference Expectations and Agenda
Immediate Results
5. CAMP DAVID Discussion of German reunification and Khrushchev withdrew his ultimatum
September 1959 peace settlement on Berlin.
Eisenhower & Khrushchev
Discussion of tensions in Europe
6. PARIS
May 1960
Eisenhower &
Khrushchev
(with Macmillan and
de Gaulle)
Khrushchev wanted to explore US views
on relations with Red China.
Getting acquainted: Khrushchev
invited Eisenhower to visit
Moscow after Big Four summit.
Eisenhower tried to assure Khrushchev
of Washington's peaceful intentions.
Discussion of disarmament
Discussion of German reunification
and peace settlement.
Khrushchev demanded American apology
for U-2 overflights (U-2 shot
down May 1, 1960).
Agreement to hold Big Four summit
ASAP
Eisenhower refused to pursue
Khrushchev's opening.
Eisenhower accepted the
invitation.
"Spirit of Camp David"--a tempo-
rary improvement in the atmo-
spherics of US-Soviet relations
Conference broke up in furor
over the U-2 incident. Khrushchev
withdrew the invitation for
Eisenhower to visit Moscow.
Subsequent Developments
Eisenhower accepted responsibility Khrushchev suggested he would like to hold
for the U-2 incident but did not another summit in 6-8 months--with the next
apologize. president.
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Conference
Expectations and Agenda
Immediate Results
Subsequent Developments
7. VIENNA
Discussion of US and Soviet relations
No agreement
June 1961
with Cuba
Kennedy & Khrushchev
Discussion of German reunification
Khrushchev renewed his ultimatum
Ultimatum was later dropped, but construc-
and peace settlement
on Berlin.
tion of Berlin wall began in August 1961.
Agreement on nuclear test ban
Soviets resumed atmospheric testing.
Khrushchev reportedly wished to take
Cuban Missile Crisis, October 1982
the measure of Kennedy and, if
possible, intimidate him.
Kennedy sought to overcome differences
that had exacerbated US-Soviet
relations by projecting an image of
reasonableness.
Discussion of political-military
situation in Southeast Asia
Agreement to work for neutral-
ization of Laos
Fragile neutralism established in Laos.
8. GLASSBORO
July 1967
Johnson & Kosygin
Discussion of the situation in the
Middle East in the wake of the
June 1967 Arab-Israeli War
Discussion of measures to control
strategic arms, particularly ABMs
No agreement
Friendly discussion, but no
agreement
August 19, 1968--Agreement to start SALT
in October 1968. Johnson invited to Moscow
for opening of talks.
August 20, 1968--Soviets invade
Czechoslovakia. SALT talks postponed.
Johnson visit cancelled.
Discussion of military and politicial No agreement.
situation in Vietnam
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Conference
Expectations and Agenda
NOTE: According to Soviet defector
Arkadiy Shevchenko, Kosygin wanted to
avoid the meeting if possible because
he feared that a lack of progress
would undermine his reputation as
negotiator.
Immediate Results Subsequent Developments
9. MOSCOW
May 1972
Nixon & Brezhnev
Discussion of measures to place
numerical limits on strategic arms
Discussion of controls on qualitative
improvement of strategic arms
Agreement on US-Soviet trade and
joint cooperation in other areas
Brezhnev sought to win US recognition
of the Soviet Union's superpower
status and to secure US economic
cooperation in an effort to ease
Soviet economic problems.
Nixon sought to moderate Soviet
behavior by enmeshing the USSR in a
web of cooperative arrangements.
He also hoped to persuade the Soviets
to influence North Vietnam to agree to
acceptable peace terms.
Interim Agreement and ABM
Treaty signed.
Postponed for further negotiation US began MIRVing in 1973. Soviets began
MIRVing and accuracy improvements in 1974.
Joint trade commission established Trade agreement negotiations were
to pursue negotiations completed in October 1972
Agreements signed in areas of Grain purchase agreement signed July 1972.
health, environment, and space
Signing of Basic Principles of US The October 1973 Middle East War frayed this
Soviet Relations: both sides agreement.
promise to act jointly to prevent
situations capable of exacerbating
bilateral relations and forswear
pursuit of unilateral advantage at
each other's expense
No formal agreement Vietnamese peace agreement reached
in January 1973. __
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Conference
Expectations and Agenda
Immediate Results
Subsequent Developments
10. WASHINGTON
June 1973
Nixon & Brezhnev
11. MOSCOW
June 1974
Nixon & Brezhnev
Continuation of 1972 expectations
Agreement on additional measures
to limit strategic arms
Discussion of the Middle East
situation following the October 1973
Arab-Israeli War
Discussion of measures to expand
US-Soviet trade and granting
Most-Favored-Nation status to the
USSR
Discussion of the Middle East
situation
Agreement to continue summits on
a regular basis. Nixon invited to
visit Moscow in 1974
Agreement on peaceful uses of atomic
energy
Agreement to begin urgent
consultations in case of threat of
nuclear war between the parties or
between the parties and third
countries
Commitment to continue negotiations
toward a permanent treaty to succeed
interim agreement
No progress
No formal agreement
US-Soviet trade increased. Watergate
crisis worsened executive-congressional
relations. Through the Jackson-Vanik
amendment, Congress linked MFN to Jewish
emigration from Soviet Union. The Soviets
repudiated the Soviet-American Trade
Agreement in January 1975.
No agreement
President Nixon resigned in August 1974
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Conference Expectations and Agenda
Immediate Results Subsequent Developments
Signed previously prepared agreements
on limiting nuclear tests, reducing
ABM sites, and economic, industrial
and technical cooperation
Agreement to pursue negotiations on
quantitative and qualitative limita-
tion of strategic arms toward a treaty
lasting until 1985
US wanted to discuss North Vietnamese No agreement Fall of Saigon, April 1975
violations of Paris Peace Accords.
12. VLADIVOSTOK Strategic Arms Limitation--
November 1974 progress on a permanent treaty and
Ford & Brezhnev launcher and MIRV limits
Vladivostok Accords agreed on In March 1977, the Carter
equal numerical ceilings on Administration proposed going beyond
launchers and sub-ceilings on the Vladivostok Accords to seek deep
MIRVed launchers. cuts in force ceilings. The
Soviets rebuffed Carter's efforts.
13. HELSINKI
Informal talks held in US and
CSCE Accords were signed, but
August 1975
Soviet embassies on the occasion
there was no formal bilateral
Ford & Brezhnev
of the meeting of heads of state
US-Soviet agreement
to sign the Helsinki Final Act of
the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.
14. VIENNA
Finalization of negotiations on
SALT II Treaty signed.
June 1979
SALT II Treaty
Carter & Brezhnev
Increasing Soviet and Cuban involvement
in Third World became a major source of
tension in US-Soviet relations.
Soviets proceeded to ignore the human
rights provisions of the Helsinki Accords.
US intelligence reports of the existence
of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba raised
the issues of whether the Soviets had
complied with the Cuban'Missile Crisis
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Conference Expectations and Agenda
Immediate Results Subsequent Developments
Accords and whether they could be
trusted to adhere to any international
agreement.
The Soviets invaded Afghanistan
in December 1979. In January 1980,
President Carter withdrew the SALT II Treaty
from Senate consideration and announced an
embargo of grain sales and suspension of
exchanges with the Soviet Union.
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