ESTIMATES AND NET ASSESSMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R001604270022-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 9, 2010
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: January 26, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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26 January 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Estimates and Net Assessments
ftecutive Registry
402
Here are some matters I would like to talk to you about.
1. In reviewin the Status of Interagency Work in Process it appears
that Gershwin and carry the heaviest load by far, with Ermarth,
Vickers, Fuller, a Low and Wettering also fairly heavy. Nall has
listed four very important Estimates, two of them apparently Estimates and
a Memorandum to Holders on the same subject due at the same time. I consider
it important to get the ones on Soviet Sciences, Free World Advanced
Technologies and an update on Soviet Military Technology on the streets
as soon as possible during this year. What contribution are the other NIOs
making or planning to make to the estimate program? Do we need to reallocate
resources to back up Gershwin, and Nall more strongly? I think
we can get Fuller going on an evaluation of Qadhafi's position, objectives
and vulnerabilities as soon as we can.
2. I attach a very good memorandum that Hal Ford did on the draft
Estimate on Strategic Implications of the Soviet Presence in Afghanistan.
I have already commented on that draft which has a lot of good substance
but is too wandering and unforcused with the best part at the end and not
reflected in the Key Judgments accurately. In light of the attention that
Afghanistan is going to get during the coming months it is important to get
this Estimate cleanly and sharply done as quickly as possible. It has been
around far too long already. Hal seems to be pretty much on target with his
suggestions for reorganization. Also, let's be sure that those doing the
Afghanistan Estimate will focus on advanced Soviet capabilities in the
southern theater or are at least aware of Ermarth's memorandum on that
subject (prepared for the NSC) and Estimate due in June on
Soviet Capabilities for Multitheater War.
3. Also, I would like to have a discussion on whether we should be
undertaking anything else in the area in the way of net assessments. I
attach a covering memorandum which I am addressing to you, Gershwin and
William J. Casey
Attachments:
As stated SECRET
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THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Council
15 January 1985
NOTE FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Mr. Casey's Comment (Memo of 14 Jan 85)
on NIE 11/37-85: Strategic Implications
of the Soviet Presence in Afghanistan
I attach, FYI, some suggestions I made in
November re the original draft of this NIE. There
might be something in those suggestions which could
be adapted in revising the present text.
Hal [~-rd
NI0/AL
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14 January 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, National Intelligence Council
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: NIE 11/37-85: Strategic Implications of the Soviet
Presence in Afghanistan
1. I agree that the draft estimate on the strategic implications of
the Soviet presence in Afghanistan is an intriguing paper. It is also an
impressive piece of work, but its very size minimizes its value. Worse
still, the most useful and important part of it, Implications of Soviet
Victory in Afghanistan, is stuck at the back and is hardly mentioned in
the key judgments. Moreover, I find it somewhat more sanguine as to where
a Soviet victory would leave Western interests in the whole area. I also
found it more sanguine than my offhand perception of the US ability to deter
the Soviets from using a consolidated Afghanistan as a base for further
movement.
2. 1 have made a lot of markings on these questions on pages 79-96.
Some of the questions are somewhat answered later on, but not to my full
satisfaction. It almost appears as though we have two estimates here with
Section VII being able to stand on its own; however, it is hard to disentangle
it from other strategic and political implications. Perhaps the way to resolve
this dilemma is to make an appendix out of the military analysis but to get
its implications and conclusions set out in the key judgments.
3. Throughout the draft, closer editing would probably help a lot.
4. Although in his covering memo the NIO says he spent a lot of time
on the SRP comments, I still detect some of what the SRP called the most
critical weaknesses in paragraph 3 of their 26 October comments. I still
agree with their conclusion that the discussion of US military advantage
in the Iranian area is overly reassuring and still written in the context of
a radical Islamic government, which perhaps with leverage on two Iranian borders
instead of one Iranian border the Soviets may be able to do something about.
5. It is a difficult estimate but its importance requires another crash
effort to deal with the difficulties and get it out. It has been around too
long.
6. I'd be interested in knowing the degree of coordination it has received.
I want comments and suggestions from NIO/USSR and NIO/GPF. The Ermarth memo of
last fall on Soviet opportunities in the southern theater struck me as much
more trenchantly on the mark. It appears that perhaps there has not been enough
input from Soviet and military specialists.
Orig - Ch, NIC
1 -
1 DD C1.
1 - ile
William J. Casey
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JtCR T
NOFORN
1 November 1984
NOTE FOR: Herb Meyer Graham Fuller
FROM: Hal Ford
SUBJECT: Quick Thoughts -- from a Cold Reader --
NIE 11/37-84, Strategic Implications ofnth24 Octberaft
e SovietrPrresencef
in Afghanistan
1. I agree with much of the SRP's critique. The draft NIE reflects
prodigious thought and work. It is well and responsibly done. There is
much of great value in it. There are scores of estimates in it. But it
is not an Estimate.
2. It should be. The concept of the paper strikes me as sound, and
relevant to policymaking needs. The piece should go back to the drawing
board for major face-lifting surgery.
3. My major reactions to the present text are, in brief:
a. Nothing stands out sharply as the paper's findings or
contributions to policymaking. There is discussion of a maze of
interacting forces, but no clear so-what. Everything is talked
about, but the reader isn't told how to weigh all these elements.
The paper needs a beginning, middle, and end, with certain key themes
or findings stressed. A legitimate response of a policymaker to the
present text could be that old chestnut: 'I'm still confused, but on
a higher level." The NIF must do more than that. It must do lots of
things simultaneously: (1) uplift knowledge and understanding
clarify and sort out key elements from an extremely complicated (2)
strategic situation; and (3) offer the policymaking reader some
sense of trends -- those which are inexorable and those subject to
remedy -- and (if possible) some sense of handles for US
policymaking. At present the paper does lots of (1), but less of (2)
and (3).
b. The value of the paper to consumers can be enhanced by
somewhat expanding the concept of the paper to include at least some
underlying theme of what general Soviet course in Afghanistan seems
most likely for the future. This will (1) strengthen the paper's
unity/progression of thought; 12) underlie a subsequent discussion in
SECRF
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DECL OADR I
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NOFORN)
the NIE of the likely strategic consequences, short and long range,
of such a future; and (3) eliminate the need for the present spate of
words, here and there in the draft, about further Soviet military
invasions in the region which I assume you (NI0/NESA) consider to be
unlikely.
c. Shorten and simplify the paper throughout. At present it is
indigestible: the policymaking officers you wish to influence simply
do not have the time and energy to plow through the present text's
complexities.
d. Lots of the data in the text could be factored out and put at
annex. Also, I assume that there will be a lot of helpful maps and
graphics in the NIE.
e. The present Key Judgments need the most work: to distill the
so-what essence of the good stuff in the text. See my rough draft
ideas, below, for revised KJ's. To some extent these KJ's reflect
the present text/KJ's; to some extent they simply reflect my own
personal (mistaken?) judgments about the NIE's subject matter. In
any event, do what you will with my suggestions.
4. See also uV marginalia scribbles. Good luck.
Attachment
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w SECRET w
NOFORN
SUBJECT: Quick Thoughts -- from a Cold Reader -- on 24 October Draft of
NIE 11/37-84, Strategic Implications of the Soviet Presence
in Afghanistan
DCI/NIC/NIO/AL/HFord:~ (1 NOY 84)
Distribution:
Orig - VC/NIC
1 - A/NIO/NESA
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - AG/K.G.; M.K.; and C.O.
1 - SRP
1 - Ford Chrono
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