LETTER TO JOHN MCCLAUGHRY FROM WILLIAM J. CASEY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R001604250029-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 31, 2009
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: December 7, 1984
• Content Type: LETTER

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R001604250029-6
STAT
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R001604250029-6
 )PERATIOSaNc CFNTFR1(1 IRRFNT C11PPfRT C1RC i 1P ( 7_
nitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R001604250029-6
WALL STREET JOURNAL, Page 28
launching Its Own Forces
Fourth, where a vacuum existed or the
costs and risks were low, the U.S.S.R
proved still willing to launch Its own forces
at targets on its periphery-Afghanistan,
and perhaps elsewhere when and if cir-
cumstances seem right.
Fifth, the Soviets advised new radical
regimes to mute their revolutionary rbeto-
Tic and to try to keep their links to Western
commercial resources, foreign assistance
and international financial institutions.
Moscow's ambitions did not cloud recogni-
tion that It could not afford more economic
dependents such as Cuba and Vietnam.
This strategy has worked. A Soviet Un-
ion; that had found Itself in 1972 without
major successes-except for the survival
of the Castro regime-and with many fail-
ures in the Third World after two decades
of effort could count the following achieve-
ments by the end of 1982:
? Victory in Vietnam and Hanoi's con-
solid on of power in all of Indochina.
? mu t'daical noires in Ethiopia, An-
gola and Nitaragud."
Regroup to Check the Soviet Thrust
By WIr.WAM J. CASEY
The effects of American defeats in Viet-
.in and Iran undermined the confidence
U.S. friends and allies in the Third
orid (and Europe and Japan) and en-
red that the Soviet Union would see in
e Third World its principal foreign-policy
portunities for years to come.
The Soviets themselves suffered set-
Lcks in the 1960s and early '70s in the
rird World. They suffered one setback af-
r another in Africa. They saw their hopes
South America dashed by the overthrow
Salvador Allende in Chile and they were
imiliatingly expelled from Egypt in 1972.
hen they turned again to the Third World
1975. it was with a strategy designed to
inimize the chance of a repetition of
ose setbacks. The strategy, enriched and
rengthened over several years. is realis-
and calculated to exploit effectively
ith events and opportunities.
First, shown the way by Castro in An-
la, the Soviets helped him consolidate
e radical power of the MPLA there, cre-
ing a government dependent on Soviet
id Cuban support for survival. This was
flowed by the dispatch of thousands of
,
than Troops to Ethiopia. Unlike aauaL, goal for over a century.
tither the MPLA nor Mengistu could af- . . Cuban control of Grenada (and new
rd to order the Cubans and Soviets out. military facilities there for support of fur-
In the new strategy, the principal, ther subversion).
-vious role in Third World countries . An active insurgency in El Salvador,
aWd be played by another Third World where U.S. support of the elected govern-
ate-Libya. Vietnam, Nicaragua. No su- merit has rekindled old Vietnam memo-
!rpower would be seen to be guiding or Ties
ming or directing the radical forces at . Nicaraguan support of revolutionary
ork; the host government would be main- violence in Honduras and Guatemala, as
fined by foreign advisers and troops who well as El Salvador.
iuldn't be expelled in the event of a ? U.S. expulsion from Iran, which,
range of heart. Additionally, it was a though not through any Soviet action, rep
mite that (and makes)
m- resented a major strategic gain for the
rt response e by by the West appear ar neo any-im di-
U.S.S.R.
~ri. ? Rapid progress toward Cuban control
Seecoconndd, when radical governments Suriname, the first breakthrough on the
line to power, the Soviets directly or or South American continent.
surrogates helped
-r
rough
? Pro-Western regimes under siege in
e
t
o ensur
structure re
security
internal
r
- at any challenge from within would be
be no more io -
amped des. . out. Sometimes There The it worked, in
ri
a ad a and Angola, Sometimes
and sometimes there wa there wa-s
)t enough time, as in Jamaica.
the Soviets supplemented these
Third
,
22 April 1983
Item No. 4
Any effort to counter
the Soviets in the Third
World will fail unless Con-
gress is a party to the execu-
tive s thinking and plan-
ning--all along the way.
1. We have too often neglected our
friends and neutrals in Africa, the Middle
East, Latin America and Asia until they
became a problem or were threatened by
Idevelopments we considered hostile to our
interests. The Third World now buys 40%
of our exports; that alone is reason enough
to pay greater attention to the problems of
the less developed countries (LDCs) before
we confront coups, insurgencies or instabil-
ity. The priority of the Third World in our
overall foreign policy must be raised and
isustained. The executive branch must do
more to educate the public, the Congress
1and Third World governments about Soviet
,strategy in the LDCs generally.
2. The U.S. must establish priorities in
major commitments. President Nixon
wanted to rely on key regional states as
bulwarks for stability and peace. There
are some dangers in this approach (Iran
was to be the key state in the Persian
Gulf), but it is generally sensible. If our
early help fails to prevent serious trouble,
for which countries are we prepared to put
our chips on the table? We should choose
L 0N; 7i tillEPO/El~
Chad and the Sudan.
Beyond these successes, the Soviets
could see opport
nities
actual or
otential
0
u
,
p
,
2
1
to achieve their objectives in many other
,0GE Z ~
places.
The U.S. needs a realistic counter-strat-
ctics with their more traditional offer- egy. Many components of that strategy
gs. such as technical and political train- also are familiar, though they must be ap-
g in the U.S.S.R., the rapid supply of proached and linked in new ways. The
eapons and the use of propaganda and measures needed to address the Soviet
ibversion to support friends or help desta- challenge in the Third World have the ad-
lize unfriendly governments. ditional appeal that they represent also a
sensible American approach to the Third
World whether or not the U.S.S.R_ is in-
volved: -
? Possession of Afghanistan
a Russian
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R001604250029-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R001604250029-6
CE G'ROLIP _ V - 4r
ahead of time and to consultation with key
members of committees of Congress so
that their support at crucial moments is
more likely. Great losing battles for for-
eign military sales and economic assis-
tance, played out on the world stage and at
critical times, represent devastating set-
backs for the U.S. with ramifications going
tar beyond the affected country.
We Need a Constant Policy
3. We must be prepared to demand
firmly but tactfully and privately that our
friends observe certain standards of be-
havior with regard to basic human rights.
It is required by our own principles and es-
sential to political support in the U.S.
Moreover, we have to be willing to talk
straight to those we would help about is-
sues they must address to block foreign ex-
ploitation of their problems-issues such as
land reform, corruption and the like. We
need to show how the Soviets have ex-
ploited such vulnerabilities elsewhere to
good effect to make clear we aren't
preaching out of cultural arrogance but
are making recommendations based on ex-
perience.
4. We need to be ready to help our
friends defend themselves. We can train
them in counterinsurgency tactics and up-
grade their communications, mobility and
intelligence services. We need changes in
our foreign-military-sales laws to permit
the U.S. to provide arms more quickly. We
also need to change our military procure-
ment policies so as to have stocks of cer-
tain basic kinds of weapons more readily
available.
5. We must find a way to mobilize and
use our greatest asset in the Third World-
private business. Few in the Third World
wish to adopt the Soviet economic system.
Neither we nor the Soviets can offer unlim-
ited or even large-scale economic assis-
tance to the I.DGs. Investment-is the key to
economic success or at least survival in
the Third World and we, our NATO allies
and Japan need to develop a common
strategy to promote investment in the
Third World. The Soviets are helpless to
compete with private capital in these coun-
tries.
6. Finally, the executive branch needs
to collaborate more closely in the setting of
strategy with key members and commit-
tees of Congress. Too often opportunities to
counter the Soviets have been lost by
clashes between the two branches. The in-
dependent stand of Congress is a fact of
life, and any effort to counter the Soviets
in the Third World will fail unless Congress
is a party to the executive's thinking and
planning-all along the way. Support for a
Third World policy must be bipartisan and
stable.
Without a sustained, constant policy ap-
plied over a number of years, we cannot
counter the relentless pressure of the
U.S.S.R in the Third World. It is past time
for the American government-executive
and Congress-to take the Soviet challenge
in the Third World seriously and to develop
a broad, integrated strategy for countering
it. It will be the principal U.S.-Soviet bat-'
tleground for many years to come.
Mr. Casey is director of the Central in-
telligence Agency.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/01/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R001604250029-6