STATEMENT BY THE HONORABLE KENNETH W. DAM BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE U.S. SENATE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M00539R001802760010-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 17, 2010
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: April 17, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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STAT
E 1utive Secretary
8 Apr 85
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United States Department of State
Deputy Secretary of State
April 19, 1985
Attached is my statement before
the SSCI on Wednesday. The entire
statement was submitted for the
record. The portions that I read
are marked.
Kenneth W. Dam
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Executive Registry
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STATEMENT BY
THE HONORABLE KENNETH W. DAM
BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
U.S. SENATE
APRIL 17, 1985
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SECRET
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of this committee,
I know the Committee is familiar with the President's
report to Congress of April 3, which requested release of 14
million dollars for the Nicaraguan resistance, and with his
proposal the following day which explained how this money would
be used to induce the Sandinistas into a dialogue with their
opposition as a step toward national reconciliation and
political reform.
The President's proposal demonstrates that we are not
seeking the funding as an end in itself, but rather as a means
to promote a process that could lead to peaceful national
reconciliation in Nicaragua.
Specifically, the proposal has three fundamental parts.
First, the extension by the Nicaraguan opposition of its March
1 dialogue offer -- a dialogue that would be accompanied by a
ceasefire -- from April 20 to June 1. The opposition has
already agreed to this extension. Second, resumption of United
States assistance to the opposition. Third, limitation on such
assistance to non-military purposes until at least June 1. If
by that date the Sandinistas do not respond positively to the
opposition offer to talk, or if no agreement has been reached
by 60 days after they accept the offer, the President would
lift the restriction on non-military assistance unless both the
opposition and the Sandinistas ask him to keep it in effect.
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StGRET
It is important to note that the March 1 Declaration was
not produced in isolation by the Nicaraguan resistance, but
rather complements and reflects proposals made by a broad
spectrum of Nicaraguans inside and outside the country. The
March 1 document closely parallels an earlier proposal for
dialogue made by the internal opposition on February 22.
Furthermore, on March 22, the Bishops Conference of the
Nicaraguan Catholic Church agreed to mediate a
Government-opposition dialogue, as requested in the March 1
Declaration. The Church earlier had called for dialogue
between the Government and the armed opposition in an Faster
Pastoral Letter issued in April 1984.
CI want to describe for you today,. in more detail than I
think has been provided, why we believe the President's
initiative is so importan not just to settling the conflict in
Nicaragua, but to the ca se of peace in the region as a whole.
SECRET
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SECRET
You are well aware that our policy t~ward Nicaragua seeks
four objectives:
severing of Nicaragua's military ties to Cuba and the
Soviet Bloc;
end of Sandinista support for subversion;
reduction in Nicaragua's military buildup to restore
regional military ba]/ance; and
genuine democratic/government.
These goals do not represent a unilateral U.S. effort to
impose its will upon another sovereign country. They are
closely paralleled in the precepts for peace agreed to by all
participants in the Con adora process, including Nicaragua --
the basic 21 Points of/September 1983.
We regard all fur of our objectives toward Nicaragua as
important. They muq/t all be met if we are to help achieve
regional peace and/stability. Yet I am concerned that in the
case of one of th~ four objectives -- Nicaragua's
democratization - the relationship with overall efforts to
bring peace to entral America remains obscure and hence may
enjoy less support than it should.
SECRET
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SE~P CT
To understand this relationship, we should start with the
realities of Nicaragua today. This com ittee needs no
convincing as to the nature of the Sand vista regime and its
policies. You have followed the case nd seen the facts. In
addition to the damning evidence avai able to the world of
Sandinista oppression and aggression you have seen the
intelligence data that reveals the a tent of Nicaragua's ties
with powers hostile to the United States, the details of its
rapid military buildup, and the deree of Sandinista
responsibility for subverting its/neighbors. As the Chairman
of this committee said in a speech three weeks ago:
QUOTE The Sandinista Natio~al Directorate has stolen a
democratic revolution from the citizens of Nicaragua as
surely as the Bolsheviks//stole the Russian revolution
against the Czar. It hats set out on a course of
subversion abroad and rfpression at home which has
disturbed and frightened its neighbors. UNQUOTE
SECRFT
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Our friends in Central America, as th Chairman made
clear, have long been aware of the truth bout Nicaragua.
President Suazo calls the Sandinista re ime a cancer.
President Monge of democratic Costa Ri a who was here on
Monday, has been very outspoken, espe ially in private.
Incidentally, the current presidents 1 campaign in Costa Rica
is interesting -- each of the two m jor parties is appealing
for votes on the ground that it wi/11 stand tougher against
Sandinista intimidation. That's/a real switch from Somoza's
day when Costa Rica helped the S'andinistas reach power.
SECRET
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The problem so clearly seen by us and our friends is not
going to go away. If we don't deal with 't now, it's going to
get worse. Nicaragua is going to remain a source of tension
and destabilization until there are cha ges in that country's
internal political system. As long as/the commandantes rule
unhindered by the checks and balances/of independent
governmental institutions and unrespiOnsive to the popular will,
it is clear that they will pursue the same agenda they have
pursued in their first six years i/h power. And that agenda
could not be more obvious. I find it ironic when the
Administration is accused of e.a geration in depicting
Sandinista intentions, or of q/.bting them out of context, when
in fact the record of Sandinis/,ta pronouncements leaves no doubt
as to their dedication to Mar,/Kist, totalitarian rule at home
and spread of revolution abroad. No objective observer can
still believe -- when they bee Castro at Ortega's inauguration,
the Prime Minister of Iran/earlier this year in Managua, and
Tomas Borge by Qaddafi's ide in Tripoli -- that the
Sandinistas are really npnaligned social reformers willing to
live in peace with theif neighbors if only we would leave them
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In reality, the Sandinistas and their Cuban mentors and
their Soviet advisors have a vision for Central America that is
totally different from our own. They on't seek to live in
peace with their neighbors -- they wait to see them made over
into the Marxist, totalitarian image of today's Cuba. And they
will not stop short of their goal less we demonstrate that
the American commitment to suppor central American resistance
to agression is stronger than th Zdetermination of the
Sandinistas and their allies to erpetrate it.
If we are agreed that there must be internal change, the
question is, how do you get it in Nicaragua today. We are
convinced that it won't hap~en spontaneously or voluntarily.
In this context I hope we lon't delude ourselves when we call
attention to the fact that the Sandinistas reneged on their
1979 promises to democratic government, or to the hypocrisy of
their endorsement of the/September 1984 Contadora draft
agreement at a time when they were carrying out their sham
election campaign. It/does no harm to remind the Sandinistas
of their deceit, but a are fooling ourselves if we imagine
that these commitmen s ever had any real meaning, or that by
invoking them we ca shame the commandantes into political.
liberalization.
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SEG~
The plain truth is there will be n such change unless the
Sandinistas are pressured into it. Th men who rule Nicaragua
are not democrats, nor have they ever been. They are
totalitarian Marxists, cut from the ame cloth as Castro. They
gained power by force, wield it by orce, and will only give it
up or modify their behavior if for ed to do so. We believe we
have a chance to make them change if we are given the leverage
to do so. But for that, we need the funds the President is
requesting, and we need this Co mittee's support to get them.
As the President's report make clear, containment and
conventional pressure won't d the job.
If anyone expects San 'vista rule merely to wither away or
collapse under the strains of diplomatic pressure or economic
troubles I would have th look to the Sandinistas' mentors --
to Cuba, where Castro h ruled for a quarter-century despite a
shattered economy and a opprobrium of much of the Hemisphere
and the world; or to a USSR, whose leadership maintains an
iron grip despite th moral bankruptcy and practical failings
of its rule.
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-? SECRET
Although I have stressed he intransigence of the
Sandinistas, they do respond ,to pressure. We have seen that in
1983 when armed opposition pressure made them finally agree to
the concept of multilatera peace talks; and last year when
they attempted to turn th tide of negative world opinion by
going through the motio of an election. What we propose is
to offer them a way ou of their internal dilemma and combine
that with physical pr ssure; we believe this is the only way
they may come to se the light. Bill Casey will review the
details of our pro osal. But I want to echo our conviction
that while tough we have a realistic, doable policy -- one
that will work in Nicaragua as it has in El Salvador.)
Our insistence on internal change in Nicaragua typically
elicits two challenges in response: 1) Doesn't this mean you
are simply determined to overthrow the Sandinistas? and, 2)
What gives you the right to tell another nation how it must
govern itself?
The answer to the first question is simply no. We do not
demand removal of the current Nicaraguan leadership. We do, as
I stressed earlier, insist on changes, in internal -- and
external -- policy. If the current leadership makes those
changes, as part of negotiations with the opposition or simply
because they bow to pressure, that's fine with us. It's really
up to them.- -
SECRET
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As to our right to insist, the answer is no less
compelling. On the most basic level, we have an inherent
responsibility to defend our interests and seek to shape events
in accordance with our own ideals and goals. Clearly our
communist adversaries have never shrunk from this
responsibility -- nor can we. If we truly believe in
democratic values and human freedom we must defend them. If we
conclude, as the Administration does, that change in Nicaragua
is essential -- not for its own sake but in the interest of
peace and freedom -- then the justification to work for such
change is self-evident. Bear in mind that we are asking of
Nicaragua no more than what President Duarte is doing in El
Salvador. President Duarte has opened a dialogue with the
rebels in El Salvador, and has encouraged all guerrilla
factions to participate in an open political process --
including free elections -- as well as to humanize the war.
The Sandinistas have long called for a political solution in El
Salvador; let them follow their own advice and deal seriously
with Nicaraguan opposition.
SECRET
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Moreover, in the Contadora Document of Objectives, all of
the Central American countries including Nicaragua agreed that
internal reconciliation on the basis of democratic principles
is essential to ending the conflict in the region. Yet to date
Nicaragua has rejected any form of internal dialogue with its
armed opposition. We want tobreak the logjam. But to succeed
we have to keep the pressure on Nicaragua. Without it, as the
Sandinista record of broken promises and rejection of all
serious calls for dialogue from the opposition, the Church, and
their neighbors makes clear, the Sandinistas will remain
intransigent.
The President's initiative will supply that pressure. It
comes at a time when there is a clear desire for peace
throughout Central America and the political will there to make
peace possible. I call to your attention the reactions to the
President's proposal from Latin American leaders. President
Duarte of El Salvador called it the right step at the right
time in our quest for peace and democracy in this region."
Mexican President de al Madrid said the United States proposal
"could constitute a forward step in the solution of this
delicate conflict."
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President Monge of Costa Rica said "it is a proposal for a
peaceful solution to one of the great problems of our time in
Central America, aimed at achieving peace and making possible
democracy." Ecuadorean President Febres Cordero said, that "If
the left has been suggesting in general a dialogue between the
guerrillas and the legitimately constituted government in El
Salvador, and all the parties in Guatemala take part in the
democratic process, why can't there be a dialogue between the
Sandinista Government and the opposition forces?" A statement
released on behalf of President Barletta of Panama said, "The
proposal moves forward both on the cessation of hostilities in
Central America as well as on dialogue instead of
confrontation." President Alfonsin of Argentina said our
proposal "is a positive policy that, if taken up by Latin
America, might produce some formula for a solution."
Some foreign leaders qualified heir public endorsements.
But if you look at what they said in full, all of them (except
Nicaragua) saw in the proposal potential contribution to a
peaceful settlement. The rea message was, if not publicly
explicit: they support our approach and want the Sandinistas
to take our initiative se iously.
There is thus an opportunity to be seized. Our proposal
is not an end run get the $14 million. We think that the
steps outlined b the President, based on the proposals for
dialogue of the Nicaraguan opposition, can lead to peace
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The Sandinistas are fully aware of the implications of our
proposal. They were dismayed by some of the favorable
reactions to it in the region. Their abrupt and negative
reaction to the proposal shows that they see it as a danger --
that they fear exposure as the odd man out; the real obstacle
to peace.
If Congress does not support us at this critical juncture
I am convinced that we will miss a chance for peace in Central
America that may not recur.
Cf this happens, the outlo for the region is bleak. The
fighting will not stop, in fa I see it worsening. Economic
recovery under these circum tances stands little chance; more
human misery is in store. Extremists of left and right would
again be in control. F agile democracies would be in great
jeopardy.
We are cal ling on Congress to help us break this vicious
cycle. If we o not seize this opportunity we are going to
face harder choices not far down the road
Doc #2188C
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