LETTER TO WILLIAM J. CASEY FROM OSWALD H. GANLEY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M00539R001001420004-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 13, 2010
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: May 17, 1985
• Content Type: LETTER

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
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DCI
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DDCI
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EXDIR
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D/ICS
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DD.I
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DDA
7.
DDO
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DDS&T
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Chm/NIC
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GC
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IG
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Compt
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D/Pers
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D/OLL
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D/PAO
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SA/IA
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AO/DCI
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C/IPD/OIS
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NIO Sp
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D SOYA
X
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C ACIS
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STAT
23 May 85
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Program on Information Resources Policy
May 17, 1985
Mr. William J. Casey
The Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
Anthony G. Oettinger
John C. LeGates
John F. McLaughlin
Benjamin M. Compaine
Oswald H. Ganley
In your letter of October 19,1984 to Mr. Oettinger,
commenting on Major Rowell's draft report "Arms Control
Verification: A Guide to Policy Issues for the 1980s" you asked
that we send you several copies once the report has been printed.
Enclosed are five copies. Please let us know if you need
more copies and we shall be glad to make appropriate
arrangements.
Thank you again for reviewing the draft.
Oswald H. Ganley
Executive Director
OHG/cros
Enclosures
Harvard University -~ Center for Information Policy Research Harvard University
~~_~~, 200 Aiken
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
617-495-4114
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/13 :CIA-RDP87M00539R001001420004-7
Arms Control Verifications
A Guide to Policy Issues
for the 1980s
William F. Rowell
Program on Information Resources Policy
Harvard University Center for Information
Policy Research
Cambridge, Massachusetts
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Addressing Congress after signing the SALT II (Strategic Arms
imitation Talks) Treaty in June 1979, President Carter discussed the
1.
overriding need to avoid nuclear war:
In any age, such a rivalry risks degenerating into
war, but our age is unique, for the terrible power of
nuclear weapons has created an incentive for avoiding
war that transcends even very deep differences of
politics and philosophy. In the age of the hydrogen
bomb, there is no longer any meaningful distinction
between global war and global suicide.
In a similar fashion, President Reagan in his May 1982 commencement
address to his alma mater, Eureka College, vividly sketched the horrors
of nuclear war and his own responsibility to prevent it:
The fourth point is arms reductions. I know that
this weighs heavily on many of your minds. In our 1931
"Prism," we quoted Carl Sandburg, who in his own
beautiful way quoted the Mother Prairie, saying, "Have
you seen a red sunset drip over one of my cornfields,
the shore of night stars, the wave lines of dawn up a
wheat valley?" What an idyllic scene that paints in our
minds -- and what a nightmarish prospect that a huge
mushroom cloud might someday destroy such beauty. "1y
duty as President is to ensure that the ultimate
nightmare never occurs, that the prairies and the cities
and the people who inhabit the re-nain free and
untouched by nuclear conflict.
Since World ~Jar.II, the United States has placed considerable
emphasis on arms control, especially upon negotiated arms control
agreements, to enhance national security and reduce the likelihood of
war, Eiowever, because of the critical importance of America's military
relationship with the Soviet Union and an unwillingness, stemming from a
profound distrust, to rely on Soviet promises alone, American leadership
has continually sought assurances of Soviet compliance. From President
Truman's 1950 call for "disarmament to be policed continuously" using
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"foolproof" measures3 to President Reagan's 1983_speech to the United
Nations General Assembly reaffirming the unwillingness of the United
States to "compromise on the necessity of effective verification,"~
American presidents have repeatedly emphasized~a firm policy of no arms
control without the necessary verification measures. Congress,
recognizing the central role of verification in arms control, in 1977
formally resolved that "adequate verification of compliance should be an
indispensable part of any international arms control agreement."5 A
further indication of the importance that Americans place upon
verification is the virtually universal agreement by nuclear freeze
proponents on the need for a "verifiable" freeze.6
BRIEF HISTORY OF VERIFICATION
This section provides a simplified history of arms control
verification efforts. The purpose here is not to provide a detailed,
authoritative account but rather to describe the broad evolution of arms
control verification in order to provide a context for examining current
and future policy issues.
Despite the fact that arms control agreements date from antiquity,
the phenomenon of verification as a major issue in arms control
negotiations did not surface until the advent of nuclear weapons.
Until these times, the tremendous difficulty in making significant
changes to a country's military potential without highly visible force
changes reduced the need for explicit assurances of compliance. For
example, although the post-l-/W I naval treaties among the big powers
(Washington and London Naval Treaties) contained detailed provisions
requiring exchange of data among the parties, there were no explicit
provisions for verification such as inspection of ships under
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