EXECUTIVE FOR ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00269R000500050043-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 7, 2010
• Sequence Number: 43
• Publication Date: May 26, 1948
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. Mathias F. Correa
26 May 1948
SKWEA,
SUBJECT: Executive for Administration and Management
I have talked with the Executive for A & M, his Deputy and the Chiefs
of his various Branches. I have also examined comments on and criticisms of
A & M from sources outside of A & M, It is difficult to make a fair estimate
of such an organization and its personnel without delving much more deeply
into its services and reaction of the customers served. I will set forth
below, however, a short summary including composition, a somewhat snap judgment
of key personnel, general criticism leveled at A & M, and points that might
possibly warrant remedial action.
1. Composition
A & M is a fairly large unit consisting ofE:1 personnel. It has the
following five branches:
(a) Budget and Finance Branch ----
(b) Services Branch -
(c) Personnel Branch
*(d) Reference Center
(e) Management Branch
3--Strictly speaking, Reference Center no longer belongs to A & M.
Through some administrative legerdemain, the Office of Collection and
Dissemination, with the majority of its functions and personnel, was merged
with Reference Center. This having been done, the combined 001)-Reference
Center has itself disappeared and has been reconstituted as a new Office of
Collection and Dissemination on the Old Office level.
2. Key Personnel
a From having talked with him only twice, I would judge that
Executive for A & M, is very possibly a capable administrative
officer who is enjoying a position as one of the inner council. I believe
that CIA revolves around A & M, and thatnjoys the feeling of power
and authority, If returned to his normal position of servicing the operating
offices, he would probably do a capable job and not incur the criticism which
is presently leveled at him.
(b) eputy, has made no very clear im-
pression on me. He seems to be imbued with the spirit of A & M, as the crown
prince should.
(c) Saunders is Chief of Budget and Finance Branch, He appears
to be a mild man, perhaps slightly lacking in force. He has had a long
budgetary and accounting back round is enthusiastic about his job, and, I
believe, knows his business? ells me his relations with the Bureau
of the Budget and GAO are excellent1
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Chief of the Services Branch, seems forcef'' and efficient.
He has a be ground of Government service and OSS. r.
(e) Kelly, Chief of Personnel Branch, is a young man of 30 years.
At college he majored in Public Administration and has eight years of personnel
background in various departments of Washington. He does not appear very force-
ful but is more outspoken than most of those in A & M. I believe he is aware
of the difficulties of recruiting and keeping personnel and is trying to tap
every source. He appears enthusiastic and hard working and, in general, made
a favorable impression.
(f) Dr. Andrews, the Chief of Reference Center, is a professional
anthropologist and a former assistant to Professor Hooten at Harvard. He is
intelligent, enthusiastic and drives himself hard. He has unquestioned ability
in his own field. I believe his trained research mind will prove of value in
Reference Center.
(g) = who is Chief of the Management Branch, is young and
with great zeal. He appears to be third in the A . M hierarchy behind
an I always have the feeling that a management branch must con-
tinually over-manage to justify its existence, but I think approaches
his job as moderately as possible.
All the Chiefs of the A & M Branches "talk a good l e", but it is diffi-
cult to check their assertions without a much more comprehensive investigation.
From a superficial contact, they appear to be doing a good job and I think are
probably capable.
3,, Criticism of A & M, mostly from inside CIA, is generally as follows:
(a) Excessive authority wielded byl I an administrative
officer. (See no. 4).
(b) Administrative (almost impenetrable) strata between Director and
Assistant Directors for Operating Offices. See No. 4)-
(c) Predominance of Service and State personnel in. high brackets.
Replacement from outside and consequent difficulty in promotion. (See No. 4).
(e) Personnel procurement. (See No. 4)-
(f) Difficulty in requesting promotions, etc. This is a normal and
usual complaint. Kelly says that Personnel Branch only checks promotions on
the basis of available slots, time and grade, etc. He says that about 90% go
through on the recommendation of Branch Chiefs. I think he makes it sound
slightly too easy,
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JIC%,Kt 1
i There have been many sarcastic remarks about the e)_wS.nation.and
subsequent reconstitution of OCD, This is described as typically A & M and
rather idiotic,
fit., Points that may warrant further study,
(a) Criticism under 3(a) and 3(b) seems valid. The whole question
of staff levels appears to me wrong. Whereas in theory the Executives and the
Assistant Directors are on the same level, in practice this is not so, Whether
by chance, progressive encroachment or deliberate usurpation of prerogatives
and power, the Executive for A & M has become the most powerful staff member,
and the Assistant Directors find themselves on a lower level, To my mind, the
Assistant Directors of the Operating Offices (ORE, 00, and O30) should form a
close working group with, perhaps,the Executive Director, As Chiefs of Operations
they should conduct their operations and operational planning under the close
and constant advice of the Director V Executive or a*r.Deputy, They should be
the advisors to the Director and the Executive for A & M should be returned to
his normal position of serving the operating Offices. At present I have the
feeling that A & M bars the way to close association between the Director and
the Operating Chiefs. This I consider poor policy*
c,ndc--
(b) Criticism era the 3(c) is also valid. At present key slots are
reserved for approximately 20 representatives of each of the Services and 15
from State, These Service and State personnel are not on CIA pay roll. This
is a policy of the front office, and I am not sure that I like it. The Service
and State personnel consider their assignment to CIA as a two-year tour of
duty.
tt_
that
with fresh and enthusiastic ideas. Iv believe that eitUmustsdeLa new nnel
stroy pcontinuity,
It also means that too often replacements in these reserved slots are made
by selection of a Service or State representative with too little consideration
of the fact that there may be better qualified civilian personnel available.
When replacement is made from outside and not through promotion, it tends to
discourage CIA personnel who begin to see no futures tells me that
gradually more replacements will be made through promo ion an pointed out
that Mr. Carey will become Assistant Director of the Office of Operations,
succeeding General Sibert. 0 also claims that gradually the number of
these Service slots will be whittled down so that eventually it will be under
50, Unquestionably, there should be Service and State personnel in CIA, but
there is a question in my mind as to whether the present number is not too
large and the general brackets reserved for them too high.
(c) Personnel recruiting and turnover, At the moment, CIA is
below ceiling strength, and due to delay in security clearances there is no
immediate prospect of improvement. Kelly, Personnel Officer, is doing his best
but he has a number of problems, Clerical personnel at the moment presents
great difficulty and there seems to be considerable competition between present
Government departments and agencies and newly established agencies such as ECA.
This is the level in which there is the greatest turnover. It is also difficult
for Kelly to recruit for ORE, 00, and 0S0 as requirements are specialized,
For instance, 00 in the Foreign Documents and FBIB Branches require a great
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number of people with two or more language backgrounds, some intelligence
experience, and, in many cases, considerable area knowledge. As many of these
people are foreign horn, the security question is quite acute. I believe
that given time and working closer with the Operating Offices the recruiting
program will show improvement, as I think Kelly is competent and hard working.
The turnover figures are not as bad as I had expected. For the period 1 February
1947 through 30 April 1948, there were a total of 265 separations. This figure
does not include 060. During this same period, CIA added to its rolls
people through recruiting and the absorption of such outside units as the Map
Division of ORE. This figure is also ExOSO.
-4-
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