CONVERSATIONS IN MOSCOW

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP85M00364R002404770002-9
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
2
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 21, 2010
Sequence Number: 
2
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
December 5, 1983
Content Type: 
MEMO
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PDF icon CIA-RDP85M00364R002404770002-9.pdf86.92 KB
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/25: CIA-RDP85M00364R002404770002-9 % I December 5, 1983 MEMORANDUM TO: Ambassador Richard Murphy Assistant Secretary, NEA FROM: Ambassador (ret.) Robert G.. Neumann SUBJ: Conversations in Moscow Former Assistant Secretary State/NEA Harold Saunders and I went to Moscow November 27 - December 3, 1983 for one of the "Dart- mouth Conversations" sponsored by the Kettering Foundation. The American participants were former Assistant Secretary of State Harold Saunders and I, accompanied by two acedemic Soviet plus interpreters. Kettering and "Crisis Management" specialists and Rockefeller Foundations Leader of the Soviet Delegation was Academician Evgenie Primakov, former$oviet ambassador to Cairo and. high ranking advisor to the Soviet government whose authority was made very clear in several instances. Saunders and I suggested that it might be useful for us-- two meet confidentially with ranking Soviet officials. Those appointments, came through immediately (indicating,Primakov's connections) and were with the Director (gquivalent to Asst. Sec.) for Middle East Affairs, MFA . Polifkovr'1~puty Director International Department of the Central Committe CP-USSR Zaglatin. These are officials whom Ambassador Hartman dee.e-.~~et see. Weidebriefed Ambassador Hartman but only in general terms because we were meeting at a reception he gave in our honor in a non-secu location (Spasso House). While we were treated personally with great courtesy, the atmosphe was extremely tense. We were given a clear and unmistakable message which, because of circumstances, form and direction are, in my and Saunders' opinion to be taken seriously. We were told the following at first at lunch, later we were called out individually and given the message in calm but very serious tone by Primakov obviously acting -under instruction. This took place before the U.S. bombing attack on Syrian installations but in clear anticipation of such an event. The message: Don't hit the Syrians. If you do we shall have to and will escalate. We shall not be driven out of our presence in the Middle East and we shall give the Syrians what ever they need. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/25: CIA-RDP85M00364R002404770002-9 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/25: CIA-RDP85M00364R002404770002-9 SECRET You are escalating and we shall escalate. With specific reference to the Cuban missile crisis we were reminded of what the Russians said thereafter (you will never again find us in such a situation) and told that Syria was the only Soviet window to the Middle East and the Soviets would maintain it by whatever means needed. To this was added: Your and our forces are only a few miles apart. We both have difficult and at times difficult-to-control clients. In this situation an escalation can have uncontrollable consequences. 11A- v r 0 P- JJ4 L4 c 'k Yo J:e" \Nk -kr' r (rte LTIovt- d r i (~ aeor`, VtW4 Ndr 5', rior-t i e S"j rj a SECRET Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/25: CIA-RDP85M00364R002404770002-9