WHY TRUST CHINA NOW?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000706380001-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 2, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 8, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000706380001-0
ARTICLE APP
ON PAGE
NtW YUKK IlMtS
8 December 1985
Why Trust China Now?
By Leonard S. Spector
WASHINGTON
A S our intelligence agencies
struggle with the im-
plications of Larry
Wu-Tai Chin's 20
years of top-level
spying for China,
across town at the State Department
they're readying a celebration: The
long-might United States-China nu-
clear trade pact, under which we will
give China technology and materials
for nuclear power, is about to become
a reality.
In its current form, as the Adminis-
tration has acknowledged, the accord
is unverifiable. China has refused to
permit the International Atomic
Energy Agency to keep track of
American nuclear exports or to allow
comprehensive American inspec-
tions. Instead, the agreement gives
Washington the vague right to
"visits" and "exchanges of informa-
tion" - but not a program of system-
atic accounting required in all other
agreements with nations that import
nuclear materials from ins, including
Britain and France.
In essence, this means trusting
China's word that it won't misuse
American nuclear transfers. With our
Government accusing China of 20
Leonard S. Spector is senior associate
at the Carnegie Endowment for Inter-
national Peace and author of "The
New Nuclear Nations," an annual re-
port on the spread of nuclear weap-
ons.
years of deceit - deceit that continued
even as the nuclear deal was being ne-
gotiated - unqualified reliance on such
assurances hardly seems warranted to.
day, if it ever was.
A resolution conditionally endorsing
the accord was passed by the Senate be-
fore the spy scandal broke and is
shortly to be adopted by the House. it
demands no new verification conces-
sions from China but merely calls on
the President to certify that China has
accepted "effective" verification
mechanisms - without setting clear-
cut standards. Unfortunately, the Ad-
ministrationis on record as stating that
existing arrangements are already
adequate to protect our interests.
More than potential Chinese nu-
clear chicanery is at stake. The sensi-
tive nuclear pact has been treated by
both sides as a key barometer of
United States-China relations. In the
immediate aftermath of the spy scan-
dal, Washington's stand on the accord
may be the single most important in-
dicator of how seriously it views
China's spying exploits. President
Reagan's fist-shaking at the spies in
our midst seems like so much bluster
now that he has decided to continue
business as usual with China on the.
highly visible nuclear issue.
There is also the question of can-
dor. Only days before China's
activities were revealed in the press
- at a time when they were ce
rtainly
known to senior Central Intell
igence
Agency and Justice Department offi.
cials - key members of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee were
briefed by the C.I.A. On the basis of
That briefing, the committee ex-
pressed its support for the nuclear
agreement. Did the committee learn
of China's spying activities at the
briefing and decide to endorse the
agreement anyway? Or was this in-
formation withheld because it would
upset the nuclear deal?
Technically, the nuclear accord is
not a treaty. It becomes effective au-
tomatically once it has been before
Congress for 90 days of "continuous
session," a period that will end
tomorrow night. Disapproval by a
majority of each house of Congress
could have stalled the agreement. But
this is highly unlikely to happen be-
fore the deadline expires. The Presi-
dent could also have withdrawn the
agreement on his own and resubmit-
ted it after America had made clear
its displeasure with the Chinese. But
he too has declined to act.
Why has Washington accepted an
unverifiable nuclear pact and under-
mined the President'i antispying cru-
sade in the bargain? Because Wash-
ington's real concern is to strengthen
ties with a potential anti-Soviet ally -
despite the damage to other United
States interests.
There's still one last chance to im-
prove the pact. The actual delivery of
nuclear materials is still months
away; and tomorrow, the Senate will
consider an amendment by Senator
John Glenn that would require truly
effective safeguards before exports
are allowed. Will the Senate seize this
initiative? Or will it casually give
China a vote of confidence barely two
weeks after Mr. Chin's arrest? ^
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000706380001-0