...WHY NOT TRY DIPLOMACY INSTEAD?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000706300003-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 2, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: March 19, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP90-009658000706300003-6
NEW YORK TIMES
~~P ~ 19 March 1986
...Why Not Tr
Y
:Diplomacy Instead?
By Wayne S. Smith
W~ISHINGTON - The United
States' choices in Nicaragua are not,
as the Administration asserts, be-
tween aiding the "contras" and see-
ing the whole region engulfed by
Communism. There are alternatives,
if wee would but grasp them. Among
the rnost promising are the efforts of
moss Latin American countries to
produce a diplomatic solution.
Meeting in Caraballeda, Venezue-
la, on Jan. 11 and 12, eight major
countries -Mexico, Venezuela, Co-
lomt~ia, Panama, Argentina, Brazil,
Pen. and Uruguay -agreed on steps
to revitalize the Contadora process.
Two days later, five Central Amer-
icanstates pledged their full support.
Believing that the United States'
aid to the contras and its refusal to re-
RE:vive the
Contadora
process
sumo bilateral negotiations with the
Sancinistas were two of the principal
obstacles to a settlement, on Feb. 10,
the Foreign ministers of eight Latin
American countries converged on
Was'~ington to urge Secretary of State
George P. Shultz to halt aid and re-
turn to the negotiating table.
Mr. Shultz refused, and the Presi-
dent showed his outright disdain for
the ::-atin American effort by going
ahead with his request for $100 mil-
lion in contra aid -aid that the Con-
tadora countries regard as totally in-
com ~atible with their own peace ef-
fort. Colombia's foreign minister la-
bele'I President Reagan's action "in-
transigent and extreme." The presi-
dents of several other countries said
the ;aid request was a mistake that
would produce tragic results.
The United States is now virtually
isolated on this issue. With the possi-
ble exceptions of El Salvador, Para-
guay and Chile, no Latin American
' country supports our contra policy.
Even Honduras is threatening not to
allow any more aid to be shipped
across its territory. In the face of this
united opposition, the best the Admin-
istration can do is to claim that the
Wayne S. Smith is adjunct professor
of Latin American studies at the
Johrs Hopkins University School of
Advanced International Studies.
Latin Americans say one thing in pub-
lic, quite ahother in private.
Even if that were true, it would
leave Washington in the dubious posi-
tion of basing policy on something
whispered furtively and off the
record. Few, however, believe it is
true. As Representative Michael D.
Barnes, Democrat of Maryland, put it
last week: "Every Latin American
government official I have talked to
has said the same thing in private
that they say in public: that is, they
disagree with our policy."
Only the Administration's intransi-
gence is blocking a Contadora agree-
ment, which would address all our se-
curity concerns. Managua has em-
phasized that it is ready to resume
talks at any time within the Conta-
dora context. It was prepared to sign
a Contadora agreement in September
1984 and would be prepared to do so
now provided Washington were still
willing to sign a protocol committing
itself to respect that agreement.
Obviously, Nicaragua cannot agree
to reduce its armed forces and send
home Soviet and Cuban military per-
sonnel unless the United States agrees
to matching steps in the area. But the
Administration refuses to take any ac-
tion unless the Sandinistas first sit
down with the contras and negotiate
the holding of new elections. To insist
on this as a condition is to b[~^
ProAres,_ s, or t e an inistas regard
the contras as tso ate mercenan s
organized by the entral Intelli?ence
A ene led b far too man National
Guar m t e Somoza re 'me and
re resenttn no one mst a tcara a.
Many o ervers in a United States
agree with that assessment. That's
one reason Congress does not want to
give the contras more aid.
The Administration is right about
one thing: national reconciliation is
needed in Nicaragua. The Contadora
countries recognize this and are
trying to bring about an internal dia-
logue. They do not, however, insist
that the contras be included; rather,
it would be between the Sandinistas
and the opposition parties in Nicara-
gua.
Would that the Latin Americans
could impel the Administration to a
solution in Central America as the
Filipinos did in the Philippines. Unfor-
tunately, the Administration has a far
greater capacity to gam up the works
in Central America. So long as it is sid-
ing the contras and refusing to associ-
ateitself with a Contadora agreement,
there can be no hope of a settlement.
Tragically, by so arrogantly blocking
the diplomatic initiatives of the very
countries it claims to be defending, the
Administration dooms them to contin-
ued turmoil and bloodshed. ^
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP90-009658000706300003-6